勝鬘寶窟 3.46

3.46

「如來藏者」下，第三明如來藏非三種眾生境界。三種眾生者，一墮身見眾生。此是凡夫外道，於五陰身內而見有我，明名身見眾生。顛倒眾生者，二乘人也。於法身常樂我淨，起無常等四顛倒也。空亂意眾生者，初學大乘人多習空觀，妨亂真解，名空亂意眾生。《涅槃》云「十地菩薩為無我論之所惑亂」，今文無乃非十地，但學大乘人為空見惑，不知佛性。「非境界」者，總明如來藏非此三種人之境界也。如來藏非我人眾生，橫計我人眾生，不識如來藏。如來藏非是無常無我，計無常無我者，不識如來藏。如來藏非空非有，若計空有者，亦不識如來藏。是故如來藏言亡慮絕、不可思議，豈得言有如來藏一初為生死作依持建立。若言有如來藏為生死作依持建立者，是有見眾生。又若言有能藏所藏作有見解者，皆是能藏，無所藏故。有所得眾生，生死涅槃皆是真實生死。有所得人，眾生與佛皆是眾生。故《中論》云「若不受諸法，我當得佛涅槃。當知是人，還為受所縛。」故受此無受，無受還成受，即其證也。有人言：意散亂失空解眾生，明真實法體即是空。此人不解，而於有解外別求於空，故失空解也。不得禪定，不得一心，名為亂意，故名散亂失空意眾生。亦三種眾生，出《佛性論》。撿《佛性論．無差別品》為四種人：為身見眾生，故論法身。身見眾生不了我我所；為對治此，故說法身。二為對二乘顛倒眾生故，說名如來。二乘於常真如中，計無常等四倒；為對此故，說真如常，無有四倒。三為散動眾生，說名真諦。始行菩薩有二種人：一見諸法，折之故空；二謂有實法，名之為有。第一人執空、第二人執有，故此二人並迷如來藏中道之法。為對此故，說於真諦。

From "The tathāgatagarbha is [not the realm]" below, the third section explains that the tathāgatagarbha is not the realm of the three kinds of sentient beings. As for the three kinds of sentient beings: First are sentient beings who fall into the view of selfhood. These are ordinary persons and non-Buddhists who, within the body of the five aggregates, see a self; hence they are called sentient beings with the view of selfhood. 'Perverted sentient beings' are the people of the two vehicles. Toward the permanence, bliss, self, and purity of the dharmakāya, they produce the four perversions of impermanence and so forth. 'Sentient beings whose minds are confused about emptiness' refers to beginners in the Mahāyāna who frequently practice the contemplation of emptiness, which impedes and confuses their true understanding; hence they are called sentient beings whose minds are confused about emptiness. The Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] says, "Bodhisattvas on the ten stages are deluded and confused by the doctrine of non-self." In the present text it does not mean those on the ten stages; it is merely that those who study the Mahāyāna are deluded by the view of emptiness and do not know the buddhadhātu. 'Is not the realm' generally explains that the tathāgatagarbha is not the realm of these three kinds of persons. The tathāgatagarbha is neither self, sentient being, life, nor person; those who falsely calculate a self, sentient being, life, or person do not know the tathāgatagarbha. The tathāgatagarbha is neither impermanence nor non-self; those who calculate impermanence and non-self do not know the tathāgatagarbha. The tathāgatagarbha is neither empty nor existent; if one calculates emptiness or existence, one also does not know the tathāgatagarbha. Therefore, the tathāgatagarbha is beyond words and thought, inconceivable; how could one say that there is a tathāgatagarbha that primarily serves as a foundation and establishment for saṃsāra? If one says that there is a tathāgatagarbha that serves as a foundation and establishment for saṃsāra, one is a sentient being holding the view of existence. Furthermore, if one says there is an active concealer and a concealed object and forms an understanding based on the view of existence, these are all active concealers, because there is no concealed object. For sentient beings with acquisition, both saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are real saṃsāra. For a person with acquisition, both sentient beings and buddhas are sentient beings. Thus the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states, "If [one thinks,] 'By not grasping phenomena, I will attain the nirvāṇa of the buddhas,' know that this person is still bound by grasping." Therefore, grasping this non-grasping turns non-grasping back into grasping, which is just the proof of this. Some say: 'Sentient beings whose minds are distracted and lose the understanding of emptiness' means that the true essence of phenomena is emptiness itself. This person does not understand, and apart from the understanding of existence, seeks emptiness separately, and thus loses the understanding of emptiness. Failing to attain dhyāna-concentration and not attaining singleness of mind is called 'confused mind'; hence they are called 'sentient beings whose minds are distracted and lose emptiness'. These three kinds of sentient beings also come from the Treatise on Buddhadhātu (*Buddhadhātuvibhāga-śāstra). Consulting the *Buddhadhātuvibhāga-śāstra's "Chapter on Non-Differentiation," they are four kinds of persons: For the sake of sentient beings with the view of selfhood, it discusses the dharmakāya. Sentient beings with the view of selfhood do not understand self and what belongs to self; to counteract this, it speaks of the dharmakāya. Second, for the sake of perverted sentient beings of the two vehicles, it is called the Tathāgata. The two vehicles, in the midst of permanent tathatā, calculate the four perversions of impermanence and so forth; to counteract this, it states that tathatā is permanent and free of the four perversions. Third, for the sake of distracted and agitated sentient beings, it is called the ultimate truth. There are two kinds of newly practicing bodhisattvas: one observes phenomena and analyzes them into emptiness; the other considers that there are real phenomena and calls them existent. The first grasps emptiness, and the second grasps existence; thus both of these two persons are deluded about the Middle Way of the tathāgatagarbha. To counteract this, it speaks of the ultimate truth.