大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 75

English (machine translation) 75

Language: English

75.1

Expounded by the śramaṇa Chengguan of Da Huayan Monastery on Mount Qingliang in the Tang

In the third part, the detailed explanation, where the commentary says: "Hearing the absence of characteristics without being startled," and so forth: this "not being startled" and the rest is the same as in the *Vajracchedikā-sūtra*, and all the treatises explain it. In the second fascicle of Vasubandhu's treatise, there are two explanations. One says: "'Not being startled' means that toward the principle of non-arising, the mind is not startled, because it proceeds toward the path of birth. 'Not being terrified' means that toward the absence of composite characteristics in all phenomena, the mind is not terrified; and within the composite characteristics of conventional reality, it continuously discriminates without grasping them as real. 'Not being afraid' means that the mind is not like that, being eternally resolved." The second explanation says: "Furthermore, the words 'not startled' and so forth, in their respective order, mean that when hearing, contemplating, and cultivating, the mind is peaceful and unmoving, because notions of sentient beings and the like have already been left far behind." In the second fascicle of Asaṅga's treatise, it says: "In the Śrāvakayāna, the World-Honoured One spoke of existent phenomena and empty phenomena. At the time of hearing, upon hearing that existent phenomena do not exist, one is startled; upon hearing that empty phenomena do not exist, one is terrified. At the time of contemplating, because one cannot accord with what is heard regarding the principle that both do not exist, one is afraid." There is yet another explanation based on the three kinds of non-nature, which is the meaning of the commentary below. The second fascicle of the *Vajracchedikā-prajñāpāramitā-śāstra* says: "'Startled' means giving rise to fear in an improper situation (if correctly translated from the Sanskrit, it should be called 'transgressive terror'), because transgressing correct principle is like straying from the correct path and is deplorable. 'Terrified' (which should be called 'continuous terror') means giving rise to fear continuously, because once terror has arisen one cannot eliminate it. 'Afraid' (which should be called 'fixed fear') means giving rise to a resolved mind of being singularly fearful. If these are absent, one's mind becomes free from panic and confusion." Now in the commentary there are three explanations in total: the first is Asaṅga's, and the second unfolds that treatise's text; the next explanation combines three interpretations. One precisely accords with Vasubandhu; the second is explained in terms of the three wisdoms, also separately matching the treatise text; two, the word "transgress" in the first phrase, "continuous" in the second, and "fixed" in the last phrase, precisely represent the intention of the *Vajracchedikā-śāstra*. Three, these three words also encompass the meaning of Vasubandhu's first explanation.

75.3

Regarding the Commentary's statement: 'Furthermore, hearing that existence is non-existent,' and so forth: this is the third explanation, which is identical to Asaṅga's first interpretation. Thus, the three explanations in the Commentary already encompass the five interpretations found across the various treatises. Regarding the Commentary's statement: ''Delighting' refers to the beginning of the wisdom of contemplation,' and so forth: the treatise states: 'What is the bodhisattva's practice in accordance with the Dharma? It should be understood that this practice is summarily of five kinds: namely, according with the reality one seeks, according with the Dharma one receives, the physical, verbal, and mental karmic actions operating without delusion, correct wisdom, and correct cultivation (this outlines and lists the five practices).' The treatise continues: 'What is the bodhisattva's correct wisdom regarding the Dharma? It means that bodhisattvas dwell alone in quiet seclusion, and according to the Dharma they have heard, desire to deliberate on it, desire to weigh it, and desire to observe it.' And further on it says: 'Based precisely on this patience already attained, by repeatedly directing their attention to make it firm and solid, these bodhisattvas are able to comply with and enter into its cultivation.' Explanation: 'Desiring to deliberate' is precisely the meaning of 'delighting' in the sūtra, encompassing both the beginning and the end of complying and heading toward [cultivation]. The treatise explains this extensively; here, the Commentary briefly indicates that delighting in the Dharma and taking joy in observation constitute the beginning, while prolonged contemplation heading toward cultivation constitutes the end. Regarding the Commentary's statement: ''Single-mindedly recollecting' refers to the beginning of the wisdom of cultivation,' and so forth: the treatise states: 'What is correct cultivation regarding the Dharma? It should be understood that this cultivation summarily has four aspects: first, śamatha; second, vipaśyanā; third, cultivating śamatha and vipaśyanā; and fourth, delighting in cultivating śamatha and vipaśyanā.' And further on it says: 'All such deeds that are undertaken, through these four aspects of cultivation, will all attain bodhi.' Explanation: The treatise speaks of four aspects of cultivation, which correspond in this sūtra to 'single-mindedly recollecting,' 'cultivating and practicing,' and 'peacefully abiding,' marking the initial and subsequent aspects of cultivation. The treatise also explains this in detail; here, the Commentary summarizes it, taking the initiation of preparatory practice as the beginning, and the perfection of the fundamental concentration of preparatory practice, along with the arising of wisdom dependent on concentration, as its substance. Regarding the Commentary's statement: 'Fully as stated in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*': this refers to the thirty-eighth chapter, the 'Chapter on the Multitude of Dispositions.' Among the seven kinds of skillful means for the dharmas received and studied by bodhisattvas, this meaning is explained extensively in the second skillful means, 'having abundant resolute faith, and practice in accordance with the Dharma.' The treatise states: 'What is the bodhisattva's having abundant resolute faith? It means that bodhisattvas, with respect to their eight bases of resolute faith, are fully endowed with and accomplish pure faith as the forerunner, along with determinate joy and pleasure.' And further on it says: 'Eighth, with respect to the bases of resolute faith in good words, good speech, and good preaching, being fully endowed with and accomplishing pure faith as the forerunner, along with determinate joy and pleasure, refers to having abundant resolute faith regarding the sūtras, geyas, vyākaraṇas, and so forth.' That commentary explains: 'The dharmas such as sūtras are the objects sealed by understanding, and are termed the bases of resolute faith. Faith and resolute faith can alternate as cause and effect for one another. Here, taking the resolute faith produced by that faith, faith is therefore the forerunner. The word 'determinate' reveals the essence of resolute faith. The words 'joy and pleasure' reveal the fruit of resolute faith; joy and pleasure are precisely pleasant feeling, or else desire and pleasure.' Explanation: What the treatise calls 'faith and resolution' corresponds in this sūtra to 'deeply believing and awakening to understanding'; hence, the Jin translation simply says 'faith and resolution.'

