大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 9.23

9.23

The Commentary states: "Emptiness of the ultimate truth..." and so forth; this is the sixth [section], which explains the emptiness and existence of the two truths, concerning the meaning of mutual identity within identity versus difference. Although there are non-identity and non-difference, set against the preceding [teaching] this constitutes mutual identity. Therefore the *Benevolent Kings Sūtra*, "Chapter on the Two Truths," states: "King Prasenajit said: 'Is the conventional truth present within the ultimate truth? If one says it is not, cognition should not be twofold; if one says it is present, cognition should not be single. How is it regarding the meaning of single and twofold?' The Buddha said: 'You now have no hearing, and I now have no speaking; no hearing and no speaking is precisely termed the single meaning and the two meanings.' Then he spoke a verse, saying: 'The signless is the ultimate truth; it is not made by oneself nor made by another. Causes and conditions are fundamentally existent in themselves, neither made by oneself nor made by another. The dharmatā is fundamentally without nature, and the ultimate truth is empty like this. All existing things are fundamentally existent phenomena, existing through the collection of the three designations. Existence and non-existence are fundamentally two in themselves, just like the two horns of an ox. When illuminated by understanding, they are seen as non-dual; the two truths are constantly non-identical. To understanding, they are constantly single in themselves; to the truths, they are constantly two in themselves. Thoroughly penetrating this non-duality, one truly enters the ultimate truth.'" Fascicle thirteen of the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* states: "Mañjuśrī said to the Buddha: 'What is the meaning of the conventional truth and ultimate truth taught by the World-Honoured One? World-Honoured One, is the conventional truth present within the ultimate truth? Is the ultimate truth present within the conventional truth? If it is present, there should be only a single truth; if it is not present, would that not mean the Tathāgata speaks falsely?' The Buddha said: 'Good son, the conventional truth is precisely the ultimate truth.' 'World-Honoured One, if so, there are no two truths.' The Buddha said: 'There are skilful upāyas that, in accordance with sentient beings, teach that there are two truths. Good son, if conforming to verbal expression, there are two kinds: first, worldly phenomena; second, supramundane phenomena. Good son, that which is known by supramundane people is termed the ultimate truth. That which is known by worldly people is termed the conventional truth. Good son, when the five aggregates harmonize and are given the name of a certain person, and ordinary sentient beings conform to what is named—this is termed the conventional truth. Understanding that the aggregates have no name of a certain person, and that apart from the aggregates there is also no name of a certain person, supramundane people can know them according to their nature and characteristics—this is termed the ultimate truth.'" Comparing the above two sūtras with the previous two treatises, the two traditions differ. In the former teaching, eight truths are distinguished: the first is exclusively conventional, the last is exclusively ultimate, and the middle six truths, looking back and forth from above and below, each partake of both meanings, yet all are treated in terms of phenomena, leaving the eighth truth to abide uniquely outside of phenomena. Now in these two sūtras: in the *Benevolent Kings Sūtra*, although there are two truths, cognitive illumination is non-dual; in the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*, fundamentally there is only a single truth, but understanding and confusion divide it into two. This is precisely twofold yet non-dual, non-dual yet twofold; single and twofold being unimpeded constitutes the true two truths. Hence an ancient said: 'The two truths are together yet not a pair; constantly divergent yet never separate.' This is precisely its meaning. Master Sengzhao said: 'Because right and wrong are mutually relative, the names "true" and "conventional" arise; a single truth is the real, while speaking of two is provisional.' This is precisely the import of the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*. The *Liang Treatise* [on Mahāyānasaṃgraha] also states: 'Cognitive obscuration is extremely blinding; it is referred to as grasping separately at the true and the conventional.' However, the Faxiang school focuses on analysis, while the Faxing school focuses on interpenetration; each relies on one approach, so do not give rise to one-sided obstinacy. However, when the Commentary says, "Emptiness of the ultimate truth encompasses both the true and the false," both the true and the false are empty, not merely the true being empty. The false has false existence and false emptiness; the true has [true existence]. As for saying "emptiness of the ultimate truth," it is not that there being no thing is emptiness; rather, it is the emptiness that is identical with subtle existence. "The true is not outside the conventional" clarifies their non-difference, implicitly implying that the conventional is not outside the true. "Being identical to the conventional is the true" clarifies their mutual identity, implicitly implying that being identical to the true is the conventional. As for why it does not say that the conventional is not outside the true and being identical to the true is the conventional: first, it is implicitly indicated, as clarified above; second, because the false must be the true, yet there is also the true that is not the false. Just as waves are precisely moisture, yet there is moisture that is not waves, namely calm water. Since the Buddha has already realized it, one only speaks of conforming to and contemplating the conventional truth as entering the ultimate truth; there is no conforming to and contemplating the ultimate truth as entering the conventional. Therefore, in the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* above, when Mañjuśrī raises both queries, the Tathāgata only states that the conventional truth is precisely the ultimate. The Commentary's words "Although empty, it is not severed," and so forth: because the two truths above are already harmonized, they cause [reality] to be neither severed nor permanent. The subtle purport of the Middle Way is not merely treated in terms of phenomena; this is precisely the text of the *Madhyamakaśāstra* and the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa*. Setting emptiness as the ultimate truth and existence as the conventional truth: because emptiness is the emptiness identical with existence, although empty, it is not severed; this is precisely the true that is identical with the conventional. It is not like the initial teaching, where one only speaks of emptiness like the hair of a tortoise or the horns of a hare. "Although existent, it is not permanent": because existence is the existence identical with emptiness, this existence is impermanent; this is precisely the conventional that is identical with the true. If one grasps existence as definitively existent, one falls into the view of permanence. Therefore the *Madhyamakaśāstra* states: 'Definite existence leads to attachment to permanence; definite non-existence leads to attachment to annihilation. Therefore the wise should not be attached to existence or non-existence.' Being neither severed nor permanent is precisely the Middle Way; if it is impermanent because of cessation and unsevered because of continuation, that is only a single meaning within the conventional. The above, then, without destroying existence and non-existence, is free from existence and non-existence; existence and non-existence are neither one nor different, and thus constitute the Middle Way. If they were one, the meanings of existence and non-existence would both be destroyed; if they were different, one would fall into annihilation or permanence. Why is this? If phenomena definitively had the characteristic of existence, they would ultimately lack the characteristic of non-existence. Just as those who assert existence across the three times say that what exists in the future shifts to the present and turns into the past without abandoning its fundamental characteristic—this would be permanence. Furthermore, that which is definitively existent should not arise from conditions; not arising from conditions, it falls into causeless permanence. If phenomena were definitively non-existent, being previously existent and now non-existent would be annihilation. If one does not harmonize the three truths to clarify emptiness and existence, one will definitely be unable to eliminate the views of annihilation and permanence.