勝鬘寶窟 2.52

2.52

第八大意門。然凡夫隨名著名、隨相取相，聞說有五住煩惱，則言有惑可斷。二乘未除，唯佛能盡，則言有人能斷。有五住可斷，則成斷見；惑斷而證涅槃，則成常見。《法華》中以此喻窮子，是除糞之人，以有惑可斷。有人能除，故名除糞。今大乘學，還作此解，是大除糞人也。《金光明》云「無明體性本自不有，妄想因緣和合而有。無所有故，假名無明。是故我說名曰無明。」無明既爾，四住且爾，豈可言有五住可斷？但今約空，謂眾生故，強名五住。知此五住本來無生，故名為斷耳。《大品》云「若法先有後無，諸佛菩薩則有過罪。」此經云「非壞法滅。本性清淨，故名為滅。」須留此門也。就釋煩惱又為三：一別明四住；二「心不相應無始」已下，別彰無明；三「此四住地力」下，四住無明相對辨異。就釋四住中有三：「煩惱有二種」，謂標數也；「何等為二」下，第二列名也；「住地有四種」下，第三廣釋。釋上二門即二：一釋住地章門、次釋起章門。釋住地章門中前列四數。「此四住地生一切起煩惱」者，總釋住地之名。此之四種，性成在已，故名為住。地者，能生現起，故說為地。今言此四住生一切起煩惱者，對所生顯能生為地，亦是能生起煩惱為地，起煩惱依之得立名住。「起者剎那心剎那相應」，次釋起章門也。外國稱剎那，此云念也。王一念緣境，煩惱法數隨心而起，同時不相離，故言剎那相應。故馬鳴言：「心異念異，而同知同緣，名相應染。若非起煩惱，心自緣境，煩惱不起，不與心應。」彼名愛結為念也。有人用《成實論》釋，欲明從地起煩惱轉麁，便有識想受行四心之異，前後想受同緣一境，故言相應。此釋意，唯是一境，識得此境上實法，想得境上假名，次想後起受，領境上好惡，次行於境起善惡。四心前後緣一境，故名相應。

Eighth is the section on the general meaning. Now, ordinary people grasp at names following names and seize marks following marks; hearing it said that there are five entrenchments of defilement, they say that there are delusions to be severed. The two vehicles have not eliminated them and only the Buddha can exhaust them; thus they say there is a person who can sever them. If there are five entrenchments to be severed, this becomes an annihilationist view; if delusion is severed and one realizes nirvāṇa, this becomes an eternalist view. In the Lotus Sūtra, this is exemplified by the poor son who is a person removing dung: because there are delusions to be severed and there is a person who can remove them, it is called removing dung. Now, if Mahāyāna practitioners still hold this understanding, they are great dung-removers! The Suvarṇaprabhāsa-sūtra says: 'The essence of ignorance originally does not exist; it exists through the assembly of causes and conditions of false conceptualization. Because it is nonexistent, it is conventionally designated as ignorance. For this reason, I call it ignorance.' Since ignorance is like this, the four entrenchments are also like this; how could one say that there are five entrenchments to be severed? It is only that now, with reference to emptiness and on account of sentient beings, they are forcibly named the five entrenchments. Knowing that these five entrenchments are originally unproduced is therefore called 'severing', nothing more. The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra states: 'If dharmas existed first and became nonexistent later, the Buddhas and bodhisattvas would incur fault.' This sūtra states: 'It is not a cessation through the destruction of dharmas. Because intrinsic nature is pure, it is called cessation.' This section must be retained. As for explaining defilements, there are again three parts: first, explaining the four entrenchments separately; second, from 'the mind unassociated, beginningless...' onward, highlighting ignorance separately; third, from 'by the power of these four entrenchments...' onward, distinguishing the four entrenchments and ignorance against each other. In explaining the four entrenchments there are three parts: 'defilements are of two kinds' indicates the number; from 'what are the two' onward, the second lists the names; from 'entrenchments are of four kinds' onward, the third extensively explains them. Explaining the above two aspects comprises two parts: first, explaining the heading of entrenchment, and next, explaining the heading of arising. In explaining the heading of entrenchment, it first lists the four numbers. 'These four entrenchments produce all arising defilements' provides a general explanation of the name 'entrenchment'. These four kinds, being established as natures within oneself, are therefore called 'dwelling' (nivāsa/sthāna). 'Ground/entrenchment' (bhūmi) means that which can produce active arisings, and is therefore spoken of as ground. Now, saying that these four entrenchments produce all arising defilements, in contrast to what is produced, shows that what can produce is the ground; it is also that being able to produce arising defilements constitutes the ground, and that arising defilements, relying upon them, are able to stand, which is called dwelling. 'What arises is momentary and momentarily associated with the mind' next explains the heading of arising. In foreign countries it is called kṣaṇa; here it is called a thought-moment (cittakṣaṇa). When the primary mind in a single thought-moment conditions an object, the mental factors of defilement arise following the mind, simultaneously and inseparable; therefore it is said to be momentarily associated. Thus Aśvaghoṣa said: 'Mind is distinct and thought is distinct, yet knowing together and conditioning together is called associated defilement. If it is not an arising defilement, the mind itself conditions objects, defilement does not arise, and it is not associated with the mind.' He names the fetter of craving a thought. Some explain this using the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra: wishing to clarify that defilements arising from the entrenchment turn coarser, there are differences among the four minds of consciousness, notion, feeling, and volition; preceding and succeeding notions and feelings conditioning the same object together is therefore called associated. The meaning of this explanation is: there is only a single object; consciousness apprehends the real dharma upon this object, notion apprehends the conventional name upon the object, feeling arises subsequent to notion and receives the agreeable or disagreeable upon the object, and next, volition gives rise to good or evil with respect to the object. Because the four minds condition a single object in succession, they are called associated.