大般涅槃經集解 32.26

32.26

案僧亮曰：若是一諦說有二義者，則應一是虛妄，故云將非虛妄說耶。法瑤曰：如其相無，則二名無實而有二名者豈非虛妄耶？僧宗曰：先張兩關以求其旨。若真中有俗，則俗來同真；若俗中有真，則真來同俗。若以真同俗則唯一世諦，以俗同真則唯一真諦，不應有二諦之說也。若俗不容真、真不容俗者，是則天然楚越也。若真中必無俗者，而如來說色即空，此則虛妄說也。寶亮曰：世諦以虛妄故有，即體不異空也。若無有而可異於空者，豈有空之可異於有耶？故無而即一體，便二諦之名立也。若有有可無，便是世諦之中有第一義也。無既無所無，亦無無可異有也。若有無可異有，便是第一義中有世諦也。兩既不相有，故知有無可有、無無可無。若有有可有、有無可無，此便相有。得知諸法從本已來，空無毫末之相，但於病者為有，於解者常無。文殊致問，為彰此理也。

Sengliang notes: "If there is one truth and two meanings are spoken of, then one must be false; hence it is said, 'Would that not be a false statement?'" Fayao says: "If they are mutually non-existent, then the two names lack reality; to have two names, how could that not be false?" Sengzong says: "He first sets up two checkpoints to seek out its meaning. If the conventional is within the ultimate, then the conventional becomes identical to the ultimate; if the ultimate is within the conventional, then the ultimate becomes identical to the conventional. If the ultimate is identical to the conventional, there is only a single conventional truth; if the conventional is identical to the ultimate, there is only a single ultimate truth—there should not be the teaching of two truths. If the conventional does not accommodate the ultimate and the ultimate does not accommodate the conventional, then they are as distant as Chu and Yue. If there is definitely no conventional within the ultimate, yet the Tathāgata says that form is emptiness, then this would be a false statement." Baoliang says: "The conventional truth exists because of falsity, and its essence is not different from emptiness. If there were no existence that could differ from emptiness, how could there be emptiness that differs from existence? Thus, non-existence is directly a single essence, and the names of the two truths are established. If there were an existence that could be negated, that would mean the ultimate truth is within the conventional truth. Non-existence, having nothing to negate, also has no non-existence that could differ from existence. If there were non-existence that could differ from existence, that would mean the conventional truth is within the ultimate truth. Since neither mutually exists, we know that existence is without anything that can exist, and non-existence is without anything that can be non-existent. If existence had something that could exist, and non-existence had something that could be non-existent, they would mutually exist. One understands that from the beginning all dharmas have been empty, lacking even the finest mark; they exist only for the afflicted, and are always non-existent for the enlightened. Mañjuśrī raises this question to illuminate this principle."