大般涅槃經集解 63

English (machine translation) 63

Language: English

63.1

Detailed explanation of the meaning of Sunakkhatta severing his roots of goodness; setting forth the matter of Sunakkhatta breaking the bonds of the desire realm and attaining the four dhyānas before severing his roots of goodness; setting forth the matter of Sunakkhatta speaking of the ascetic nirgrantha; explaining the meaning of severing the roots of goodness; explaining the meaning of the buddhadhātu not being severed when the roots of goodness are severed; explaining that the buddhadhātu is like empty space, not subsumed under the three periods of time; explaining the meaning of an icchantika's bodily and vocal actions being entirely unwholesome; explaining the intention behind allowing Sunakkhatta to leave the household life.

63.2

Chapter 24: Bodhisattva Kāśyapa

63.3

Sengliang notes: In practicing the path together, there is transgression and non-transgression. The preceding 'Chapter on Siṃhanāda' distinguished non-transgression, while this chapter discusses transgression. Why is this? As for what the preceding chapter stated, although one possesses the buddhadhātu, one must cultivate goodness to bring it to completion; as for what this chapter states, although one possesses the buddhadhātu, those who sever goodness obstruct it. Thus we know that while both discuss the nature, there is the difference of transgression and non-transgression. Fayao says: The preceding chapter extensively explained that the buddhadhātu is not single: it is either cause or fruit, neither cause nor fruit; either cause or condition; either wholesome or unwholesome; or it is said to be the mind, or said not to be the mind; or it is said to be separate from the aggregates, or not so. Although the various explanations are not of a single track, the buddhadhātu is one; thus one must not cling one-sidedly to one dharma as correct and others as incorrect. Kāśyapa now cites the non-definitive teachings of forty-nine years, in which those who cling one-sidedly all miss the Buddha's intention. If clinging to the past was already mistaken, how could clinging to the present be correct? If anyone clings one-sidedly to what was stated above, none of them will grasp the Buddha's intention. The sūtra has explicit text stating that down to sentient beings bound by all fetters of affliction and the wholesome dharmas of the five aggregates, all are the buddhadhātu. It also says that the nature is neither internal nor external, both internal and external, neither existent nor non-existent, and both existent and non-existent; moreover, with respect to an icchantika or a person with roots of goodness, it elucidates the buddhadhātu through four alternatives. It further cites the seven persons in the Ganges River who are not apart from the water of the buddhadhātu, and also says that these seven persons, whether wholesome or unwholesome, whether on the path of expedients or the path of liberation, whether cause or fruit, are all the buddhadhātu. With the sūtra text being like this, how could one cling one-sidedly to a single dharma? If one does not examine and conclude what was discussed from beginning to end, but instead cites a single aspect of the buddhadhātu and takes it as definitive, regarding only the fruit as the buddhadhātu, one will, I fear, miss its intended meaning. The previous chapter explained that there are seven persons in the river of birth and death, showing that one does not naturally attain bodhi merely through the power of the buddhadhātu without cultivating the path, does one? Here it explains that there are seven kinds of persons in the river of nirvāṇa; the icchantika hears the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra, and only then slanders it and does not believe, severing his roots of goodness. Yet the sound of nirvāṇa first secretly brings distant benefit, which is called entering the river of nirvāṇa; how much more so for the remaining six persons? Here it explains that although the seven persons differ, none of them is apart from the water of the buddhadhātu. Although both chapters explain the same thing, what they discuss differs substantially. Sengzong says: Above, in the thirty-fourth question regarding the nature of peace and bliss, Siṃhanāda initiated this discourse, but the principle revealed was still not fully clarified, so here it returns to complete the original question. Previously it explained that although an icchantika severs his roots of goodness, he still possesses the buddhadhātu; now, by way of Sunakkhatta, it extensively explains how an icchantika severs goodness and the cause of its rebirth. It explains that what is severed is active, produced goodness, and therefore the meaning of the primary cause is preserved. It explains the cause of its rebirth, and therefore the principle of the conditional cause is complete. Furthermore, viewing cause and fruit against each other, the Middle Way is detailed. The two sages complement each other and together reveal the wonderful principle; yet discerning the principle completely does not necessarily require an expansive text. Broadly speaking, the chapter has six sections: first, explaining the severing of the roots of goodness; second, discerning their rebirth; third, explaining the Middle Way; fourth, revealing the cultivation of the path; fifth, exhortation; sixth, praising the Buddha. Baoliang says: Siṃhanāda and Kāśyapa both discuss the buddhadhātu, but the broad difference in their main import is that Siṃhanāda speaks in terms of orderly progression in accord with principle, whereas Kāśyapa discusses it in terms of transgression. What Siṃhanāda stated speaks directly from cause to fruit, relying on principle to generate faith, and does not speak of the meaning of first severing the roots of goodness and later regenerating them. What Kāśyapa stated also speaks of sequential cultivation from cause; however, when one's practice is not yet established, one turns back, severs faithful mind, and becomes an icchantika, after which disgust is renewed, one is able to give rise to goodness, and one advances further toward attaining buddhahood. It is precisely this that constitutes the difference. Thus, although Siṃhanāda explained severing goodness, he had not yet clarified its rebirth. What Kāśyapa now discusses explains the meaning of its regenerating after having been severed. Broadly divided, there are nine sections: first, explaining the characteristics of severing the roots of goodness; second, explaining why goodness is severed, which is truly because the capacities and natures of sentient beings are indeterminate; third, discerning disputes, which arise because differing capacities and natures evoke distinct teachings, leading people to cling mutually to their views and deviate from the Middle Way; fourth, extensively explaining the fault of giving rise to wrong views through attachment, precisely because their indeterminate capacities and natures do not fathom the Buddha's teaching, and each follows their own attachments to slander and miss the intended meaning; fifth, explaining that later they all extricate themselves and regain the roots of goodness; sixth, explaining that they equally attain the permanent fruit; seventh, explaining the difference, in that birth and death take the three outflows as their cause and thus evoke impermanent retribution, while the fruit of buddhahood is assisted by true understanding, exhausting the outflows so that its substance is permanent; eighth, praising the sūtra; ninth, praising the Buddha. Daohui's private record states: What Siṃhanāda asked concerned matters at the Twin Śāla Trees. What Kāśyapa asked concerned matters since the attainment of the path. Classifying the beginning and the end establishes their difference. Moreover, this chapter elucidates the nature in terms of persons, while the preceding chapter elucidated the nature in terms of dharmas. Zhixiu says: Broadly divided, this chapter has six sections: first, explaining that the roots of goodness are severed while the buddhadhātu is not severed; second, explaining the rebirth of the roots of goodness; third, explaining the Middle Way of neither internal nor external, neither existent nor non-existent; fourth, explaining non-dispute; fifth, explaining pure conduct; sixth, praising the Buddha.

