大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 53.4

53.4

疏「言六相者」下，第四列名略釋。先須總識其相。一「總相」者，一含多德故。二「別相」者，多德非一故。三「同相」者，多義不相違故。四「異相」者，多義不相似故。五「成相」者，由此諸義緣起成故。六「壞相」者，諸緣各住自性，不移動故。列名，皆是論文。「此標」下，疏參釋之。欲分主客，先一時出論。論云「總者是根本入，別者餘九入。別依止本，滿彼本故。同相者，入故。異相者，增相故。成相者，略說故。壞相者，廣說故。如世界成壞。餘一切十句，隨義類知。」釋曰：其中有疏，可以意得。疏「九相漸增」者，疏釋。如攝入是聞慧，思義入是思慧。後後勝前，故以漸增為不相似。言「攬九緣成一」者，成一入故。言「分一作九」者，九義不同，總入隨之，故無別一也。然準遠公，成壞二門因上異相而有故。言成是略者，以彼異中聞思修等體不相應，是故隨彼九入復成一入，故名為略。壞是廣者，以彼異中聞等九種義不同故，總入隨之，分以為九，故云廣也。亦可總則攬別而成，別則分總為別。同則別，別帶總；異則別，別互乖。成則雙攬，同異方成。若無異相，總不成故。如舍椽梁總皆相似，終不成舍。壞則唯別，各住自性故。此三對歷然不同。疏「又云如世界」下，論喻成壞。從「猶如」下，即疏釋論。謂三輪四大等，即成剎之緣起，攬為娑婆，故名為成。就一分為百億四天下，無別娑婆，稱之為壞，非如世界二十劫成、二十劫壞。疏「亦如梁」等下，第五以喻總釋，即賢首意。疏「餘一切十句」下，第六舉例遍釋，即論文也。疏「別章廣顯」者，即第七指廣在餘，即賢首教義分齊。彼唯三門：一教興義、二列名略釋、三問答料揀。前之二門上已具竟，今但明問答寄就一舍之上辨，其六相例法可知。問：何等是總相？答云：舍是總相。問：此但椽等，何者是舍？答：椽等即是舍，獨能作舍故，離即不成。若爾，未有瓦等應即是舍。若未有瓦等不是椽故，以無瓦等，對何說椽？若諸緣共出少力共作、不全作者，有斷常過。但諸少力不成一全舍故，舍則斷也。不成執有，是無因常。今去一椽，即非全舍，明椽全成椽即舍也。由此全成，便令此椽即瓦栿等，以去於椽即舍便壞，則瓦栿等亦皆壞故。故此諸緣皆即是椽，舍方善成。一緣既爾，餘緣亦然。故緣起法不成則已，成則圓融。第二別相者，椽等諸緣別於總故，若不別者，總義不成，由無別時則無總故。是故即以總為別也。問：若總即別，應不成總。答：由即別故，故得成總。如椽即舍，故名總相；舍即是椽，故名別相。若別不即舍，不是椽故；若舍不即椽，不是舍故。若不相即，總在別外，即非總也；別在總外，即非別也。問：若不別者，復有何過？答：有斷常過。謂若無別，即無椽等，舍不成故。無而執有，無因常故。下之四相，各有斷常，可以意得。第三同相者，椽等諸緣和合作舍，不相違故，皆名舍緣，非作餘物故。若不同者，諸緣相背則不同，作舍則不成。與總何別？答：總相唯望一舍，同則諸緣互望，成力義齊。第四異相者，椽等諸緣隨自形類相差別故。問：異應不同。答：由相各異、長短等殊，方為舍緣，同力成舍。此與別何異？別相諸緣別於一舍，異則諸緣自互相望。第五成相者，由此諸緣，舍義得成故。由成舍故，椽等名緣。不爾，二俱不成。問：現見諸緣各住自性，何因得成？答：由不作舍，舍方得成。以若作舍，失本緣故，舍不得成。今由不作，諸緣現在，故舍得成。又若不作舍，椽不名緣。今既名緣，明知作舍。第六壞相者，椽等諸緣各住自法，本不作故。若作舍者，即失本法，舍則不成。由不作故，舍得成也。又總即一舍，別即諸緣，同即互不相違，異則諸緣各別，成則諸緣辦果，壞則各住自法。乃為頌曰：一則是多為總相，多即非一是別相，多類自同成於異，各體別異顯於同，一多緣起理妙成，壞住自法恒不作。唯智境界非事識，以此方便會一乘。六相之義，略已終矣。

In the Commentary, from "As for the six characteristics..." downward, is the fourth [section], which lists the names and briefly explains them. First, one must generally recognize their characteristics: 1. The "universal characteristic" (sāmānya-lakṣaṇa): because one encompasses manifold virtues. 2. The "particular characteristic" (viśeṣa-lakṣaṇa): because manifold virtues are not identical. 3. The "identical characteristic" (samāna-lakṣaṇa): because manifold meanings do not contradict one another. 4. The "differentiating characteristic" (vilakṣaṇa): because manifold meanings are not similar to one another. 5. The "integrating characteristic" (saṃsiddha-lakṣaṇa): because dependent origination is accomplished by means of these meanings. 6. The "disintegrating characteristic" (vyavasthāna-lakṣaṇa): because the various conditions each abide in their own nature and do not shift. Listing their names is entirely drawn from the treatise's text. From "This indicates..." downward, the commentary integrates and explains them. To distinguish host and guest, the treatise is first cited as a single whole. The treatise states: "The universal is the fundamental entry; the particular consists of the other nine entries. The particular relies upon the root and fulfills that root. The identical characteristic is due to entry. The differentiating characteristic is due to the increasing characteristics. The integrating characteristic is due to brief exposition. The disintegrating characteristic is due to extensive exposition. Just as the worlds form and disintegrate. All other tenfold statements should be understood by analogy according to their meaning." The subcommentary explains: In this, the commentary's meaning can be comprehended mentally. In the commentary, "the nine characteristics gradually increase" is the commentary's explanation. For instance, the entry of comprehension is the wisdom born of hearing, and the entry of contemplating the meaning is the wisdom born of thinking. Each subsequent one surpasses the preceding; therefore, gradual increase constitutes non-similarity. The statement "gathering nine conditions to form one" means forming a single entry. The statement "dividing one to make nine" means that the nine meanings differ, and the universal entry conforms to them, so there is no separate "one." However, according to Master Huiyuan, the two gates of integration and disintegration exist because of the above differentiating characteristic. Stating that integration is brief means that because, within differentiation, hearing, thinking, cultivating, and so forth are not inherently identical in substance, a single entry is newly formed in accordance with