大般涅槃經集解 66

English (machine translation) 66

Language: English

66.1

Broadly Explaining the Matter of an Icchantika Reckoning There Is No Cause and Effect; Discussing the Principle of an Icchantika Giving Rise to Roots of Goodness; Discussing the Principle of an Icchantika Severing the Roots of Goodness in the Three Times; Clarifying the Principle that a Person Who Has Severed Roots of Goodness Possesses Buddhadhātu; Broadly Explaining the Principles of Buddhadhātu of Five, Six, and Seven Kinds, Such as the Ninth Abode and Eighth Abode; Broadly Explaining How Diverse Understandings of Buddhadhātu All Lose the Middle Way.

66.2

Chapter on Kāśyapa, Part 4

66.3

[Bodhisattva Kāśyapa said to the Buddha: "World-Honoured One […] good son, one who severs the roots of goodness."]

66.4

Sengliang comments: Intending to inquire about the one who severs the good, he first asks who the one who doubts and is attached is.

66.5

Kāśyapa said: "World-Honoured One! What kind of persons can sever the roots of goodness?"

66.6

Sengliang comments: He asks: between sharp and dull faculties, which one can sever the good?

66.7

"Good son! If there are those who are intelligent, astute, of sharp faculties, and able to distinguish well,

66.8

Sengliang comments: It is people of worldly knowledge, discriminatory intelligence, and sharp faculties who can sever the roots of goodness. Sengzong says: The sixth section broadly explains how one severs the roots of goodness due to giving rise to wrong views.

66.9

who stay far away from good friends, do not listen to the correct Dharma, do not engage in proper reflection, and do not abide according to the Dharma—

66.10

Sengliang comments: Both the severing of the good and correct determinacy derive from sharp faculties. Why? If externally one stays close to good friends, one becomes correct; if externally one departs from good friends, one severs [the good]. This explains the beginning of severing the good. It is the fourth part, on the analogy of wrong views.

66.11

such a person can sever the roots of goodness […] one should know that this person can sever the roots of goodness.

66.12

Sengliang comments: Previously it was clarified that severing the good arises from wrong views and lack of faith; now the causes from which wrong views arise are explained. Daohui's notes state: The wrong view that denies and claims there is no giving comprises six matters.

66.13

They further have this thought: 'There is no father and no mother […] one should know that this person can sever the roots of goodness.'

66.14

Daohui's notes state: The denial of father and mother comprises six matters.

66.15

They further have this thought: 'All the world […] therefore one should know that there are no fruits of good and evil.'

66.16

Daohui's notes state: The claim that there are no good and evil comprises three matters.

66.17

They further have this thought: 'All the world […] When engaging in such contemplation, they can sever the roots of goodness.'

66.18

Daohui's notes state: By raising six matters, it destroys the noble path and nirvāṇa, and simultaneously denies the existence of noble ones.

66.19

"Good son! If there are sentient beings who profoundly hold such views […] and the three evil destinies, and schism of the saṃgha are also like this.

66.20

Sengliang comments: In conclusion, those who can sever the roots of goodness are certainly of sharp intellect; failing to attain correct understanding, they give rise to views based on delusion, and deduce with erroneous grasping.

66.21

Bodhisattva Kāśyapa said to the Buddha: "World-Honoured One […] when will they be able to regenerate the roots of goodness?"

66.22

Sengliang comments: Fifth is the section on generating the good, seeking an opening from an impasse. Those who grasp one-sidedly cannot discern, and can sever the roots of goodness. Those who do not grasp can discern, and regenerate the roots of goodness. Below, it explains that buddhadhātu is not fixed and matters must be discerned, which is the meaning of generating the good. Sengzong says: The second part of the major division clarifies the regeneration of the good. Baoliang says: The fifth part of the major division clarifies the regeneration of the good. Although sentient beings sever the roots of goodness, when receiving suffering they develop a mind that reviles suffering; therefore, they regenerate the roots of goodness, continuing without interruption until reaching buddhahood. Now, regarding the words in this passage, they are quite expansive; they are briefly divided into five distinctions: first, clarifying the regeneration of the roots of goodness to determine the nature of cause and effect; second, clarifying the practice of the Middle Way; third, citing the Buddha's three kinds of speech to make beings open-minded, clarifying that the Buddha's words have no fixed form and must not be grasped rigidly; fourth, clarifying whether buddhadhātu exists or not; fifth, distinguishing gains and losses to conclude the above.

66.23

The Buddha said: "Good son! This person at two times […] when first entering hell and when leaving hell.

66.24

Sengliang comments: When first undergoing suffering, remorse arises in the mind, and goodness is regenerated. If suffering is already intense, the mind is confused, turbid, and does not know to feel remorse; not until about to leave does one feel remorse. Sengzong says: This refers to a person of sharp faculties. Baoliang says: If one has extremely sharp faculties, like the five hundred brahmins, merely entering hell they are able to generate the good, because such a person is intelligent. This is also because they had previously never experienced great suffering; now, receiving birth in hell, they immediately perceive the severity of the suffering, and are able to reflect, examine, and awaken to the fact that what they did was contrary to principle, thereby instantly changing their mind. If their spiritual faculties are slightly inferior, not until leaving hell, under the subsequent remaining retributions, are they able to reform. There are countless paths within this; it cannot be fixed. Daohui's notes state: At the time of first entering, suffering has just begun, spiritual awareness is not yet dim, and they still have correct consciousness; later, when leaving hell, the suffering endured is light, allowing their mind to arise; therefore, at these two times they are able to generate the good.

