大般涅槃經集解 47

English (machine translation) 47

Language: English

47.1

Distinguishing the indeterminate nature of the four types of transgressors such as those who protect the Dharma; Discussing the meaning of icchantikas severing wholesome roots; Broadly distinguishing that all Buddhas are neither gods nor non-gods and other matters; Distinguishing the meaning of the three outflows; Distinguishing the meaning of the seven outflows.

47.2

Chapter on the Noble Virtue King, Part Three

47.3

"Good son! How does a bodhisattva-mahāsattva […] this is called hearing what has not been heard."

47.4

Sengliang notes: Above, it was said that conditioned productive causes are impermanent, while nirvāṇa is attained from a revealing cause and is therefore permanent. If so, the twelve divisions of the canon are all revealing causes of nirvāṇa. That is to say, in this sūtra, the text is profound and its meaning is esoteric, not what the two vehicles can hear; in the sūtras of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, there is no mention of icchantikas having the buddhadhātu. The reason this matter is spoken of again is to prompt the question from the Noble Virtue King.

47.5

King of High and Noble Virtue Whose Light Shines Everywhere […] for what reason is one called an icchantika?

47.6

Sengliang comments: The King of Virtues uses two challenges; first, using one challenge concerning the buddhadhātu, he completes the prior fifth argument that nirvāṇa is indeterminate. If the buddhadhātu is wholesome, it ought to ward off the hells and the icchantika; if the nature is eternal, it ought to ward off impermanence so that it does not occur. Sengzong says: The arising of this question stems from what preceded it. In the preceding six challenges, the first line made it fundamentally non-existent and now existing. The Tathāgata has already explained this principle, clarifying that it does not begin to exist anew. Saying that the principle of the buddhadhātu is beyond myriad transformations and outside of saṃsāra, its import has already been manifested. If one takes the statement that it is fundamentally existent to mean that it is identical with the aggregates, then since the aggregates are impermanent, it would make the nature also impermanent. Here there are eight lines. The first three lines challenge it so that it cannot already exist. If it existed, its function should be seen; if it does not exist, it only exists when the vajra[-like concentration] ceases, which in turn reverts to becoming fundamentally non-existent and now existing. If it is fundamentally non-existent and now existing, then it is impermanent. The lower five lines are challenges concerning indeterminacy. The general import in all cases is to make the fruit of buddhahood impermanent, completing the preceding six-line challenge of impermanence. Investigating the origin of the challenge of indeterminacy, it arose from the Buddha's previous answer to the King of High Virtue, which clarified the principle of indeterminacy. Now he challenges: If, by indeterminacy, what is not heard can be heard, then it should revert to being reborn. The first challenge says: If there is a buddhadhātu, then it should have a function, and thus should ward off the hells; yet now people who commit the four grave prohibitions and the five inexpiable sins do not escape the evil realms. One should know that it is not fundamentally existent in their bodies; if it is not fundamentally existent, then it is impermanent. The second challenge says: If the body has the nature, and since this nature is permanent, then it should have the function of permanence and bliss; why then is it said again that it lacks permanence, bliss, and self? If it lacks permanence and self, then there cannot be the nature within the body. The third challenge says: The icchantika severs wholesome roots, and since the buddhadhātu is said to already exist, then it should be severed by the icchantika. If you say that although it exists it cannot be severed, then again one cannot say that it lacks permanence, bliss, and self. If one says that it does not exist at present, then that is the meaning of fundamental non-existence. Furthermore, if having the nature means it cannot be severed, then that is the definition of an icchantika. Indeterminate, repeatedly posing challenges. As for committing the four grave offenses being called indeterminate: first, regarding the wrongly determined, four kinds of persons are indeterminate, hence impermanent. Second, regarding the group of the rightly determined, persons of the two vehicles are indeterminate, hence impermanent. Third, clarifying indeterminacy with regard to the Tathāgata. Fourth, clarifying indeterminacy with regard to nirvāṇa. Fifth, generally citing all phenomena, encompassing both cause and effect, as all being indeterminate, from the icchantika below up to the buddhas above. The icchantika is the extreme limit of evil; because of his indeterminacy, he is able to attain buddhahood. The Tathāgata is the utmost peak of all goodness; also because of the meaning of indeterminacy, he would revert to saṃsāra. Although there are five lines, the intention is to challenge the fruit. Baoliang says: The King of Virtues' second question is only answered in the subsequent fascicle. Why is this so? Previously, after answering the first question, it said: Persons who commit the grave prohibitions and the icchantikas all possess the buddhadhātu. Now, through this sūtra, they are able to hear it. The King of Virtues now takes this statement and further poses two challenges. The Buddha must precisely dispatch this meaning first; therefore, he comes to provisionally answer the characteristics of the previous lesser and greater nirvāṇa. In the latter two challenges, the first challenge has five barriers. If those who commit the grave offenses and icchantikas have the buddhadhātu, and the buddhadhātu is wholesome, why do they fall into the hells? The second barrier says: If such people necessarily have the buddhadhātu, it should not be said that they lack permanence, bliss, self, and purity. The third barrier says: If severing wholesome roots is called being an icchantika, and the buddhadhātu is wholesome, why is it not severed? The fourth barrier says: If the fruit of the buddhadhātu is severed, how can it again be said to be permanence, bliss, self, and purity? The fifth barrier says: If the buddhadhātu is not severed, then they should not receive the name of an icchantika. Although there are these five barriers, they all reciprocally establish each other and together form one challenge. Zhixiu says: Because the Buddha answered the previous challenge by saying that nirvāṇa is not fundamentally non-existent and now existing, and its essence is not a phenomenon that is heard, this third turn raises yet another challenge, grasping that the icchantika lacks the nature and that it is indeterminate, causing the essence of nirvāṇa to revert to being fundamentally non-existent and now existing, which would then be an impermanent phenomenon that can be heard. Although the first three lines pose different challenges, their primary intention is to make the buddhadhātu not fundamentally existent and nirvāṇa something fundamentally non-existent and now existing, which cannot fail to be a phenomenon that is heard. The latter five lines pose challenges and rebukes regarding indeterminacy, making all phenomena completely indeterminate. Since nirvāṇa is likewise, it should revert to being impermanent and constitute a phenomenon that is heard.

