大般涅槃經集解 47.14

47.14

案僧亮曰：答第三也。從理名內，不從理名外。內外皆是性，不可斷也。僧宗曰：此下答前三中第三句。其前難意，欲闡提善根既斷，性亦應斷。今答言善有二種，內之與外，意業善為內、身口業善為外。佛性非內外，故非無常也。闡提佛性既是當有，非為已有，豈可責令遮地獄？既言當有，豈得有常樂我淨義？勢可得兼當第一第二難也。復有二種，更廣明佛性不同此也。此言無漏，是因地無漏也。非常者，佛性不同三心滅處及三無為常也。若斷已得名闡提者，言起作之善是可斷，後復還得故。以斷起作之善，故稱闡提。佛性理常，性相恒爾，豈可斷耶？寶亮曰：正舉第一問來答。我上言譬提有佛性，唯有正因性，本不論有緣因。何故作此之難，而令斷生已得善故，受闡提名也。善有二種一內二外者，若意地所生善名內，從身口所生善為外。正因之性，非此內外善攝，故不斷也。漏有漏者，若狹相所起之善名有漏；若於緣中稱境解、不與惑俱，名之無漏。明正因性亦非此二善，是故不斷也。常無常者，昔於滅諦中善名常，從緣中所起者名無常。正因性亦非常善無常善，所以不斷也。而正因佛性若可斷，則應同上所列善；而今不然，故知不斷。正斷緣中所生善故，得一闡提名也。

Sengliang comments: This answers the third. What accords with principle is called internal; what does not accord with principle is called external. Both internal and external are natures; they cannot be severed. Sengzong says: Below this answers the third line among the former three. The intention of the previous challenge was that since the icchantika's wholesome roots are severed, the nature should also be severed. Now he answers that there are two kinds of wholesome roots: internal and external; the wholesome karma of the mind is internal, while the wholesome karma of body and speech is external. The buddhadhātu is neither internal nor external, hence it is not impermanent. Since the icchantika's buddhadhātu is to exist in the future and does not already exist [as realized], how could one demand that it ward off the hells? Since it is said to exist in the future, how could it have permanence, bliss, self, and purity? Its import can concurrently answer the first and second challenges. There are again two kinds, further explaining extensively that the buddhadhātu is not like these. The 'undefiled' mentioned here is the undefiled on the causal stage. 'Not eternal' means that the buddhadhātu is not like the cessation of the three minds or the permanence of the three unconditioned phenomena. If one is named an icchantika once it is severed, this means that active, conditioned goodness is severable, and can later be regained; because active goodness is severed, one is termed an icchantika. The principle of the buddhadhātu is eternally constant, its nature and characteristics are ever thus; how could it be severed? Baoliang says: Directly adducing the first question to answer it. Above I said that the icchantika possesses the buddhadhātu, having only the direct causal nature; originally it did not discuss having the conditional causal nature. Why make this challenge, claiming that because he severs the goodness that has arisen and been attained, he receives the name of an icchantika? As for goodness being of two kinds, internal and external: the goodness generated from the mental ground is called internal; the goodness generated from body and speech is external. The nature of the direct cause is not subsumed under these internal and external goods; therefore it is unsevered. As for defiled and undefiled: goodness arising from narrow characteristics is called defiled; if, regarding conditions, understanding accords with the object and is not accompanied by afflictions, it is called undefiled. This clarifies that the nature of the direct cause is also not these two goods; therefore it is unsevered. As for permanent and impermanent: formerly, goodness within the truth of cessation was called permanent, and that arising from conditions was called impermanent. The nature of the direct cause is also neither permanent goodness nor impermanent goodness; therefore it is unsevered. If the direct causal buddhadhātu could be severed, it would be identical to the goods listed above; but since it is not so, one knows it is unsevered. It is precisely because of severing the goodness generated from conditions that one attains the name of an icchantika.