66.25

"Good son! Goodness is of three kinds […] because they sever causes of the three times, it is called severing.

66.26

Sengliang comments: The past has already ceased; because it does not exist, it cannot be severed. The future has not yet arrived, so it goes without saying. That severing the causes of the three times is called severing: taking a single present thought of good mind as the cause, it can produce subsequent good. Now, because wrong views obstruct this good mind so that it cannot arise, it is called severing the causes of the three times. Sengzong says: This clarifies severing the goodness of the three times. As for why it is not called severing the fruits of the past: if a past cause has already determined the fruition and retribution will be in a future rebirth, this retribution must certainly be received in the future, so it is not severed. The cause belonging to this very retribution is also fixed and cannot be severed. Because the text is abridged, it only says that fruits are not severed. A past cause bears fruit in the future; the substance of the cause has already perished—how could it be severed? That severing the causes of the three times is called severing the roots of goodness: if goodness exists in the present, it is present goodness. This goodness ought to pass into the past, so it is past goodness. Present goodness continuing into the future is called future goodness. Now, through this body one becomes an icchantika, and evil karma manifests; thus present goodness that ought to arise cannot arise, which is precisely severing present goodness. If this goodness were to arise, it would then pass into the past; because it does not arise, there is nothing that passes away, which is precisely severing past goodness. This continuation of future categories that ought to continue cannot continue, which is precisely severing the future. In terms of meaning, this text is abridged. Why? Present goodness can produce future fruits; now, severing the present so that it does not arise is severing the cause. Since it is called severing the cause, the fruit has nowhere from which to arise; how is this not severing the fruit? It should also be said to sever the fruit, but due to abridgment it only mentions the cause. Baoliang says: The principle of generating goodness is always within the three times. What previously arose in the past cannot in principle be severed. It is merely by reference to the present obstructing the future that it is called severing two times. What is called 'severing causes of the three times' here: if goodness is produced in the present, this goodness then passes into the past and serves as a past cause. The arising of present goodness relies on the cooperative efficacy of previously arisen goodness. The arising of future goodness also takes the present as cause, cause enabling the continuity of categories. Now that the present is severed, good causes within the three times do not arise; therefore it is said to sever causes of the three times.

66.27

Bodhisattva Kāśyapa said to the Buddha: "World-Honoured One […] is it future, or does it pervade the three times?"

66.28

Sengliang comments: There are four questions in all; this is the first question. Existing phenomena should not be outside the three times; now, to which time is it determined to belong? Sengzong says: There are two questions in all. First, he asks whether buddhadhātu is subsumed under the three times or not. Next, he asks whether an icchantika presently has buddhadhātu or not. If they have it, one should not say they sever the roots of goodness; if they do not have it, one should not say that all possess it. Baoliang says: There are three challenges in all. First, raising the nature of the fruit to make a challenge, he asks: if one who severs the roots of goodness has buddhadhātu, is this buddhadhātu in the past, in the future, in the present, or does it pervade the three times? If buddhadhātu were in the three times, how could it be called permanent? The second challenge says: if a person who severs the roots of goodness has buddhadhātu, since this is good, how can it be said to be severed? If they lack it, how could the Buddha say it is severed? The third precludes the Buddha's intention: if one says it both exists and is severed, one again cannot say buddhadhātu is permanent. Daohui's notes state: The questions are threefold: two are as above; the third means that if it is neither entirely existing nor entirely non-existing, it should be half-existing and half-non-existing, hence it is said to 'both exist and be severed.' Zhixiu says: Intending to make a challenge, he first determines in which time buddhadhātu is among the three times. Below he makes a three-turn challenge.

66.29

"If past, how is it called permanent? […] third, real; fourth, good; fifth, pure; and sixth, visible.

66.30

Sengliang comments: This is the second challenge. Originally non-existent and now existing is the present. Having existed and returning to non-existence is the past. About to exist but not yet arisen is called the future. Phenomena being in the three times is impermanence; the Buddha says the nature is permanent. Next, resolving it by means of the meaning of permanence: that it will definitely be attained proves the future; that it can definitely be seen proves the present. That buddhadhātu has six [aspects] cites the Buddha's teaching: one proves that the nature is permanent, and two proves that it can be seen. Zhixiu says: The first is a determining challenge formulated with respect to the three times. Initially it makes it permanent, not subsumed under the three times. Later, pressing with respect to the two times, it makes it subsumed under time, so that it cannot be permanent.

66.31

If one who severs the roots of goodness has buddhadhātu […] all sentient beings all possess buddhadhātu.

66.32

Sengliang comments: This is the third challenge. Zhixiu says: The second takes the single phrase 'buddhadhātu is good' to make a double-pronged challenge. If an icchantika has the nature, one should not say they sever the good; if the good is severed, the nature should not exist.

66.33

If it is said that buddhadhātu both exists and is severed, how could the Tathāgata again say that it is permanent?

66.34

Sengliang states: "This is the fourth objection. The import of these four objections is entirely to censure the Buddha's teachings as being indefinite." Zhixiu states: "The third adduces the teaching of permanence spoken by the Buddha to guard against objections. If the buddhadhātu is permanent, it is a determinate entity; if it is not determinate, it cannot be called permanent."

66.35

The Buddha said: "Good son! The Tathāgata, the World-Honoured One, [...] the third is answering by counter-questioning, and the fourth is setting aside [the question] in answering."