75.4

Second, the acquiescent patience (anulomikī-kṣānti). In the explanation, śamatha and vipaśyanā are used throughout because, since the practice accords with all dharmas, the essential aspects of practice consist solely of śamatha and vipaśyanā. Regarding the Commentary's statement: 'Calming and contemplating a single object': this means that at the beginning of cultivation, one binds conditions to a single object, without discriminating between phenomenal matters and principle. The sūtra calls this 'contemplation.' Regarding the Commentary's statement: 'Calming and resting in phenomenal objects so as to accord with their principle': this means that while initially cultivating, phenomenal matters and principle may admit of distinction, but now one gradually enters deeper, thereby entering the profound directly through the phenomenal. Both of the above two calmings fall under the calming of resting, within the calming that accords with conditions and realizes true reality. The contemplations in both places both encompass the empty and the provisional, and are both contemplations of penetrating discernment. Regarding the Commentary's statement: 'Meaning calming so that defilements do not arise': this is the calming of cessation, because cessation of delusion is called calming. Its 'correctly abiding and cultivating': this means dwelling equally in the Middle Way of both emptiness and existence without leaning to either side, hence it is called 'correctly abiding.' Its meaning extends to both penetrating contemplation and discernment contemplation; hence it says 'contemplation thoroughly penetrates the preceding object.' Regarding the Commentary's statement: 'Quiescent and merged with the realm of principle': this is the non-calming calming, meaning that since one is merged with principle, it is neither calming nor non-calming, and is only forcibly termed calming. 'Wisdom manifest in the mind': this is the non-contemplating contemplation; the dharmadhātu is thoroughly luminous, neither contemplating nor non-contemplating, and is only forcibly termed contemplation. Regarding the Commentary's statement: 'The above four all practice calming and contemplation together': it is also possible for calming and contemplation to be cultivated separately, but then it is not yet true acquiescent patience; only when both are exercised together does it become true.

75.5

Third, the patience of the non-arising of dharmas (anutpattikadharmakṣānti). Below the Commentary's 'In the explanation, explaining the intention of the first question, it says...', the text of the Commentary has two parts: first, it directly answers the previous question; second, below 'This is because conditions gather...', it explains the preceding answer. Regarding 'The verse text fully contains it': the verse states, 'The bodhisattva likewise / Observes all dharmas, / All arising from causes and conditions, / Unborn and therefore unceasing,' which is this. Below the Commentary's 'Explaining the intention of the second question...', herein the Commentary has three parts: first, clarifying that mentioning the general encompasses the particular, which is designated as 'unborn'; second, using the beginning to subsume the subsequent, thus labeling it solely as 'unborn'; third, re-explaining the preceding meaning. Below the Commentary's 'If following the particular meaning...', this is the second part, using the beginning to subsume the subsequent, explaining why it is designated solely as 'unborn.' Regarding 'Hence the *Śraddhābalādhānāvatāramudrā-sūtra* states...', and so forth: that sūtra explains in detail the characteristics of the first bhūmi. Its second fascicle states: 'Furthermore, Mañjuśrī! Bodhisattvas mahāsattvas have five dharmas that can purify the first Joyful Bhūmi and attain the stage of great fearlessness and peace. What are the five? First, the bodhisattva gives rise to such a thought: 'I have already attained abiding in the anutpattikadharmakṣānti; therefore, I give rise to a peaceful mind, and in order to cause others to abide in the anutpattikadharmakṣānti, I give rise to a comforting mind.'' 'Further speaking of anutpattikadharmakṣānti': this means realizing quiescence and cessation. 'Second, the bodhisattva gives rise to such a thought: 'I have already attained abiding in the unceasing-dharma-patience; therefore, I give rise to a peaceful mind, and in order to cause others to abide in the unceasing-dharma-patience, I give rise to a comforting mind.'' 'Further speaking of unceasing-dharma-patience': this means realizing anutpattikadharmakṣānti. 'Third, the bodhisattva gives rise to such a thought: 'I have already attained the wisdom of mindfulness of the body; therefore, I give rise to a peaceful mind, and in order to cause others to abide in the wisdom of mindfulness of the body, I give rise to a comforting mind.'' 'Further speaking of the wisdom of mindfulness of the body': this means being free from body and mind. 'Fourth, attaining the wisdom of mindfulness of feelings; the wisdom of mindfulness of feelings means putting an end to all feelings. Fifth, attaining the wisdom of mindfulness of the mind; the wisdom of mindfulness of the mind means giving rise to the mind as being like an illusion.' The latter two are cited briefly, as their import is identical to the first three; here, only the first two are taken, so the Commentary does not quote in full. However, citing them has two intents: first, to directly corroborate the second meaning, clarifying that there is an unceasing-patience; second, to concurrently corroborate the first meaning, because unceasing accomplishes non-arising. Therefore, that sūtra states: 'The unceasing-patience, because it realizes non-arising, may also be named the inexhaustible patience,' and so forth.