47.7

"World-Honoured One! Committing the four grave prohibitions is called indeterminate [...] the icchantikas and their like will attain nirvāṇa."

47.8

Sengliang comments: The second challenge is that the icchantika should not attain buddhahood. Why? The four kinds of persons are wrongly determined. If the wrongly determined are indeterminate, the rightly determined should also be indeterminate. If indeterminate, nirvāṇa is then not eternal. If there are permanence and bliss, then the icchantika should not attain buddhahood. Baoliang says: Below this, he poses the challenge of indeterminacy. Moreover, he first enumerates instances of indeterminacy and then concludes the challenge. If the icchantika is indeterminate and later reverts to attaining buddhahood, all phenomena are likewise. Since nirvāṇa is counted among all phenomena, it should also be indeterminate and could revert to being saṃsāra. Fayao says: If it is further indeterminate, one should know that there is no permanence and bliss.

47.9

At that time, the World-Honoured One addressed Bodhisattva Radiance Pervading High King of Virtue: "[...] I shall analyze and explain it for you."

47.10

Baoliang comments: About to answer the challenge, he first praises his grasp of the principle and his understanding of it.

47.11

"Good son! The icchantika is also not determined [...] Because it is not determined, therefore he is able to attain it."

47.12

Sengliang comments: He answers the later question first. Sengzong says: Within the answer, he first answers the fourth. Previously, he cited the four kinds of the wrongly determined as a challenge; now he provisionally adduces the icchantika, and later will go through the four persons one by one. Next, he answers the third, the thrust of which concurrently answers the first and the second. Below, after answering concerning the two vehicles, before answering the fifth, he first answers the sixth line regarding nirvāṇa. The first line is truly as you said: precisely because of indeterminacy, he attains buddhahood. But phenomena cannot be treated as of a single category, wishing to make nirvāṇa also indeterminate. Why is this so? Phenomena have sameness and difference. If it is saṃskṛta, it possesses three kinds: because its essence is impermanent, it is nominal continuity; because it lacks self-nature, it exists at one time, which is nominal causal establishment; and because its designation is attained relative to another, there is nominal relativity. Nirvāṇa can only be said to have relativity within its name. By this principle, it is also nominally termed indeterminate. Because it is eternal, it is free from the characteristics of the two nominalities, and thus can be truly indeterminate. Sengliang says: This is not yet the definitive answer; he merely adduces the second question in brief to empty the minds of the assembly, causing them to realize that the myriad phenomena have no fixed characteristics. Zhixiu says: The reason he separately answers the previous challenge is that he wishes to clarify that the icchantika attains buddhahood, so one knows that the wholesome roots severed are not the buddhadhātu, in order to complete the meaning of answering the previous three challenges. This is the first, initially adducing the fourth challenge. The fourth matter specifically and separately answers the fourth challenge because he wishes to clarify that the icchantika later attains buddhahood. Thus one knows that the wholesome roots severed in the causal stage are not the buddhadhātu, in order to complete the meaning of answering the previous three challenges.

