大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 9

English (machine translation) 9

Language: English

9.1

Composed by the Śramaṇa Chengguan of Da Huayan Monastery on Mount Qingliang in the Tang

Regarding the commentary's "If based on the characteristics of dharmas that are taught" onward: third, distinguishing the differences based on what is expounded. However, this was broadly clarified within the second fascicle of Xianshou's Boundaries of Doctrine; here it is only briefly stated. Within this, the opening sentence introduces it, and what follows separately explains each. First, within the Hīnayāna, there are four points: 1. based on the quantity of dharmas; 2. based on the distinctions between the two kinds of emptiness; 3. based on the fundamental basis; 4. concluding that it is incomplete. Now, the first: as for "seventy-five," it refers to the quantities within the five categories of dharmas. That is: 1. form dharmas are eleven; the Kośa verse says: "Form is only the five sense faculties, / the five sensory objects, and unmanifest form." 2. Mind dharmas are one, which is the mental consciousness. 3. Mental factors (caitasika) are forty-six: the universal mahābhūmika are ten; the Kośa verse says: "Sensation, ideation, volition, contact, desire, / wisdom, mindfulness, and attention, / resolution and samādhi / are universal to all minds." The great wholesome bhūmika are ten; the verse says: "Faith and non-negligence, / pliancy, equanimity, shame, and blame, / the two roots and non-harming, / and diligence are universal only to wholesome minds." The great affliction bhūmika are six: "Delusion, negligence, indolence, disbelief, / torpor, and restlessness are always solely defiled." The great unwholesome bhūmika are two, namely, shamelessness and unblameworthiness. The minor affliction bhūmika are ten; the verse says: "Wrath, concealment, avarice, jealousy, affliction, / harm, resentment, deceit, duplicity, and arrogance— / categories such as these are called / minor affliction-ground dharmas." The indeterminate are eight, namely: remorse, sleep, examination, investigation, greed, anger, pride, and doubt. The above six categories comprise forty-six. 4. Dharmas not associated with mind (cittaviprayuktasasaṃskāra) are of fourteen kinds: 1. acquisition; 2. non-acquisition; 3. generic similarity; 4. retribution of non-conception; 5. concentration of non-conception; 6. concentration of cessation; 7. life faculty; 8. origination; 9. abiding; 10. alteration; 11. cessation; 12. name; 13. phrase; 14. syllable. Hence the verse says: "Acquisition, non-acquisition, generic similarity, / non-conception, the two concentrations, life, / as well as origination, abiding, alteration, cessation, / along with the bodies of name, phrase, and syllable." 5. Unconditioned dharmas (asaṃskṛta) are three: 1. cessation through analytical contemplation (pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha); 2. cessation not through analytical contemplation (apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha); 3. space (ākāśa). Totaling the above five categories of dharmas, they combine to seventy-five dharmas. Compared to the Mahāyāna, they lack twenty-five, which will be clarified directly below.

9.3

Regarding the commentary's "only teaching personal emptiness" onward: clarifying the distinction between the two kinds of emptiness. Because their faculties are inferior, they are not yet capable of hearing the true principle of both kinds of emptiness taught. Fascicle forty-one of the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa states: "Because the Hīnayāna disciples have dull faculties, for their sake emptiness of sentient beings is taught." The Awakening of Faith states: "Those who grasp at views of self—relying on the dull faculties of the two vehicles, the Tathāgata only taught for their sake the selflessness of persons and so forth; even if both kinds of emptiness were spoken of, it was slight and not yet clearly revealed."

9.4

Regarding the commentary's "only relying on the six consciousnesses and the three poisons" onward: clarifying the fundamental basis. Although there are many doctrines regarding what the Hīnayāna considers the root of saṃsāra, three are briefly adduced: 1. considering the mind of consciousness [as the root], as taught in fascicle eight of the Nyāyānusāra: the Sautrāntika masters consider present form, mind, and so forth to be the causes of defilement and purity. The meaning is: just as in the Mahāyāna the eighth [consciousness] serves as what is perfumed. 2. The three poisons serve as the cause, whose meaning is like the active perfumer in the Mahāyāna. Now, citing the Āgamas only proves the three poisons. And saying "and so forth" means that because the three poisons serve as causes and conditions, they give rise to the three karmas; because the three karmas serve as causes and conditions, they give rise to the three realms; therefore, all dharmas exist. The verse in the "Examination of the Twelve Links of Dependent Origination" chapter of the Madhyamakaśāstra says: "Sentient beings, covered by ignorance, / give rise to the three actions for the sake of future [rebirth]. / Because these actions exist, / consciousness receives bodies in the six destinies," and so forth; this is precisely its meaning. 3. Combining the above two meanings: only when both that which perfumes and that which is perfumed are present does transmigration take place. If so, how does this differ from the Mahāyāna? While it appears to share the sūtra's meaning, it differs in that it is only the six consciousnesses and not the eighth that serves as what is perfumed; even if the ālaya is mentioned, it is merely a name, and what perfumes is again not the seventh consciousness; therefore, it is completely different.