63.4

Bodhisattva Kāśyapa said to the Buddha: "World-Honoured One [...] (down to) [...] being a great physician and a great medicine king."

63.5

Sengliang notes: From here downward is the first section, explaining the characteristics of severing the roots of goodness in a person who severs them. Intending to raise a difficulty, he first recounts what Siṃhanāda explained: the monk Sunakkhatta is an incurable person. Sengzong says: Within explaining the severing of the roots of goodness, there are six turns: first, explaining that the Tathāgata's compassion is not unequal, but precisely because Sunakkhatta did not accept it, it is not the Tathāgata's fault; second, extensively listing his faults and errors; third, explaining the severing of the goodness of the three periods of time; fourth, explaining that the Tathāgata fully knows the power of capacities and can know how the lower is converted into the middling, and so forth; fifth, extensively explaining disputes, showing that because sentient beings do not understand the intention underlying the teaching, they produce grave offenses; sixth, explaining why the roots of goodness are severed, extensively giving rise to wrong views. Zhixiu says: In the first section there are five divisions: first, discussing the severing of the roots of goodness; second, explaining that capacities are indeterminate; third, explaining disputes; fourth, explaining attachments; fifth, explaining wrong views.

63.6

"The monk Sunakkhatta was the son of the Buddha when he was a bodhisattva."

63.7

Sengliang notes: From here downward, he cites three matters to prove that he was not incurable. He first explains that there was a deep and weighty relationship, asking why he was not saved. Baoliang says: From here downward is the first difficulty: why did the Buddha not preach the Dharma to Sunakkhatta first?

63.8

"After leaving the household life, he received, upheld, recited, analyzed, and explained the twelve divisions of the canon."

63.9

Sengliang notes: Next, it explains that he possessed faith and was not entirely devoid of it.

63.10

"[He] destroyed the bonds of the desire realm and attained the four dhyānas."

63.11

Sengliang notes: Next, it explains that Sunakkhatta was not without roots of goodness such as mindfulness.

