大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 67

English (machine translation) 67

Language: English

67.1

Expounded by the śramaṇa Chengguan of the Great Huayan Monastery on Mount Qingliang in the Tang

Fifth, the three paths are uninterrupted. In the commentary, "contemplation subsuming errors," etc., refers to the gate of mutual subsumption of afflictions and suffering in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi.

67.3

In the commentary, under "In the past, being deluded about the primordial limit," it distinguishes them according to strength and weakness. Past delusion about the primordial limit has great power in establishing birth and death; craving and grasping have great power in drawing effects. Second, under "From their roots and branches," it is a distinction between root and branch. Avidyā is the root and is spoken of in the past; craving and grasping are branches and are spoken of in the present. The former is according to function; the latter is according to essence. This is also as stated in the Abhidharmakośa under subsuming the extensive into the concise: "Three afflictions and two karmas; seven items are also called suffering; concise effects and concise causes; by the middle, the two can be inferred." Explanation: the upper two lines directly subsume the twelve under afflictions, karma, and suffering; the lower two lines resolve an objection. That is, someone asks: all being affliction, why is there only avidyā in the preceding extremity, whereas it is divided into craving and grasping in the middle extremity? All being suffering, why are there only two in the subsequent extremity, whereas the middle possesses five? Therefore, this resolution is provided: the two of the subsequent extremity are concise effects, and the one of the preceding extremity is a concise cause; by the five of the middle, one infers and knows the subsequent two; by the two of the middle, one infers the preceding one. To speak of them more extensively would be useless; it only presents conciseness and extensiveness, without giving the reasons for conciseness. The Vijñaptimātratā, however, has them.

67.4

In the commentary, under "If according to the two lifetimes," it is from the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, which explains the distinctions in the question and answer after 'capable of generating.' Therefore, in that treatise there is previously a question: For what reason is avidyā generally established for initiating karma, while craving and grasping are separately established at the stage of moistening karma? The answer states: Although all afflictions are able to initiate and moisten, at the stage of initiating karma the power of avidyā is predominant, because it possesses eleven superior matters, namely the objective support, etc., extensively as explained in the sūtra. At the stage of moistening karma, craving and grasping are especially predominant; craving is said to be like water that can irrigate and moisten, requiring frequent irrigations to sprout the shoot of becoming. Provisionally based on the beginning and the end, they are divided into two. Craving and grasping lack the sense of perfuming and initiating, so a single avidyā is established. Explanation: the above is all the text of the treatise; by comparing the treatise with the commentary, the extensive and concise can be known. However, that treatise's question has two meanings: first, asking about the difference in establishing names. All being affliction, why is avidyā established before, while craving and grasping are established later, and so forth? Second, asking why there is a difference between conciseness and extensiveness; hence it asks: Generally establishing avidyā, and separately establishing craving and grasping. Therefore, the answer below possesses two gates: first, answering the difference in establishing names, according to the gate of superiority and inferiority; later, under "requiring frequent irrigations," answering the second question about initiating karma and moistening karma, perfuming and not perfuming. This, then, brings out the reasons for conciseness and extensiveness. Regarding the eleven superior matters, the Pratītyasamutpāda-sūtra states: '1. Superiority of objective support, because it universally takes defiled and pure as objects; 2. Superiority of mental aspect, because it conceals the true and manifests the false; 3. Superiority of causal condition, because it is the root of afflictions and karma; 4. Superiority of equal arising, because it can equally initiate the dependent arising phenomena of capable of leading, that which is led, capable of generating, and that which is generated; 5. Superiority of changing states, because of the four changes of latent proclivity, entanglement, association, and unshared; 6. Superiority of erroneous conduct, because it initiates conduct of superimposition and deprecation based on the truths; 7. Superiority of manifestation, because its subtle self-characteristic universally operates in common characteristics of the agreeable and disagreeable; 8. Superiority of karma-action, because it performs the matter of being the basis of transmigration and performs the matter of obstructing quiescence; 9. Superiority of hindrance, because it hinders superior dharmas; 10. Superiority of concomitant operation, because it still operates up to the peak of existence; 11. Superiority of antidote, because it is countered by two kinds of wondrous cognitions.' Therefore, the others are not said to also be links that initiate karma. The words "provisionally based on the beginning and the end" mean that dividing craving and grasping into two is based on craving being first and grasping being later, because craving is the beginning and grasping is the end. In reality, there are many active manifestations that moisten.

67.5

In the commentary, "Karma also has two: already moistened and not yet moistened," etc., is also from the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, as explained in the first chapter.

