大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 58.40

58.40

Second, the dual arising of kindness and compassion. Under the commentary's "the three contemplations in the preceding [section] constitute three parts," the commentary text has two parts: first it clarifies the three contemplations, and next it states that they constitute the meaning of upāya. In the former, this refers to the *Vijñaptimātratā*: "True bliss is inherently existent, yet through loss one is unaware of it. Deluded suffering is inherently empty, yet upon obtaining it one does not awaken." Among the three parts, the first is that true bliss is inherently existent; the second is that deluded suffering is inherently empty; the third is being unawakened and unaware. However, the first among these is precisely the naturally pure nirvāṇa. The explanation below states: "It is only attained after three [asaṃkhyeya] kalpas because only then does one begin to tally with it." Thus, it can be called the bliss of realizing nirvāṇa; being the quintessence among blisses, it is called "supreme." Being exceedingly superior with nothing exceeding it, it is called "foremost." Because it possesses great beneficial meaning, it is called "arthavat" (possessing meaning/benefit). The commentary's text below explains this in terms of what is realized. The second is being fully endowed with the suffering of saṃsāra. Under the commentary's "merely losing true bliss," it clarifies that it constitutes upāya. Within this there are two parts: first, establishing the principle to reveal the fault; second, directly clarifying that which arises. In the former, stating "they are already pitiable" shows that each subsequent one is deeper than the preceding. Previously, merely losing bliss made them worthy of compassionate pity; all the more so when they are further endowed with all sufferings, and thus must be rescued. How much more so when they are doubly deluded concerning those two dharmas—deluded, mistaken, and inverted—positing bliss where there is suffering, and positing suffering where there is bliss! Therefore, deluded suffering increases, making it difficult to return to true bliss, which is described as having no term for reverting to the origin. Next, under "because of the first contemplation," it specifically clarifies that which arises, which is readily understood. Regarding "first generally indicating the arising of mindfulness," the bodhisattva, relying on the previous faith and understanding of the Buddhadharma, is mindful of the extreme profundity of the Dharma. Because it is extremely profound, sentient beings lose it. Because they lose this profound bliss, they are worthy of pity. Regarding the commentary's "1. Profundity of quiescence," the treatise at once lists the nine names, and only afterward re-explains them. In explaining the first, it says: "'Quiescent' means being free from falsely imputing real existence, because of the correct grasping of false imputation." The commentary separates this into two sentences to explain it: taking the first sentence as a direct explanation of quiescence, and from "this is naturally false imputation" downward, it takes the latter sentence as an antithetical explanation. Under "quiescence," it cites the *Madhyamakaśāstra* to substantiate the above two meanings, which is in the thirteenth chapter, "Examination of Saṃskāra" (Examination of Conditioned Formations), in the second fascicle. Initially, the Hīnayāna asks: "As stated in the Buddha's sūtra, 'that which is deceptive and falsely grasped as marks—because all conditioned formations are falsely grasped, they are termed deceptive.' What is called the supreme real is precisely nirvāṇa. Deceptive false imputation is precisely the mark of deception. How can you say that everything is empty?" Therefore, Nāgārjuna replied with this verse. The first half directly answers: since there is nothing grasped, it is the meaning of emptiness. The second half explains the previous verse: the Buddha's stating "deceptive and falsely grasped" is precisely expounding emptiness; if it were not empty, it would not be called falsely grasped, but should be called real. Therefore, only the first half is used here to substantiate "the correct grasping of false imputation" in the present treatise. Regarding the commentary's "this single apophatic definition (apoha)," it shows that the second is cataphatic. Moreover, the first is freedom from delusion, and the second reveals the essence of phenomena; for this reason the treatise says: "Because dharma and artha are definite." Regarding the commentary's "meaning that the essence of the one mind is quiescent," this reflects the intention of the *Awakening of Faith*. In that treatise's "Section on Formulating the Meaning," it says: "Mahāyāna, generally speaking, has two kinds: first, dharma; second, artha (meaning/attribute)." Thus, the present treatise says: "Because dharma and artha are definite." In that treatise's explanation of dharma, it states: "That which is called 'dharma' refers to the mind of sentient beings; this mind subsumes all mundane and supramundane dharmas. Relying on this mind, the meaning of Mahāyāna is revealed. Why? Because the mark of the tathatā of this mind displays the essence of Mahāyāna; because the mark of the causes and conditions of arising and ceasing of this mind can display the essence, characteristics, and functions of Mahāyāna itself." The subcommentary explains: The commentary now stating "the one mind subsumes both gates and is called quiescent in essence" directly adopts the previous "the mark of the tathatā of this mind is the essence of Mahāyāna," in accord with the sūtra's quiescent cessation. When it states "the two gates are also quiescent," the two gates belong to the "Section on Explanations." However, within this "Section on Formulating the Meaning," the dharma just cited already possesses the two gates: the tathatā gate reveals the essence of the one mind, while the gate of arising and ceasing generally reveals the three greatnesses. Yet the explanation in that treatise states: "That which is called 'artha' refers to the greatness of essence, the greatness of characteristics, and the greatness of functions." Now, wishing to clarify that the two gates are already complete within the "Section on