those nine entries; hence it is termed brief. Disintegration is extensive because, within differentiation, the nine meanings such as hearing differ; the universal entry conforms to them and is divided into nine; hence it is called extensive. Alternatively: the universal gathers particulars to achieve formation; the particular divides the universal into particulars. Identity means that each particular embodies the universal; differentiation means that the particulars mutually diverge. Integration requires gathering both: only through identity and differentiation is it accomplished. If there were no differentiating characteristic, the universal would not be formed—just as rafters and beams of a house, if entirely identical, would never form a house. Disintegration pertains solely to the particulars, because each abides in its own nature. These three pairs are distinctly different. In the commentary, from "It also says: like the world..." downward, the treatise uses a metaphor for integration and disintegration. From "Just as..." downward, the commentary explains the treatise: the three wheels, four great elements, and so forth are the dependent origination of forming a world-system (kṣetra), which, when gathered, form the Sahā world—hence it is called integration. Divided into ten billion four-continents, there is no separate Sahā world—this is termed disintegration; it does not refer to a world forming over twenty kalpas and disintegrating over twenty kalpas. In the commentary, from "It is also like beams..." downward, the fifth [section] generally explains through a metaphor, reflecting Xianshou's thought. In the commentary, from "All other tenfold statements..." downward, the sixth [section] provides examples for comprehensive explanation, which is the text of the treatise. In the commentary, "broadly revealed in a separate chapter" is the seventh [section], directing the reader to a broader treatment elsewhere, namely Xianshou's *Treatise on the Division of the Doctrines*. There, there are only three gates: 1. The arising and significance of the doctrine; 2. Listing the names and briefly explaining them; 3. Questions, answers, and analytical selections. The first two gates have already been fully detailed above; now we merely explain the questions and answers by examining them in reference to a single house, from which the six characteristics may be inferred for other phenomena. Question: Which is the universal characteristic? Answer: The house is the universal characteristic. Question: These are merely rafters and such; which one is the house? Answer: The rafters and the rest are precisely the house, because they alone can make the house, and apart from them it is not formed. [Objection:] If so, before there are tiles and such, [the rafters] should already be the house. [Answer:] If there are not yet tiles, they are not rafters, because in the absence of tiles and such, in contrast to what would they be called rafters? If the various conditions each contributed a small amount of force to act together, rather than acting entirely, there would be the errors of annihilationism and eternalism. Merely several small forces cannot form a single complete house; thus the house would be annihilated. Grasping it as existing when unformed would be causeless eternalism. Now, if one rafter is removed, it is no longer a complete house, which clarifies that the rafter completely forms the house—the rafter is the house. Because of this complete formation, this rafter is precisely the tiles, ridgepoles, and so forth; for if the rafter is removed, the house is immediately destroyed, and the tiles, ridgepoles, and so forth are also all destroyed. Therefore, all these conditions are precisely the rafter, and only then is the house successfully formed. Since one condition is so, the other conditions are likewise. Hence, with phenomena of dependent origination: if they are not formed, that is that; but if formed, they are perfectly interfused. Second, the particular characteristic: the conditions such as the rafters are distinct from the universal. If they were not distinct, the meaning of the universal would not be established, for when there are no particulars, there is no universal. Therefore, the universal itself serves