75.6

Below the Commentary's 'Furthermore, each of these sentences has two meanings...', this is the third part, re-explaining the preceding meaning. That is, within non-arising, all meanings are simultaneously complete. What are the characteristics of this completeness? Therefore, it is explained in detail below. Therein, the text of the Commentary is divided into three: first, jointly positing the two approaches; second, opening the sections to explain them separately; third, concluding with a critique of ancient interpretations. Now, the first. However, the two approaches generally explain the first meaning mentioned earlier. The first, where the subsequent accomplishes the preceding, also explains the second meaning of following the particular, because attaining the patience of non-arising entails attaining the patience of non-cessation and so forth; and the patience of non-cessation and so forth purifies the patience of non-arising and so forth. Below the Commentary's 'However, the purport of the text...', this is the second part, opening the sections to explain them separately. Directly explaining the first approach implicitly explains the second approach; hence, it cites the first approach below. Below the explanation of 'Now first, how is it...', it is solely with respect to principle. However, in the principle of non-arising there is no sequence; because what is dispelled—arising and so forth—has a sequence, by negating them with 'non-', a sequence is also formed; therefore, the Commentary clarifies this first. That which the principle of arising, cessation, exhaustion, and so forth relies upon is the sequence of phenomenal matters. Later, below 'Now, because the preceding are non-existent...', it then reveals the sequence of the principle of non-arising. Regarding the Commentary's 'Therefore, through the subsequent, non-arising is demonstrated': above, it had just clarified that because the preceding exists, the subsequent exists, and so forth; now, by analogy, it concludes the preceding, using the preceding to explain the subsequent, and using the subsequent to accomplish the preceding. Regarding the Commentary's 'The next four reveal principle': because exhaustion is conditioned, defilement is affliction, distinction is phenomenal matter, and location is spatial direction—all of these are objects of contemplation. Now, understanding them to be identical to the true constitutes the non-arising of principle. Regarding the Commentary's 'The latter six reveal the non-arising of wisdom': because the mind's deluded movement is called arising, if the mind is quiescent, then wisdom does not arise. Below 'Therefore the verse states...', it cites corroboration with respect to wisdom. Below 'Principle and wisdom harmonize...', it concludes the above meaning. The verse cites one phrase, which fully states: 'Because of non-cessation, there is no exhaustion; / Because of no exhaustion, there is no defilement.' Explanation: This refers to the preceding four with respect to principle. The next verse states: 'Regarding the changing dharmas of the world, / Fully understanding that they are changeless; / If there is no change, there is no location; / If there is no location, there is quiescence; / The mind is without defiled attachment, / Vowing to deliver all sentient beings.' Explanation: This refers to the latter six revealing wisdom; the Commentary cites one phrase to reveal wisdom clearly. The word 'and so forth' encompasses the rest, all of which pertain to the characteristics of wisdom. Below the Commentary's 'The third is solely with respect to wisdom...', first, because understanding arising from conditions is the cause of accomplishing wisdom, wisdom does not arise, harmonizing with the above principle. 'Arising' is the meaning of birth; being serene and untransmuted, its essence does not cease into non-existence. 'Immovable' is with respect to principle; with no arising to be ceased, it is exactly identical to the 'neither arising nor ceasing, and not a mere one-sided cessation' found in the Great Meaning of the Ten Grounds. The rest are all characteristics of the profound non-arising wisdom of prajñā. The wondrous function of true wisdom is different from mere emptiness that solely refutes faults; one must consider this carefully.

75.7

Below the Commentary's 'If it were solely with respect to knowing...', this is the third part, concluding with a critique of ancient interpretations, namely the *Kanding ji*. Therein it only states: 'Because dharmas arise from conditions, each lacks self-arising; since arising is already non-arising, upon what would cessation depend to cease?' Therefore, it now critiques this: if the principle is non-arising, and knowing it constitutes patience, even lesser sages possess it; thus it would not be the profound and mysterious patience of equal awakening.