63.12

"Why did the Tathāgata prophesy of Sunakkhatta [...] (down to) [...] being an incurable person who dwells in hell for an eon?"

63.13

Sengliang notes: This briefly concludes the difficulty.

63.14

"For what reason did the Tathāgata not first expound the true Dharma for him, and only afterward for the bodhisattvas?"

63.15

Sengliang notes: Curing a disease lies in the time when it first arises and is still curable. If one does not treat it first, but waits until outflows inevitably occur, this is not equal compassion.

63.16

"If the Tathāgata, the World-Honoured One, cannot save [him] [...] (down to) [...] possessing great compassion and great expedients."

63.17

Sengliang notes: If he was curable yet not treated, this would mean having no compassion. Baoliang says: The second reproaches him for lacking compassion; the third metaphorically indicates a lack of expedients.

63.18

The Buddha said: "Good son! Suppose, for example, parents [...] (down to) [...] which of them should they first teach to understand worldly affairs?"

63.19

Sengliang notes: He first answers regarding the father's compassion being equal. Although there is prior and posterior in teaching, it does not violate the meaning of compassion; this serves as a metaphor showing that the Buddha's compassion is equal and without partiality. Baoliang says: From here downward he first answers the second difficulty: 'I long knew that he would sever his roots of goodness; therefore, over all those years I guided him and preached the Dharma to him to create benefit for future lives.'

63.20

Bodhisattva Kāśyapa said to the Buddha: "World-Honoured One [...] (down to) [...] out of compassionate thought they next teach him in turn."

63.21

Sengliang notes: People take knowledge and vision as joy. Although a father's compassion is equal, nevertheless, one who can accomplish it quickly should be taught first.

63.22

"Good son! The Tathāgata is also like this [...] (down to) [...] in order to produce all wholesome seeds for future lives."

63.23

Sengliang notes: The point of applying the metaphor is that, while having no partiality, there must be benefit: one who broadly propagates the transformation of a single lamp should be taught first.

63.24

"Good son! It is like the three kinds of fields [...] (down to) [...] the third is a metaphor for an icchantika."

63.25

Sengliang notes: The meaning is as explained above.

63.26

"Good son! When a great lion kills a fragrant elephant [...] (down to) [...] when expounding the Dharma, his exertion is without difference."

63.27

Sengliang comments: In the end, [the Buddha] simply uses the power of a single upāya. Above, it explained that although there are earlier and later [times], the application of compassion is truly equal. Here, it explains that the upāya across the three periods of time constantly exerts its full power. Baoliang comments: This answers the third objection. It clarifies that it is not that the Buddha lacks great upāya, but merely that the upāya does not become manifest in the case of Sunakkhatta. Just as the lion between the two beasts [of the chase] exerts equal strength, yet in the case of the hare does not display it.

63.28

"Good son! Once when I was dwelling in Rājagṛha […] yet he had no mind to believe and accept it at all."

63.29

Sengliang comments: In all, three events are cited; this is the first causal context. Bakkula is the name of an evil yakṣa. Transformative teaching is received with faith as its foundation; but the icchantika has severed faith, which explains why he does not receive transformative teaching. Sengzong comments: From here below is the second [part], which expounds at length on the fault of severing good roots. Baoliang comments: From here below, it directly clarifies the characteristics of Sunakkhatta's severing of good roots, while also corroborating and explaining the previous second and third answers. Although the Buddha possesses the upāya of great compassion, because it is difficult for a mind of pure faith to arise in Sunakkhatta, there is no benefit.

63.30

"Good son! Once when I was in the land of Kāśi […] yet he utterly lacked a mind to believe and accept it."

63.31

Sengliang comments: The second causal context. Baoliang comments: Since his mind was rooted in disbelief, he also obstructed others from believing; thus, his mind died. He placed the worm on the Buddha's footprint to cause the onlookers to produce perverse thoughts.

63.32

"Good son! Once when I, together with Sunakkhatta […] yet he utterly lacked a mind to believe and accept it."

63.33

Sengliang comments: The third causal context. Although equally listed as disbelief, this single event especially discusses turning one's tongue against and eclipsing the Venerable and Holy One, revealing his mind even more. The reason for asking twice about Kora-khattiya was to know whether the actual matter corresponded to the Buddha's words or not. And once Kora-khattiya had personally verified it, [the Buddha] went back to the root with Sunakkhatta and consequently admonished him. Baoliang comments: The Holy One's transformation has no fixed mode; his response to beings is manifold. Since [Sunakkhatta's] mind harbored jealousy, how could he be saved?

