大般涅槃經集解 67

English (machine translation) 67

Language: English

67.1

Broadly clarifying that in the middle way cause and effect mutually generate, using milk and curd as a simile. Broadly analyzing the seven types of expressions: cause expressions, fruit expressions, and so forth. Citing the simile of the seven types of sentient beings in the Gaṅgā River. Explaining the first, constantly submerged, namely icchantikas. Explaining the second, temporarily emerging and returning to submergence, meaning lacking complete faith, and so forth. Explaining the third, having emerged then remaining, meaning hearing the Dharma, contemplating, and dwelling in accordance with the Dharma, and so forth. Explaining the fourth, having emerged, surveying the four quarters, broadly explaining the sixteen mental activities of warmth, summits, and patiences. Explaining the afflictions severed by a srotāpanna as being like forty li of water, with the remainder like a drop on a single hair, up to similes like firmly holding an object in the mouth. Explaining the fifth, having surveyed then progressing, namely the sakṛdāgāmin.

67.2

Chapter on Kāśyapa, Part 5

67.3

"World-Honoured One! As worldly people say that there is curd within milk, what is the meaning of this?"

67.4

Sengliang notes: This specifically cites what is spoken by one who clings one-sidedly, wishing to block their error. Zhixiu says: Below, this is the third cause and condition: citing what worldly people say, that because there is fruit within the cause it can produce the fruit, inquiring of the Buddha to seek resolution. Daohui's Record states: Just as in the 'Lion's Roar' chapter there was also the objection of pre-existence, it is adduced here because he wishes the Buddha to broadly clarify the principle of neither existence nor non-existence.

67.5

"Good son! If someone says that there is curd in milk […] if one says there is no curd, this is called false.

67.6

Sengliang notes: This has the fault of premature reckoning. Sengzong says: Third, relying on a simile to dispel attachment. If one says it already exists, this is clinging and eternalism. If one says it is completely non-existent, this is again false speech. Zhixiu says: The Buddha explains this question in two rounds. The first round first refutes falsity; the second round poses a counter-questioning objection: if milk and curd were one, why does curd not emerge beforehand?

67.7

"Apart from these two matters, one should definitively state […] milk produces cold illnesses, while curd produces hot illnesses.

67.8

Sengzong notes: At the time of the cause there is no fruit, hence it says 'also non-existent'. It will definitely produce the fruit, hence it says 'also existent'. 'Difference in color and taste': milk is white and sweet, while curd is yellow and sour.

67.9

"Good son! If one says that within milk is the nature of curd […] previously non-existent and now existent, it is an impermanent phenomenon.

67.10

Sengliang notes: When exponents of eternalism say there is fruit within the cause, their faults differ. One holds that there is curd within milk, subtle and imperceptible, like fruit in a vessel, yet the fruit is distinct from the vessel. The second holds that milk is curd and curd is milk, both changing with time, their substance eternally one; hence it says their names are earlier and later, but their reality has no difference. Daohui's Record states: If the five flavors existed at the same time, who would establish the sequence of milk first, then curd, up to ghee? Zhixiu says: One has never seen or heard of curd preceding milk. If they were necessarily simultaneous, by what condition would milk certainly not be later, and curd not be earlier? Hence we know that at the time of milk there is definitely no curd.

67.11

"Good son! If someone says that milk has the nature of curd […] because the mind is not impartial, it is called false.

67.12

Sengliang comments: He formulates the idea from the perspective of water. This means: if, seeing that curd is produced from milk and not produced from water, you take this as proof that milk possesses the nature of curd, this is not proof. Why? Milk is a proximate cause, while curd is a remote cause. You see the proximate, but do not see the remote. In reality, both are causes, yet you claim that one has [the nature] and the other does not; this mind is not impartial. Zhixiu says: Below is the fourth causal scenario, taking up the adherent's conception. Their statement that one knows milk already possesses the nature of curd because it is able to produce curd—just as water lacks curd and therefore does not produce it—is refuted here by four subsequent arguments. First, he challenges them by demanding that grass must also contain milk, making the objection that this is necessarily unequal; second, he challenges them with the fault that curd would then have to produce milk; third, he cites a sūtra as proof; fourth, he adduces the harmonious coming together of the four factors to produce visual consciousness, correctly explaining the principle of a cause producing an effect. This is the first objection.