9.5

Regarding the commentary's "not having exhausted the source of dharmas" onward: fourth, concluding that it is non-definitive, which can be understood.

9.6

Regarding the commentary's "Second, within the initial teaching" onward: the text of the commentary divides into three: first, general; next, specific; finally, conclusion. Now, the first divides into two: first, showing its inferiority compared to what follows; next, showing its superiority compared to what precedes. In the former, because characteristics are many and nature is few, it is called the Faxiang (Dharma-characteristic) school. As for "the taught dharmatā is included in the number of dharma-characteristics," this means that the taught tathatā dharmatā is merely counted among the six unconditioned [dharmas] within the hundred dharmas. Next, from "teaching that there are a hundred dharmas" onward: showing its superiority compared to what precedes. As for the "hundred dharmas," mind dharmas are eight, mental factors are fifty-one, form dharmas are eleven, dharmas not associated with mind are twenty-four, and unconditioned dharmas are six, thus making the number of one hundred. To the previous seventy-five, twenty-five are added: that is, to mind dharmas seven are added, because the Hīnayāna has only a single mental consciousness; to mental factors five are added; to dharmas not associated with mind ten are added; to unconditioned dharmas three are added—all as stated in that [school].

9.7

Regarding the commentary's "teaching that there are eight consciousnesses" onward: second, clarifying specifically. The text has nine sections, which are the ten meanings within the Faxiang school among the ten pairs in the previous reconciliation of the two schools, and they all correspond in sequence to what precedes; only the first corresponds to the third, and the second corresponds to the first and second, because the third pairs mind-only as true versus false, with the six consciousnesses and three poisons serving as the basis. Now, the first: how does the first contrast with what precedes in speaking of the eight consciousnesses? Speaking of eight because they serve as the basis surpasses the preceding teaching. "Solely being arising and ceasing" clarifies its inferiority compared to what follows. "Establishing the causes of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa based on the arising and ceasing consciousness" is unlike the preceding teaching that clarifies the three poisons and six consciousnesses as causes, and unlike the final teaching where the unarisen-unceasing and the arisen-ceasing are combined. Thus the first fascicle of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha states: "The realm from beginningless time / is the common basis of all dharmas; / by virtue of this, there exist all destinies / as well as the attainment of nirvāṇa." "Realm" has the meaning of cause, meaning the seed consciousness and so forth, as explained extensively below.

9.8

Under the Commentary's "intrinsic seeds" is the second contrast: the meaning of the five lineages in the distinction between one lineage and five lineages. It contains the meaning of the three vehicles from the first contrast, the distinction between the one vehicle and the three vehicles, because the vehicles and the lineages complement each other. Merely explaining the five lineages entails the three vehicles; yet the three vehicles are merely methods of conversion and not distinct doctrines within what is expounded, so they are omitted and left unexplained, contained within the five lineages. "Intrinsic" clarifies that they are inherently existent, distinguishing them from newly perfumed [seeds]. Thus the Yogācārabhūmi states: "There are briefly two kinds of lineage: first, abiding in the original nature; second, formed by habituation. 'Abiding in the original nature' means the superior six sense bases of bodhisattvas; possessing such characteristics, handed down successively from beginningless time, obtained intrinsically, and so forth. 'Formed by habituation' means obtained by previously habituated wholesome roots." The Prakaraṇāryavācā says: "How is the distinction of lineages [established]? By five kinds of reasoning, because distinctions in all dhātus are obtainable." Among the five, the first four are "having" and the last one is "lacking"; hence it is said, "having and lacking are eternally distinct."

9.9

Regarding the Commentary's "Since the consciousness posited is produced solely from karma and afflictions," and so forth: this is the third [contrast], the meaning of "static" in the distinction between tathatā in concordance with conditions versus static. The preceding clause arises by taking up the aforementioned arising and ceasing consciousness. "Karma and afflictions": because the active eighth [consciousness] is called the retribution consciousness; perfumed into seeds by past afflictions and karma, it summons this fruit of consciousness to requite projecting karma. The prior six consciousnesses, which requite completing karma, arise from the retribution [consciousness] and are called "arising from retribution," not "retribution," because they are intermittent. Thus all eight consciousnesses are produced from karma and afflictions. Under "Therefore the tathatā posited," it directly explains the meaning of "unchanging." If consciousness arose from tathatā, the tathāgatagarbha, then it would possess the meaning of concordance with conditions. Since consciousness is discriminated as arising from karma and afflictions, one clearly knows that tathatā is unchanging. Thus the Vijñaptimātratā explains the name tathatā, saying: "'Tatha' means true and real, indicating the absence of falsehood. 'Tā' means eternal, indicating the absence of change. If it changed in concordance with conditions, how could it be called 'tathatā'?"