63.34

"Good son! Even though the monk Sunakkhatta recited and chanted […] yet I truly hold that there is no cause and effect."

63.35

Sengliang comments: This clarifies the absence of wisdom. If good arises from understanding, it cannot be severed; if it does not arise from understanding, encountering perversity will sever it. Though he recited and chanted in the past, it did not arise from understanding, so he could not be saved either. This answers the second objection. 'One who knows well the characteristics of phenomena' refers to knowing having two kinds: direct knowing and inferential knowing of characteristics. He said the Buddha does not know directly, nor is he omniscient. Sengzong comments: Although he received the twelve divisions of the canon, because he did not understand their import, he regressed and slandered, even severing his good roots. How much less could he be saved if he had not upheld them?

63.36

"Good son! If you do not believe […] he will fall while alive into the Avīci hell."

63.37

Sengliang comments: Vain words have no effect; it is better to verify the reality. Sinking into hell: if compassion is not accumulated, there is nothing with which to extinguish [evil karmic] embodiment; when guilt ripens and retribution arrives, he therefore sinks.

63.38

"Good son! Although the monk Sunakkhatta entered the Buddha-Dharma […] was killed and destroyed by a great rākṣasa demon."

63.39

Sengliang comments: The Buddha spoke of the causes and fruits of the three vehicles, yet Sunakkhatta obtained not even one. Because he lacked faith, he attained nothing. 'Due to heedlessness and due to evil companions': heedlessness is the internal affliction, and evil companions are the external condition. Equipped with these two evils, he ultimately severed his good roots. Entering the great ocean without gain: a person devoid of faith and wisdom, though entering the ocean of Dharma, also gains nothing. Dying by self-slaughter parallels heedlessness. Being killed by evil demons parallels evil companions. Sengzong comments: Prophesying that he would definitely enter hell seems at first glance uncompassionate, yet it is great compassion. Why so? If it were not prophesied, it would foster perverse faith in others.

63.40

"Good son! Therefore, the Tathāgata, out of pity […] because of evil perversity, did not abandon his evil views."

63.41

Sengliang comments: This answers the third objection. Although [the Buddha] spoke out of pity, because of his heedlessness, he ultimately could not be altered.

63.42

"Good son! From the past onward, I have seen this Sunakkhatta […] this lowest of men will dwell in hell for an eon."

63.43

Sengliang comments: This answers the fourth objection. If there were slight good within that could be granted externally through upāya, this person could be delivered. If there is no slight good within, then despite external upāya, nothing can be done. Baoliang comments: This answers the first objection. If Sunakkhatta had even the slightest hair's breadth of good, how could it be permissible to prophesy that he is an incurable person dwelling in hell for an eon? It is because he is an icchantika.

63.44

"Good son! Suppose a person were submerged in a cesspool […] therefore he cannot be pulled out of hell."

63.45

Sengliang comments: Reaching in with the hand parallels great upāya. The hair of the head parallels slight good. Baoliang comments: Although there is future good, the present heavy evil provides nothing to foster and stimulate it, so [good in] both lifetimes is suppressed and severed.

63.46

Bodhisattva Kāśyapa said: "World-Honoured One! Why did the Tathāgata prophesy that he would fall into the Avīci hell?"

63.47

Sengliang comments: When Sunakkhatta saw the Buddha, anger arose, and he instantly entered hell. The Buddha's stopping there seems like a lack of compassion; wishing to ask for an explanation, he therefore raised this question.

63.48

"Good son! The monk Sunakkhatta had many followers […] even down to the breadth of a hair."

63.49

Sengliang comments: The intent of the answer is that if [the Buddha] had not gone and not prophesied, externally it would have fostered manifold evils in others, and internally he would have suffered severe retribution for a long time; therefore it was prophesied beforehand that he would definitely enter hell. And now when [the Buddha] went there, he indeed sank into Avīci. How could this be a lack of compassion? It is precisely that by which his evil causes are extinguished. 'Truly without duality': because people heard the Buddha's words, they did not believe Sunakkhatta's words, and thus external evil was not increased, causing his suffering of retribution to be lessened.

63.50

"Good son! I knew long ago that this monk Sunakkhatta […] this is called the Tathāgata's fifth power of understanding."

