大般涅槃經集解 66.48

66.48

案僧亮曰：兼答初難也。難云：性有三世。今明非三世不可說有，便三世攝，少可見故，名現在者；以少見故，名後身也。過去具但二世也。未具見故，名未來者。未具見即少分見也。學身說有去來，非無學也。法瑤曰：答前為過去、為未來、為現在、為遍三世問也。須分別之。佛果非三世，佛緣性三世也。緣因體又是因者、又是果者，故曰佛性。因故三世，果亦三世也。正果佛性非三世也，故言果非三世也。後身菩薩因緣觀智即是佛種性，此初一念為現在，未滿足為未來，過去無也。十住觀智由因而生，觀智佛性故，亦得名為佛性。此佛性亦有因法亦有果法，皆三世也。未有正果佛性故，不得言非三世也。僧宗曰：答初問也。問云：若三世者則是無常。今答云：性有因果。若是果性則常，非是三世。若是因性，如後身菩薩，見在少見故，亦得言現在，未全明了故，亦得言未來也。言其現在未來因，故言爾也，實非三世。若得果時，則不得爾，正以在因之時必當見故，義言其當也。以現在少見，便義言其見也。即非三世，豈為無常？及至五種明闡提當必有故，亦得言有，始是分別答也。寶亮曰：答第一難也。明佛性非在三世中，復不為三世所攝也。後身佛性在三世者，明緣因性，現在少分見故，得名現在；未來方得具足，亦名未來也。道慧記曰：此釋第一難，兼釋第二難也。又曰：此正答第一問也。又曰：此合結釋二問也。智秀曰：此下故是答第二難，兼釋初定性所在也。三世攝者，其在因也；不攝者，在果也。

Sengliang states: "This concurrently answers the first objection. The objection stated: 'The nature possesses the three times.' Now it clarifies that it is not of the three times and cannot be spoken of as existent, yet is subsumed under the three times. Because it can be slightly seen, it is called present; because it is seen to a slight extent, it is called the final body. The past fully possesses only two times. Because it is not fully seen, it is called future. 'Not fully seen' means seen in slight measure. The body of the trainee is said to have past and future, not that of the non-trainee." Fayao states: "This answers the earlier question of whether it is past, future, present, or pervasive of the three times. One must distinguish it: the Buddha-fruit is not of the three times, while the Buddha's conditioned nature is of the three times. The substance of the contributory cause is also cause and also fruit; hence it is called buddhadhātu. As cause, it is of the three times, and as fruit, it is also of the three times. The buddhadhātu of the actual fruit is not of the three times; hence it is said that the fruit is not of the three times. The contemplative wisdom of causes and conditions of the bodhisattva in the final body is precisely the seed-nature of buddhahood; this initial single thought is present, being unfulfilled it is future, and it has no past. The contemplative wisdom of the ten abidings arises from causes; because it is contemplative-wisdom buddhadhātu, it may also be termed buddhadhātu. This buddhadhātu has causal dharmas and fruitional dharmas, all belonging to the three times. Because the buddhadhātu of the actual fruit is not yet present, one cannot say it is not of the three times." Sengzong states: "This answers the first question. The question stated: 'If it belongs to the three times, it is impermanent.' Now it answers: 'The nature has cause and fruit. If it is the fruitional nature, it is permanent and not of the three times. If it is the causal nature, as with the bodhisattva in the final body, because it is slightly seen in the present, it can also be called present; because it is not yet entirely clear, it can also be called future.' Speaking of its present and future causes, it is thus stated; in reality, it is not of the three times. When the fruit is attained, it cannot be so; it is precisely because, when in the cause, it will certainly be seen, that it is conceptually said to be future. Because it is slightly seen in the present, it is conceptually said to be seen. If it is not of the three times, how could it be impermanent? When it comes to the five kinds clarifying that an icchantika will certainly possess it in the future, it can also be called existent; this is truly answering by distinguishing." Baoliang states: "This answers the first objection. It clarifies that the buddhadhātu is not within the three times, nor is it subsumed under the three times. That the buddhadhātu of the final body is in the three times clarifies that the nature of contributory causes, being seen in slight measure in the present, can be called present; because it will be fully perfected only in the future, it is also called future." Daohui's notes state: "This resolves the first objection and concurrently resolves the second objection." He also states: "This directly answers the first question." He also states: "This combines and synthesizes the explanation of the two questions." Zhixiu states: "From here down, it continues to answer the second objection, and concurrently clarifies where the determinate nature resides. That which is subsumed under the three times is in the cause; that which is not subsumed is in the fruit."