67.13

"Good sons, if one were to say that milk definitely contains curd […] neither has the nature of curd nor lacks the nature of curd."

67.14

Sengliang comments: If the two natures of milk and curd were one and the same, they ought to serve mutually as cause and effect. Sengzong says: He challenges both sides together. If an effect exists within the cause, a cause ought also to exist within the effect. Zhixiu says: This is the second objection. Since it is said that both exist at the same time, then they equally exist.

67.15

"Good sons, for this reason, in this sūtra, the Tathāgata […] one should also say that sentient beings' buddhadhātu does not exist."

67.16

Zhixiu comments: Third, he cites a sūtra as proof to reveal the Middle Way.

67.17

"Good sons, the coming together of four factors produces visual consciousness […] the nature of curd in milk is also like this."

67.18

Sengliang comments: These four factors come together, yet three are of the nature of form (rūpa), and only consciousness is not of the nature of form. Since cause and effect differ in nature, this proves non-existence. Sengzong says: He again provides an explicit metaphor to clarify non-existence within the cause. Just as the coming together of the four factors produces consciousness: if you search for consciousness within empty space and light, how could it be found? Zhixiu says: Fourth, he directly explains the principle of a cause producing an effect.

67.19

"If someone should say that water lacks the nature of curd […] from these four factors auditory consciousness ought to be produced."

67.20

Sengliang comments: Causes are proximate and remote; the proximate is called the direct cause (pradhānāhetu), and the remote is called the auxiliary cause (pratyaya). Auxiliary causes may be shared, but direct causes differ; hence he says distinct causes have distinct effects. Sengzong says: The production of dharmas varies; it is not that there is an inherent nature of production. Milk produces curd because it is the cause of curd; others do not produce it because they are not its causes. Just as curd is exclusively the effect of milk and not the effect of other things. Zhixiu says: This is the fifth causal scenario. It adduces the absence of the effect in other causal factors to prove that milk contains the nature of curd. It is refuted through three subsequent arguments. First, he adduces distinct causes and distinct effects, clarifying that because of the direct cause curd arises from milk and does not arise from water; he also adduces the production of consciousness and the method for obtaining butter to establish that curd arises from milk and cannot rely on water. Second, he cites a sūtra as proof. Third, he adduces the salty nature of salt, directly revealing that the effect-nature of curd fundamentally does not exist within the cause.

67.21

"Good sons, if, apart from skillful means, curd is obtained from milk […] one should likewise obtain it apart from skillful means."

67.22

Sengzong comments: 'Apart from' refers to multiple skillful means. For instance, with a single drop of sap from the *phāṇita* tree, it immediately becomes curd. Fresh butter is also like this, necessarily depending on five conditions. One should know that the modes of production differ. 'Should likewise be apart from skillful means' means it should likewise be apart from multiple skillful means. Zhixiu says: This is still one matter within the first subsequent argument, helping to complete the challenge.

67.23

"Good sons, for this reason, in this sūtra, I have spoken […] therefore dharmas exist; through cessation of causes, therefore dharmas do not exist."

67.24

Zhixiu comments: The second subsequent argument cites a sūtra as proof.

67.25

"Good sons, just as salt's nature is salty and can make what is unsalty […] through other conditions it becomes salty."

67.26

Sengzong comments: He doubly proves the absence of inherent nature. Zhixiu says: The third subsequent argument directly reveals the non-existence of the effect within the cause.

67.27

"If one says that all unsalty things […] unsalty things are also like this."

67.28

Sengliang comments: He formulates the idea from the opponent's perspective, answering the challenge above. This means: although unsalty things have the nature of saltiness, it is unnoticeable because it is subtle, requiring external saltiness to manifest it. Sengzong says: He exposes the absurdity of its possessing inherent nature. If you say that because unsalty things have the nature of saltiness they need salt to manifest it, now we see that when an unsalty thing is placed in a salty substance, its flavor is just rightly obtained; could it be that salt also has a subtle unsalty nature? If that were so, salty and unsalty would each possess both natures; why, then, when they are not combined, can neither be used alone? Therefore, we know that dharmas previously lack the effect. Zhixiu says: This is the sixth causal scenario, refuted by three subsequent arguments. First, he challenges them regarding each having both natures. Second, because they still cling to the causal factor not lacking the substance of the effect—as it necessarily requires external four great elements to augment it—he turns it back to question and challenge them: if it existed previously, it should not have a sequence. Third, he further adduces the *śirīṣa* fruit to prove that no effect exists previously in the cause. This is the first.