63.51

Sengliang comments: Because he did not go outside, he did not generate offenses in others. The fifth power of understanding refers to the power [of knowing diverse] dispositions among the ten powers.

63.52

"World-Honoured One! By what cause and condition do icchantikas have no good dharmas?"

63.53

Sengliang comments: Above, it was said that having neither faith nor wisdom in the present is called severing good roots, but the five faculties and future good were not yet clarified; hence the question is raised. Sengzong comments: From here below is the third [part], clarifying the severing of good across two lifetimes. Zhixiu comments: From here below is the second section, revealing the meaning of severing good roots. Six rounds clarify the doctrine; this is the first, seeking the characteristics of severing good roots.

63.54

"Good son! Because icchantikas sever good roots […] killing an icchantika incurs no offense of killing."

63.55

Sengliang comments: Killing living beings is an offense because of harming [goodness]. The icchantika has no good; one merely incurs the offense of an evil mind, but not the offense of killing [a sentient being].

63.56

"World-Honoured One! Is an icchantika called an icchantika because he ultimately never has good dharmas?"

63.57

Sengliang comments: Intending to inquire about the meaning of future good, he first establishes this definition, asking whether an icchantika's good roots ultimately never arise in mind. Zhixiu comments: The second round: citing the ultimate end to press the Buddha for a definition.

63.58

The Buddha said: "So it is, so it is."

63.59

Sengliang comments: The meaning of 'ultimately' has both near and far: one lifetime or even an eon. Wishing to open the discussion, he temporarily answers 'so it is.'

63.60

"World-Honoured One! All sentient beings have three kinds of good […] is severing good dharmas called being an icchantika?"

63.61

Sengliang comments: Raising the three periods of time as the doctrine, he takes what should arise in the future. As it has not arisen in the present, it cannot be severed. The ultimate purport cannot be seen immediately. Zhixiu comments: The third round: challenging that dharmas of the future, not yet having arisen, cannot be severed, so one should not become an icchantika by severing good.

63.62

"Good son! There are two kinds of severing […] therefore I say that he severs good roots."

63.63

Sengliang comments: Extinguishing without continuing is termed 'severing'. Regarding intrinsic severing and obstructive severing: the mind has three kinds—good, unwholesome, and indeterminate. When an ordinary person generates an unwholesome or indeterminate mind, though there is no good mind, it is simply that the mind cannot engage parallel conditions, so the good mind does not continue; this is called intrinsic severing. Because he has no perverse views in the present, it is not called obstructive severing. An icchantika has in the present the obstruction of heavy perverse views, preventing future [good] from arising in the present; this is called possessing both severings. Fayao comments: This supplements the earlier question on existence and non-existence. Because it is non-existent in the present, one may say good roots are severed; because it exists in the future, one may say all possess buddhadhātu.

63.64

"Good son! Suppose a person were submerged in a cesspool […] therefore he is called incurable."

63.65

Sengliang comments: The intent of the simile is to reveal that obstructive severing is not ultimate severing. Although future good has the capacity to arise, because it is actively obstructed by present perverse views and cannot arise, it cannot rescue one from suffering.

63.66

"Through the cause and condition of buddhadhātu, he can be saved […] icchantikas are also like this."

63.67

Sengliang comments: This refers to the nature of the direct cause. What is severed is the good roots of conditioning causes, not the direct cause. By the power of the direct cause, after a long time good will arise again. 'Not of the three times' explains the meaning of not being severed. The direct cause is continuous permanence; being permanent, it has no past or future. 'Like a spoiled seed': since unwholesome and indeterminate states are taken as the direct cause, and these two dharmas are weak in power, they definitely do not produce good in the present lifetime; hence the simile of the spoiled seed.

63.68

"World-Honoured One! If icchantikas do not sever buddhadhātu […] why is it said that they sever all good?"

63.69

Sengliang comments: He takes the preceding statement that the direct cause is unsevered to formulate the question. The power of the direct cause will definitely induce the Buddha-fruit; since both fruit-good and cause-good are unsevered, one knows he is not an icchantika. Zhixiu comments: The fourth round: taking up the import of not severing the nature to press an objection. Buddhadhātu is good; if the icchantika cannot sever it, how does he become an icchantika?

63.70

"Good son! If sentient beings in the present lifetime […] they could not be called icchantikas."

63.71

Sengliang comments: Buddhadhātu is good; if buddhadhātu were presently existent, one would not be an icchantika. This clarifies that the direct cause has the meaning of seed-nature, and is not taken as the nature of conditioning causes.