9.10

Under the Commentary's "other-dependent nature" is the fourth [contrast]: the meaning of "non-identical" in the distinction between identical and separate regarding the emptiness and existence of the three natures. "Three natures" means: first, the parikalpita-svabhāva (imagined nature); second, the paratantra-svabhāva (other-dependent nature); third, the pariniṣpanna-svabhāva (consummated nature). Thus the eighth fascicle of the Cheng weishi lun states: "Through those various conceptualisations, one conceptualises various objects. This imagined nature of conceptualisation has no own-nature whatsoever. The other-dependent nature is produced by conditions of discrimination. The consummated [nature] in relation to that is eternally far removed from the former nature." Here there are two verses: the first one explains the imagined, the next two lines clarify the other-dependent, and the final two lines explain the consummated. Regarding the first verse, there are the opinions of several masters; here we follow Dharmapāla: the first line is the active conceptualiser, the next line is the conceptualised, and the final two lines explain the grasped. In the correct doctrine, the active conceptualisers are only the sixth and seventh consciousnesses, and because their conceptualisations are manifold, it says "those various." The conceptualised is strictly only the other-dependent; as the immediate object of cognition, it is said through succession to also extend to the consummated, because [the latter] is a mediate condition. This is not the realm of ordinary beings, so it is not an immediate condition. Regarding its grasped nature: for Master Sthiramati, the minds and mental factors of the three realms, due to beginningless false perfuming, although each is single in essence, resemble two natures, namely the vision and form divisions, which are the grasper and grasped; these two divisions exist subjectively but are absent in principle, and this appearance is called the imagined nature; the underlying essence they rely upon is truly born relying on conditions, and this nature is not non-existent, being called other-dependent. For Master Dharmapāla, all minds and mental factors, transformed by the power of perfuming, are born from conditions because of the two divisions; they are also other-dependent conceptualisations, relying upon which one falsely grasps definitive, real existence, non-existence, oneness, difference, both, or neither; these two alone are named the imagined nature. The two lines on the other-dependent nature mean: the essences of the minds and mental factors born of multiple conditions, as well as the form and vision divisions, whether contaminated or uncontaminated, are all other-dependent, because they arise dependent on other conditions. The verse says "produced by conditions of discrimination": one should know that this provisionally speaks of the defiled part of the other-dependent, for the purified part of the other-dependent is also the consummated; or, all defiled and pure minds and mental factors are named discrimination because they can perceive and deliberate, so then all defiled and pure other-dependent [phenomena] are subsumed under the other-dependent nature here. The two lines on the consummated mean: the real nature of all phenomena, perfected and consummated, revealed by the two emptinesses, is called pariniṣpanna. This reveals that it is pervasive and eternal, its essence not false, distinguishing it from specific characteristics, common characteristics, empty space, the self, and so on. The explanation states: "Pervasive" explains perfected; "eternal" explains consummated; "its essence is not false" explains the meaning of real nature. This single phrase "its essence" runs through all three places: pervasive distinguishes it from specific characteristics; eternal distinguishes it from common characteristics; the phrase "not false" distinguishes it from empty space and the self. If so, since the essence of the purified part of the other-dependent is not eternal and pervasive, how can it also be the consummated nature? Thus the treatise next says: "Uncontaminated conditioned [phenomena], free from inversion and ultimate, with superior functions that are all-pervading, also obtain this name. However, in this present verse, it speaks of the former and not the latter." The explanation states: Here, freedom from inversion is called real; being ultimate is consummated; superior functions that are all-pervading explains the meaning of perfected. Thus the consummated has two kinds: first, stated in terms of principle; second, stated in terms of fruitional virtue. Therefore the treatise qualifies: "In this present verse, it speaks of the former and not the latter," because it is stated in terms of the three natures, which pervade everything. The treatise passage above merely explains the term pariniṣpanna. Next, in explaining the remaining text, it says: "This means that upon that other-dependent [nature], it is eternally far removed from the former imagined nature. Taking tathatā revealed by the two emptinesses as its nature, it speaks of 'upon that.'" This reveals that the consummated and the other-dependent are neither identical nor separate. The phrase "eternally far removed" reveals that the nature of the grasper and grasped falsely grasped by delusion is not permanently existent in principle. The word "former" reveals that the other-dependent is not empty; "nature" reveals that the two emptinesses are not the consummated, because tathatā is free from the meanings of existence and non-existence. The explanation given above relies entirely on Vijñaptimātra. The meaning of the Commentary's words here is to distinguish it from the Dharmatā school. In the Dharmatā school, the lack of own-nature in the other-dependent is itself the consummated. That is, the other-dependent has no own-nature; having no own-nature is emptiness, and emptiness is the consummated. Here it says "seeming to exist and not non-existent," which is not identical to emptiness. The phrasing only explains the other-dependent, implicitly evoking the name of the consummated. "Saying that the sūtras' meaning of emptiness is only in terms of the grasped": among the three natures, this single imagined nature is empty, while the two natures are not empty, hence it says "only in terms of the grasped."

9.11

Under the Commentary's "Since it speaks of three natures," and so forth: this is the fifth [contrast], the meaning of "not decreasing" in the distinction between neither increasing nor decreasing regarding sentient beings and buddhas. Here the meaning is distinct, yet the phrasing is completely identical. Unlike the preceding and subsequent [contrasts of] the one vehicle and three vehicles, which only take the meaning of the three vehicles, and so forth, it means that among the five lineages, persons without lineage definitely do not achieve Buddhahood. With such sentient beings preserving the realm of sentient beings, how could it decrease?