67.29

"If one says that the power of the external four great elements can augment […] the four great elements are also like this."

67.30

Sengliang comments: If the sequence of the five flavors already existed, one should not artificially claim that all dharmas rely on external [elements]. Zhixiu says: The second subsequent argument turns the challenge back: there should not be a sequence.

67.31

"If one says that from external four great elements internal four great elements are augmented […] not augmented by relying on external four great elements."

67.32

Sengliang comments: The power of the four great elements is equal, naturally having the power to produce and grow; the internal does not augment the external, nor the external the internal. Sengzong says: He exposes the absurdity of their doctrine. If you say that external dharmas contain the internal, now we do not see that the internal can augment the external. Zhixiu says: The third subsequent argument further adduces the *śirīṣa* fruit to prove the principle that the effect does not previously exist within the cause.

67.33

"Good sons, such as the twelve divisions of the canon spoken by me […] such sūtras are called speaking in accordance with one's own intent."

67.34

Sengliang comments: The characteristics of dharmas differentiated in scriptural teachings fundamentally proclaim the Buddha's intent. Above, he clarified that dharmas are not fixed; here, he clarifies that the Buddha's intent is not fixed. Sengzong says: This is the fourth section. It clarifies that the Tathāgata well understands the characteristics of dharmas and can speak in accordance with his own intent. For example, for the sake of the desire realm he spoke of the body born of parents, not of ignorance. How could one rely on these words to form attachments? Baoliang says: The third section dispels attachment. It clarifies that the Buddha's words have no fixed method and cannot be clung to one-sidedly, encouraging students to be open-minded. Saying 'speaking in accordance with one's own intent' means the Buddha is one who recognizes dharmas and speaks according to the characteristics of dharmas. Zhixiu says: Below is the second section, further using the idea of speaking as one intends to show that in accordance with conditions many kinds of teachings can be given. By analogy, this reveals the Middle Way of buddhadhātu; how could one cling to it one-sidedly? There are four turns: first, using unfixed words to clarify that nature is not fixed; second, clarifying that buddhadhātu can also be treated as existent or non-existent; third, adducing the Ganges as a metaphor; fourth, discriminating gain and loss. Daohui's record states: Above, the Middle Way of internal and external, and the Middle Way of existence and non-existence have already been clarified, concluding that the principle cannot be fixedly grasped. Now he again clarifies that the Buddha's speech is not fixed, sometimes in accordance with his own intent, sometimes in accordance with others' intent; how could one fixedly cling to it?

67.35

"What is called speaking in accordance with others' intent? […] 'Excellent, elder!' This is called speaking in accordance with others' intent."

67.36

Sengliang comments: The Buddha's intent is not displeased; this is called following others' intent. Sengzong says: What worldly people say, the Buddha also says following them; this is called following oneself and others. If it is not the true principle, yet he speaks in accordance with others, this is called following others. Baoliang says: Accommodating individuals' faculties without being the definitive teaching is called speaking in accordance with others.

67.37

"What is called speaking in accordance with one's own and others' intent? […] to say there is no such thing—this is called speaking in accordance with others."

67.38

Sengliang comments: Following what wise persons of the three times say, without contradicting them.

67.39

"Good sons, as when I have spoken of tenth-abode bodhisattvas […] this is called speaking in accordance with one's own and others' intent."

67.40

Sengliang comments: When the cause is proximate, the effect is easy to see; when the cause is remote, it is difficult to know. Because they see themselves but do not see sentient beings, it is called 'seeing slightly'. Sengzong says: On the ten grounds, with respect to the Buddha, it is not called seeing; adapting to intent, he says it is seeing slightly. Baoliang says: In the chapter 'Lion's Roar', this line of meaning has already been explained in two or three places.

67.41

"Good sons, the Tathāgata sometimes, for the sake of one dharma […] yet they are not separated from the aggregates, realms, and entrances."

67.42

Sengliang comments: One dharma is one cause; immeasurable dharmas are immeasurable causes. If one speaks having grasped the root, then the one subsumes the immeasurable. As for 'relying on a good spiritual friend', speaking of faithful mind already subsumes it completely. Bodhi has two causes: first, hearing the Dharma from another, which is the good spiritual friend; second, inner reflection, which takes faithful mind as its root. As for 'not separated from the aggregates, realms, and entrances', these three subsume dharmas entirely.

