大般涅槃經集解 47.14

47.14

Sengliang comments: This answers the third. What accords with principle is called internal; what does not accord with principle is called external. Both internal and external are natures; they cannot be severed. Sengzong says: Below this answers the third line among the former three. The intention of the previous challenge was that since the icchantika's wholesome roots are severed, the nature should also be severed. Now he answers that there are two kinds of wholesome roots: internal and external; the wholesome karma of the mind is internal, while the wholesome karma of body and speech is external. The buddhadhātu is neither internal nor external, hence it is not impermanent. Since the icchantika's buddhadhātu is to exist in the future and does not already exist [as realized], how could one demand that it ward off the hells? Since it is said to exist in the future, how could it have permanence, bliss, self, and purity? Its import can concurrently answer the first and second challenges. There are again two kinds, further explaining extensively that the buddhadhātu is not like these. The 'undefiled' mentioned here is the undefiled on the causal stage. 'Not eternal' means that the buddhadhātu is not like the cessation of the three minds or the permanence of the three unconditioned phenomena. If one is named an icchantika once it is severed, this means that active, conditioned goodness is severable, and can later be regained; because active goodness is severed, one is termed an icchantika. The principle of the buddhadhātu is eternally constant, its nature and characteristics are ever thus; how could it be severed? Baoliang says: Directly adducing the first question to answer it. Above I said that the icchantika possesses the buddhadhātu, having only the direct causal nature; originally it did not discuss having the conditional causal nature. Why make this challenge, claiming that because he severs the goodness that has arisen and been attained, he receives the name of an icchantika? As for goodness being of two kinds, internal and external: the goodness generated from the mental ground is called internal; the goodness generated from body and speech is external. The nature of the direct cause is not subsumed under these internal and external goods; therefore it is unsevered. As for defiled and undefiled: goodness arising from narrow characteristics is called defiled; if, regarding conditions, understanding accords with the object and is not accompanied by afflictions, it is called undefiled. This clarifies that the nature of the direct cause is also not these two goods; therefore it is unsevered. As for permanent and impermanent: formerly, goodness within the truth of cessation was called permanent, and that arising from conditions was called impermanent. The nature of the direct cause is also neither permanent goodness nor impermanent goodness; therefore it is unsevered. If the direct causal buddhadhātu could be severed, it would be identical to the goods listed above; but since it is not so, one knows it is unsevered. It is precisely because of severing the goodness generated from conditions that one attains the name of an icchantika.