75.8

Fourth, the patience of seeing dharmas as like an illusion (māyopama-kṣānti). Regarding the Commentary's statement: 'Now the first has three parts,' and so forth: the text of the Commentary has two parts: first, a general breakdown; second, below 'First, all...', it explains them separately. Within the explanation there are three parts: first, separately explaining the first section; second, jointly explaining the first two sections; third, separately explaining the third section. Within the first there are four parts: first, directly explaining the phrase 'all dharmas'; second, below 'Therefore the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā*...', citing corroboration of its universal meaning; third, below 'Although nirvāṇa is true...', resolving an objection against the sūtra; fourth, citing texts to settle the matter. In the third part, it refers to an objection saying: 'Deluded dharmas arising from conditions may be granted to be like an illusion; but nirvāṇa is real and true, and moreover does not arise from conditions—how can it be identical to an illusion?' Therefore, it takes up the text and explains it. The explanation has two intents: first, clarifying that although it is true, it also depends on conditions; though not born of conditions, it is manifested through conditions, and is also empty and without nature. Second, clarifying that nirvāṇa is not an illusion, but to break the mind attached to nirvāṇa, it is said to be like an illusion. This breaks the nirvāṇa in the mind while also revealing that the essence of nirvāṇa is precisely true emptiness and thereby accomplishes wondrous existence. These are all as stated in the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa*.

75.9

Below the Commentary's 'In the expanded version, it collectively says...', in the fourth part, citing texts to settle the matter: first, it cites a restricted text to clarify that nirvāṇa is not an illusion. Next, below 'However, there is the worldly sphere of dharmas...', since dharmas extend to the true, they therefore encompass nirvāṇa. Next, below 'This is concealed by the conditioned...', it explains that the true is the meaning of the worldly sphere. Below 'Later it says...', it cites a sūtra to establish that it universally encompasses everything.

75.10

Below the Commentary's 'Regarding the doctrine and the metaphor...', this is the second part, jointly explaining the first two sections, because opening the five meanings contains both what establishes and what is established. Therein, it is divided into four: first, generally opening the doctrinal approaches; second, matching them to the sūtra to reveal their intent; third, explaining and resolving objections; fourth, separately clarifying the doctrinal principles. Now, the first. The five dharmas do not go beyond the three natures: the first one is the consummate nature (pariniṣpanna); the second and third are the dependent nature (paratantra), referring to the second as cause and the third as fruit; the fourth clarifies the mutual identity of the dependent and the consummate; the fifth is the imaginary nature (parikalpita).

75.11

In the commentary, from "Now the sūtra says" below, is the second [section], revealing the intention by correlating with the sūtra. Therein, stating that "taking the second as the cause" is because it arises from conditions, leading to the awakening that the third is indeed the other-dependent. "Establishing the fourth" refers to identifying phenomena with principle. "Dispelling the sickness of the fifth" means that the sentiment of conceptualization perishes. "Returning to the first" means that the principle of the perfected is revealed.

75.12

In the commentary, from "However, conditions are also" below, is the third [section], resolving objections and difficulties. That is, there is an objection saying: "If taking the afflictions and karma of the second as conditions causes the third, other-dependent nature, to lack intrinsic nature, then the second, karma and afflictions, ought to be real, because they do not arise from conditions." Therefore, it is now explained: "They also arise from conditions, meaning that karma arises from afflictions, afflictions originate from false discrimination, and ultimately reaching non-abiding, all rely on causes and conditions." Thus, the Madhyamakaśāstra is cited to clarify that both cause and effect are illusory. Hence, the treatise sums up: "Like the initial phantom person, this is named karma; what is created by the phantom person is named the fruit of karma." Since there has never been a single phenomenon that does not arise from conditions, to demonstrate dependent origination, the creating and the created are distinguished.

75.13

In the commentary, from "However, the above five meanings" below, is the fourth [section], specifically clarifying the doctrine. Therein are two parts: first, establishing existence and non-existence; next, establishing the four propositions. Regarding existence and non-existence, because among the three natures each has two aspects, all have existence and non-existence. The two of the perfected are: first, the existence of nature; second, the non-existence of characteristics. The two of the other-dependent are: first, the existence through conditions; second, the non-existence of nature. The two of the conceptualized are: first, existence in sentiment; second, non-existence in principle. Now in the first, there are indeed the two aspects of the perfected. The sorcery and the horse are both the two aspects of the other-dependent; but sorcery is the cause capable of producing, arising in reliance upon the real, hence its function exists and its essence is non-existent—existence of function is existence through conditions, and non-existence of essence is non-existence of nature. The third, the horse, is the produced effect, hence its characteristic exists and reality is non-existent—existence of characteristic is existence through conditions, and non-existence of reality is non-existence of nature. The fourth clarifies that the other-dependent and the perfected are not separate, identifying phenomena as identical with the real. Life exemplifies the false, and death exemplifies the real; because phenomena vanish and principle is revealed, life is non-existent and death is existent. "Because of unimpededness" brings out its cause, which is the non-obstruction of principle and phenomena. In the fifth, with respect to sentiment it exists, because false views are distinct; with respect to principle it is non-existent, because what is falsely conceptualized certainly cannot exist. The reason why the analogy of illusion broadly explains existence and non-existence is that when grasped by deluded sentiment, both existence and non-existence lose the principle; when free from deluded conceptualization, both existence and non-existence are true. Thus we know that in the analogy of illusion, all phenomena are neither real nor hollow, neither empty nor existent. If there is no existence, non-existence is not established; if there is no non-existence, existence is not established. Existence and non-existence thoroughly interpenetrate, so the myriad transformations are equally fused.