Formulating the Meaning," it therefore says that the two gates already constitute the artha; this is the rationale for the all-inclusive mind. Thus, it clarifies that the three greatnesses are merely the meaning of the gate of arising and ceasing, whereas the meaning of the two gates is broader. The three greatnesses and two gates have been frequently cited above. Regarding the commentary's "3. Remedying the obstacle of false discrimination," there are multiple approaches to explaining these three, as in the Sixth Ground below. Master Huiyuan states: "Discrimination is false thought. The characteristics of the mind's essence are the phenomenal marks produced by discrimination. Grasping and rejection mean grasping and rejection based on discrimination: in favorable conditions, through craving and seeking, one wishes to grasp; in contrary conditions, through aversion and turning away, one wishes to reject. It can also be explained according to the three natures: discrimination is the parikalpita (imputed nature), as it is orally translated as the discriminative nature; marks are the paratantra (other-dependent nature); and grasping and rejection mean grasping the true pariniṣpanna (consummated nature)." Now, remedying attachment to the three natures brings about the three naturelessnesses, and thus they constitute the three gates of liberation; the words "extreme profundity" are omitted for brevity, so the third is called extreme profundity of emptiness, the fourth extreme profundity of signlessness, and the fifth extreme profundity of wishlessness. Regarding the commentary's "6. Clarifying the contemplation of separation from defilement," below there are three contemplations that remedy the obstacles of the three paths. This remedies the obstacle to the path of realization: that is, attaining the true path of realization, which brings false thoughts to an absolute end. Cognition directed toward objects is called defilement; true cognition is distinct from that, hence it is called "separation." Taking non-attainment as the upāya is called true upāya. It also concurrently reveals the path of upāya and the subsequent non-abiding [path], thus making four paths. Regarding "namely, the non-abiding path," with the great mind of self-benefit one does not abide in saṃsāra, and with the vast mind of benefiting others one does not abide in nirvāṇa. The treatise text only says "thus unsurpassed," yet the meaning explained in the treatise is precisely the present commentary's second contemplation of being fully endowed with all sufferings. Regarding the commentary's "however, the twelve links," the intention is revealed through question and answer. The question's intent is readily understood. From "karma and affliction are the causes of suffering" downward, the answer has two meanings: this is taking the causes along with the results and naming them suffering, hence in the Sixth Ground they entirely belong to the tree of suffering; second, from "furthermore, the two are fluctuating" downward, karma and afflictions are saṃskāras, and saṃskāras are the five aggregates, whose essence is suffering. Because motion entails suffering, it cites the *Awakening of Faith* as proof, which is the first of the three subtle marks: "First is the karmic mark of avidyā. Because the mind moves in reliance upon non-enlightenment, it is named karma. When enlightened it does not move; when it moves there is suffering, because the result is not separate from the cause." The subcommentary explains: The commentary's intention means that even the most subtle of the subtle is suffering in its very mark, how much more so the coarse! Master Huiyuan also says: "Because the faults of suffering are heavy, they are highlighted in particular." Under the commentary's "the former is divided into two," the commentary text has three parts: first, dividing into two; under "therefore the treatise master," citing proof for the division into two; third, under "wishing to reveal the former three," setting forth the reasons for dividing into two. There are subtly two meanings: first, relying on cause and effect, the former three are divided as causes. Consciousness has two meanings: as a cause it belongs to the former, and as a result it belongs to the latter; therefore, even after the former three are finished, it still speaks of the "latter ten," because consciousness is a result. Second, from "also reveals" downward, there is another meaning, which also comes to resolve an objection. That is, someone asks: The former three are causes, and causes are in one place. Among the latter ten, the causes of craving, grasping, and becoming—how can they be together with the results? Therefore, there is this intention, which is to differentiate it from the *Vijñaptimātratā*. The *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* states: "The ten causes and two results are definitely not in the same lifetime. The former seven and subsequent three may be the same or different; the two, three, and seven are each definitely in the same lifetime." "Two" means birth and old age and death; "three" means craving, and so forth; "seven" means the preceding seven. Here, the preceding two and three belong to the past, and the subsequent seven and eight belong to the present. That is, the preceding seven links are not definitely in the same lifetime, hence it says "allowing different lifetimes." As for Master Huiyuan, he resolves craving and so forth as causes, saying: "Because they increase future results of suffering, they are placed together with results. If so, why are the former three not spoken of following the latter as suffering? He answers: They have already arisen in the past, so cause and effect are determined." Although there is this resolution, the present commentary says: "It is not merely that cause and effect must be divided into two; it is to reveal that the former seven can be divided into two." Regarding "summarizing suffering in terms of result," this explains the treatise master, clarifying that his summarizing of the faults is explained together with the latter ten links. The general meaning is readily understood. Under the commentary's "generally speaking, wrong views," the commentary text is divided into two: first, explaining wrong views; next, explaining the mind's