Pramāṇa · Search · About · API

大般涅槃經集解 66.46

English (machine translation) 66.46

Language
English

66.46

Sengliang states: "This addresses his third question, answering his dual dilemma regarding existence and non-existence." Sengzong states: "Now it clarifies that a person who has severed the roots of goodness possesses all the aforementioned samādhis and bodhisattva natures. The answer means: you ask whether, if it exists, they cannot be called one who has severed the roots of goodness. I say that they will have roots of goodness; how could one say that everyone has the buddhadhātu? When I say non-existent, it is completely unobtainable at present, but will certainly exist in the future; how could they have severed the roots of goodness? That these two obstruct the future is precisely because, currently possessing the obstruction of afflictions, they cannot swiftly achieve buddhahood in the future; hence it is merely called non-existent, not eternally non-existent. This is called answering by distinguishing." Baoliang states: "This provisionally answers the second objection. It means that one who has severed the roots of goodness also possesses the seven kinds of buddhadhātu at the head of the fruit, as well as the six kinds of natures of contributory causes of the ten abidings. These two kinds of buddhadhātu, because they obstruct the future, are called non-existent; because they will definitely be attained, they are called existent. It is only because of present delusions and obstructions that the two kinds of natures do not manifest, so they are designated non-existent. How could one say that one who has severed the roots of goodness has no buddhadhātu?" Zhixiu states: "It clarifies that because the two kinds of natures are non-existent in the present, they are not of the category that is severed. Because other virtues are severed separately, the meaning of icchantika is established; because they will exist in the future, it is said that all possess them."

Linked texts (1)