9.12

Under the Commentary's "The two truths, ultimate and conventional, are completely distinct," and so forth: this is the sixth contrast, the meaning of "separation" in the distinction between identical and separate regarding the emptiness and existence of the two truths. Within it, two meanings are contained: first, merely explaining the distinction between the two truths; second, concurrently explaining the distinction of the Middle Way. Regarding the distinction between the two truths: relying on the ninth fascicle of the Vijñaptimātratā, there are four kinds of ultimate truth: first, worldly ultimate truth, meaning the aggregates, sense fields, elements, and so forth; second, principled ultimate truth, meaning the four truths such as suffering; third, attained ultimate truth, meaning the tathatā of the two emptinesses; fourth, ultimate ultimate truth, meaning the one true dharmadhātu. Relying on the sixty-fourth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi, there are four conventional truths: first, worldly conventional truth, meaning armies, forests, and so forth; second, principled conventional truth, meaning the aggregates, sense fields, elements, and so forth; third, attained conventional truth, meaning stream-enterers and so forth; fourth, posited conventional truth, namely posited tathatā. By pairing the four conventional truths with the aforementioned four kinds of ultimate truth of the Vijñaptimātratā, there are four tiers of two truths: first, conventional two truths, meaning armies and forests are conventional, and the aggregates and so forth are ultimate; second, phenomena-and-principle two truths, meaning the aggregates and so forth are conventional, and suffering and so forth are ultimate; third, ultimate two truths, meaning suffering and so forth are conventional, and posited tathatā is ultimate; fourth, posited and unposited two truths, meaning posited tathatā is conventional, and unposited tathatā is ultimate. Furthermore, with four each for conventional and ultimate, there are eight truths. The four conventional truths are: first, the truth of nominal designation without reality; second, the truth of distinctions in accord with phenomena; third, the truth of conventional establishment by upāya; fourth, the truth of nominal designation without establishment, meaning the principle of the two emptinesses is spoken according to exposition, possessing only nominal designations without apprehending the essence. The four ultimate truths are: first, the truth of the manifestation of essence and function; second, the truth of distinctions between cause and effect; third, the truth of revealing reality by relying on doors; fourth, the truth of discarding exposition to address the purport. However, for the above eight truths, the names differ slightly, but the meaning is not different from the preceding. Moreover, among the four tiers, the first conventional truth is confined solely to the conventional, and the last ultimate truth is confined solely to the ultimate; the intermediate six truths each apply to both the conventional and ultimate truths. For example, the first ultimate truth is ultimate when viewed toward the preceding, but conventional when viewed toward the second. Since each of the four tiers of two truths is distinct, it is said that they are completely distinct, unlike the two truths of dharmatā which are mutually identical. Under the Commentary's "Neither annihilated nor eternal: the effect arises and the cause perishes": this meaning is specifically opened within the approach of the two truths. This explains non-annihilation and non-eternity within conventional truth, unlike the mutual interpenetration of the two truths of dharmatā explaining non-annihilation and non-eternity. "The effect arises and the cause perishes": because the cause perishes, it is not eternal; because the effect arises, it is not annihilated. Thus the third fascicle of the Vijñaptimātratā states: "This ālayavijñāna flows constantly like a torrent." The explanation says: "'Constantly' precludes annihilation; 'flows' indicates non-eternity," and so forth. The intention is: if the cause did not perish but transferred into the effect, it would be called eternal. If the effect did not continue and the cause produced nothing, it would fall into annihilation. Now, because it is constantly continuous, there is neither annihilation nor eternity. This is elaborated in the Vijñaptimātratā.

9.13

Regarding the Commentary's "The four simultaneous characteristics: cessation marks subsequent non-existence": this is the seventh [contrast], the meaning of "successive" in the distinction between simultaneous and successive regarding the four characteristics. The second fascicle of the Cheng weishi lun states: "Yet conditioned phenomena, through the power of causes and conditions, were originally non-existent and now exist, provisionally exist and return to non-existence; to mark their difference from the unconditioned, the four characteristics are provisionally established (this introduces the thesis). Originally non-existent and now existent: the state of existence is called arising. Pausing temporarily in the state of arising is called abiding. When abiding differs between prior and subsequent, the name 'change' is further established. Provisionally existent and returning to non-existence: the time of non-existence is called cessation (this clarifies the characteristics individually). Because the first three are existent, they are together in the present; because the last one is non-existent, it is in the past (distinguishing it from the Hīnayāna view that arising is in the future while the remaining three are in the present). How can a non-existent phenomenon be a characteristic of conditioned phenomena (the objection)? Marking this subsequent non-existence, what fault is there in it being a characteristic (the general answer)? Arising marks that an existent phenomenon was previously non-existent; cessation marks that an existent phenomenon is subsequently non-existent; change marks that this phenomenon is not static; abiding marks that this phenomenon temporarily has function (this explains the marking function individually). Therefore, although these four characteristics are all called marks with respect to conditioned phenomena, their markings are different. These four characteristics are provisionally established based on a single moment (this concludes)." Now the Commentary merely raises cessation because this single phrase alone differs from dharmatā, as it does not allow simultaneity.