67.6

Where the commentary says, 'It is said that none of the three paths is ever interrupted,' below, this also resolves the difficulty concerning a beginning and an end, revealing that there is neither beginning nor end. First, it explains it directly; next, it cites corroborating evidence. In the former, as for 'from the three afflictions the two karmas are produced,' from the one [affliction], avidyā, the one karma, saṃskāra, is produced; and from the two, tṛṣṇā and upādāna, the one karma, bhava, is produced. As for 'the two karmas produce the seven sufferings,' it is because from the one karma, saṃskāra, the five beginning with vijñāna are produced; and from the one karma, bhava, jāti and jarāmaraṇa are produced. As for 'the seven in turn produce the three,' it is because the five sufferings beginning with vijñāna produce the two, tṛṣṇā and upādāna; and the two sufferings of jāti and maraṇa produce avidyā. The above [passage] says that because of not understanding, one transmigrates through birth and death. As for 'as Bodhisattva Śuddhamati [states],' that treatise corresponds with this, where the verse says: / 'Afflictions are the first, eighth, and ninth; / karma is the second and the tenth; / the remaining seven are said to be suffering; / the three encompass the twelve dharmas. / Because from the three, two are produced, / and from the two, seven are produced, / and from the seven, three are produced again, / therefore [it turns] like a wheel. / All mundane dharmas / are only cause and effect, without a person; / merely from dharmas that are empty, / empty dharmas are produced again in turn.' / If one relies on the Kośa, it likewise resolves the difficulty, for the treatise asks: 'If the links of dependent origination are only twelve, then without stating a fruition for jarāmaraṇa, birth and death ought to have an end. Without stating a cause for avidyā, birth and death ought to have a beginning. Or else one ought to posit further links of dependent origination, and beyond those there would be yet others, resulting in the fault of an infinite regress.' It answers: 'One ought not to posit further [links]. Yet there is not the former fault, for here the World-Honoured One has already revealed [the meaning] by virtue of the sense.' 'How is it already revealed?' The verse says: / 'From affliction, affliction and karma are produced; / from karma, things are produced; / from things, things and afflictions are produced; / in principle, the constituents of existence are only these.' / The explanation states: The first line has two [meanings]: first, from affliction, affliction is produced, meaning from tṛṣṇā, upādāna is produced; second, from affliction, karma is produced, meaning that upādāna produces bhava, and avidyā produces saṃskāra. The next line has one meaning, namely, from saṃskāra, vijñāna is produced, and from bhava, jāti is produced; these are all from karma, things are produced. The third line has two meanings: first, from things, things are produced, meaning vijñāna produces nāmarūpa, up to sparśa producing vedanā, and jāti producing jarāmaraṇa; second, from things, afflictions are produced, meaning vedanā produces tṛṣṇā, and in principle there should also be jarāmaraṇa producing avidyā. The upper word 'things' is the producing [cause], and the lower words 'things and afflictions' are the two produced [results]; the two words 'from... are produced' are applied twice. The fourth line concludes the explanation and answers the objection, meaning that of the constituents of existence there are only these twelve, and the principle is complete. The texts of the treatises cited above differ slightly, but their doctrinal purport is largely the same.

67.7

Where the commentary says, 'like two bundles of reeds,' it refers to cause and effect being mutually interdependent. This was already present in the first approach, but there it only concerned vijñāna and nāmarūpa being mutually interdependent; here it applies generally to the twelve links of dependent origination. However, the reason it must be called 'bundles of reeds' is that it also takes their being hollow inside: regarding the characteristics of the twelve links of dependent origination, that they exist is called arising, and that they are empty non-entities is called cessation. Arising and ceasing are conventional aggregations, which are also like bundles of reeds.

67.8

Where the commentary says, 'the mind that schematizes ascetic practices is itself affliction,' this is precisely wrong view, and it is also the adherence to views and ascetic precepts, and it is also a karma based on delusion. Because these defilements all belong to the truth of the origination of suffering, they are causes of suffering, not causes of liberation. This is also the cause consisting of past deeds [advocated by] outsiders, all as explained previously.

67.9

Where the commentary says, 'Within the contemplation of the cognition of all aspects, this is the fifth, the contemplation of entering the truths,' the commentary therefore has two explanations: the first is the primary intent of the treatise; the second, from 'Furthermore, the three paths are essentially...' onward, is the intent of Tiantai, which will be distinguished further below in the general conclusion.

67.10

Sixth: The Approach of Transmigration Across the Three Periods of Time. Within the initial contemplation of the truths according to characteristics, there are three parts: first, generally indicating the name of the contemplation; second, explaining the three periods; third, explaining the sūtra text.

67.11

Where the commentary says, 'The three periods are not the same,' below, this is the second, explaining the three periods. However, Vijñaptimātra divides it into four: First, narrating the intent. As for 'combining the projectors and the projected,' the first two are the projectors and the next five are the projected, which must belong to one lifetime. From 'ten causes' onward, 'directly establishing' all the way to 'and parting from annihilationism and eternalism,' are all treatise text. That 'the retribution in the next life is necessarily the same, but the retribution in subsequent lives differs' is an explanatory interpretation of the meaning. Third, from 'This merely by means of...' onward, concludes and establishes the treatise's intent. Hence that treatise next states, 'Setting up a twofold tier is truly useless, or else exceeding this would lead to an infinite regress.' The explanation states: as for 'infinite regress,' if out of delusion regarding the prior period one speaks of passing beyond two causes, there may be those who are deluded regarding the period prior to the prior, so two causes would still be too few and one should speak of even more. If one says that because of delusion regarding the subsequent period one speaks of two fruitions, there may also be those who are deluded regarding the period subsequent to the subsequent, so two fruitions would still be too few and one should speak of even more. Fourth, from 'If so...' onward, reconciles with that treatise and establishes the meaning of the three periods.