66.36

Sengliang states: "The Buddha's meaning is that disputes miss the middle path due to one-sided clinging. Now, as the principles of phenomena differ, there are four kinds of answers, which cannot be stated unequivocally in a single way." Sengzong states: "Here, citing the four kinds of answers first aims at answering by distinguishing." Baoliang states: "This is not yet directly answering the objection, but merely bringing up that the Buddha has four modes of discourse. Below, he explains them sequentially, employing the answer by distinguishing as the response." Zhixiu states: "The four modes of answering questions constitute a distinct doctrinal rubric. Here, taking distinguishing and setting aside to resolve his objection, he first lists the four general chapter headings, and below explains them individually."

66.37

"Good son! What is answering decisively? [...] abiding according to the Dharma: this is called answering decisively."

66.38

Sengliang states: "Because the principle has no duality, it requires no distinction; this is called answering decisively."

66.39

"What is answering by distinguishing? As I have taught, [...] is called the truth of the path: this is called answering by distinguishing."

66.40

Sengliang states: "There are two modes of exposition: exposition of phenomena and exposition of meaning. Exposition of phenomena is comprehensive and brief, while exposition of meaning is distinct and extensive; therefore it is called answering by distinguishing."

66.41

"What is answering by counter-questioning? As I have taught, [...] for greed, anger, and delusion, I taught that everything is burning."

66.42

Sengliang states: "Some meanings are self-evident without needing question and answer; others have a general phenomenon with distinct meanings that must be questioned before being answered. He cites the Tathāgata's authentic intent as the explanation."

66.43

"Good son! The Tathāgata's ten powers, four fearlessnesses, [...] and sixth, seen to a slight extent: this is called answering by distinguishing."

66.44

Sengliang states: "He first answers the second question. The buddhadhātu has the permanent and the impermanent, which necessitates distinction; one cannot cling to permanence in framing a question. The seven things—possessing the eight masteries, the four blisses, the four purities, the uncontaminated, and seeing the dharmatā—are all called true aśaikṣa dharmas, and all can be seen to a slight extent." Sengzong states: "Intending to bring up his second question, he first adduces the various virtues of the fruit-stage and the dharmas of the bodhisattva in the final body, presenting an answer by distinguishing." Baoliang states: "The ten powers and so forth up to the seven things of the buddhadhātu are all the buddhadhātu of the fruit-stage. That the buddhadhātu of the bodhisattva in the final body has six is because within the buddhadhātu of the ten abidings, it predominantly clarifies the nature of contributory causes. First, permanence: because on the ten stages one slightly sees the permanence of the true self, it is said to be 'also permanent'. The uncontaminated understanding, once attained, is never lost, so it is also called permanent. Second, purity: the defilements of affliction are eliminated. Third, truth: unmixed with falsity. Fourth, reality: substance and function are not deceptive. Fifth, goodness: a purely clean mind. Sixth, seen to a slight extent: this means the nature of the fruit is distinguished in this way." Daohui's notes state: "This answers the first question, clarifying that this buddhadhātu is not of the three times and is permanent, while the remainder is subsumed under the three times." Zhixiu states: "Answering the first objection, it clarifies that although the buddhadhātu is one in name and meaning, it is realized as seven in the fruit and six in the cause, and is thus indefinite. How could one, hearing of cutting off the causes of the three times, cling to the buddhadhātu being subsumed under the three times, consider it impermanent, and make a definitive objection?"

66.45

"As you asked before whether a person who has severed the roots of goodness [...] can be called existent: this is called answering by distinguishing."

66.46

Sengliang states: "This addresses his third question, answering his dual dilemma regarding existence and non-existence." Sengzong states: "Now it clarifies that a person who has severed the roots of goodness possesses all the aforementioned samādhis and bodhisattva natures. The answer means: you ask whether, if it exists, they cannot be called one who has severed the roots of goodness. I say that they will have roots of goodness; how could one say that everyone has the buddhadhātu? When I say non-existent, it is completely unobtainable at present, but will certainly exist in the future; how could they have severed the roots of goodness? That these two obstruct the future is precisely because, currently possessing the obstruction of afflictions, they cannot swiftly achieve buddhahood in the future; hence it is merely called non-existent, not eternally non-existent. This is called answering by distinguishing." Baoliang states: "This provisionally answers the second objection. It means that one who has severed the roots of goodness also possesses the seven kinds of buddhadhātu at the head of the fruit, as well as the six kinds of natures of contributory causes of the ten abidings. These two kinds of buddhadhātu, because they obstruct the future, are called non-existent; because they will definitely be attained, they are called existent. It is only because of present delusions and obstructions that the two kinds of natures do not manifest, so they are designated non-existent. How could one say that one who has severed the roots of goodness has no buddhadhātu?" Zhixiu states: "It clarifies that because the two kinds of natures are non-existent in the present, they are not of the category that is severed. Because other virtues are severed separately, the meaning of icchantika is established; because they will exist in the future, it is said that all possess them."

66.47

"The Tathāgata's buddhadhātu is not past, not present, [...] because it is not fully seen, it is called future."