9.14

Regarding the Commentary's statement below from "fundamental and subsequent": this is the eighth [contrast], on the severance and realization between the cognizing [cognition] and cognized [object], namely the sense of non-identity within the distinction of identity and difference. Because it clarifies severance and realization, it also speaks of taking objects as conditions: the fundamental [cognition] takes conditions as the real, while the subsequent [cognition] takes conditions as the conventional. "Figuratively described as double contemplation" means that it is also said that comprehending the conventional derives from realizing the real. The two cognitions doubly contemplate the real and the conventional; because in that school the two cognitions do not merge and the two objects are not identical, when precisely in double contemplation, they constantly illuminate separately. Regarding "the difference in severing afflictions": the fundamental cognition severs latent defilements confused about principle, while the subsequent cognition severs latent defilements confused about phenomena. Dharmapāla says: "Because it does not directly realize [principle], it lacks the capacity to sever latent defilements confused about principle. Yet, because it non-erroneously realizes conventional characteristics, it can also permanently sever latent defilements confused about phenomena." Therefore the Yogācārabhūmi says: "On the stage of the path of cultivation, there is the supramundane path of severance and the mundane-and-supramundane path of severance." According to the handed-down explanation: the fundamental substance can sever both kinds of latent defilements, those confused about principle and those confused about phenomena, whereas the subsequent cognition only severs latent defilements confused about phenomena. When severing confusion about principle, it contemplates the objective realm of principle; when severing confusion about phenomena, it contemplates the objective realm of phenomena; thus they are not identical. Since it is said that the fundamental [cognition] possesses the meaning of double severance, it is therefore called double contemplation. Since the subsequent [cognition] does not sever confusion about principle, it reverts to separate illumination; it is not like the dharmatā [teaching, where] one severance is the severance of all. The text of the Commentary here speaks elliptically. If speaking in terms of severing afflictions, it should say: it is figuratively described as double severance, yet in reality it is separate severance. Regarding "realizing unconditioned principle by means of conditioned cognition": this is spoken solely in terms of the fundamental [cognition's] severance of afflictions. Above it clarified the severance of afflictions; here it analyzes the realization of principle. Previously, regarding taking conditions as objects to sever afflictions, it addressed non-identity solely in terms of what is contemplated; now, regarding this realization of principle, it clarifies the meaning of non-identity by correlating the mind and the object in terms of the realized and what realizes. The cognition that realizes is conditioned, while the principle that is realized is unconditioned; hence they are not identical.

9.15

Regarding the Commentary's statement below from "since supramundane cognition relies on consciousness that arises and ceases": this is the ninth, clarifying the sense of being conditioned within the distinction between the Buddha's body being unconditioned and conditioned. The Buddhabhūmi-śāstra, fascicle three, says: "Within the ground of Great Awakening, the boundless merits are briefly of two kinds: first, conditioned; second, unconditioned. Unconditioned merits are subsumed under the pure dharmadhātu. The pure dharmadhātu is precisely tathatā. Unconditioned merits are all distinctions in the essence and characteristics of tathatā. Conditioned merits are subsumed under the four cognitions; because the functions of cognition are predominant in the state of undefilement, they are made manifest under the name of cognition. The minds, mental factors, and other categories possessing all seeds subsume all merits if taken according to the real sense; if taken according to coarse characteristics, they subsume wondrous observation..." and so forth. From this we clearly know that the four cognitions are all conditioned. The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, fascicle ten, says: "Regarding what is attained through the four transformations, there are again two kinds: first, that attained through manifestation, namely great nirvāṇa; second, that attained through generation, namely great bodhi. Although there are originally seeds capable of generating this, because the cognitive hindrance obstructs them, they cannot be generated. By the power of the noble path, that hindrance is severed, thereby causing them to arise from seeds; this is named attaining bodhi. Having arisen, they continue uninterrupted to the end of the future." This refers to the "States of Mind Associated with the Four Cognitions." It goes on to say: "Therefore these four cognitions comprehensively subsume all conditioned merits on the Buddha ground without remainder." Based on these two treatises, it is clear that they are all conditioned. Now the Commentary's first two lines state the reason for their being conditioned: because they are generated from seeds, being generated means being conditioned. How much more so when the consciousness that is capable of generating is in essence arising and ceasing—how could the generated cognition not be conditioned? Since it is conditioned and produced through cultivation, it must possess the characteristics of the conditioned, namely arising, abiding, changing, and ceasing; hence it says "it is altered by characteristics." The four cognitions subsume the three bodies; the great round mirror cognition accomplishes [the body for] one's own enjoyment; therefore it says "the reward body is conditioned and undefiled."

9.16

The Commentary's passage from "principles and categories such as these" below is the conclusion.