67.12

Where the commentary says, 'Second, relying on the Upadeśa,' below, this is the second explanation. As for 'opening up both the produced and the projected,' in the Kośa projected and produced are not spoken of, but now, in accordance with the Mahāyāna and in contrast to the Vijñaptimātra's combining the projectors and the projected, it is said that 'both are opened up.' Therefore it concludes by saying that the three paths run in parallel, meaning that avidyā and saṃskāra are themselves the producers, and it is not necessary that they first be moistened by tṛṣṇā and so forth before they are capable.

67.13

Where the commentary says, 'Third, relying on this sūtra,' and so forth, this is the third explanation, which is the meaning of there being three lifetimes in the Mahāyāna. That Vijñaptimātra judged the three [lifetimes] to belong to the Hīnayāna particularly contradicts the ultimate teaching. As for 'in order to negate that the former seven are definitely of the same lifetime,' this refers to the Vijñaptimātra above. As for 'in order to negate that tṛṣṇā and so forth are merely moisteners,' that which is negated is also the intent of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi. Here it is clarified that tṛṣṇā and so forth are identical with avidyā and saṃskāra, possessing both initiating and moistening, and so forth.

67.14

Where the commentary says, 'pointing out that the cause incurs the fruition to cause disgust with the cause,' it directly explains the reason for subordinating the cause to the fruition. It says that the faults of the fruition are due to the causes of tṛṣṇā and so forth, so one should feel disgust toward the causes. It also resolves a difficulty. Namely, someone might ask: 'The former two lifetimes are clarified according to their actual lifetimes; why should the future have its causes subordinated to the fruition?' The intent of the answer is evident.

67.15

Where the commentary says, 'then the projectors, projected, producers, and produced...' below, it concludes and indicates the original meaning. It means that the two projectors are admitted to include the producers, and within the producing tṛṣṇā and so forth there must be the projected five of the projectors that share in being what is produced. And as for saying 'they may mutually obtain,' it is because although three lifetimes are spoken of in the Mahāyāna, regarding the five fruitions, they encompass both seeds and actual manifestations: in terms of being seeds they are merely the projected, while in terms of actual manifestations they are precisely the produced. The unmoistened two are merely called the projectors, while the already-moistened two are called the producers. Tṛṣṇā and so forth that initiate karma are merely called projectors, while tṛṣṇā and so forth that have already moistened are called producers; hence 'they may all mutually obtain.'

67.16

Where the commentary says, 'the clear text is evident,' this concludes by criticizing the Vijñaptimātra; it is not that it does not permit its establishing the meaning of two lifetimes, but that accepting two and rejecting three is mistaken.

67.17

Where the commentary says, 'Having already understood...' below, this is the third part, explaining the sūtra text. Where the commentary says, 'Only in this way is it called seeing that past causes can prevent the three faults,' this is also warding off a difficulty. For there might be an objection saying: 'The sūtra merely says that the two are in the past; why does the treatise master reciprocally subordinate them?' Therefore it now answers: One must know that past causes can incur present fruitions, and present fruitions must be produced from past causes. Only then can one guard against faults such as [the doctrine of] past deeds, as will be explained below.

67.18

Where the commentary says, 'Because the present is witnessed before our eyes, it is divided into two directions to clarify its two meanings,' this also resolves an objection. Namely, someone might ask: 'Previously, the two causes of avidyā and saṃskāra were explained reciprocally only in relation to the present; now in clarifying the five dharmas of the present, they should also be reciprocal, so why are there two directions?' Therefore it now answers: For the previous two causes, the causes have passed away into the past, so one must speak of those causes in relation to the present; once the present fruition is established, only then does one know that those causes incurred the fruition without failure. The present now does not merely requite past causes, but can also, relying on the present, incur future fruitions; therefore it is clarified in two directions. If they were further made mutually complementary, it would not differ from the previous two. Again, one might object: 'Earlier, in speaking of avidyā, it was already said that present fruitions requite past causes; why is it now restated that these are past fruitions?' To this one should answer: Previously requiting the past was to establish the past; now speaking of past incurrence is to establish the present, so it is not redundant. For this reason, the two dharmas are clarified in two directions.