66.48

Sengliang states: "This concurrently answers the first objection. The objection stated: 'The nature possesses the three times.' Now it clarifies that it is not of the three times and cannot be spoken of as existent, yet is subsumed under the three times. Because it can be slightly seen, it is called present; because it is seen to a slight extent, it is called the final body. The past fully possesses only two times. Because it is not fully seen, it is called future. 'Not fully seen' means seen in slight measure. The body of the trainee is said to have past and future, not that of the non-trainee." Fayao states: "This answers the earlier question of whether it is past, future, present, or pervasive of the three times. One must distinguish it: the Buddha-fruit is not of the three times, while the Buddha's conditioned nature is of the three times. The substance of the contributory cause is also cause and also fruit; hence it is called buddhadhātu. As cause, it is of the three times, and as fruit, it is also of the three times. The buddhadhātu of the actual fruit is not of the three times; hence it is said that the fruit is not of the three times. The contemplative wisdom of causes and conditions of the bodhisattva in the final body is precisely the seed-nature of buddhahood; this initial single thought is present, being unfulfilled it is future, and it has no past. The contemplative wisdom of the ten abidings arises from causes; because it is contemplative-wisdom buddhadhātu, it may also be termed buddhadhātu. This buddhadhātu has causal dharmas and fruitional dharmas, all belonging to the three times. Because the buddhadhātu of the actual fruit is not yet present, one cannot say it is not of the three times." Sengzong states: "This answers the first question. The question stated: 'If it belongs to the three times, it is impermanent.' Now it answers: 'The nature has cause and fruit. If it is the fruitional nature, it is permanent and not of the three times. If it is the causal nature, as with the bodhisattva in the final body, because it is slightly seen in the present, it can also be called present; because it is not yet entirely clear, it can also be called future.' Speaking of its present and future causes, it is thus stated; in reality, it is not of the three times. When the fruit is attained, it cannot be so; it is precisely because, when in the cause, it will certainly be seen, that it is conceptually said to be future. Because it is slightly seen in the present, it is conceptually said to be seen. If it is not of the three times, how could it be impermanent? When it comes to the five kinds clarifying that an icchantika will certainly possess it in the future, it can also be called existent; this is truly answering by distinguishing." Baoliang states: "This answers the first objection. It clarifies that the buddhadhātu is not within the three times, nor is it subsumed under the three times. That the buddhadhātu of the final body is in the three times clarifies that the nature of contributory causes, being seen in slight measure in the present, can be called present; because it will be fully perfected only in the future, it is also called future." Daohui's notes state: "This resolves the first objection and concurrently resolves the second objection." He also states: "This directly answers the first question." He also states: "This combines and synthesizes the explanation of the two questions." Zhixiu states: "From here down, it continues to answer the second objection, and concurrently clarifies where the determinate nature resides. That which is subsumed under the three times is in the cause; that which is not subsumed is in the fruit."

66.49

"Before the Tathāgata had attained anuttarasamyaksaṃbodhi, [...] the fruit is also like this: this is called answering by distinguishing."

66.50

Sengliang states: "From trainee to non-trainee, there are two explanations of continuity; that 'the fruit of the buddhadhātu is also like this' means it is also subsumed under the three times." Sengliang states: "When one has not yet attained the fruit of the unexcelled path, it is still the buddhadhātu of contributory causes, all subsumed under the three times. That 'the fruit is not so' refers to the nature of the Buddha-fruit. Those possessing the three times are from the ten abidings downward. That the nature of contributory causes has that which is not [of the three times] is the buddhadhātu of the Buddha-fruit. Because of the cause of the buddhadhātu of the bodhisattva in the final body, it is also subsumed under the three times. That 'the fruit is also like this' means that this is the nature of contributory causes from the ten abidings downward, where the preceding thought is the cause and the subsequent thought is the fruit, which is also subsumed under the three times."

66.51

"The six kinds of buddhadhātu of a bodhisattva of the ninth abiding [...] the fruit is also like this: this is called answering by distinguishing."

66.52

Sengliang states: "Having severed the residual habits of fetters and extinguished gross afflictions, the explanation of permanence differs from the permanence of the final body." Baoliang states: "Since one remains exclusively in contemplation without emerging or entering, the name of permanence remains."

66.53

"A bodhisattva of the eighth abiding down to the sixth abiding [...] the fruit is also like this: this is called answering by distinguishing."

66.54

Sengliang states: "From the eighth abiding down to the sixth abiding, one has not yet severed the habit of views, so it is said to be impermanent. Having no afflictions of the three realms, it is said to be good." Baoliang states: "The ninth abiding and tenth abiding equally obtain the designation of permanence. That those from the eighth abiding downward lack it is how we know that in the initial mind of the eighth stage, there still must be emerging and entering contemplation. Although those from the medium forbearance upward lack it, they are stripped of the designation and not granted it."

66.55

"The five things of the buddhadhātu of a bodhisattva of the fifth abiding down to the first abiding [...] fourth, visible; fifth, good and ungood."

66.56

Sengliang states: "'Good and ungood' refers to classifying the afflictions of the three realms as ungood." Baoliang states: "The good is the contributory cause; the ungood is the objective-domain cause. Although the sixth abiding possesses subtle delusions of the formless realm, their painful function is light and does not severely oppress the mind, so it is not given the name of an objective domain."

66.57

"Good son! These five kinds of buddhadhātu [...] can thus be said to exist: this is called answering by distinguishing."

66.58

Sengliang states: "Above, addressing the third question and concurrently answering the first have extensively distinguished them to completion; now it returns to conclude the third. The seven kinds and six kinds are contributory causes, which the icchantika lacks at present. The five things have the ungood, which, although afflictions, are not the afflictions that sever goodness, and for the icchantika they are also what will exist in the future." Baoliang states: "Because a person who has severed the roots of goodness will certainly attain all the buddhadhātu clarified above, it is said to exist."