67.43

"Good sons, the Tathāgata expounds the Dharma for the sake of sentient beings […] this is called speaking as one intends."

67.44

Sengliang comments: 'Speaking as one intends' means suffering is not as one intends, while bliss is as one intends. Sentient beings detest suffering and wish to seek what is as they intend; the Buddha speaks the seven in response to faculties, causing all to attain it. All seven modes of speech are for what is as one intends, but the seventh distinctively receives this name. If he speaks the seven in response to faculties, speech cannot be fixed. 'Speech that should not be spoken' means the Dharma lacks this principle; he speaks what should not be spoken wishing to make sentient beings turn from evil and cultivate good. Sengzong says: The fifth section dispels attachment. It means sometimes within the cause he speaks of the effect, and sometimes within the effect he speaks of the cause; how could one rely on these words to generate attachment? 'Cause-and-effect speech' means arising from past karma and also being able to create future effects. Baoliang says: The text explains itself; these are all words encouraging students.

67.45

"Good sons, the Tathāgata also has speech in accordance with his own intent […] the twelve links of dependent origination are called non-existent."

67.46

Sengliang comments: He further expands on the differentiation of the Middle Way's existence and non-existence according to his own intent above. Why? Above he clarified that existence is future existence and non-existence is present non-existence; now he discerns that both existence and non-existence are present, so it must be differentiated again. Sengzong says: The sixth section determines cause and effect, clarifying the meaning of existence and non-existence regarding buddhadhātu. 'Existent' refers to the wondrously existent dharmas of the ten powers and four fearlessnesses, which is the effect-nature. Once the effect is attained, past unwholesome and indeterminate karmas do not exist. One should know that at the time of the effect there is no cause; how could there be an effect at the time of the cause? This is called determining cause and effect, which must not be conflated. Baoliang says: The fourth section clarifies the meaning of the existence and non-existence of buddhadhātu. There are three turns in total: first, clarifying existence and non-existence through two gateways; second, through four gateways; third, through seven gateways.

67.47

"Good sons, as with existence and non-existence, wholesome and unwholesome […] how much less the supramundane supreme ultimate truth."

67.48

Sengliang comments: He expands on existence and non-existence above. That is, wholesome is existent, unwholesome is non-existent; non-causes-and-conditions are existent, causes-and-conditions are non-existent; and even up to speaking of the icchantika, it is also like this. Reversing the above one by one, he explains the meaning of speech in accordance with his own intent. Sengzong says: Having just cited the programmatic heading, he wishes to assimilate the lower clauses to say: how could it be only that cause and effect are not conflated? Even within the cause, wholesome and unwholesome must also not be conflated. Baoliang says: From above down to here is the first, clarifying existence and non-existence through two gateways. It clarifies that at the time of the effect there are the ten powers and various samādhis, while at the time of the cause there are only wholesome, unwholesome, indeterminate, and so forth, lacking the ten powers and the like.

67.49

"Good sons, there may be buddhadhātu that icchantikas have […] how could sentient beings interpret it in one fixed way?"

67.50

Sengliang states: That which the icchantika has and the person of goodness lacks refers to the evil views that cut off good roots, which are a cause and an obstruction; the icchantika has them, whereas the person with roots of goodness lacks them. That which the icchantika lacks and the person with roots of goodness has refers to the supportive causal power of good dharmas that is able to eliminate obstructions; the person with roots of goodness has it, whereas the icchantika lacks it. The indeterminate is neither an obstruction nor an elimination; therefore both individuals possess it. As for the nature of the fruit of the aśaikṣa, both individuals lack it. Sengzong states: 'That which the icchantika has' further distinguishes the meaning that the buddhadhātu cannot be conflated. The icchantika has completely cut off all goodness and possesses only great evil. Since in his state of evil there is no goodness, in the causal stage how could he already possess the fruit? This evil is consciousness itself, distinct from earth and wood; he will eventually have the meaning of attaining buddhahood, and it may also be named the direct causal nature (pradhāna-hetu-svabhāva). Baoliang states: The second part clarifies presence and absence in terms of four gateways. The ten evils are the buddhadhātu in the realm of the icchantika; this person later will still be able to feel revulsion toward evil and give rise to goodness born of conditions. Speaking of the fruit within the cause, it is therefore said that the icchantika has it. 'The good person has it' refers to the supportive causal nature. 'Both individuals possess it' refers to the direct causal nature. 'Both individuals lack it' refers to the fruition nature.