67.19

Where the commentary says, 'Because these future causes definitely obtain future fruitions, it is provisionally fixed,' the first phrase explains and establishes it, and it also resolves a difficulty. That is, someone might object: 'If the present tṛṣṇā and so forth are named future from their fruition, why are past avidyā and so forth not named present from their fruition?' Therefore it now answers: The future fruition has not yet arrived, so it is named future from its fruition. Knowing that it is definitely obtained causes one to generate disgust. The past cause has already passed away, so how could it be named present? Again, one might ask: 'If present tṛṣṇā and so forth are named future from their fruition, present vijñāna and so forth should be named past from their cause.' This is also as answered before: Future causes are definitely obtained, so they are named future from their fruition. The present is already obtained, so why must it be named past? Again, one might ask: 'In explaining the past and present above, there were reciprocal two directions; now in distinguishing the future, why is cause merely set against fruition?' Answer: The former two sūtra texts directly spoke of past and present without speaking of reciprocal establishment, so the treatise established them reciprocally. Now in this sūtra text, the sūtra itself sets the present against the future, so the treatise does not elaborate on it. As for 'provisionally fixed,' this concludes and establishes the meaning above. That is, speaking of one portion of the three periods is called 'provisional'; that the principle and reckoning are like this is called 'fixed.' In contrast to the successive unfolding below, it is called provisional, because it is an unidirectional principle.

67.20

Where the commentary says, 'Having already understood the three periods...' below, this is the second part, guarding against faults. Within this there are two parts: first, the faults; next, guarding against them. In the former, within each single fault, the text has three parts: first, indicating the name; second, investigating and explaining; third, distinguishing what they proceed from. What they proceed from is that the commentary indicates and explains the treatise: in both of the first two faults, the former looks toward the latter, while in the last one fault, the latter looks toward the former, because avidyā and saṃskāra precede retribution. First, the karma has already passed away and been lost before receiving retribution: the fruition is subsequent, looking back toward the preceding karma to constitute the fault.

67.21

Where the commentary says, 'The above distinguishes the faults...' below, this is the second part, clarifying the guarding. Within this there are four parts: first, concluding the preceding and asking about what follows; second, from 'If one sees...' downward, generally indicating the meaning of guarding; third, from 'However, past karma...' downward, bringing out the reason for the faults; fourth, citing the sūtra directly to guard against them. In the third there are two parts: first, generally clarifying karma that does not receive retribution; next, from 'Now avidyā...' downward, citing the present sūtra text to clarify karma that does receive retribution. In the first of these, as for 'first, unperformed,' these words are difficult to understand. For if it is not performed, it is not yet called karma; therefore we now rely on the Yogācāra[-bhūmi], where karma that has not been performed is called 'non-performance.' The ninth fascicle of the treatise says: 'As for non-performance of karma, it refers to karma without volition. If there is no volition, one does not give rise to bodily karma or verbal karma.' The explanation states: According to this non-performance, it is what arises spontaneously, without deliberate intention. Even if there were intention, but having had the intention one did not give rise to body and speech, it does not receive retribution. Therefore, in the explanation of manifested and unmanifested karma in the [Daśabhūmika-vyākhyā on the] Nine Bhūmis, it says: 'Action and non-action: action is body and speech; non-action is mind. As in killing, stealing, and so forth, although the mind desires to do it, it is not manifested in body and speech, so it does not receive retribution.' If complete non-performance were called not receiving retribution, why would it need to be stated? And how could the treatise say that 'there are three kinds of karma that do not receive retribution'? Because non-performance means there is no karma. Second, 'unmoistened' is understood. However, the treatise merely says 'performed but not yet having obtained retribution'; the word 'unmoistened' was added by the commentary's interpretation. Third, as for 'obtaining an antidote,' in the Yogācāra[-bhūmi] this is called 'non-increasing karma.' Non-increasing karma has ten kinds in all: 1. karma done in dreams; 2. karma done out of ignorance; 3. karma done without deliberate intention; 4. karma done without intense application and without frequency; 5. karma done in madness; 6. karma done in loss of mindfulness; 7. karma done without desire or pleasure; 8. karma that is intrinsically indeterminate; 9. karma impaired by remorse; 10. karma impaired by an antidote. These ten are called non-increasing karma. Apart from these ten kinds, all remaining karmas are called increasing.

67.22

Regarding the Commentary's line beginning with "Now, with ignorance conditioning formative action": second, adducing the present sūtra passage to explain the meaning of receiving retribution. Within this there are two parts: first, explaining directly; second, concluding with a response to the external objection. For the first: contrasting with the previous three [kinds of karma that] do not receive retribution. "'Now, with ignorance conditioning formative action' reveals that it has already been performed": this sets apart the first [kind], karma not yet performed. Since it is formative action initiated by ignorance, this formative action must certainly be capable of inducing future retribution; hence it is not karma of which one previously was unmindful.

67.23

Regarding the Commentary's line "The present five [factors], consciousness and the rest, reveal that it has already been moisturized and already experienced": the previous ignorance and formative action have already been completely moisturized, and therefore one now receives the fruit; thus the two past causes already subsume both initiation and moisturization.

67.24

Regarding the Commentary's line "The three [factors] of craving, grasping, and becoming show that it has not yet obtained an antidote": this means that if an antidote had been obtained, one should not, depending on the present, further give rise to craving and so forth. After this, there is further an inverse explanation in the treatise stating: "If one cuts off craving and grasping, even if there is the performance of karma, ignorance and formative action cannot give rise to becoming." Explanation: this reveals that in the present there are also ignorance and formative action that are what is moisturized, and so forth. Examining the intent of this treatise, the two past causes possess both initiation and moisturization, yet it mentions only the name of initiating karma; the present craving and so forth also possess both initiation and moisturization, yet it shows only the name of moisturization. Therefore, the commentary above says that each allows for the mutual presence [of both]; contemplate this. It is also possible that present craving and grasping do not moisturize past karma of subsequent retribution, and so cannot give rise to becoming.

