大般涅槃經集解 32.26

32.26

Sengliang notes: "If there is one truth and two meanings are spoken of, then one must be false; hence it is said, 'Would that not be a false statement?'" Fayao says: "If they are mutually non-existent, then the two names lack reality; to have two names, how could that not be false?" Sengzong says: "He first sets up two checkpoints to seek out its meaning. If the conventional is within the ultimate, then the conventional becomes identical to the ultimate; if the ultimate is within the conventional, then the ultimate becomes identical to the conventional. If the ultimate is identical to the conventional, there is only a single conventional truth; if the conventional is identical to the ultimate, there is only a single ultimate truth—there should not be the teaching of two truths. If the conventional does not accommodate the ultimate and the ultimate does not accommodate the conventional, then they are as distant as Chu and Yue. If there is definitely no conventional within the ultimate, yet the Tathāgata says that form is emptiness, then this would be a false statement." Baoliang says: "The conventional truth exists because of falsity, and its essence is not different from emptiness. If there were no existence that could differ from emptiness, how could there be emptiness that differs from existence? Thus, non-existence is directly a single essence, and the names of the two truths are established. If there were an existence that could be negated, that would mean the ultimate truth is within the conventional truth. Non-existence, having nothing to negate, also has no non-existence that could differ from existence. If there were non-existence that could differ from existence, that would mean the conventional truth is within the ultimate truth. Since neither mutually exists, we know that existence is without anything that can exist, and non-existence is without anything that can be non-existent. If existence had something that could exist, and non-existence had something that could be non-existent, they would mutually exist. One understands that from the beginning all dharmas have been empty, lacking even the finest mark; they exist only for the afflicted, and are always non-existent for the enlightened. Mañjuśrī raises this question to illuminate this principle."