66.59

"If anyone should say that one who has severed the roots of goodness definitely has the buddhadhātu, or definitely lacks the buddhadhātu, this is called setting aside [the question] in answering."

66.60

Sengliang states: "This answers the fourth question. It clarifies that existence is future existence, and non-existence is present non-existence. An answer is decisive, yet the buddhadhātu is indefinite. If one speaks definitively while the doubter remains unresolved, it should not be an answer by setting aside. If one speaks of its indefiniteness so that doubts are resolved, it does not require a repeated answer; this is called setting aside [the question] in answering." Fayao states: "This answers the earlier question of being both existent and severed. Because roots of goodness are severed, one cannot say it definitely exists. Because roots of goodness are reborn, one cannot say it definitely does not exist. That one may say it both exists and does not exist clarifies the nature of contributory causes of the myriad goods." Baoliang states: "This answers the third objection. The import of the answer is: one cannot definitely say it exists, nor can one definitely say it is severed. Saying it definitely exists or definitely does not exist is called setting aside [the question] in answering."

66.61

Bodhisattva Kāśyapa said: "World-Honoured One! I have heard that not answering [...] by what causes and conditions is answering called setting aside [the question] in answering?"

66.62

Sengliang states: "As other sūtras state that not answering is called setting aside [the question] in answering, he therefore raises the question."

66.63

"Good son! I do not say that setting aside and not answering is setting aside [the question] in answering."

66.64

Sengliang states: "The words are concise. It should say: 'It is not only setting aside and not answering that is called setting aside [the question] in answering,' the meaning of which appears below."

66.65

"Good son! Setting aside [the question] in answering like this again has two kinds [...] for this reason it can be called setting aside [the question] in answering."

66.66

Sengliang notes: "First, not answering is called set-aside. Second, answering yet setting aside. To set aside without answering is to halt meaningless questions. To answer yet set aside is to dispel their biased attachments. Baoliang says: 'There is not answering, which is also called a set-aside answer. There is also answering with a rebuke to halt [it] without explaining, which is likewise called a set-aside answer. The Buddha now employs the latter explanation; hence he says, "stopping [them] so they do not become attached."' Daohui's Records state: '"I also do not say that setting aside without answering [is it]," meaning that only not answering is called a set-aside answer. It also states: "Nor do I say that not answering is a set-aside answer." It also states: "Nor do I say that setting aside is not answering; rather, setting aside serves as an answer." First, because it stops [them]—it stops their grasping. Second, "do not become attached"—it does not permit their definite attachment. Both kinds of set-aside answers share these two meanings.' It also states: 'Stopping them is the spoken set-aside answer; not becoming attached is the silent set-aside answer.'"

66.67

Bodhisattva Kāśyapa addressed the Buddha: "World-Honoured One, [...] is neither past, present, nor future."

66.68

Sengliang notes: "Above, the essence of the cause was not yet explained; now he inquires about it again." Sengzong says: "He further inquires to reveal the essence and characteristics, so as to make people recognise them." Baoliang says: "Above, the explanation that the Buddha-fruit is not of the three times was quite clear in meaning. However, the name 'fruit' is easily confused with [fruits of] saṃsāra, so Kāśyapa raises this question to illuminate this point." Zhixiu says: "Although he explained above the nature in terms of whether it is subsumed or not subsumed by the three times of cause and effect, he did not reveal its essence. Now this question is raised to illuminate it."

66.69

The Buddha said: "Good son, the five aggregates are of two kinds [...] nor are they past, present, or future."

66.70

Sengliang notes: "This broadly pertains to the causal stage. The initial [stage] is the cause, and the vajra[-like samādhi] is the fruit; these are still conditioned and do not escape the three times. Saying 'also neither' refers to the Buddha-fruit." Baoliang says: "Both cause and fruit are subsumed under the three times. The five aggregates of the preceding thought-moment are the cause, and the five aggregates of the subsequent thought-moment are the fruit; thus cause and effect are both of the three times. That which is not of the three times is solely the fruit-buddhadhātu, which is singularly liberated." Zhixiu says: "This directly answers the question. If it is the stage of transformation, it carries the responsive [body], and therefore possesses all five [aggregates]."

66.71

"Good son, all the fetters such as ignorance and afflictions [...] the Tathāgata's buddhadhātu is like sarpirmaṇḍa."