67.25

Regarding the Commentary's line "Since in already performed karma there is the distinction between moisturized and unmoisturized, this constitutes a different cause": below is the second part, concluding with a response to the external objection. In the three faults established above, although the phrasing is concise, their general character is entirely due to having no different cause. A different cause is the self. Now it clarifies that it does not require a self to be a different cause: rather, having already been created, already been moisturized, and not having obtained an antidote constitute the different cause. These words come from the treatise after it states the faults. Having set forth the three faults, the treatise says: "These three kinds of faults are because, seeing a different cause such as past periods, there are distinctions such as receiving retribution in the next birth." Explanation: above, the treatise generally sets forth its faults and generally clarifies the answer to them. Now, having set forth the reasons for the faults, it only then uses this to conclude the response.

67.26

Regarding the Commentary's line beginning with "Once moisturized, one receives retribution in the next birth": fourth, directly clarifying the guarding against the faults. The three faults constitute three separate points. First: although a single body possesses karma of the six destinies, that which is moisturized is experienced first; how could it be simultaneous? This is taking having been moisturized as the different cause. Second, from "Since one has oneself created a different cause" onward guards against the second fault. The two retributions are retribution in the next birth and retribution in subsequent births; this is taking having already created as the different cause. Third, from "If already performed karma does not obtain an antidote" onward guards against the third fault; that is, taking not obtaining an antidote as the different cause. As for the phrase "because the force continues": in the Hīnayāna it is the sequential holding-together of later by later; in the Mahāyāna it is having been perfumed into seeds that can subsequently yield fruit; hence it is called "force." "The three faults are avoided": this is the conclusion.

67.27

Regarding the Commentary's line beginning with "Afterward, with the cessation of ignorance": reverse contemplation. Within this there are two parts: first, explaining the text; second, from "However, the twelve links are all complete in the three times" onward, concluding with the instruction. That is to say, the two past causes already contain craving and so forth that can moisturize karma, which must arise based on past consciousness and the rest, running through the faults of beginning in birth and ending in death, thus completing the twelve [links]. Arising initiation, moisturization, and so forth based on the present seven fruits, the present also has them complete. However, among the seven phenomena, five are just birth and death divided into general and particular; thus they are said to be seven. Although two are spoken of for the future, like the present they are also complete, because the two must possess the five and the initiating causes. Therefore, what was said above—that all allow for mutual presence—is entirely as previously stated. As for "Merely following the traces of conversion, hidden and revealed are divided into three to cause one to know the causal conditions of the faults" onward: this brings out the intention behind what is hidden and revealed, the meaning of which is as previously explained. From "Then ignorance loses its life" onward expresses the intent of reverse contemplation. Severing the afflictions that initiate karma with the sword of wisdom, and drying up the present craving and grasping that moisturize karma with the fire of wisdom, the seven sufferings do not arise. That which is capable of leading to birth and that which is led to birth are the four-sided net. This is as the *Shiji* records: "Tang went out and encountered a hunter praying: 'From heaven above, out of earth below, coming from the four directions—may all enter my net!' Tang saw this, opened three sides of the net, and prayed: 'May what can go up go up, what can go down go down, what can go east go east, what can go west go west, what can go south go south, and what can go north go north. Only those that defy my decree, enter my net!'" This revealed making the law broad. Now, it also does not leave a single side; hence it is said that all four are open. All emerge to realize non-arising, like birds leaving the net to roam freely in the eight directions.

67.28

Regarding the Commentary's line beginning with "Second, in terms of great compassion": within the text there are three parts: first, showing in the direct order that there is a cause; next, from "If there were no" onward, questioning in reverse to clarify that there is a subsequent [fruit]; from "This cause" onward, concluding that it is so.