47.13

"As you have said, that the buddhadhātu is unsevered [...] is neither defiled nor undefiled; therefore it is unsevered."

47.14

Sengliang comments: This answers the third. What accords with principle is called internal; what does not accord with principle is called external. Both internal and external are natures; they cannot be severed. Sengzong says: Below this answers the third line among the former three. The intention of the previous challenge was that since the icchantika's wholesome roots are severed, the nature should also be severed. Now he answers that there are two kinds of wholesome roots: internal and external; the wholesome karma of the mind is internal, while the wholesome karma of body and speech is external. The buddhadhātu is neither internal nor external, hence it is not impermanent. Since the icchantika's buddhadhātu is to exist in the future and does not already exist [as realized], how could one demand that it ward off the hells? Since it is said to exist in the future, how could it have permanence, bliss, self, and purity? Its import can concurrently answer the first and second challenges. There are again two kinds, further explaining extensively that the buddhadhātu is not like these. The 'undefiled' mentioned here is the undefiled on the causal stage. 'Not eternal' means that the buddhadhātu is not like the cessation of the three minds or the permanence of the three unconditioned phenomena. If one is named an icchantika once it is severed, this means that active, conditioned goodness is severable, and can later be regained; because active goodness is severed, one is termed an icchantika. The principle of the buddhadhātu is eternally constant, its nature and characteristics are ever thus; how could it be severed? Baoliang says: Directly adducing the first question to answer it. Above I said that the icchantika possesses the buddhadhātu, having only the direct causal nature; originally it did not discuss having the conditional causal nature. Why make this challenge, claiming that because he severs the goodness that has arisen and been attained, he receives the name of an icchantika? As for goodness being of two kinds, internal and external: the goodness generated from the mental ground is called internal; the goodness generated from body and speech is external. The nature of the direct cause is not subsumed under these internal and external goods; therefore it is unsevered. As for defiled and undefiled: goodness arising from narrow characteristics is called defiled; if, regarding conditions, understanding accords with the object and is not accompanied by afflictions, it is called undefiled. This clarifies that the nature of the direct cause is also not these two goods; therefore it is unsevered. As for permanent and impermanent: formerly, goodness within the truth of cessation was called permanent, and that arising from conditions was called impermanent. The nature of the direct cause is also neither permanent goodness nor impermanent goodness; therefore it is unsevered. If the direct causal buddhadhātu could be severed, it would be identical to the goods listed above; but since it is not so, one knows it is unsevered. It is precisely because of severing the goodness generated from conditions that one attains the name of an icchantika.

47.15

"There are further two kinds: first, permanent [...] the buddhadhātu is neither permanent nor impermanent; therefore it is unsevered."

47.16

Sengliang comments: The direct cause is permanent; the conditional cause is impermanent.

47.17

"If it could be severed, it should be regained [...] if severed, he is then named an icchantika."

47.18

Sengliang comments: This clarifies that active, conditioned phenomena mutually overpower one another by their force. Giving rise to wrong views severs wholesome roots and leads into the hells; giving rise to right views severs icchantika-hood and wards off the hells. The buddhadhātu is not active or conditioned; it cannot ward off the hells, impermanence, or the icchantika. This comprehensively answers the first three challenges.

47.19

"Those who commit the four grave offenses are also indeterminate [...] seeing that all phenomena have the characteristic of impermanence."

47.20

Sengliang comments: As for those who commit the four grave offenses, he further addresses the subsequent challenge in his reply. Baoliang says: Below this answers the second question, clarifying that although the icchantika severs wholesome roots at the time, later, when wholesome roots arise, he will definitely become a buddha. There is no intermediate stopping point; if it were determinate, how could he become a buddha? Nirvāṇa may indeed be numbered among all phenomena, but because its essence and function are determinate, it cannot be identical to the false and deceptive nature of saṃsāra. The true essence is unmoving, while its traces have no fixed characteristic. He first preaches ten similes clarifying that all phenomena are empty and false, and later elaborately explains the conversion of beings.

47.21

"Good son! There are also determinate characteristics [...] attains the aspiration for anuttarā-samyak-saṃbodhi."

47.22

Sengliang comments: Saying 'nirvāṇa' is in contrast to the twenty-five states of existence; therefore it is determinate.

47.23

"Good son! The Tathāgata now in the city of Kuśinagara [...] The Tathāgata's nirvāṇa is also like this."

