勝鬘寶窟 2.52

2.52

Eighth is the section on the general meaning. Now, ordinary people grasp at names following names and seize marks following marks; hearing it said that there are five entrenchments of defilement, they say that there are delusions to be severed. The two vehicles have not eliminated them and only the Buddha can exhaust them; thus they say there is a person who can sever them. If there are five entrenchments to be severed, this becomes an annihilationist view; if delusion is severed and one realizes nirvāṇa, this becomes an eternalist view. In the Lotus Sūtra, this is exemplified by the poor son who is a person removing dung: because there are delusions to be severed and there is a person who can remove them, it is called removing dung. Now, if Mahāyāna practitioners still hold this understanding, they are great dung-removers! The Suvarṇaprabhāsa-sūtra says: 'The essence of ignorance originally does not exist; it exists through the assembly of causes and conditions of false conceptualization. Because it is nonexistent, it is conventionally designated as ignorance. For this reason, I call it ignorance.' Since ignorance is like this, the four entrenchments are also like this; how could one say that there are five entrenchments to be severed? It is only that now, with reference to emptiness and on account of sentient beings, they are forcibly named the five entrenchments. Knowing that these five entrenchments are originally unproduced is therefore called 'severing', nothing more. The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra states: 'If dharmas existed first and became nonexistent later, the Buddhas and bodhisattvas would incur fault.' This sūtra states: 'It is not a cessation through the destruction of dharmas. Because intrinsic nature is pure, it is called cessation.' This section must be retained. As for explaining defilements, there are again three parts: first, explaining the four entrenchments separately; second, from 'the mind unassociated, beginningless...' onward, highlighting ignorance separately; third, from 'by the power of these four entrenchments...' onward, distinguishing the four entrenchments and ignorance against each other. In explaining the four entrenchments there are three parts: 'defilements are of two kinds' indicates the number; from 'what are the two' onward, the second lists the names; from 'entrenchments are of four kinds' onward, the third extensively explains them. Explaining the above two aspects comprises two parts: first, explaining the heading of entrenchment, and next, explaining the heading of arising. In explaining the heading of entrenchment, it first lists the four numbers. 'These four entrenchments produce all arising defilements' provides a general explanation of the name 'entrenchment'. These four kinds, being established as natures within oneself, are therefore called 'dwelling' (nivāsa/sthāna). 'Ground/entrenchment' (bhūmi) means that which can produce active arisings, and is therefore spoken of as ground. Now, saying that these four entrenchments produce all arising defilements, in contrast to what is produced, shows that what can produce is the ground; it is also that being able to produce arising defilements constitutes the ground, and that arising defilements, relying upon them, are able to stand, which is called dwelling. 'What arises is momentary and momentarily associated with the mind' next explains the heading of arising. In foreign countries it is called kṣaṇa; here it is called a thought-moment (cittakṣaṇa). When the primary mind in a single thought-moment conditions an object, the mental factors of defilement arise following the mind, simultaneously and inseparable; therefore it is said to be momentarily associated. Thus Aśvaghoṣa said: 'Mind is distinct and thought is distinct, yet knowing together and conditioning together is called associated defilement. If it is not an arising defilement, the mind itself conditions objects, defilement does not arise, and it is not associated with the mind.' He names the fetter of craving a thought. Some explain this using the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra: wishing to clarify that defilements arising from the entrenchment turn coarser, there are differences among the four minds of consciousness, notion, feeling, and volition; preceding and succeeding notions and feelings conditioning the same object together is therefore called associated. The meaning of this explanation is: there is only a single object; consciousness apprehends the real dharma upon this object, notion apprehends the conventional name upon the object, feeling arises subsequent to notion and receives the agreeable or disagreeable upon the object, and next, volition gives rise to good or evil with respect to the object. Because the four minds condition a single object in succession, they are called associated.