66.72

Sengliang notes: "This is the direct-cause nature. Above, it was said that the buddhadhātu of the Buddha and the ten stages are different, but the buddhadhātu of ordinary beings was not yet discussed. Now, proceeding from ordinary beings up to the Buddha, he further distinguishes their subtle and coarse [states] through analogies. Obtaining wholesome five aggregates refers to the conditioned-cause nature of tainted goodness. From the srotāpanna upward, the untainted is distinguished as subtle or coarse, arising from the direct cause." Sengzong says: "This explains the direct-cause nature. This spiritual consciousness is the direct cause of the Buddha; relying on this, one can generate the wholesome five aggregates up to bodhi. Because sentient beings are like blood mingled [with milk], this is due to having afflictions within their substance. Just as sentient beings are all formed from semen and blood, this illuminates that although they possess the buddhadhātu, they must rely on the myriad wholesome deeds to attain Buddhahood. Srotāpannas and sakṛdāgāmins have equally severed [some] delusions of the desire realm through cultivation without exhausting them; because they possess a small degree of goodness, their buddhadhātu is like milk. Anāgāmins have exhausted [the delusions of] the desire realm, which is likened to curd. Arhats have exhausted the afflictions of the three realms, which is likened to raw butter. Pratyekabuddhas up to bodhisattvas of the ten stages have severed the delusions beyond the three realms, which is like clarified butter. The Buddha is like sarpirmaṇḍa." Baoliang says: "Having concluded discriminating the two questions, he further gathers all myriad dharmas together. The deaths of ignorance and so forth are none other than buddhadhātu: whether as direct cause, conditioned cause, or cognitive-object cause, according to the principle taken up, all can assist the fruit. Therefore, having concluded the general discussion of buddhadhātu, in order that the principle be left with no omission, he must comprehensively illuminate ordinary beings so that the matter is completely addressed. Therefore, speaking of sentient beings' buddhadhātu as being like milk mingled with blood, where good and evil are not yet separated, in principle it is called mingled. Up to the differences in gradations of sentient beings' buddhadhātu, it is as stated in the text." Zhixiu says: "Above, he only illuminated bodhisattvas, and did not bring out ordinary beings and lesser sages. Moreover, although he illuminated that buddhadhātu can be attained, this was merely spoken in terms of the differences among various persons in the causal stage. Yet he did not explain the reason; hence here he reveals them together, explaining that all dharmas in the causal stage have the meaning of being able to attain [it], and this constitutes the difference."

66.73

"Good son, present afflictions [...] buddhadhātu is also like this. This is called a discriminative answer."

66.74

Sengliang notes: "The grass is an analogy for the buddhadhātu of ordinary beings and sages; the cow is an analogy for the bodhisattva of the final existence. When the cow eats the grass, it turns into sarpirmaṇḍa, which is an analogy for seeing the nature in the final existence and immediately becoming a Buddha." Sengzong says: "Because there are present afflictions, they cannot behold it; how could one say it does not exist?"

66.75

Bodhisattva Kāśyapa addressed the Buddha: "World-Honoured One, [...] do people who have severed their roots of goodness have the buddhadhātu?"

66.76

Sengliang notes: "This expands on the set-aside answer above: that which has not yet arisen in the future should not be said to have buddhadhātu in an icchantika." Sengzong says: "He still grasps at seeing existence to raise the objection." Baoliang says: "The explanation roughly obstructed the principle of the fetters of desire giving birth again; hence Kāśyapa raises this question again." Zhixiu says: "Kāśyapa also similarly had not penetrated it, which is why he asked."

66.77

The Buddha said: "Good son, just as all sentient beings [...] due to the cause and condition of the power of buddhadhātu, they regenerate roots of goodness."

66.78

Sengliang notes: "Generally, 'existence' encompasses the three times. 'Sentient being' is a provisional designation for a continuity, unifying the three times into one existence, all belonging to it. 'Ultimately unable to produce fruit' explains that before it arrives, it lacks function. The three existences have different functions: present existence can sever, while future existence can produce; hence it is said to be definitely non-existent." Sengzong says: "Having past karma, one has present fruit. Future karma has not yet arisen, so one cannot have its fruit. Although buddhadhātu is not of the three times, because present afflictions exist, wholesome karma is absent. Because they do not see the buddhadhātu, it is figuratively said to be severed, but it is not permanently severed. Due to the causes and conditions of the future buddhadhātu, it is able to be born again." Baoliang says: "The Buddha now distinguishes it again through analogy. Just as sentient beings have past karma, they invite present fruit. Although there is a future, karma does not yet exist, so it cannot produce fruit. Although the fruit has not yet arisen, due to the causes and conditions of present afflictions, one can sever the roots of goodness. Due to the power of the causes and conditions of future wholesome karma, they can be born again." Zhixiu says: "The Buddha explains the principle in terms of karma. When there is karma, one obtains the fruit; when there are sentient beings, they can attain Buddhahood; hence it is merely said that there is buddhadhātu."

66.79

Kāśyapa said: "World-Honoured One, how can the future produce roots of goodness?"

66.80

Sengliang notes: "Above it was said that what has not arisen has no fruit; now he asks about the principle of its arising." Daohui's Records state: "The intent of the question is: since the future lacks goodness, how can it produce goodness?"

66.81

"Good son, just like a lamp or the sun [...] is also like this. This is called a discriminative answer."

66.82

Sengliang notes: "The arising of dharmas is called birth. The nature of the sun is light; although it has not yet risen, its nature is inherently without darkness, which is called destroying darkness. The natures of good and evil are inherently mutually opposed; when goodness arises, evil is extinguished." Baoliang says: "This person rides upon past goodness as the cause and present good spiritual friends as the condition, and thus is able to extinguish evil and produce goodness." Zhixiu says: "Although not yet having arisen, its nature can destroy darkness; that the buddhadhātu can produce roots of goodness in the future is just like this. This is a partial analogy, which must be carefully evaluated and understood."

66.83

Bodhisattva Kāśyapa addressed the Buddha: "World-Honoured One, [...] the buddhadhātu of sentient beings is neither internal nor external."