63.72

"Just as in the worldly realm the self-nature of sentient beings […] because it will be seen in the future, it is said that sentient beings all possess buddhadhātu."

63.73

Sengliang comments: Using the worldly self as a simile, he corroborates the meaning of non-existence in the present. 'Because it will be seen in the future': above it was said that sentient beings have no permanent name in the present, because all possess suffering. It is taken as existent because it will be seen in the future, not presently existent.

63.74

"For this reason, bodhisattvas of the ten abodes, having fully adorned themselves, only then attain slight vision [of it]."

63.75

Sengliang comments: Above, it said that being seen in the future constitutes existence; here it states the time of seeing it. Slight vision is termed the cause, and complete vision is termed the fruit; the cause is named 'attaining', and the fruit is 'what is attained'. Here, taking attaining as buddhadhātu is speaking of the fruit within the cause.

63.76

Bodhisattva Kāśyapa said: "World-Honoured One! Buddhadhātu is permanent […] if it arises, is it not good?"

63.77

Sengliang comments: Above, it was said that buddhadhātu is permanent and has no three times; yet it was also said that buddhadhātu will be seen in the future. These earlier and later statements contradict each other, so the meaning of permanence is not yet clear; hence he interrogates it using emptiness. Zhixiu comments: The fifth round contains two objections: first, challenging that since the nature is not of the three times, it should not be spoken of as future; second, challenging that since there is benevolence and love, how could it not be good?

63.78

The Buddha said: "Excellent, excellent, good son! […] not past, not future, not present."

63.79

Sengliang comments: This confirms and completes the above meaning, that it has no three times.

63.80

"All sentient beings have three kinds of bodies […] because the future body is pure, it is said to be buddhadhātu."

63.81

Sengliang comments: What is spoken of as buddhadhātu is merely speaking of the fruit within the cause, not the fault of mutual contradiction between the two earlier and later statements.

63.82

"World-Honoured One! If the meaning of what the Buddha has explained is thus, [why is it said that] all sentient beings possess the buddhadhātu?" [down to]

63.83

Sengliang comments: The objection means: If the buddhadhātu is permanent, and what is permanent is without arising and without ceasing and not characterized by saṃskṛta traits, why then is it said that all sentient beings possess it? Zhixiu says: In the sixth exchange, there is a two-pronged objection: First, if it is not of the three times, present sentient beings should not possess it. Later it says: If sentient beings possess it, it should share the same substance with sentient beings.

63.84

"Good son! Although the buddhadhātu of sentient beings is absent in the present, it cannot be said to be non-existent.

63.85

Sengliang comments: Although it lacks a present characteristic, it will ultimately be obtained for function. Because it is ultimately obtained for function, it exists for sentient beings.

63.86

Just as the nature of empty space, though absent in the present, cannot be said to be non-existent.

63.87

Sengliang comments: Empty space has no present characteristic, yet it can be said that sentient beings have its present function. The buddhadhātu is also like this: although it does not presently exist, present sentient beings also come to have its function.

63.88

Although all sentient beings are impermanent, this buddhadhātu is permanent and unchanging.

63.89

Sengliang comments: Wishing to analyze extensively to settle the simile's nature, he raises the two approaches once again.

63.90

"For this reason, I have explained in this sūtra [that the buddhadhātu of sentient beings is] just like empty space, neither internal nor external." [down to]

63.91

Sengliang comments: By speaking of neither internal nor external, he clarifies that it is permanent.

63.92

"If empty space were to have an inside or an outside, [it would not be called permanent and omnipresent;] the buddhadhātu of sentient beings is also like this." [down to]

63.93

Sengliang comments: If it had an inside and an outside, it would not be a unity. If it had parts, it would not be permanent. The inside would lack the outside, the outside would lack the middle, and the middle would lack the inside—how could it be called omnipresent?

63.94

"As you have said, that for icchantikas [the good roots are severed, but later they still produce good roots;] the karma of an icchantika is also like this." [down to]

63.95

Sengliang comments: The mind is the master of good and evil, yet it is ruined by wrong views. Although they may have the utmost compassionate thought, in the end it does not become good. The meaning is shown in the simile.