9.17

Regarding the Commentary's statement "Three: in the final teaching, the characteristics of phenomena are spoken of sparsely," and so forth: the Commentary also has three parts: first, a general statement; next, specific explanations; and finally, a conclusion. Now, the first: in comparison to the preceding initial teaching, that there is more or less in each can be understood. Regarding "the characteristics of phenomena that are spoken of are also returned and integrated into the nature": for example, when the five aggregates are spoken of, the five aggregates are empty, and emptiness is precisely dharmatā. A subsequent passage says: "The phenomena of the five aggregates in the three periods of time are called the world. Their cessation is not the world; such things are merely conventional designations." It also says: "Where there is dispute, saṃsāra is spoken of; where there is no dispute, nirvāṇa is spoken of. Both saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are ungraspable," and so on. Again, for example, speaking of the mind: "The mind is precisely free from thoughts, of one mark with the dharmadhātu, the ocean of worlds of the Flower Store, the dharmadhātu without distinctions," and so forth. Such passages are more than one. Therefore, in this school, it is not that characteristics are absent; the intention of the school is to reveal the nature as profound and subtle, causing living beings to comprehend this and quickly realize bodhi. Therefore the chapter "Awakening through Light" says: "That which is turned by the Tathāgata..." and so on.

9.18

Regarding the Commentary's statement below from "the eight consciousnesses established": this specifically explains them. The text also consists of nine sections, corresponding in sequence to the preceding [nine], making ten sections of meaning; here the third also serves as its first, in order to correlate with the previous order. Now this first is, within the distinction between the true and false in mind-only, clarifying that complete-division consciousness-only is accomplished by the true mind. The ten meanings of the Dharmatā school are precisely the meanings within the Common Teaching of this sūtra; they will be explained below by quoting extensively from the text itself, but for now other sūtras are briefly quoted to explain them. "Penetrates the tathāgatagarbha": the tathāgatagarbha is neither arising nor ceasing, distinguishing it from the previous teaching's [position that it is] solely an arising and ceasing consciousness. The Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, fascicle one, says: "Just as the waves of the great ocean / Are raised by this fierce wind, / The surging waves beat against the vast chasm, / Without any period of interruption; / The ocean of the storehouse consciousness is permanently abiding, / Stirred by the winds of the objective realm, / The waves of the various consciousnesses / Leap, roll, and arise in turn." Since it says that its essence is permanently abiding, it is clear that it is not merely arising and ceasing; permanently abiding is precisely the tathāgatagarbha. Regarding "the non-arising and non-ceasing harmoniously uniting with arising and ceasing": this is the text of the Awakening of Faith. In full, it says: "The non-arising and non-ceasing harmoniously uniting with arising and ceasing, neither one nor different, is called the ālayavijñāna." Since the harmonious union of the two is called the ālaya, we know that the ālaya is not solely arising and ceasing. Pure reality does not arise, and sheer falsehood cannot be established; only when reality and falsehood harmoniously unite do they form the storehouse consciousness. This is analyzed extensively as in the chapter "Asking for Clarification."

9.19

Regarding the Commentary's statement "all sentient beings are equal in having a single nature": this is the second, clarifying the sense of a single nature along with the meaning of the One Vehicle within the distinction between one nature and five natures, contrasting with the previous five natures and three vehicles, as explained extensively above.

9.20

Regarding the Commentary's statement "they are merely tathatā established in concordance with conditions": this is the third, conveying the meaning of concordance with conditions within the distinction between tathatā's concordance with conditions and its being unchanging. The Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra says: "The tathāgatagarbha, perfumed by beginningless evil habits, is called the storehouse consciousness." It also says: "The tathāgatagarbha experiences suffering and pleasure, arising and ceasing together with causes." Both clarify that it accords with conditions to establish all phenomena. The Awakening of Faith also says: "The intrinsically pure mind, stirred by the wind of ignorance, forms the defiled mind," and so on. That the Commentary says "merely" follows upon what precedes it, meaning that the sentient beings mentioned above are merely formed by tathatā according with conditions. Because of this establishment, the single nature is not lost; in contrast to the initial teaching above, which only spoke of it being immutable, it is therefore said to accord with conditions, not that this school lacks the sense of being unchanging. Because it is unchanging, it can for the first time accord with conditions; because it accords with conditions, it can truly be unchanging. How so? If it were to change its own essence, by what means could it accord with conditions? Just as, if there were no wet nature, how could it follow the wind and form waves? It is precisely by this meaning that the sūtras say tathatā accords with conditions. If it could not accord with conditions, its essence would not pervade conditions. Since it would be absent within conditions, how could it be unchanging? Therefore the two meanings reciprocally complete each other. Hence the Śrīmālā-sūtra says: "Undefiled yet defiled—this is difficult to understand; defiled yet undefiled—this is difficult to understand." These two pairs in this sūtra: the upper pair is unchanging concordance with conditions; the lower pair is according with conditions without losing one's own nature.