67.51

"Good son! Just as in the Ganges River […] one that moves in both water and on land is the turtle."

67.52

Sengliang states: The river is an analogy for the Nirvāṇa Sūtra. As for the 'seven kinds of sentient beings', the sūtra explains seven kinds of buddhadhātu, whose meanings of presence and absence differ. One is present existence, and six are present non-existence. Regarding existence across the three periods of time, one is present, and six are past. The future is also called the Middle Way. Sengzong states: The seventh section clarifies that cause and effect are not conflated. There are seven kinds of sentient beings in the river; in the Nirvāṇa Sūtra, there are seven kinds of ordinary persons and noble ones. The reason we know they are not conflated is that only with the turtle can it be said that one has reached the shore; prior to that, the other six kinds are still in the river. Being in the river, one is not called having reached the shore—how could the fruit already exist in the cause? Baoliang states: The third cycle clarifies presence and absence in terms of seven persons. 'Constantly submerged' refers to the icchantika. 'Emerging briefly and submerging again' refers to the fully bound ordinary person, who temporarily gives rise to worldly goodness and then returns to birth-and-death. 'Having emerged, staying' refers to the establishment of the five faculties such as faith. 'Looking all around the four directions' refers to the fruit of the srotaāpanna. 'Having looked, proceeding' refers to the sakṛdāgāmin. 'Having proceeded, staying again' refers to the anāgāmin. 'Moving in both water and on land' refers to attaining arhatship. From this up to mahānirvāṇa, all together constitute the seventh person.

67.53

"Good son! The river of such a subtle and wondrous mahānirvāṇa […] is merely an externalist text and not a Buddhist sūtra."

67.54

Sengliang states: The previous evil thoughts and evil words in slandering nirvāṇa become progressively graver sins, serving as the cause for cutting off the roots of goodness.

67.55

"At that time, this person stays far away from good spiritual friends […] therefore he is called 'constantly submerged', like a large fish in the Ganges River."

67.56

Sengliang states: This broadly reveals the fault of those who slander the Dharma.

67.57

"Good son! Although I also explain that the icchantika and others […] practicing the goodness of giving and precepts is called 'constantly submerged'."

67.58

Sengliang states: Above, the three paths were explained; here, the five destinies are explained. Sengzong states: Before attaining the stage of the dharma of heat (ūṣmagata), all retain the possibility of falling back; this is the second person. Just as Sunakkhatta cultivated and attained the four dhyānas, yet gave rise to unwholesomeness and entered the three evil destinies. Baoliang states: Hearing the sūtra gives rise to faith, and therefore this is called 'emerging'. Yet because the five things are not complete, within this he gives rise to the three poisons, falling back into the category of the second person. If he himself knows that these five things are not complete and relies on good spiritual friends to make progress so that his faculty of faith is established, he belongs to the stage of the third person who stays. Zhixiu states: If the five virtues are not complete, one will ultimately sever the buddhadhātu.

67.59

"Good son! There are four good actions that result in evil fruit […] with the two persons above, it is also just like this."

67.60

Sengliang states: Giving and precepts are dharmas for emerging from birth-and-death, so they are called 'emerging'; the sūtra compares them to food. Because of [clinging to] existence, one is submerged in birth-and-death, so it is called 'submerged'; the sūtra compares it to poison, calling it food mixed with poison. Furthermore, generating faith is 'emerging', while ultimately severing the roots of goodness is 'submerging'. For this reason, Sunakkhatta, who appears later, is the second person. The first person has thick and heavy afflictions and will certainly enter severe suffering; hence it is said that 'the body is heavy and the location is deep'. Although the second person also gives rise to slander, in the future he will certainly nourish himself with goodness; hence it is said that 'the body is heavy and the location is shallow'. Baoliang states: The following explains in sequence the meaning of the incompleteness of the aforementioned five things.

67.61

"Good son! Or again, there may be a person who delights in and clings to the three realms of existence […] for this reason it is called 'incomplete'."

