大般涅槃經集解 47.6

47.6

Sengliang comments: The King of Virtues uses two challenges; first, using one challenge concerning the buddhadhātu, he completes the prior fifth argument that nirvāṇa is indeterminate. If the buddhadhātu is wholesome, it ought to ward off the hells and the icchantika; if the nature is eternal, it ought to ward off impermanence so that it does not occur. Sengzong says: The arising of this question stems from what preceded it. In the preceding six challenges, the first line made it fundamentally non-existent and now existing. The Tathāgata has already explained this principle, clarifying that it does not begin to exist anew. Saying that the principle of the buddhadhātu is beyond myriad transformations and outside of saṃsāra, its import has already been manifested. If one takes the statement that it is fundamentally existent to mean that it is identical with the aggregates, then since the aggregates are impermanent, it would make the nature also impermanent. Here there are eight lines. The first three lines challenge it so that it cannot already exist. If it existed, its function should be seen; if it does not exist, it only exists when the vajra[-like concentration] ceases, which in turn reverts to becoming fundamentally non-existent and now existing. If it is fundamentally non-existent and now existing, then it is impermanent. The lower five lines are challenges concerning indeterminacy. The general import in all cases is to make the fruit of buddhahood impermanent, completing the preceding six-line challenge of impermanence. Investigating the origin of the challenge of indeterminacy, it arose from the Buddha's previous answer to the King of High Virtue, which clarified the principle of indeterminacy. Now he challenges: If, by indeterminacy, what is not heard can be heard, then it should revert to being reborn. The first challenge says: If there is a buddhadhātu, then it should have a function, and thus should ward off the hells; yet now people who commit the four grave prohibitions and the five inexpiable sins do not escape the evil realms. One should know that it is not fundamentally existent in their bodies; if it is not fundamentally existent, then it is impermanent. The second challenge says: If the body has the nature, and since this nature is permanent, then it should have the function of permanence and bliss; why then is it said again that it lacks permanence, bliss, and self? If it lacks permanence and self, then there cannot be the nature within the body. The third challenge says: The icchantika severs wholesome roots, and since the buddhadhātu is said to already exist, then it should be severed by the icchantika. If you say that although it exists it cannot be severed, then again one cannot say that it lacks permanence, bliss, and self. If one says that it does not exist at present, then that is the meaning of fundamental non-existence. Furthermore, if having the nature means it cannot be severed, then that is the definition of an icchantika. Indeterminate, repeatedly posing challenges. As for committing the four grave offenses being called indeterminate: first, regarding the wrongly determined, four kinds of persons are indeterminate, hence impermanent. Second, regarding the group of the rightly determined, persons of the two vehicles are indeterminate, hence impermanent. Third, clarifying indeterminacy with regard to the Tathāgata. Fourth, clarifying indeterminacy with regard to nirvāṇa. Fifth, generally citing all phenomena, encompassing both cause and effect, as all being indeterminate, from the icchantika below up to the buddhas above. The icchantika is the extreme limit of evil; because of his indeterminacy, he is able to attain buddhahood. The Tathāgata is the utmost peak of all goodness; also because of the meaning of indeterminacy, he would revert to saṃsāra. Although there are five lines, the intention is to challenge the fruit. Baoliang says: The King of Virtues' second question is only answered in the subsequent fascicle. Why is this so? Previously, after answering the first question, it said: Persons who commit the grave prohibitions and the icchantikas all possess the buddhadhātu. Now, through this sūtra, they are able to hear it. The King of Virtues now takes this statement and further poses two challenges. The Buddha must precisely dispatch this meaning first; therefore, he comes to provisionally answer the characteristics of the previous lesser and greater nirvāṇa. In the latter two challenges, the first challenge has five barriers. If those who commit the grave offenses and icchantikas have the buddhadhātu, and the buddhadhātu is wholesome, why do they fall into the hells? The second barrier says: If such people necessarily have the buddhadhātu, it should not be said that they lack permanence, bliss, self, and purity. The third barrier says: If severing wholesome roots is called being an icchantika, and the buddhadhātu is wholesome, why is it not severed? The fourth barrier says: If the fruit of the buddhadhātu is severed, how can it again be said to be permanence, bliss, self, and purity? The fifth barrier says: If the buddhadhātu is not severed, then they should not receive the name of an icchantika. Although there are these five barriers, they all reciprocally establish each other and together form one challenge. Zhixiu says: Because the Buddha answered the previous challenge by saying that nirvāṇa is not fundamentally non-existent and now existing, and its essence is not a phenomenon that is heard, this third turn raises yet another challenge, grasping that the icchantika lacks the nature and that it is indeterminate, causing the essence of nirvāṇa to revert to being fundamentally non-existent and now existing, which would then be an impermanent phenomenon that can be heard. Although the first three lines pose different challenges, their primary intention is to make the buddhadhātu not fundamentally existent and nirvāṇa something fundamentally non-existent and now existing, which cannot fail to be a phenomenon that is heard. The latter five lines pose challenges and rebukes regarding indeterminacy, making all phenomena completely indeterminate. Since nirvāṇa is likewise, it should revert to being impermanent and constitute a phenomenon that is heard.