9.21

Regarding the Commentary's statement "the dependent's lack of intrinsic nature is precisely the consummate": this is the fourth, clarifying the meaning of mutual identity within the distinction of identity and difference regarding the emptiness and existence of the three natures. That is to say, the dependent nature consists of phenomena produced from causes and conditions; what is conditionally produced lacks intrinsic nature, and because it lacks intrinsic nature, it is empty; emptiness is precisely the consummate, with no two separate essences. "Lacking intrinsic nature" here means lacking the nature of imagined clinging. In the Faxiang school, the imagined is absent, and absence is emptiness, so they only make the imagined empty. In the Dharmatā school, on the dependent nature there is no imagined nature; hence the dependent is empty, and emptiness is the principle of lacking intrinsic nature, and the principle of lacking intrinsic nature is precisely the true nature. Hence the Ghanavyūha-sūtra says: "Names are the imagined nature; characteristics are the dependent origination. Dispelling both names and characteristics: this is the supreme meaning." The Madhyamakaśāstra says: "Phenomena produced through causes and conditions: / I declare to be emptiness; / They are also conventional designations; / They are also the meaning of the Middle Way." On a single condition, the three meanings are fully present, with neither prior nor posterior; hence being existent is being empty, without mutually abandoning each other. If explaining the names of the three natures, the general meaning does not differ from the preceding teaching; it is only because of merging or not merging that the two schools of nature and characteristics are divided.

9.22

Regarding the Commentary's statement "because the single principle is completely equal, it is said that the realm of sentient beings and the realm of buddhas neither increase nor decrease": this is the fifth, the distinction that sentient beings and buddhas neither increase nor decrease. Here only the meaning is different, while the names do not differ. That is to say, since the dharmatā is identical, even if all sentient beings were to simultaneously become buddhas, the realm of sentient beings would not decrease and the realm of buddhas would not increase. Since the realms of sentient beings and buddhas are dharmatā, dharmatā cannot be added to dharmatā. For example, just as space in the east is sentient beings and space in the west is buddhas, one cannot add space in the east to space in the west to make the east decrease and the west increase; hence there is neither increase nor decrease. Sūtras such as the Mahāprajñāpāramitā all speak according to the equality of the single nature.