75.14

In the commentary, "Furthermore, among the five each possesses four propositions," etc., is the second [part], revealing and establishing the four propositions. Therein are two parts: first, a single layer of four propositions; next, multiple layers of four propositions. In the first part, there are again two: first, correctly revealing [them]; next, eliminating errors. This is the first. First, the four of the existence of nature and non-existence of characteristics: 1. existence, because the true nature exists; 2. emptiness, because it lacks all characteristics; 3. both existence and emptiness, because the doctrinal aspects differ; 4. neither existence nor emptiness, because they mutually fuse and eliminate each other. Second, the four of the existence of function and non-existence of essence: 1. existence, because deluded regarding the real there is function; 2. emptiness, because relying on the real it has no essence; 3. both existence and emptiness, because essence and function are not destroyed; 4. neither existence nor emptiness, because being a function without essence it is not existent, and being an essence-less function it is not empty. Third, the four of the existence of characteristics and non-existence of reality: 1. existence, because phenomenal characteristics appear; 2. emptiness, because being produced by conditions it lacks reality; 3. both preserved, because the lack of intrinsic nature does not obstruct production by conditions, and production by conditions does not obstruct the lack of intrinsic nature; 4. both negated, because production by conditions is itself the lack of intrinsic nature, hence not existent, and the lack of intrinsic nature is itself production by conditions, hence not empty. Fourth, the four of life being non-existence and death being existence: 1. because the true nature is revealed; 2. because the other-dependent is precisely without intrinsic nature; 3. because nature and characteristics are both preserved; 4. because nature and characteristics mutually eliminate each other. Fifth, the four of existence in sentiment and non-existence in principle: 1. because the false sentiment of conceptualization can engender saṃsāra; 2. because seeking it in terms of principle, it cannot be found; 3. because only by principle being non-existent does one know that sentiment exists, and if sentiment did not exist, principle being non-existent would not be revealed; 4. because existence in sentiment is itself non-existence in principle, and non-existence in principle is itself existence in sentiment.

75.15

In the commentary, "However, all are endowed with virtues, unlike the four slanders," is the elimination of errors. Regarding the "four slanders": [holding] fixed existence is the slander of exaggeration; [holding] fixed non-existence is the slander of deprecation; [holding] both existence and non-existence is the slander of contradiction; [holding] neither existence nor non-existence is the slander of prapañca. The commentary, through being endowed with virtues, shows the reason for their difference. That is, the four propositions explained above are themselves endowed with virtues, because they accord with the real, unlike the four propositions grasped by sentiments and fixed attachments. Now to re-clarify the meaning of being endowed with virtues in the first approach: 1. Tathatā is the meaning of existence, because it is the reliance for delusion and awakening, because of the meaning of being non-empty, and because it cannot be destroyed. 2. The true nature is emptiness, because it is free from characteristics, because of the meaning of concordance with conditions, and because it is spoken in contrast to defilement. 3. Tathatā is both existent and empty, because it is endowed with virtues, because of its mastery in reverse and forward sequence, and because its essence is fused. 4. The true nature is neither existent nor empty, because the two are non-dual, and because fixed grasping cannot be attained. The remaining four propositions have already been briefly clarified earlier. Furthermore, all [cases where] emptiness is identical to existence are the emptiness endowed with virtues; existence identical to emptiness is the existence endowed with virtues. Thus, existence that is non-existence and emptiness that is non-emptiness are what is endowed with virtues. Moreover, the emptiness exhausting existence and the existence exhausting emptiness are endowed with virtues. Furthermore, any single proposition necessarily possesses the other three; if any is lacking, it is not endowed with virtues. Furthermore, the four propositions being simultaneously illuminated constitutes the cognitive sphere of understanding; the four propositions being simultaneously obliterated constitutes the cognitive sphere of practice; thus only when words perish and thoughts end is it endowed with virtues. From this it is known that according to the four slanders, all four propositions are severed; according to endowment with virtues, the four propositions do not perish. Being neither identical nor separate, only then does one know the illusory dharmas. Therefore, the second [chapter of the] Laṅkāvatāra has one contemplate the four propositions: namely, oneness, difference, both, neither; existence, non-existence, neither existence nor non-existence; permanence, impermanence, and so forth.