67.29

Regarding the Commentary's line beginning with "The presence or absence of power": within the text there are three parts: first, citing the phrase; second, from "This means these three" onward, the commentary explaining the treatise; third, from "Thoroughly investigating in this manner" onward, concluding the contemplation. In the second there are three parts: 1. explaining the presence and absence of power; 2. from "By these three periods" onward, explaining the meaning of the basis for faithful entry; 3. from "Within transformation" onward, explaining superiority in transformation. The statement "encompassing the three periods only then reveals superiority in transformation" is also the distinction of dependent origination in the *Yogācāra*. Thus the *Yogācāra* says: "What is the distinction of dependent origination? It refers to ignorance regarding the prior period and so forth. As the sūtra explains in detail: What is ignorance regarding the prior period? It refers to giving rise to improper conceptualization regarding past formative forces and so forth, thinking: 'Did I exist in the past? Or did I not exist? What was my essential nature? What kind of being was I?'—whatever ignorance there is, and so forth." This is also what the *Kośa* says: "Speaking of the prior, posterior, and middle periods is to dispel others' delusion." Thus that treatise states: "Why do the sūtras only speak of sentient beings, which is why there is the above verse? Explanation: The World-Honoured One spoke of dependent origination solely with reference to sentient beings in order to dispel delusion regarding the three periods. Question: How are sentient beings deluded regarding the prior period? It refers to giving rise to such doubts regarding the prior period: 'Did I exist or not exist in past lifetimes? What kind of self did I have? How was my self?'" Explanation: Here there are three doubts: first, doubting the existence or non-existence of the self; second, doubting the essential nature of the self—whether the self is identical with the aggregates or separate from the aggregates; third, doubting the differentiation of the self—whether it is a permanent self or an impermanent self. "Question: How are sentient beings deluded regarding the posterior period? Answer: It refers to giving rise to such doubts regarding the posterior period: 'Will I exist or not exist in future lifetimes? What kind of self will I have? How will my self be?'" Explanation: The three doubts are as before, differing only in past and future. "Question: How are sentient beings deluded regarding the middle period? Answer: It refers to giving rise to such doubts regarding the middle period: 'What am I? How is this self? To whom do I belong? Who will belong to me?'" Explanation: Here there are four doubts. "What am I?" doubts the intrinsic nature of the self. "How is this self?" doubts the differentiation of the self. "To whom do I belong?" doubts the cause of the self; that is, from what cause in the past does this present self come? "Who will belong to me?" doubts the fruit of the self; that is, what fruit will belong to me in the future? "In order to eliminate such delusion regarding the three periods, the sūtras speak only of the dependent origination of sentient beings. For the sūtra states: 'Monks, listen attentively! If there is a monk who can see with correct wisdom as it truly is the phenomena that have already arisen through dependent origination, he will certainly not be deluded regarding the three periods, thinking: "Did I exist or not exist in the past?" and so forth.'" Explanation: Although the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna treatises differ, their import is entirely one. Now, since the three periods are devoid of a self, these delusions naturally perish; therefore, using the three periods to transform those ordinary beings, eliminate their ignorance of self, and cause them to faithfully enter selflessness and practice the conduct of selflessness constitutes superiority in transformation.

67.30

Seventh, the gate of the aggregation of the three sufferings. Regarding the Commentary's line beginning with "Fifth, the contemplation of revulsion toward that which is not reviled": first, explaining the contemplation; second, from "Within the text" onward, explaining the sūtra. In the former: first, directly explaining; second, from "Although the two vehicles know" onward, resolving the difficulty. Lest someone ask: "From the fourth dhyāna upward there is only the suffering of conditioning; since the three vehicles have already transcended this, why speak of not being revulsed?" Hence there is this resolution. This has two senses: first, with reference to absence within the realm, as the twelfth fascicle of the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra* states, "Suffering has immeasurable characteristics, which are not known by the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas"; second, including the suffering of transformation, meaning it is to exit the three realms definitively without remainder. Therefore, in the Commentary's direct presentation there are naturally three gates: 1. the gate of increase and decrease according to characteristics; 2. the gate of true principle pervading everywhere; 3. the gate of distinguishing by the three feelings. The upper two are the gates of distinguishing the three sufferings in the *Vijñaptimātratā*; the third is the gate of distinguishing by the three feelings. Citing the treatise to explain at length. For the first: this is the gate of increase and decrease according to characteristics. As for "producing suffering through contact": depending on the condition of suffering, a painful mind is produced; hence it is called the suffering of suffering. However, since its contact and feeling extend to all three feelings, speaking specifically of the suffering of suffering is stated according to its predominance, and is also for the purpose of reviling it. As for "aging and death destroying life": this wards off an external objection. Lest someone object, "In aging and death there is no pleasure; why call it the suffering of change?"—hence this explanation is made. Thus the suffering of change has two aspects: first, the destruction of pleasure; second, the destruction of karma. Truly being capable of destroying life is precisely the destruction of karma, and so it receives the name 'the suffering of change.'

67.31

Regarding the Commentary's line beginning with "If based on the Yogācāra and Vijñaptimātratā": second, citing the treatises to explain at length. Within this there are two parts: first, directly citing the treatises. This is in terms of the gate of true principle pervading everywhere, being the exact text of the *Vijñaptimātratā*, and the *Yogācāra* is the same as this.

67.32

Regarding the Commentary's line beginning with "If in terms of destroying life": second, reconciling and explaining using the Commentary. Within this there are four parts: 1. Reconciling the suffering of change, which is understandable. 2. From "If relying on neutral feeling" onward explains the above suffering of change. The mention of "eleven" is because aging and death are excluded. 3. From "Since these three sufferings arise from the three feelings" onward explains the completion of aging and death. The statement that there is no neutral feeling is precisely the gate of distinguishing by the three feelings. 4. From "Both sufferings are said to be partial" onward explains partial and complete. "That which is the two sufferings must be the suffering of conditioning": because all contaminated phenomena are momentary by nature. From "There are those that are" onward explains the two partial aspects, which has two senses: first, the two sufferings do not pervade neutral feeling, and hence are called partial; second, from "Moreover, these two sufferings" onward, change and the suffering of suffering do not mutually subsume each other, and moreover they lack neutral feeling; therefore, neither subsumes the other two, because within the suffering of change there is no painful feeling, and within the suffering of suffering there is no pleasurable feeling.