66.84

Sengliang notes: "This expands on the discriminative answer above. By biased attachment, disputes arise, and ultimately roots of goodness are severed. Discriminating the Middle Way eliminates their biased attachments; these are all answers to the principle that it cannot be definitively stated." Fayao says: "The rūpaskandha is external, and the [remaining] four aggregates are internal; this is merely the conditioned-cause nature. The direct-cause buddhadhātu is not form, being neither internal nor external. Hitherto, neither internal nor external, neither existent nor non-existent, has been the meaning of the Middle Way; therefore, he raises this question again." Sengzong says: "This is the third major section. If we speak of grasping the intent, there would be no need to explain it again. But because people do not yet understand, in connection with the above explanation of regeneration, explaining that buddhadhātu is subsumed by the three times, and that to become a Buddha in the future one must cultivate goodness to achieve it, from here on is the contemplation of the Middle Way. Hence this Middle Way is explained next. There are seven subsections: First, explaining the Middle Way through combined function. Second, explaining the Middle Way through neither existence nor non-existence to elucidate internal and external. Third, using milk and curd to dispel attachment in order to explain the Middle Way. Fourth, explaining that the Tathāgata speaks according to his own intention—explaining that what the Tathāgata understands differs from ordinary beings, and precisely because they do not skillfully understand the causes and effects of dharmas, he speaks in accordance with beings; how could one give rise to attachment based on his words? Fifth, explaining that he relies on seven kinds of speech to dispel attachment: there is causal speech and fruit speech; sometimes fruit is spoken of within the cause, and sometimes cause is spoken of within the fruit; how could one give rise to attachment to this? Sixth, establishing cause and effect again, explaining that when the fruit exists, the cause is absent; at the time of the cause, how could the fruit already exist? Seventh, explaining by means of the analogy of seven kinds of persons. 'Why say neither internal nor external?'—this objects to the Buddha's preceding statement." Baoliang says: "From here down is the second major section, explaining the Middle Way Buddha-fruit. Buddhadhātu is neither internal nor external; above, in the 'Chapter on the Lion's Roar', it was explained that the fruit is neither already present in the direct cause, nor already present in the conditioned cause, yet it is not attained apart from the five aggregates; hence it is said to be neither internal nor external. Now, here it is explained that all dharmas, good and evil, are entirely buddhadhātu. Fearing that people's minds would be confused, Kāśyapa misunderstood the receipt, seizing upon the previous statement to formulate an objection. He thought: if all dharmas are entirely buddhadhātu, which means there is not a single dharma that is not it, why was it stated above that buddhadhātu is neither internal nor external?" Zhixiu says: "Above, it was explained that the future nature is possessed by sentient beings, and it was further said to be the five aggregates; fearing that beings' minds would have biased attachments and deviate from the balance of principle, this third major section, in order to remove delusional attachments, distinguishes and explains the Middle Way, revealing that the nature of the future fruit is neither existent nor non-existent, free from internal and external. There are three distinctions: First, from here down through the three kinds, directly revealing that the Middle Way nature is neither internal nor external, free from existence and non-existence. Second, up to the Ganges analogy, ending with speech according to one's own intention, citing wish-fulfilling speech that can be spoken in many ways according to conditions; how much more so for the buddhadhātu, which cannot be definitively grasped! Third, classifying and distinguishing the difference between empty space and buddhadhātu."

66.85

The Buddha said: "Good son, for what reason [...] is the buddhadhātu of sentient beings the Middle Way?"

66.86

Sengliang notes: "This means: you previously understood; if you understood, you should not ask again. Asking now is a loss of understanding." Sengzong says: "He points to the preceding 'Chapter on the Lion's Roar', where the Middle Way was already extensively explained; now he should not ask again." Baoliang says: "Here, the Buddha's intent means: 'What I called neither internal nor external means that the fruit nature is neither inside nor outside; this is the Middle Way. Why did you suddenly miss the meaning and ask this question?'" Huilang, relating Tan'ai, says: "Because it was stated above that the unwholesome five aggregates and the wholesome five aggregates are all buddhadhātu, Kāśyapa asks again: 'If the five aggregates are buddhadhātu, why say neither internal nor external?' He wishes him to extensively explain the two kinds of Middle Way: internal/external and existence/non-existence." Daohui's Records state: "The holy teaching is not fixed; since the principle of the Middle Way cannot be definitively grasped, how could sentient beings hold definite attachments? Desiring to dispel attachments and accord with the Middle Way, he raises this question to seek an explanation."

66.87

Kāśyapa said: "World-Honoured One, I truly have not lost the meaning [...] because they cannot understand, I raise this question."

66.88

Sengliang notes: "Kāśyapa, receiving the intent, immediately brushes away traces."

66.89

"Good son, sentient beings' lack of understanding is itself the Middle Way; at times there is understanding, and at times there is lack of understanding."

66.90

Sengliang notes: This clarifies that all phenomena are the middle way; one should not cling to extremes. Sengzong says: Regarding 'sentient beings' not understanding is just the middle way': 'not understanding' means delusion; when one is deluded, there is no understanding, which is 'not internal'; when one understands, there is no delusion, which is 'not external'. Hence it is called 'just the middle way'. Baoliang says: This means sentient beings' not understanding lacks any inherent nature. Next, below, it says 'sometimes having understanding, sometimes lacking understanding'; both understanding and not understanding arise from conditions. Sentient beings also arise from conditions; mutually devoid of nature, all are the middle way. One need only avoid grasping, rendering both empty. If it were not so, this would be one-sided clinging. Daohui's Record states: The text on the middle way is divided into eight sections: first, clarifying the middle way of internal and external; second, analyzing existence; third, dispelling attachments; fourth, revealing three types of expressions, which also dispels attachments; fifth, revealing seven types of expressions; sixth, determining cause and effect; seventh, universally illustrating cause and effect through seven persons; eighth, specifically providing similes for the fruit. This is the first, clarifying the middle way of internal and external. Zhixiu says: Kāśyapa has already stated his clung-to view, intending to benefit beings. From here on, the Buddha broadly reveals the middle way.