75.16

In the commentary, "If the various approaches are interwoven to form multiple four propositions," etc., is the second [part], multiple layers of four propositions. In total there are four sections, forming twenty layers. The first section has eight layers: 1. Correlating existence in the first approach with non-existence in the second approach forms four propositions: first, dependent origination is existent, because the true nature is wondrously existent; second, dependent origination is non-existent, because karma and afflictions lack essence; third, both existent and non-existent, simultaneously illuminating the real and the false; fourth, neither existent nor non-existent, both the real and the false being simultaneously severed. 2. Correlating non-existence in the first approach with existence in the second forms four propositions: first, dependent origination is existent, because karma and afflictions have function and engender saṃsāra; second, is non-existent, because the one true dharmadhātu is free from all characteristics; third, both existent and non-existent, simultaneously illuminating the real and the false; fourth, neither existent nor non-existent, both the real and the false being simultaneously severed. 3. Correlating existence in the first approach with non-existence in the third approach forms four propositions: first, dependent origination is existent, because the true nature exists; second, is non-existent, because phenomena lack reality; third, both existent and non-existent, simultaneously illuminating phenomena and principle; fourth, neither existent nor non-existent, phenomena and principle being mutually identical and mutually obliterating each other. 4. Correlating non-existence in the first approach with existence in the third forms four propositions: first, phenomenal characteristics exist; second, characteristics of principle are empty; third, emptiness and existence both appear; fourth, emptiness and existence mutually obliterate each other. 5. Correlating existence in the first approach with non-existence in the fourth approach forms four propositions: first, the true nature exists; second, phenomena are hollow; third, simultaneously illuminating both; fourth, mutually identical and eliminating each other. 6. Correlating non-existence in the first approach with existence in the fourth forms four propositions: first, the principle of lacking intrinsic nature exists; second, the principle lacks characteristics; third, both meanings appear simultaneously; fourth, neither existent nor non-existent, the true middle way. 7. Correlating existence in the first approach with non-existence in the fifth forms four propositions: first, the true principle exists; second, sentiment's conceptualization is non-existent with respect to principle; third, where existence is, false conceptualization is non-existent; fourth, existence of nature is itself non-existence in principle, and non-existence in principle is itself existence of nature. 8. Correlating non-existence in the first approach with existence in the fifth forms four propositions: first, existence, existing in sentiment; second, non-existence, principle lacking characteristics; third, both preserved, since only when principle lacks characteristics is it existent in false sentiment; fourth, both negated, since the existence of false sentiment is itself the formlessness of the true principle, hence not existent, and the formlessness of the true nature can be the reliance for false sentiment, hence not non-existent. The above uses the existence and non-existence of the first approach correlated with the existence and non-existence of the four lower approaches to form eight layers of four propositions. Secondly, using the existence and non-existence of the second approach correlated with the three lower approaches again forms six layers of four propositions; thirdly, using the existence and non-existence of the third approach correlated with the two lower approaches again forms four layers of four propositions; fourthly, using the existence and non-existence of the fourth approach correlated with the existence and non-existence of the fifth approach forms two layers of four propositions, totalling twenty layers of four propositions. One must not take the latter as the head and correlate it back with the earlier, because that is not different from taking the earlier approach as the head and correlating it with the latter. Now I have set out the eight layers in full; for the other twelve layers, reflect upon them by analogy, as I will not present them for fear of verbosity.

75.17

In the commentary, "first, in terms of mutual resemblance": like seeing one leaf fall and knowing it is autumn across the world, or seeing one flower blossom and knowing it is spring across the world.

75.18

In the commentary, from "second, in terms of perfect interfusion" below, the commentary's text itself has three meanings: first is the meaning of the non-obstruction of principle and phenomena. Second, the two approaches below "using principle to fuse phenomena" are the meaning of the non-obstruction between phenomena and phenomena; the former approach is the gate of the interpenetration of dharmatā, and the third is the gate of the mutual conditionality of dependent origination. Within the third gate, the commentary's text divides into two: first, presenting one approach; next, "mutual identity." From "since it is so" below, it generalizes to the other approaches. Therein are three: first, using identity to generalize to entry; second, from "since different entities are so" below, using the different to generalize to the identical; third, from "one gate" below, using one gate to generalize to all gates. Just as the gate of the mutual conditionality of dependent origination is so, the gate of the lack of fixed nature, the gate of appearance from mind alone, and so forth, are also like this. Furthermore, just as mutual identity and entry are so, the gate of the subtle and minute mutually containing and establishing, and so forth, are also like this.

75.19

In the commentary, "The negated phenomena can also correspond sequentially to the preceding sentient and insentient spheres": such as "neither male nor female" corresponds to the earlier fully comprehending sentient beings; "neither earth, water, fire, nor wind" corresponds to the earlier fully comprehending realms, etc. In the commentary, "because the elephant, etc., are not the sorcery," etc., is the gate of cause and effect being mutually distinct, because the effect of the other-dependent is not the condition of conceptualization. "The lower phrase is the reverse of this": sorcery is not the elephant, etc., clarifying that the conceptualized is not the other-dependent; the following clarification that characteristics exist is cause and effect mutually establishing each other.

75.20

In the commentary, from "movement and quiescence are non-dual" below, following this the commentary's text has five [parts]: 1. generally explaining the sūtra text; 2. citing evidence; 3. explaining the meaning of not grasping existence and non-existence; 4. presenting analogies to corroborate it; 5. doctrinal categorization and evaluation. The first gate is understood.