47.24

Sengliang comments: Nirvāṇa has greater and lesser forms, and also many meanings. Now, only the four meanings of the mahānirvāṇa—permanence, bliss, self, and purity—are determinate; the other meanings are all indeterminate. Just as with saṃskṛta phenomena, impermanence and suffering are determinate, while other meanings are indeterminate. As for the two ends not being burnable: this clarifies that the two bodies, the true and the responsive, cannot be extinguished. Baoliang says: From here down to 'neither preached nor not preached', one should know that the Tathāgata's body is neither Tathāgata nor non-Tathāgata; therefore the Tathāgata is indeterminate.

47.25

"Good son! You should know that the Tathāgata is also indeterminate [...] By this meaning, the Tathāgata is indeterminate."

47.26

Sengliang comments: The earlier clause 'not a deva' refers to the four kinds of devas, clarifying that the Tathāgata is none of them. From 'not a human' onward, [the categories] are first fully enumerated and subsequently explained in sequence.

47.27

'Good son, why is the Tathāgata not called a worldly deva […] Therefore, the Tathāgata is also not non-determinate.'

47.28

Sengliang comments: Regarding 'explaining the characteristics of sentient beings,' [the Buddha] himself states that he is a lion among men. Regarding 'the distinct and diverse characteristics of all phenomena,' it is like the eye not smelling fragrances and the ear not seeing forms; the Buddhas are not like this. Regarding 'having only a single characteristic,' this may be designated by means of the dharmakāya, and cannot be differentiated by the six sense faculties. The 'Vajrakāya Chapter' states, 'excluding the characteristic of a single phenomenon,' meaning that he cannot be named by the single characteristic of humans or devas. Regarding 'the dharmadhātu of the Tathāgata,' this is the dharmatā of the Tathāgata. Regarding 'having long since transcended all characteristics,' the above clarified the thirty-two marks, while the below clarifies that the Tathāgata has long transcended this matter. Regarding 'skillfully knowing all characteristics,' in accordance with the characteristics that sentient beings ought to see, he skillfully knows how to respond to them. Regarding 'because of having the characteristic of space,' space has no distinctions; the Tathāgata is not like [ordinary entities].

47.29

'The Tathāgata is not with outflows. Why? […] The Tathāgata has eradicated them forever; therefore, he is without outflows.'

47.30

Sengzong comments: The following explains being without outflows. First, it generally clarifies being free from the three outflows. From after the three outflows, the seven outflows arise: two are [actual] outflows, and five are causal conditions that assist the outflows. Some are designated according to their antidotes, and others receive their names from their causes. Intending to speak of the arising of views, [the text] first clarifies the doubting mind, which is the origin of views. Another interpretation: Regarding 'giving rise to six kinds of views,' this precisely refers to the outflow of views; in substance, there is no other [entity]. The outflow of reflection can be known by its meaning. Baoliang comments: The reason why all Buddhas are able to completely embody the trace and substance in this way, being free of all outflows and complete in all virtues, is that their activities transcend the realm of humans and devas. In contrast, because ordinary beings are endowed with all outflows, they lack these divine virtues. The following section consequently explains in detail the faults and perils of ordinary beings generating outflows. If one traces their outflows, the source does not go beyond the two outflows of seeing the truths and of reflection as their root. Precisely because of having these two outflows, they are able to broadly generate all outflows. Now, from one perspective explaining outflows, they are broadly divided into seven kinds. Even if the three outflows are divided into seven, they ultimately do not diverge from seeing the truths and reflection. The seven outflows are: first, the outflow of seeing the truths; second, the outflow of reflection; third, the outflow of the faculties; fourth, the outflow of avoidance; fifth, the outflow of close association; sixth, the outflow of reception; and seventh, the outflow of mindfulness. The following successively explains these seven gateways, describing their faults and perils. If a practitioner contemplates and understands in reliance on this Mahānirvāṇa, their outflows will be extinguished at once, and they will eternally ascend to the unconditioned. Zhixiu comments: Below, among the clarification of the seven outflows, it first raises the three outflows, properly presenting seeing the truths and reflection as the proper substance of the outflows; next, it presents doubt and views, which distinctively reveals the outflow of seeing the truths.

47.31

'Furthermore, all ordinary beings do not see the faults of outflows […] constantly cultivating noble practices; therefore, they are without outflows.'

