大般涅槃經集解 66.48

66.48

Sengliang states: "This concurrently answers the first objection. The objection stated: 'The nature possesses the three times.' Now it clarifies that it is not of the three times and cannot be spoken of as existent, yet is subsumed under the three times. Because it can be slightly seen, it is called present; because it is seen to a slight extent, it is called the final body. The past fully possesses only two times. Because it is not fully seen, it is called future. 'Not fully seen' means seen in slight measure. The body of the trainee is said to have past and future, not that of the non-trainee." Fayao states: "This answers the earlier question of whether it is past, future, present, or pervasive of the three times. One must distinguish it: the Buddha-fruit is not of the three times, while the Buddha's conditioned nature is of the three times. The substance of the contributory cause is also cause and also fruit; hence it is called buddhadhātu. As cause, it is of the three times, and as fruit, it is also of the three times. The buddhadhātu of the actual fruit is not of the three times; hence it is said that the fruit is not of the three times. The contemplative wisdom of causes and conditions of the bodhisattva in the final body is precisely the seed-nature of buddhahood; this initial single thought is present, being unfulfilled it is future, and it has no past. The contemplative wisdom of the ten abidings arises from causes; because it is contemplative-wisdom buddhadhātu, it may also be termed buddhadhātu. This buddhadhātu has causal dharmas and fruitional dharmas, all belonging to the three times. Because the buddhadhātu of the actual fruit is not yet present, one cannot say it is not of the three times." Sengzong states: "This answers the first question. The question stated: 'If it belongs to the three times, it is impermanent.' Now it answers: 'The nature has cause and fruit. If it is the fruitional nature, it is permanent and not of the three times. If it is the causal nature, as with the bodhisattva in the final body, because it is slightly seen in the present, it can also be called present; because it is not yet entirely clear, it can also be called future.' Speaking of its present and future causes, it is thus stated; in reality, it is not of the three times. When the fruit is attained, it cannot be so; it is precisely because, when in the cause, it will certainly be seen, that it is conceptually said to be future. Because it is slightly seen in the present, it is conceptually said to be seen. If it is not of the three times, how could it be impermanent? When it comes to the five kinds clarifying that an icchantika will certainly possess it in the future, it can also be called existent; this is truly answering by distinguishing." Baoliang states: "This answers the first objection. It clarifies that the buddhadhātu is not within the three times, nor is it subsumed under the three times. That the buddhadhātu of the final body is in the three times clarifies that the nature of contributory causes, being seen in slight measure in the present, can be called present; because it will be fully perfected only in the future, it is also called future." Daohui's notes state: "This resolves the first objection and concurrently resolves the second objection." He also states: "This directly answers the first question." He also states: "This combines and synthesizes the explanation of the two questions." Zhixiu states: "From here down, it continues to answer the second objection, and concurrently clarifies where the determinate nature resides. That which is subsumed under the three times is in the cause; that which is not subsumed is in the fruit."