75.21

Regarding the commentary's statement, "Therefore the sūtra says: 'Cognition grasping neither existence nor non-existence, one gives rise to great compassion'": this is the second [section], citing testimony, which is the verse in praise of the Buddha by Mahāmati in the first [fascicle] of the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra. That sūtra praises the Buddha's full comprehension of the three natures. The first verse says:
"The world is free from arising and ceasing,
Like flowers in empty space;
Cognition grasping neither existence nor non-existence,
One gives rise to great compassion."
This clarifies comprehension of the imagined [nature]. The next verse says:
"All dharmas are like an illusion,
Far removed from mind and consciousness;
Cognition grasping neither existence nor non-existence,
One gives rise to great compassion.
Far removed from annihilationism and eternalism,
The world is constantly like a dream;
Cognition grasping neither existence nor non-existence,
One gives rise to great compassion."
These two verses above clarify comprehension of the dependent [nature]. Next, another verse says:
"Knowing that persons and dharmas are without self,
Afflictions and the cognizable
Are ever pure and signless,
One gives rise to great compassion."
This verse clarifies comprehension of the consummate [nature]. Furthermore, following the intention of the Suvarṇaprabhāsa-sūtra, these verses above show that the Buddha is endowed with the three bodies: namely, comprehending the imagined accomplishes the transformation body; comprehending the dependent accomplishes the reward body; and comprehending the consummate accomplishes the dharmakāya. The lower halves of all four verses are identical; the present sūtra directly cites the lower half of the "like an illusion" [verse] under the dependent [nature], while the lower half of the "like a dream" [verse] will be cited further in the dream-like patience.

75.22

Regarding the commentary's statement from "Due to comprehending that the essence is empty" onward: this is the third [section], explaining the meaning of grasping neither existence nor non-existence.

75.23

Regarding the commentary's statement, "Just as the elephant's birth is precisely the elephant's death": this is the fourth [section], adducing a metaphor to correspond to and establish [the meaning].

75.24

Regarding the commentary's statement from "These two being correlated should form four propositions" onward: this is the fifth [section], distinguishing doctrinal approaches. Within this there are four: first, establishing the four propositions in terms of the second approach of resembling existence and lacking nature; second, clarifying non-identity and non-difference in relation to the first approach; third, using this to illustrate the other three approaches; fourth, using this to illustrate and explain the preceding and following [passages]. Now for the first, establishing the four propositions: 1. non-difference; 2. non-identity; 3. neither non-identity nor non-difference; 4. neither both identity and difference. The defects to be dispelled are: 1. difference; 2. identity; 3. neither identity nor difference; 4. both identity and difference. One should reflect on this as in the commentary. The second [fascicle] of the Laṅkāvatāra terms these false conceptualizations of views, which is why they must be refuted.

75.25

Regarding the commentary's statement from "If according to the two meanings on the cloth" onward: this is the second, distinguishing non-identity and non-difference in relation to the first approach. The commentary's text has three parts: first, marking what is relied upon; second, from "First, according to the cloth" onward, listing and explaining the ten propositions; third, from "If according to the approach of non-difference" onward, concluding the essential meaning. Now for the first: the phrase "the two meanings on the cloth" refers to, first, the meaning of abiding in its own nature, and second, the meaning of forming an elephant. The first is the meaning of being unchanging, and the second is the meaning of concordance with conditions. The two meanings on the elephant are: first, the meaning of emptiness of essence, and second, the meaning of differentiation. The first is the lack of nature, and the second is illusory existence. In the second part, specifically explaining the ten propositions: the first four propositions are non-difference; the next four propositions are non-identity; the ninth and tenth propositions subsume the preceding two approaches to clarify non-identity and non-difference. Within the first [group of] non-difference: the first proposition is the non-difference between concordance with conditions and differentiation; the second proposition is the non-difference between being unchanging and emptiness of essence; the third proposition combines the preceding two propositions in terms of non-obstruction; the fourth proposition combines the preceding two propositions in terms of mutual displacement. Now, within the first proposition, the commentary from "The sūtra says: 'The dharmakāya transmigrates'" onward cites testimony. It cites two sūtras as proof, which were already distinguished in the "Clarifying Inquiries" [chapter] and will now be explained again. First, "The dharmakāya transmigrating in the five destinies is called sentient beings" is from the Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśa-sūtra. The dharmakāya is precisely tathatā; transmigrating in the five destinies is concordance with conditions; and being called sentient beings is the meaning of differentiation. Next, "The tathāgatagarbha undergoes suffering and pleasure, is conjoined with causes, and appears to arise and cease" is from the fourth [fascicle] of the Laṅkāvatāra. It says there: "Mahāmati, the seven consciousnesses do not transmigrate, do not undergo suffering and pleasure, and are not the cause of nirvāṇa. Mahāmati, the tathāgatagarbha undergoes suffering and pleasure, is conjoined with causes, and appears to arise and cease." The explanation is: The seven consciousnesses arise and cease from moment to moment and are impermanent; arising, they immediately vanish. Transmigrating like a flowing river, they have no established essence of their own, and therefore do not undergo suffering and pleasure. They are neither the basis for defilement nor the basis for untainted nirvāṇa. As for the tathāgatagarbha, it is truly permanent and omnipresent, yet when one is deluded about this in the six destinies, it can concord with conditions to accomplish things and undergo the fruits of suffering and pleasure. Being conjoined with the seven consciousnesses is called "conjoined with causes." Not keeping to its own nature, it forms the seven consciousnesses, and relying on this it undergoes arising and ceasing; hence it is said to "appear to arise and cease." This clarifies that the tathāgatagarbha is precisely tathatā, which undergoes suffering and pleasure and so forth because it concords with conditions.

