大般涅槃經集解 46.38

46.38

Sengliang notes: Having already spoken of conventional truth, birth is provisional birth. But outsiders conceptualise four marks, claiming that birth is a real dharma. Now, in order to refute their perverse conceptualisations and establish the meaning of provisional birth, he asks. There are six propositions in the question. Sengzong notes: He further sets forth six objections, which still develop the previous six objections. The Tathāgata just now explained them with four propositions. The first proposition asked about the objection concerning the unheard, borrowing birth to illustrate hearing. Now he transfers the objection from hearing to birth: if one is obstructed regarding the meaning of birth, the meaning of hearing is also blocked; if the meaning of birth is thoroughly explained, the purport of hearing is also explained. Here there are three pairs, forming six across their counterparts. The former objects that the mark of birth cannot give birth to dharmas, and since it does not give birth to dharmas, then dharmas cannot be born, still clinging determinately to complete the previous intent; the middle two objections are the objections on self and other; the latter two are the objections on existence and non-existence. Investigating the continuity of these objections, their intent stems from the Buddha having just explained that unproduced dharmas are non-existent, but present provisional existence arises from causes and conditions. One should know that the principle is unheard, but heard through provisional words. Vaiḍūryaprabha takes up the previous words to raise an objection, now first challenging the essence of birth. 'If birth is permanent' first opens two forks. It means: if the mark of birth is permanent, the defiled should not have birth. Why is this? Since birth is permanent, while the essence of dharmas is impermanent, the two principles are completely opposed. Since they are completely opposed, how could the permanent essence bring about impermanent dharmas? This aims to make the defiled not arise from marks. Baoliang notes: Having above clarified the four propositions such as 'born being born,' those who cling to marks claim that outside defiled dharmas there is a separate mark of birth that comes to produce defiled dharmas; therefore Vaiḍūryaprabha now raises an objection. Now the Buddha harmonises and resolves this: if we speak in terms of principle, precisely when a dharma arises is it called a produced dharma, and when it is absent it is called extinguished; there is no separate mark of birth that comes to produce dharmas. Since his objection's intent is such, below he draws on phenomena to construct three paired objections. One objection opens two forks, thereby becoming six layers. Within one pair, he first posits the premise and then concludes the objection. Positing the first pair, he says: If defiled dharmas have birth, is it because it is permanent that it can produce them? Or is it because it is impermanent that it can produce them? Below he immediately concludes the objection, saying: 'If birth is permanent, defiled dharmas have no birth.' If there were a separate mark of birth that is permanent and produces dharmas, then the produced dharmas would have no birth. If there were a separate mark of birth that is permanent and produces dharmas, then the produced dharmas should also follow the mark of birth in being entirely permanent. Yet now we presently see that defiled dharmas are impermanent from thought-moment to thought-moment; from this we know that these dharmas are not produced by an impermanent mark of birth, and thus defiled dharmas have no mark of birth; hence it is said that defiled dharmas have no birth. Zhixiu notes: The first two propositions raise the objection of permanence and impermanence: if it were permanent, it would be still and unmoving, lacking functional power, so how could it produce dharmas? If it were impermanent, its essence could not establish itself, its power would not reach dharmas, and it could also not produce other things. The next two propositions raise the objection of self-production and producing others. First, he clarifies that as a dharma, birth by principle does not produce itself. If producing others constitutes birth, then undefiled nirvāṇa is not identical to the mark of birth, and is therefore 'other' to birth; why then can it not produce this other? Since it certainly cannot, we know that the sense of the mark of birth producing others as birth is not so. The next two propositions raise the objection regarding original existence and original non-existence. If it produces an already existing dharma, it does not require further production; if it produces a non-existent dharma to make it exist, it should be able to make empty space become existent.