63.96

"Good son! The Tathāgata is fully endowed with the power of knowing the faculties [of sentient beings; for this reason I] explain that all phenomena lack fixed characteristics." [down to]

63.97

Sengliang comments: From here below is the second section. It explains that the nature of the faculties cannot be fixed; one can advance or regress. Explaining regression serves to admonish them, and explaining advancement serves to encourage them; this is called the section on encouragement and admonition. Sengzong says: From here below is the fourth [section], clarifying that because of the Tathāgata's power of knowing faculties, he can transform the inferior into the intermediate. Because faculties are not fixed, one can advance or regress, and the Tathāgata never abandons them.

63.98

Bodhisattva Kāśyapa addressed the Buddha: "World-Honoured One, [if the Buddha knows that Sunakkhatta would sever his good roots,] for what reason did you permit him to go forth as a monastic?" [down to]

63.99

Sengliang comments: Above, the knowledge of faculties was explained, but the benefit of knowing faculties was not yet explained. Yet permitting Sunakkhatta to go forth as a monastic did not yield the benefit of the Buddha's Dharma; judging by outward traces, he seemed not to know human benefit, hence the question is raised.

63.100

The Buddha said: "Good son! In the past, [I also permitted him to go forth; it is because of this that] I am the Tathāgata fully endowed with the ten powers." [down to]

63.101

Sengliang comments: He explains the benefit of knowing faculties. Baoliang says: The Buddha knew that Sunakkhatta was destined to sever his good roots, so he brought him to go forth to let him generate subtle goodness, establishing provision for future lives. Furthermore, if he had not gone forth, his evil would have grown unrestrained. For this reason, he led him into the path. However, the compiler of the sūtra has already revealed that Devadatta was a provisional trace, yet has never disclosed the expedient nature of Sunakkhatta. Judging from this, the sūtra text should not only contain this. Examining the principle and seeking the meaning, by analogy it should not be real; it was likely not fully stated.

63.102

"Good son! The Buddha observes sentient beings endowed with good phenomena [who, after encountering bad friends,] can sever their good roots and become endowed with unwholesome roots." [down to]

63.103

Sengliang comments: He explains the causes of regression. There are four causes of regression: first, not associating with good spiritual friends; second, although being close to them, not listening to the true Dharma; third, although listening to the Dharma, not reflecting on its meaning; fourth, although reflecting on the meaning, not practicing as taught.

63.104

"Good son! The Tathāgata further knows that in this present life this person [will again encounter good friends;] at that time, they will be able to produce good roots once more." [down to]

63.105

Sengliang comments: He explains the causes of advancement. The causes of advancement are also four; he briefly raises the two causes of associating with good spiritual friends and listening to the true Dharma.

63.106

"Good son! For example, suppose there is a spring not far from a village, [and an intelligent person knows that the thirsty traveler will surely reach it; this is] what is called fully possessing the power of knowing all faculties." [down to]

63.107

Sengliang comments: This clarifies that regression is only temporary, whereas the arising of goodness is certain. The spring symbolizes the fruit of Buddhahood; the village symbolizes the three realms; the water symbolizes permanence and bliss; thirst symbolizes the eight sufferings; the intelligent person symbolizes the Buddha; the absence of any other path symbolizes that the eight sufferings are repulsive, permanence and bliss are to be joyfully sought, and the eightfold path is certain.

63.108

At that time, the World-Honoured One picked up a small amount of earth from the ground [and placed it on his fingernail, saying to Kāśyapa: "Is this earth on my fingernail more, or is the earth in the great earth of the ten directions more?" Kāśyapa said: "The earth on the fingernail] is incomparable to all the earth in the ten directions." [down to]

63.109

Sengliang comments: He clarifies that although those who regress do not do so for long, those who regress are extremely numerous; and although advancement is certain, those who advance are few.

63.110

"Good son! Those who shed their bodies and regain human bodies [and are able to cultivate the path and enter nirvāṇa,] those able to enter nirvāṇa are like the earth on a fingernail." [down to]

63.111

Sengliang comments: Those who advance pass from light into light.

63.112

"Those who, having shed their human bodies, obtain bodies in the three evil destinies [are] like all the earth in the realms of the ten directions." [down to]

63.113

Sengliang comments: He clarifies that those who regress pass from light into darkness, or from darkness into darkness.

63.114

"Good son! Those who guard and maintain the prohibitive precepts with vigorous diligence without slackening [and have faith in this Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra are like the earth on a fingernail; those who do not are] like all the earth in the realms of the ten directions." [down to]

Linked texts (1)

大般涅槃經集解 — Classical Chinese