75.26

Regarding the commentary's statement, "Second, according to the meaning of the cloth abiding in its own position" and so forth: abiding in its own [position] is being unchanging, and the characteristic of emptiness of essence is precisely tathatā. Since the two meanings accord with each other and converge characteristics into the nature, it is called "reverting the branch to the root." The root is the nature, and the branch is characteristics. In the commentary, from "The sūtra says: 'All sentient beings are precisely tathatā'" onward, it cites testimony. This is from the Maitreya section in the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra. That sūtra says: "Is the prediction received from the arising of tathatā, or is the prediction received from the ceasing of tathatā? If the prediction were received through the arising of tathatā, tathatā has no arising. If the prediction were received through the ceasing of tathatā, tathatā has no ceasing. All sentient beings are tathatā; all dharmas are also tathatā. All the noble ones and sages are also tathatā, and even Maitreya is also tathatā. If Maitreya receives a prediction, all sentient beings should also receive a prediction. Why is this? Tathatā is neither dual nor different. If Maitreya attains anuttarasamyaksaṃbodhi, all sentient beings should also attain it. Why is this? All sentient beings are the characteristic of bodhi. If Maitreya attains extinction, all sentient beings should also attain extinction. Why is this? The buddhas know that all sentient beings are completely quiescent, which is the characteristic of nirvāṇa, and do not undergo further extinction. Therefore, Maitreya, do not entice the devaputras with such a dharma." Here, the commentary's text briefly cites the essentials of two lines. The mention of "and so forth" has two meanings: first, it includes the rest of the text of the Vimalakīrti, as cited above; second, it includes other texts stating that all are tathatā. Thus this sūtra says: "All dharmas are tathatā, / The realm of the buddhas is also like this; / Down to not a single dharma / Has arising or ceasing within tathatā," and so forth.

75.27

Regarding the commentary's statement from "Third, taking the root into which the branch is subsumed and returned" onward: this proposition combines the preceding two propositions so that they are unobstructed, forming this single proposition; this is the non-difference resulting from the mutual accomplishment of emptiness of essence identical to differentiation and concordance with conditions identical to being unchanging. The phrase "the root into which the branch is subsumed and returned" refers to the emptiness of essence identical to differentiation. This is the previous second proposition where emptiness of essence is the root and differentiation is the branch; this is the root blending into the branch, causing the branch to be identical to the root, so that differentiation is precisely emptiness of essence. The phrase "and the branch from which the root is subsumed and followed" refers to concordance with conditions identical to being unchanging; this is the previous first proposition, wherein because the unchanging in its entirety concords with conditions to form differentiation, the branch blends into the root, causing the root to be identical to the branch. Therefore it says that these two are mutually blended. Because the unchanging in its entirety concords with conditions, the root does not obstruct the branch; because differentiation is precisely emptiness of essence, the branch does not obstruct the root; hence it is called "unobstructed." It is specifically because the dharmakāya forms sentient beings that one obtains that sentient beings are precisely tathatā; and it is because sentient beings are precisely tathatā that one realizes that the dharmakāya transmigrates in the five destinies to become sentient beings. Thus in the first proposition the root is equal to the branch, and in the second proposition the branch is equal to the root; hence it says "root and branch are equal." At the very time the root is equal to the branch, the branch is equal to the root, so the above two sūtras also do not contradict each other. Hence it says "because the texts of the preceding two sūtras are not separated from one another." Having combined the preceding two propositions to mutually accomplish the third proposition, the preceding two sūtras are used to testify to this proposition.

75.28

Regarding the commentary's statement, "Fourth, taking the branch that is subsumed and returned to the root" and so forth: this proposition also combines the preceding two propositions through mutual displacement to form this proposition; that is, non-difference through the mutual displacement between differentiation identical to emptiness of essence and the unchanging identical to concordance with conditions. Although the preceding two propositions are equally used, their meanings are widely divergent. The third proposition uses the first proposition, taking concordance with conditions identical to being unchanging, so that the root accomplishes the branch. Now the fourth proposition uses the initial proposition, taking the unchanging identical to concordance with conditions, which is the root displacing the branch. It is merely an inversion. The third proposition uses the second proposition, taking the emptiness of essence identical to differentiation, so that the branch accomplishes the root. Now the fourth proposition uses the [second] proposition, taking the differentiation identical to emptiness of essence, so that the branch displaces the root. This is also merely an inversion. Thus their meanings are widely divergent. The phrase "the branch that is subsumed and returned to the root" refers to the differentiation identical to emptiness of essence, which is the second proposition. The phrase "the root that is subsumed and follows the branch" refers to the unchanging identical to concordance with conditions, which is the first proposition. Because concordance with conditions is precisely unchanging, it displaces differentiation, rendering essence empty, so that the branch is quiescent. Because emptiness of essence is precisely differentiation, it displaces the unchanging, causing concordance with conditions, so that the root is quiescent. Since the root in its entirety becomes the branch, the root is concealed; since the branch in its entirety becomes the root, the branch is annihilated. Thus, when tathatā concords with conditions to form sentient beings, it never loses its true essence; hence it causes sentient beings to be non-sentient beings. When sentient beings in their emptiness of essence are precisely the dharmakāya, there has never been an absence of sentient beings; hence the dharmakāya is non-dharmakāya. Therefore both are doubly extinguished. Since both mutually extinguish each other, true and false are equal, with nothing to differentiate them.

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大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 — Classical Chinese