67.33

Regarding the Commentary's line beginning with "Second, in terms of great compassion": the text of the Commentary has four parts: 1. Generally explaining the name of the contemplation. 2. From "Those of true liberation" onward, adducing the correct to refute the heterodox. Within this there are two parts: first, citing the text of the treatise; second, from "These four are precisely nirvāṇa" onward, the Commentary explains the above treatise, matching bliss, permanence, virtue, and so forth in corresponding order. From "Therefore the Nirvāṇa says" onward only proves the fourth, because the characteristic of self is hidden. 3. From "Therefore the four passages below" onward reveals the false and adduces the correct. 4. From "Now this clarifies that" onward separately explains this gate.

67.34

Third, the contemplation of all characteristics. Regarding the Commentary's line "Not knowing as it truly is subtle suffering is self-pride": this is the text of the treatise. From "This is precisely excessive pride" onward, the commentary explains the above treatise. However, while the title in the treatise mentions excessive pride, there is none in its explanation; therefore the Commentary points out that in the treatise, self-pride is precisely excessive pride, being spoken of from its origin. From "If one knows" onward explains that it is not excessive pride. As for the statement "Moreover, not knowing as it truly is": the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra* states, "For śrāvakas there is suffering and there are the truths, but there is no ultimate reality."

67.35

Eighth, the approach of the production and cessation of causes and conditions. In the commentary's first contemplation, before the text there are three points: First, explaining the name of the contemplation—its two meanings are named profound: 1) because of non-arising, and 2) because arising and non-arising are without obstruction. Second, from 'This approach' downward, the second point points to the sūtra. Third, from 'Explaining these four phrases' downward, it extensively discerns the characteristics of meaning. Within this there are three: First, dual indication of the two sections. Second, from 'Erroneous reckonings outside the principle' downward, an overall explanation of the two sections. The words 'are reckonings and are reliances' mean: reckonings are the locus of refuting heterodoxy, and reliances are the locus of revealing the principle. 'Are medicines' refers to the capacity to refute heterodoxy. 'Are principles' refers to the capacity to reveal the principle. With respect to revealing the principle, the principle is what is revealed. Now, using 'non-' as the principle causes one to see the principle within self and so forth. Seeing the principle is caused by 'non-', and therefore 'non-' is taken as that which can reveal. Afterward, from 'Exhausting arising' downward, it demonstrates the efficacy of refutation and revelation. Third, from 'However, what is reckoned' downward, it individually explains the two sections. First, in refuting heterodoxy, there are two: first the reckonings, then the refutations. The reckonings are of three kinds: Ordinary people and the Small Vehicle, as spoken before in the Yāma verse. Second, the Small Vehicle. The term 'cause of the same type' means that cause and effect are similar; as virtuous five aggregates and virtuous five aggregates mutually related turn by turn serve as causes of the same type. The term 'retribution cause' is solely because of the mutual relation between unvirtuous and defiled virtuous [dharmas]. The term 'coexistent cause' is as the four great elements mutually related serve as coexistent causes. Third, in terms of the Great Vehicle, there are inherently three meanings: the former two apply to both the Dharma-Characteristics and the Markless schools; the latter one is the Dharmatā school. All cling to dharmas so as to form afflictions, and thus all become what is refuted. Their characteristics should be known when reaching the revelation of the principle.

67.36

In the commentary, from 'Although what is reckoned is manifold' downward, the second part explains the refutation. It merely points to revealing the principle as that which can refute, because they share the same 'non-'.

67.37

In the commentary, from 'Revealing the principle is again twofold' downward, the second part reveals the principle, first indicating and then explaining.

