大般涅槃經集解 46.38

46.38

案僧亮曰：已說世諦，生是假生。但外計四相，謂生是實法。今破其橫計，使假生之義立，是故問也。有六句問也。僧宗曰：更設六難，猶成前六難也。如來向以四句解釋。初句問不聞難，借生以況聞。今移聞難生者，若於生義有滯，則聞義亦壅也；若於生義通釋，則聞旨亦釋。此有三關，相對為六。前難生相不能生法，既不生法，則法不可生，猶執定成前意也；中二難為自他難也；後二有無難也。尋此難相承躡之，意由佛向解未生法是無，而見在假，因緣故生。當知理不聞，假言故聞。琉離光承前言致難，今先難生體也。生若是常者，先張二關也。言生相若常有漏，不應有生也。何以然耶？生既是常，法體無常，二理天乖。既云天乖，何體以常乃至無常之法耶？欲使有漏不從相生也。寶亮曰：上來既明生生等四句，於執相者謂言有漏法外別有一生相來生有漏法起，故琉璃光今者作難。今佛會通，若論理而言，正是法起時名生法、無時名滅，無別有生相來生法。其難意既爾，下據事來作三關難。一難開兩關，便成六重。就一關中，先定、後結難。定初關言：有漏法若有生者，為是常故能生？是無常故能生？下即結難言：生若是常，有漏之法則無有生。若別有一生相是常而生法者，則所生之法則無有生。若生，若別有一生相是常而生法者，則所生之法亦應從生相皆常也。而今現見有漏法念念無常，得知此法不為無常生相之所生，則有漏之法無生相，是以言有漏之法則無有生也。智秀曰：初二句作常無常難，欲使常則寂然不動，無功用力故，豈能生法耶？無常則體不自立，力不及法，亦不能生他也。次二句作自生生他難。初明生之為法，理不自生也。若生他為生，無漏涅槃不即是生相，便是於生為他，何故不能生此他耶？而必不能，故知生相生他為生，義則不然。次復二句就本有本無為難。若生已有之法，則不假更生；若生無法使有，則應能使虛空成有也。

Sengliang notes: Having already spoken of conventional truth, birth is provisional birth. But outsiders conceptualise four marks, claiming that birth is a real dharma. Now, in order to refute their perverse conceptualisations and establish the meaning of provisional birth, he asks. There are six propositions in the question. Sengzong notes: He further sets forth six objections, which still develop the previous six objections. The Tathāgata just now explained them with four propositions. The first proposition asked about the objection concerning the unheard, borrowing birth to illustrate hearing. Now he transfers the objection from hearing to birth: if one is obstructed regarding the meaning of birth, the meaning of hearing is also blocked; if the meaning of birth is thoroughly explained, the purport of hearing is also explained. Here there are three pairs, forming six across their counterparts. The former objects that the mark of birth cannot give birth to dharmas, and since it does not give birth to dharmas, then dharmas cannot be born, still clinging determinately to complete the previous intent; the middle two objections are the objections on self and other; the latter two are the objections on existence and non-existence. Investigating the continuity of these objections, their intent stems from the Buddha having just explained that unproduced dharmas are non-existent, but present provisional existence arises from causes and conditions. One should know that the principle is unheard, but heard through provisional words. Vaiḍūryaprabha takes up the previous words to raise an objection, now first challenging the essence of birth. 'If birth is permanent' first opens two forks. It means: if the mark of birth is permanent, the defiled should not have birth. Why is this? Since birth is permanent, while the essence of dharmas is impermanent, the two principles are completely opposed. Since they are completely opposed, how could the permanent essence bring about impermanent dharmas? This aims to make the defiled not arise from marks. Baoliang notes: Having above clarified the four propositions such as 'born being born,' those who cling to marks claim that outside defiled dharmas there is a separate mark of birth that comes to produce defiled dharmas; therefore Vaiḍūryaprabha now raises an objection. Now the Buddha harmonises and resolves this: if we speak in terms of principle, precisely when a dharma arises is it called a produced dharma, and when it is absent it is called extinguished; there is no separate mark of birth that comes to produce dharmas. Since his objection's intent is such, below he draws on phenomena to construct three paired objections. One objection opens two forks, thereby becoming six layers. Within one pair, he first posits the premise and then concludes the objection. Positing the first pair, he says: If defiled dharmas have birth, is it because it is permanent that it can produce them? Or is it because it is impermanent that it can produce them? Below he immediately concludes the objection, saying: 'If birth is permanent, defiled dharmas have no birth.' If there were a separate mark of birth that is permanent and produces dharmas, then the produced dharmas would have no birth. If there were a separate mark of birth that is permanent and produces dharmas, then the produced dharmas should also follow the mark of birth in being entirely permanent. Yet now we presently see that defiled dharmas are impermanent from thought-moment to thought-moment; from this we know that these dharmas are not produced by an impermanent mark of birth, and thus defiled dharmas have no mark of birth; hence it is said that defiled dharmas have no birth. Zhixiu notes: The first two propositions raise the objection of permanence and impermanence: if it were permanent, it would be still and unmoving, lacking functional power, so how could it produce dharmas? If it were impermanent, its essence could not establish itself, its power would not reach dharmas, and it could also not produce other things. The next two propositions raise the objection of self-production and producing others. First, he clarifies that as a dharma, birth by principle does not produce itself. If producing others constitutes birth, then undefiled nirvāṇa is not identical to the mark of birth, and is therefore 'other' to birth; why then can it not produce this other? Since it certainly cannot, we know that the sense of the mark of birth producing others as birth is not so. The next two propositions raise the objection regarding original existence and original non-existence. If it produces an already existing dharma, it does not require further production; if it produces a non-existent dharma to make it exist, it should be able to make empty space become existent.