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大般涅槃經集解 66.84

English (machine translation) 66.84

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English

66.84

Sengliang notes: "This expands on the discriminative answer above. By biased attachment, disputes arise, and ultimately roots of goodness are severed. Discriminating the Middle Way eliminates their biased attachments; these are all answers to the principle that it cannot be definitively stated." Fayao says: "The rūpaskandha is external, and the [remaining] four aggregates are internal; this is merely the conditioned-cause nature. The direct-cause buddhadhātu is not form, being neither internal nor external. Hitherto, neither internal nor external, neither existent nor non-existent, has been the meaning of the Middle Way; therefore, he raises this question again." Sengzong says: "This is the third major section. If we speak of grasping the intent, there would be no need to explain it again. But because people do not yet understand, in connection with the above explanation of regeneration, explaining that buddhadhātu is subsumed by the three times, and that to become a Buddha in the future one must cultivate goodness to achieve it, from here on is the contemplation of the Middle Way. Hence this Middle Way is explained next. There are seven subsections: First, explaining the Middle Way through combined function. Second, explaining the Middle Way through neither existence nor non-existence to elucidate internal and external. Third, using milk and curd to dispel attachment in order to explain the Middle Way. Fourth, explaining that the Tathāgata speaks according to his own intention—explaining that what the Tathāgata understands differs from ordinary beings, and precisely because they do not skillfully understand the causes and effects of dharmas, he speaks in accordance with beings; how could one give rise to attachment based on his words? Fifth, explaining that he relies on seven kinds of speech to dispel attachment: there is causal speech and fruit speech; sometimes fruit is spoken of within the cause, and sometimes cause is spoken of within the fruit; how could one give rise to attachment to this? Sixth, establishing cause and effect again, explaining that when the fruit exists, the cause is absent; at the time of the cause, how could the fruit already exist? Seventh, explaining by means of the analogy of seven kinds of persons. 'Why say neither internal nor external?'—this objects to the Buddha's preceding statement." Baoliang says: "From here down is the second major section, explaining the Middle Way Buddha-fruit. Buddhadhātu is neither internal nor external; above, in the 'Chapter on the Lion's Roar', it was explained that the fruit is neither already present in the direct cause, nor already present in the conditioned cause, yet it is not attained apart from the five aggregates; hence it is said to be neither internal nor external. Now, here it is explained that all dharmas, good and evil, are entirely buddhadhātu. Fearing that people's minds would be confused, Kāśyapa misunderstood the receipt, seizing upon the previous statement to formulate an objection. He thought: if all dharmas are entirely buddhadhātu, which means there is not a single dharma that is not it, why was it stated above that buddhadhātu is neither internal nor external?" Zhixiu says: "Above, it was explained that the future nature is possessed by sentient beings, and it was further said to be the five aggregates; fearing that beings' minds would have biased attachments and deviate from the balance of principle, this third major section, in order to remove delusional attachments, distinguishes and explains the Middle Way, revealing that the nature of the future fruit is neither existent nor non-existent, free from internal and external. There are three distinctions: First, from here down through the three kinds, directly revealing that the Middle Way nature is neither internal nor external, free from existence and non-existence. Second, up to the Ganges analogy, ending with speech according to one's own intention, citing wish-fulfilling speech that can be spoken in many ways according to conditions; how much more so for the buddhadhātu, which cannot be definitively grasped! Third, classifying and distinguishing the difference between empty space and buddhadhātu."

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