falling. In the former, it first directly clarifies, and next cites proof. Now for the first: Wrong views are of two kinds: first, coarse; second, subtle. The coarse denies cause and effect; the subtle engages in deduction outside principle. Coarse is also termed specific; subtle is also termed general; being general, it extends to all afflictions. Here, it is both general and subtle, neither specific nor coarse. Under the commentary's "The *Nirvāṇa [Sūtra]* also states," the second is citing proof, which is from chapter 35, the "Bodhisattva Kāśyapa Chapter," occasioned by explaining the three kinds of speech such as speaking according to one's own intention. The text states: "Good son! The Tathāgata sometimes expounds immeasurable dharmas for the sake of a single dharma. As stated in a sūtra, 'All pure conduct is entirely subsumed under good spiritual friends.' As I have stated, 'All evil conduct has wrong views as its cause; although the causes of all evil conduct are immeasurable, if one speaks of wrong views, they are entirely subsumed.'" The subcommentary explains: Evil conduct extends to all karma and afflictions; hence it says that all afflictions are entirely subsumed by wrong views. Under the commentary's "it is originally within it, so how can it be called falling?" the second explains the phrase "the mind falls." It also resolves an objection; the above is the wording of the objection. Afflictions are beginningless, so how could there be an initial falling? If there is an initial falling, then there must have been a time when one had not yet fallen into wrong views. From "here there are two meanings" downward, the answer has two meanings: The first meaning is easy to understand: namely, within a single body, when body and mind are limpid and quiescent, a transient thought suddenly arises, which is named "falling." From "second, in terms of delusion regarding the true" downward, it directly resolves the objection regarding the absence of afflictions. The true is that which is deluded; the false is that which deludes. Since that which deludes exists, its meaning is like falling; therefore, both the false and the true are beginningless. Regarding the statement "mutually dependent and devoid of intrinsic nature," it discards both the true and the false. Regarding "mutually dependent," relying on the true, the false arises; dependent on the false, the true is spoken of. If that which deludes did not exist, that which is deluded would not be established, so how could the true exist? Relying on the true there is the false, hence the false has no intrinsic nature. Dependent on the false the true is spoken of, so how could the true be definitively existent? Therefore, it is said that they are mutually dependent and devoid of intrinsic nature, so both subject and object are empty. From "if the true were definitively existent" downward, it antithetically establishes that the meaning of the true is free from the false. If one speaks of the true having a definite intrinsic nature, it would be a true outside of phenomena. From "if so" onward, an objection is raised following upon this reasoning. It challenges the above meaning of mutual dependence and lack of intrinsic nature: like the false's lack of intrinsic nature, it should be possible to sever it. From "the false can definitely be severed" downward, it answers. Above, based on their difference, the objection urged that it could be severed; now, based on their non-identity, the answer is that the true cannot be severed. Just as waves and wetness are mutually dependent, yet the wave can be extinguished while the wet nature is not destroyed. Being neither identical nor different, both the true and the false are established; this is one meaning. From "the true that is not empty" downward, there is another meaning. The above true that depends on emptiness is identical to the false; the non-empty true nature is not posited in opposition to the false. That this emptiness and existence are neither identical nor different is precisely what makes it the subtly wondrous true. Fearing endless objections, it concludes below: "Simply empty false attachments, and you will naturally see the source of truth. If discriminations do not perish, they all turn into deluded afflictions." This refers, for instance, to Dharma Master Fuli's posing a question: "The true nature of phenomena is originally pure; from what do deluded thoughts arise? If it is granted that the false is born from the true, how can this false ever cease? Without a beginning, there is no end; having an end, there should be a beginning. Being beginningless yet having an end, I have long harbored bewilderment at this principle. I pray that you unlock the secret, and analyze it so that we may transcend birth and death." Now, the final line of the commentary directly reveals the secret; thus, one should generally reply to his question: "Deluded regarding the true, deluded thoughts arise; awakening to the true, the false ceases. That which deludes is not that which is deluded; how could they be completely similar? Since one has never awakened from the beginningless past, the false is said to be beginningless. Knowing that the false is originally the true itself—only this is the constant and eternal principle. If the discriminating mind has not perished, how can one transcend birth and death?" However, within the commentary's text, the principle is already complete; it merely says "beginningless." For those who have long harbored bewilderment at this principle, they draw analogies and raise objections from the phenomenal perspective of the characteristics of dharmas. Now it is said that the existence of the false is itself the true, which identically has neither end nor beginning. If explained discriminatively, there should be four propositions: the true principle has neither end nor beginning; deluded thoughts have no beginning but have an end; true cognition has no end but has a beginning; suddenly arising deluded thoughts have both an end and a beginning. If explained in terms of perfect interfusion, they identically have neither end nor beginning; since they have neither end nor beginning, they also do not have beginninglessness or endlessness. Only by extinguishing speech and severing thought can one tally with this mystery.