大般涅槃經集解 67.50

67.50

Sengliang states: That which the icchantika has and the person of goodness lacks refers to the evil views that cut off good roots, which are a cause and an obstruction; the icchantika has them, whereas the person with roots of goodness lacks them. That which the icchantika lacks and the person with roots of goodness has refers to the supportive causal power of good dharmas that is able to eliminate obstructions; the person with roots of goodness has it, whereas the icchantika lacks it. The indeterminate is neither an obstruction nor an elimination; therefore both individuals possess it. As for the nature of the fruit of the aśaikṣa, both individuals lack it. Sengzong states: 'That which the icchantika has' further distinguishes the meaning that the buddhadhātu cannot be conflated. The icchantika has completely cut off all goodness and possesses only great evil. Since in his state of evil there is no goodness, in the causal stage how could he already possess the fruit? This evil is consciousness itself, distinct from earth and wood; he will eventually have the meaning of attaining buddhahood, and it may also be named the direct causal nature (pradhāna-hetu-svabhāva). Baoliang states: The second part clarifies presence and absence in terms of four gateways. The ten evils are the buddhadhātu in the realm of the icchantika; this person later will still be able to feel revulsion toward evil and give rise to goodness born of conditions. Speaking of the fruit within the cause, it is therefore said that the icchantika has it. 'The good person has it' refers to the supportive causal nature. 'Both individuals possess it' refers to the direct causal nature. 'Both individuals lack it' refers to the fruition nature.