as the particulars. Question: If the universal is precisely the particulars, it should fail to be the universal. Answer: Precisely because it is identical with the particulars, it can become the universal. Just as the rafter is the house, it is called the universal characteristic; the house is the rafter, so it is called the particular characteristic. If the particular were not identical with the house, it would not be a rafter; if the house were not identical with the rafter, it would not be a house. If they were not mutually identical: if the universal were outside the particular, it would not be universal; if the particular were outside the universal, it would not be particular. Question: If they were not particular, what further fault would there be? Answer: There would be the faults of annihilationism and eternalism. That is, if there were no particulars, there would be no rafters and such, and the house would not be formed. To grasp it as existing when non-existent would be causeless eternalism. The following four characteristics each have [their corresponding faults of] annihilationism and eternalism, which may be understood by extension. Third, the identical characteristic: the conditions such as rafters cooperate to form a house without conflicting; they are all called conditions of the house, not making other things. If they were not identical, the various conditions would oppose one another and not be identical, and making the house would not succeed. How does it differ from the universal? Answer: The universal characteristic looks solely to the single house; identity looks to the various conditions mutually, whose potency and function are equal. Fourth, the differentiating characteristic: the conditions such as rafters are differentiated from one another according to their own shapes and categories. Question: If differentiating, they should not be identical. Answer: Precisely because their characteristics each differ and lengths vary, they can serve as conditions for the house and with combined strength form the house. How does this differ from the particular? In the particular characteristic, the various conditions are distinct in relation to the single house; in differentiation, the various conditions are distinct in relation to each other. Fifth, the integrating characteristic: by means of these conditions, the meaning of the house can be achieved. Because the house is formed, rafters and the rest are termed conditions. Otherwise, neither would be established. Question: One sees directly that the various conditions each abide in their own nature; through what cause is it integrated? Answer: Through not acting as a house, the house can be achieved. For if they acted as a house, they would lose their original conditionhood, and the house could not be formed. Now, through not acting, the various conditions remain present, and thus the house can be formed. Furthermore, if they did not form the house, the rafters would not be called conditions. Since they are now called conditions, it is clear that they make the house. Sixth, the disintegrating characteristic: the conditions such as rafters each abide in their own phenomenon and fundamentally do not act. If they were to act as the house, they would lose their original phenomenon, and the house would not be formed. Because they do not act, the house can be formed. Furthermore, the universal is the single house; the particular is the manifold conditions; identity is mutual non-conflict; differentiation is the distinctness of each condition; integration is the conditions accomplishing the result; disintegration is each abiding in its own phenomenon. Thus the verse says: / One being many is the universal characteristic; / Many being not one is the particular characteristic. / Manifold types, being inherently identical, accomplish differentiation; / Individual substances, being differentiated, reveal identity. / Dependent origination of one and many is subtly accomplished in principle; / Disintegration abides in its own phenomenon, ever non-acting. / It is an object of cognition alone, not of sense consciousness; / Through this expedient means, one accords with the One Vehicle. / The meaning of the six characteristics has now been briefly concluded.