67.38

The commentary states: 'Because dharmas are from conditions, they do not arise from self': this is spoken with respect to the aforementioned effect dharma being the 'self' and the manifold conditions being the 'other'. It applies to two treatises. First, it applies to the Madhyamakaśāstra. Piṅgala explains not arising from self, saying: 'The myriad things do not arise from their own essence; they must depend on manifold causes and conditions. Furthermore, if they arose from their own essence, then a single dharma would have two essences: one called the arising, and the second called that which causes arising. If apart from remaining causes it arose from its own essence, then there would be neither cause nor condition. Moreover, arising would have yet further arising, and arising would be infinite.' Explanation: According to this, it takes the essence of the effect to be 'self'. Second, it applies to the Abhidharmasamuccaya. It first clarifies non-arising in the three phrases, and afterward discerns that it does not obstruct the three makings. First it says: 'That they do not arise from self means that all dharmas are not made by oneself, because when they have not yet arisen they have no intrinsic nature.' Explanation: This explanation agrees with the intent of Piṅgala. The treatise says: 'That they do not arise from other means that those conditions are not the agent. That they do not arise from both is due to the two kinds of causes.' Explanation: The two kinds of causes refers to the above two phrases. Since both the self and other phrases do not arise individually, they also do not arise in combination. Afterward, discerning the three makings, it says: 'However, it is not that they are not made by self or made by other; because of arising from causes, it is extremely profound.' This intent uses the three makings to explain not lacking causes; hence it says: 'Conditions viewed in relation to the effect have efficacy; causes viewed in relation to the effect are also like this.' Combining the above constitutes the three makings. Since they arise from the three makings, they are not without cause. Yet observing the three makings, the self is also a cause. Now the explanation in the commentary of not self, other, and so forth is the intent of the verse in the Madhyamakaśāstra. The verse explaining arising from self is used below in the mutual deprivation of cause and condition; hence it says: 'As the intrinsic nature of all dharmas / Does not abide within conditions,' this refutes self by means of other. Next it says: 'Because there is no intrinsic nature, / The nature of other is also absent,' this refutes other by means of self. Master Ping says: 'Refuting other by means of self generally has three types: first, universal; second, identical; third, relative.' Now the commentary fully possesses these three. First it says: 'Since there is no self, relative to what would there be an other?' This is the third, refutation by relativity, because there is no self to be correlated with, just as without long there is no short. Next it says: 'Furthermore, all dharmas are universally self,' which is the first, the universal meaning: all dharmas are self. For instance, when a hundred people are in one place, all take themselves as self, so the other is also a self. Now when one self is refuted, the other is also refuted. Next it says: 'Furthermore, other viewed in relation to other is also self': this is the second, the identical meaning. For instance, when two people look at each other, this one says it is self and points to that one as other; that one also says of himself, 'I am self,' and points to this one as other. Therefore both people possess self. When this person's self is refuted, the other person's self has also perished. From 'Self and other are not established' downward, it uses both self and other to refute the meaning of arising from both. As with two blind people, who when separated do not see forms, how could they see them when combined? From 'Even with a cause they do not arise', it uses the three makings to refute causelessness. Here it does not mean that by negating causelessness one establishes having a cause, but rather brings up a comparison to explain the combination of causes and conditions. When combination is the meaning of arising, arising is still unattainable; how could one use causelessness to establish the meaning of arising? Therefore, seeking arising through the four phrases, arising is unattainable, and the principle of non-arising can be clearly observed. When the correct principle is already revealed, how could reckonings arise?

67.39

The commentary states: 'Second, with respect to the mutual deprivation of causes and conditions': this means that based on the previous reckoning, one takes cause as self and conditions as other to reveal the principle. However, the initial dispersed explanation of the Abhidharmasamuccaya also takes refuting self as primary; hence it says: 'Furthermore, there is a distinction: depending on manifold conditions, they are not self-made; although there are manifold conditions, without seeds they do not arise, and thus they are not other-made; both of them lack activity, and thus they are not made by both; seeds and manifold conditions all have efficacy, and thus they are not uncaused arising. Therefore it is said in this way: because one's own seeds exist, they are not from other, and so forth, exactly as in the present commentary.' Explanation: The first phrase refutes other by means of self. As in external dharmas, taking the grain seed as self and water and so forth as other. In internal dharmas, consciousness seeds are self, and karmic seeds as sovereign conditions are other. If there are no seeds, an effect will definitely not arise; therefore it does not arise from other. The next phrase refutes self by means of other; hence it says that depending on manifold conditions, they are not self-made. Next, because of lacking activity they do not arise from both: this uses combination lacking nature to refute both. Next, because of having efficacy they are not causeless: this uses both to refute causelessness. The statement 'The treatise's explanation is identical to this' means taking the treatise's explanation to be identical with the Abhidharmasamuccaya, as discerned below in the explanatory text. That treatise concludes: 'If the principle of dependent origination being neither self nor other dispels both phrases, it is still extremely profound. How much more so when universally negating the four phrases; therefore dependent origination is most supremely profound.'

67.40

In the commentary, from 'If so' downward, it resolves objections and eliminates confusion. The ancients mostly took 'not causeless' to mean 'arising from causes'; hence this question and answer was formulated, citing the Madhyamakaśāstra as proof. It only proves using other to refute self, using self to refute other, and so forth, as stated before. Therefore this treatise's objection shows the intent: if you establish that intrinsic nature can produce, it should not further rely on remaining causes and conditions. If it has an intrinsic nature and yet relies on conditions, then this intrinsic nature should abide within conditions. Now, within the conditions of water and earth there is no intrinsic nature of grain; this clarifies that it does not arise from self. The commentary's 'The lower two phrases follow this by analogy' means using lack of activity to refute both, not establishing arising through lack of activity; and using both to refute causelessness, not establishing both. This individually reveals the meaning of non-arising; therefore, one is made to examine it closely so that people are not confused. As for revealing the profound, it will be explained immediately below.

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大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 — Classical Chinese