47.32

Sengliang comments: Below, the seven outflows are explained. The outflow of existence and the outflow of views are actual outflows; the remaining five are spoken of as the causes of outflows. Among the outflows of existence, it is divided into the outflow of views; because it arises from doubt, it is clarified first, as ordinary beings do not see the faults of outflows. Sengzong comments: The first two serve as general headings. Speaking of 'the self seeing the self,' this is a provisional self that is viewed as a real self. It can also mean that the Buddha-ground is the true self, yet one conceives it as a self the size of a hemp seed or grain of wheat. 'The self seeing non-self' means that the Buddha is truly the self, yet one conceives him as non-self. 'Non-self conceiving a self' means constantly conceiving a self within saṃsāra. 'Giving rise to six kinds of views: decisively having a self' refers to giving rise to the view of selfhood. 'Non-self' refers to the view of annihilation. 'Non-self seeing a self' is like sleep being non-self, yet seeing pure form. 'The self seeing the self' means seeing the future continuity without interruption through the power of concentration. 'The self seeing non-self' means if one grasps the four aggregates as the self and sees form as not the self, one can raise one self to explain the absence without issue. 'I act, receive, and know'—these three phrases constitute a single group; their functions have minor differences, but they do not diverge from the view of selfhood. If not so, the former decisive assertion serves as a general heading, and later 'self', 'acting', and 'knowing' are further divided into three phrases. Baoliang comments: Below, the substance of the outflows is properly presented, clarifying that these seven outflows do not diverge from seeing the truths and reflection. However, sentient beings' ignorance is heavy, and their various false conceptions all fail to attain the reality of phenomena. Regarding 'giving rise to six kinds of minds due to this doubt and view': the initial two minds—decisively having a self and decisively having no self—are a general phrase and probably not among the count of the six. 'The self seeing the self' is the first mind: there is only a nominally designated self, yet ordinary beings conceive an essence-self of phenomena. 'The self seeing non-self' is the second mind: the Buddha is truly the true self, yet one arbitrarily conceives him as non-self. 'Non-self seeing a self' is the third mind: there is truly no spiritual self, but only a nominal designation; grasping at the nominally designated self, one asserts it to be an essential self. The remaining three minds below refer to the agent, the receiver, and the knower. Since ordinary beings falsely conceive these, they become wrong views; the Tathāgata has forever severed the source of these outflows, and therefore he is without outflows.

47.33

'Good son, ordinary beings cannot skillfully restrain the five sense faculties […] viewing desires in this way as having many faults and perils.'

47.34

Sengliang comments: Next, the outflow of the faculties is clarified. What arises in dependence on the six sense faculties is called the outflow of the faculties. If one can restrain the six faculties, tranquilize the three karmas, and curb wrongdoing, then evil will cease. In terms of what is counteracted, it is called the outflow of precepts.

47.35

'Furthermore, the bodhisattva-mahāsattva observes that all sentient beings […] eternally severing their root; therefore, he is without outflows.'

47.36

Sengliang comments: The twenty-five leagues illustrate the two realms, using restraint of appearances as an analogy. The king illustrates the Buddha; the single minister illustrates the bodhisattva; the bowl of oil illustrates mindfulness and wisdom. 'Severing your life' means that because of losing mindfulness and wisdom, the life of wisdom is severed. The single person with a drawn sword illustrates diligence. Seeing purity and not giving rise to the characteristic of form, down to consciousness being likewise: this clarifies the ultimate and conventional truths. Contemplating the ultimate, there is no form; contemplating the conventional, one sees suffering. Not making the characteristic of arising, down to not making the characteristic of causes: arising and ceasing are the suffering of conditioned existence; causes are the accumulation. In explaining the ultimate, there is not even suffering and accumulation, let alone the contemplation of pure form. Regarding 'the composite characteristic,' it explains the conventional composite as being suffering and accumulation.

47.37

'Furthermore, good son, there is also the outflow of avoidance […] reflecting upon its meaning: this is called avoidance.'

47.38

Sengliang comments: 'Avoidance' means taking practicing the sūtra as avoidance. It first explains the substance of avoidance. Baoliang comments: Below clarifies evil outflows. In terms of the path of antidotes, it is called the outflow of avoidance. Just as the former teachings explained vicious oxen, vicious horses, bad companions, and the like, if they increase a person's evil dharmas, one is taught to avoid them. Discussing it in terms of the present sūtra, directly seeing them as saṃsāric non-self immediately achieves transcendence. Why is this so? Having realized the Dharma that all Buddhas take as their teacher, one then knows that saṃsāra is false and exists in dependence on the tathāgatagarbha; therefore, one does not need to remotely flee it. From 'what is the outflow of close association' below: the fifth, if one is closely associated with clothing and food, it generates greed and defilement in a person and severs their life of wisdom. If one is unattached to these four necessities, goodness will increase day and night, and evil dharmas will gradually be severed. In terms of what is counteracted, it is called the outflow of close association.

Linked texts (1)

大般涅槃經集解 — Classical Chinese