66.91

"Good son! In order that sentient beings attain open understanding, I say that the buddhadhātu is neither internal nor external.

66.92

Zhixiu notes: From here on, there are two modes of analyzing the middle way. First, from here, is clarifying the middle way of neither internal nor external to refute what is clung to by heterodox persons. Second, afterward, relying on six conditions—empty space, rabbit horns, and so forth—clarifying the middle way of neither existing nor non-existing.

66.93

"Why? Because ordinary sentient beings may say that the buddhadhātu […] exists apart from the aggregates, just like empty space.

66.94

Sengliang notes: This cites heterodox attachments, of which there are roughly two types. First, [like] fruit in a vessel: although the vessel is not the fruit, its nature is within the aggregates, and apart from the aggregates it does not exist. Second, [like] empty space: the buddhadhātu is permanent, while the five aggregates are impermanent; like the nature of empty space, it is not subsumed under the aggregates.

66.95

"Therefore the Tathāgata speaks of the middle way […] therefore it is called the middle way; this is called an answer by differentiation.

66.96

Sengliang notes: Permanence is the nature of the fruit; impermanence is the nature of the cause. Both being natures without bias is called 'the middle'. Sengzong says: What ordinary people reckon is not so in principle. The principle of buddhadhātu is neither internal nor external; it first cites the six sense-bases to reveal the meaning. If one said it were only internal, neither [view] would be appropriate. Now, stating that buddhadhātu relies provisionally on the internal and the external in combined functioning means that there is both a primary cause and an objective condition-cause; it is accomplished without departing from these. Hence, with reference to the efficacy of their combined functioning, it is considered the middle way. Within the analysis of combined functioning there are five rounds, and this is the first round.

66.97

"Furthermore, good son! What is called neither internal nor external […] this is called an answer by differentiation.

66.98

Sengzong notes: Second, this clarifies combined functioning with reference to conditioning causes.

66.99

"Furthermore, good son! It may be said that the buddhadhātu […] is also called internal and external; this is called the middle way.

66.100

Sengzong notes: Third, this clarifies combined functioning with reference to the true and response [bodies] in the fruit.

66.101

"Furthermore, good son! Some may say […] is also called internal and external; this is called the middle way.

66.102

Sengzong notes: Fourth, this clarifies combined functioning with reference to wisdom born of hearing and wisdom born of reflection.

66.103

"Furthermore, good son! Some may say […] is also internal and also external; this is called the middle way.

66.104

Sengzong notes: Fifth, this briefly cites practice to clarify combined functioning. The general import is solely to reveal that cause and effect are neither internal nor external. Its branches comprise these five rounds clarifying combined functioning.

66.105

"Furthermore, good son! Some may say […] is also internal and also external; this is called the middle way.

66.106

Sengzong notes: The precious jewel takes being constantly manifest as internal; the hidden gold treasure takes not being manifest as external.

66.107

"Good son! The buddhadhātu of sentient beings is neither existent nor non-existent […] the buddhadhātu of sentient beings is neither existent nor non-existent.

66.108

Sengliang notes: This analyzes the middle way of continuity between existence and non-existence. Regarding empty space, humans cannot see it as permanently existing, nor can it be seen as definitely existing. Buddhadhātu also cannot be seen as impermanently existing, nor can it be seen as not definitely existing. Its existence is not like empty space; this is the middle way of existence. Rabbit horns are definitely non-existent for humans; buddhadhātu is not definitely non-existent for humans; this is the middle way of non-existence. 'Neither existent nor non-existent' means: not existing like empty space, and its non-existence is not non-existing like rabbit horns. 'Also existent' means future existence; 'also non-existent' means present non-existence. Sengzong says: This second part explains internal and external via 'neither existent nor non-existent'. It is so precisely because: being not existent, it is not internal; being not non-existent, it is not external. Although buddhadhātu exists, it is not like empty space; that is, the substance of empty space is non-existent, yet it currently has utility for humans; although buddhadhātu is currently non-existent, it will certainly exist in the future, differing from empty space. Its non-existence is not like rabbit horns; that is, rabbit horns are eternally non-existent, whereas this nature is not eternally non-existent, so it differs. Baoliang says: Non-Buddhists reckon that empty space is a phenomenon of determinate nature; yet although buddhadhātu exists, it exists as a future existence, unlike the existence reckoned by non-Buddhists. Nor is it like the non-existence of rabbit horns: rabbit horns definitely never arise, whereas buddhadhātu can arise; how could it be the same as this eternal non-existence? Daohui's Record states: This clarifies that although empty space exists at present, it can never ultimately be seen; whereas the existence of buddhadhātu can be clearly seen with the mind's eye. Internal is existence, external is non-existence; because it is not internal it is not existent, and because it is not external it is not non-existent; therefore it is the middle way of existence and non-existence. Zhixiu says: Second, it analyzes the middle way of neither existent nor non-existent relying on six causes and conditions. This is the first cause and condition.

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大般涅槃經集解 — Classical Chinese