9.23

The Commentary states: "Emptiness of the ultimate truth..." and so forth; this is the sixth [section], which explains the emptiness and existence of the two truths, concerning the meaning of mutual identity within identity versus difference. Although there are non-identity and non-difference, set against the preceding [teaching] this constitutes mutual identity. Therefore the *Benevolent Kings Sūtra*, "Chapter on the Two Truths," states: "King Prasenajit said: 'Is the conventional truth present within the ultimate truth? If one says it is not, cognition should not be twofold; if one says it is present, cognition should not be single. How is it regarding the meaning of single and twofold?' The Buddha said: 'You now have no hearing, and I now have no speaking; no hearing and no speaking is precisely termed the single meaning and the two meanings.' Then he spoke a verse, saying: 'The signless is the ultimate truth; it is not made by oneself nor made by another. Causes and conditions are fundamentally existent in themselves, neither made by oneself nor made by another. The dharmatā is fundamentally without nature, and the ultimate truth is empty like this. All existing things are fundamentally existent phenomena, existing through the collection of the three designations. Existence and non-existence are fundamentally two in themselves, just like the two horns of an ox. When illuminated by understanding, they are seen as non-dual; the two truths are constantly non-identical. To understanding, they are constantly single in themselves; to the truths, they are constantly two in themselves. Thoroughly penetrating this non-duality, one truly enters the ultimate truth.'" Fascicle thirteen of the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* states: "Mañjuśrī said to the Buddha: 'What is the meaning of the conventional truth and ultimate truth taught by the World-Honoured One? World-Honoured One, is the conventional truth present within the ultimate truth? Is the ultimate truth present within the conventional truth? If it is present, there should be only a single truth; if it is not present, would that not mean the Tathāgata speaks falsely?' The Buddha said: 'Good son, the conventional truth is precisely the ultimate truth.' 'World-Honoured One, if so, there are no two truths.' The Buddha said: 'There are skilful upāyas that, in accordance with sentient beings, teach that there are two truths. Good son, if conforming to verbal expression, there are two kinds: first, worldly phenomena; second, supramundane phenomena. Good son, that which is known by supramundane people is termed the ultimate truth. That which is known by worldly people is termed the conventional truth. Good son, when the five aggregates harmonize and are given the name of a certain person, and ordinary sentient beings conform to what is named—this is termed the conventional truth. Understanding that the aggregates have no name of a certain person, and that apart from the aggregates there is also no name of a certain person, supramundane people can know them according to their nature and characteristics—this is termed the ultimate truth.'" Comparing the above two sūtras with the previous two treatises, the two traditions differ. In the former teaching, eight truths are distinguished: the first is exclusively conventional, the last is exclusively ultimate, and the middle six truths, looking back and forth from above and below, each partake of both meanings, yet all are treated in terms of phenomena, leaving the eighth truth to abide uniquely outside of phenomena. Now in these two sūtras: in the *Benevolent Kings Sūtra*, although there are two truths, cognitive illumination is non-dual; in the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*, fundamentally there is only a single truth, but understanding and confusion divide it into two. This is precisely twofold yet non-dual, non-dual yet twofold; single and twofold being unimpeded constitutes the true two truths. Hence an ancient said: 'The two truths are together yet not a pair; constantly divergent yet never separate.' This is precisely its meaning. Master Sengzhao said: 'Because right and wrong are mutually relative, the names "true" and "conventional" arise; a single truth is the real, while speaking of two is provisional.' This is precisely the import of the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*. The *Liang Treatise* [on Mahāyānasaṃgraha] also states: 'Cognitive obscuration is extremely blinding; it is referred to as grasping separately at the true and the conventional.' However, the Faxiang school focuses on analysis, while the Faxing school focuses on interpenetration; each relies on one approach, so do not give rise to one-sided obstinacy. However, when the Commentary says, "Emptiness of the ultimate truth encompasses both the true and the false," both the true and the false are empty, not merely the true being empty. The false has false existence and false emptiness; the true has [true existence]. As for saying "emptiness of the ultimate truth," it is not that there being no thing is emptiness; rather, it is the emptiness that is identical with subtle existence. "The true is not outside the conventional" clarifies their non-difference, implicitly implying that the conventional is not outside the true. "Being identical to the conventional is the true" clarifies their mutual identity, implicitly implying that being identical to the true is the conventional. As for why it does not say that the conventional is not outside the true and being identical to the true is the conventional: first, it is implicitly indicated, as clarified above; second, because the false must be the true, yet there is also the true that is not the false. Just as waves are precisely moisture, yet there is moisture that is not waves, namely calm water. Since the Buddha has already realized it, one only speaks of conforming to and contemplating the conventional truth as entering the ultimate truth; there is no conforming to and contemplating the ultimate truth as entering the conventional. Therefore, in the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* above, when Mañjuśrī raises both queries, the Tathāgata only states that the conventional truth is precisely the ultimate. The Commentary's words "Although empty, it is not severed," and so forth: because the two truths above are already harmonized, they cause [reality] to be neither severed nor permanent. The subtle purport of the Middle Way is not merely treated in terms of phenomena; this is precisely the text of the *Madhyamakaśāstra* and the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa*. Setting emptiness as the ultimate truth and existence as the conventional truth: because emptiness is the emptiness identical with existence, although empty, it is not severed; this is precisely the true that is identical with the conventional. It is not like the initial teaching, where one only speaks of emptiness like the hair of a tortoise or the horns of a hare. "Although existent, it is not permanent": because existence is the existence identical with emptiness, this existence is impermanent; this is precisely the conventional that is identical with the true. If one grasps existence as definitively existent, one falls into the view of permanence. Therefore the *Madhyamakaśāstra* states: 'Definite existence leads to attachment to permanence; definite non-existence leads to attachment to annihilation. Therefore the wise should not be attached to existence or non-existence.' Being neither severed nor permanent is precisely the Middle Way; if it is impermanent because of cessation and unsevered because of continuation, that is only a single meaning within the conventional. The above, then, without destroying existence and non-existence, is free from existence and non-existence; existence and non-existence are neither one nor different, and thus constitute the Middle Way. If they were one, the meanings of existence and non-existence would both be destroyed; if they were different, one would fall into annihilation or permanence. Why is this? If phenomena definitively had the characteristic of existence, they would ultimately lack the characteristic of non-existence. Just as those who assert existence across the three times say that what exists in the future shifts to the present and turns into the past without abandoning its fundamental characteristic—this would be permanence. Furthermore, that which is definitively existent should not arise from conditions; not arising from conditions, it falls into causeless permanence. If phenomena were definitively non-existent, being previously existent and now non-existent would be annihilation. If one does not harmonize the three truths to clarify emptiness and existence, one will definitely be unable to eliminate the views of annihilation and permanence.

9.24

The Commentary states: "The four characteristics are simultaneous, and their essential nature is precisely extinguished"; this is the seventh [section], concerning the meaning of simultaneity within the distinction between the four characteristics being simultaneous versus successive. Because taking essential extinction as extinction is adopted, they can be simultaneous. Therefore the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* states: 'At initial arising there is extinction; I do not teach this to fools. All dharmas do not arise; I speak of the meaning of the kṣaṇa.' The *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa* states: 'For you at this very moment also arise, also age, and also become extinguished.' It also states: 'The past is already extinguished, the future has not yet arrived, and the present has no abiding; the three times are all empty.' Therefore, the essential nature being precisely extinguished is returning characteristics to nature. Hence the *Awakening of Faith* states: 'If one attains non-thought, one knows the mind's characteristics of arising, abiding, change, and extinction. Because of non-thought and the like, in truth there is no difference of initial awakening. Because the four characteristics exist simultaneously, all lacking self-standing, they are fundamentally equal and share the same single awakening.' The former teaching provisionally establishes four characteristics, so they are not simultaneous; this teaching takes the entity of the characterized dharmas to be harmonized in accordance with dharmatā, and therefore the characterizing characteristics also arise and cease without obstruction.

First 24 of 44 passages. Read on

Linked texts (1)

大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 — Classical Chinese