67.62

Sengliang states: There are two kinds of nirvāṇa: first, the fivefold dharmakāya, which is called nirvāṇa because it does not arise or perish; second, the unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) exhaustion of the fetters. Because the icchantika lacks them, it is said that not all necessarily have them. 'Not believing that there are persons who attain the path' refers to [thinking that] the sage is naturally so without studying. 'Lacking cause and effect' means lacking good fruits.

67.63

"This person accomplishes incomplete faith […] for this reason it is called 'incomplete precepts'."

67.64

Sengzong states: 'Precepts conforming to precepts' refers to the precepts accompanying the path. 'Not complete in non-manifesting [precepts]' refers to the undefiled precepts, which can put an end to activity and are therefore called 'non-manifesting' (avijñapti).

67.65

"This person is incomplete in the two matters of faith and precepts […] for this reason it is called 'incomplete learning'."

67.66

Sengliang states: By virtue of enumerating extensive learning (bahuśruta), the remaining meanings are clearly illuminated.

67.67

"This person is incomplete in these three matters […] for this reason it is called 'incomplete giving'."

67.68

Sengliang states: If he is incapable of even the shallow matter of giving material goods, how much less could he give the Dharma?

67.69

"This person is incomplete in the above four matters […] for this reason it is called 'incomplete wisdom'."

67.70

Sengliang states: Nirvāṇa is the general designation for existence and non-existence; Tathāgata is the name for the presence of body and wisdom. Vimokṣa is the non-existence that is the extinction of fetters; existence and non-existence are one.

67.71

"This person is incomplete in these five matters […] because of seeing light he emerges, and because his body is heavy he submerges."

67.72

Sengliang states: Increasing goodness applies to the third person; increasing evil applies to the second. 'Considering oneself superior among fellow practitioners' means taking what accords with one's own view as being superior among people. Baoliang states: Having finished explaining the five matters, he first clarifies the fault of the second person, and then reveals the virtue of the third person. 'One increases good dharmas' explains the third person. 'One increases evil dharmas' explains the second person. The second person cannot seek closeness to good spiritual friends, and therefore turns around to create evil and enter birth-and-death, becoming one who emerges briefly and submerges again. If this person deeply knows and sees his own incompleteness in practice, he then strives to advance and becomes the third person who stays.

67.73

"The second person deeply knows and sees himself […] he will never submerge again; this is called 'staying'."

67.74

Sengliang states: This is the third person. Sengzong states: Seeking closeness to good spiritual friends, he attains the dharma of heat and becomes the third person, never falling back again.

67.75

"Who within my Buddha-Dharma is like this? […] assemblies such as these are also just like this."

67.76

Sengliang states: Śāriputra and the others attained the stage of the dharma of heat, the stage of right determination (samyaktva-niyata-rāśi). Sengzong states: Śāriputra once passed through the stage of the third person; he is named according to his origin to verify the meaning of non-retrogression.

67.77

"For this reason, I spoke a verse in the sūtra: […] / Having attained vimokṣa, he abides in peace and security."

67.78

Sengliang states: He cites an admonitory verse to praise the ability to stay.

67.79

"Good son! Knowing incompleteness consists altogether of five matters […] having contemplated in this way, he next attains the dharma of heat."

67.80

Sengliang states: 'Next attains the dharma of heat' means severing the status of an external ordinary person, entering the group of right determination, and staying in the initial stage of abiding. Sengzong states: For those with excessive greed, contemplating impurity clarifies how the third person's contemplative practice gradually advances into the dharma of heat. Baoliang states: Raising the five dharmas again also serves a purpose. It means that if the second person encounters a good spiritual friend who administers the medicine according to the illness, he becomes the third person; if not, he reverts to being the second person. People have sharp and dull faculties: the sharp ones contemplate the emptiness of nominal designation and immediately grasp the emptiness of dharmas. Only after penetrating the principles of both sides do they emerge from contemplation and reach the dharma of heat, concluding into a person who stays. The dull ones cannot do so; they emerge upon realizing the emptiness of nominal designation, and their faculty of faith is also established, making them the third person who stays. Thus, the conclusion has two periods; it is not that the dharma of heat alone makes one a person who stays, while the initial root of goodness fails to do so. The dharma of heat is the beginning of the emptiness of dharmas and the start of the second root of goodness; being still far from the fire of the undefiled, it is compared to heat. Zhixiu states: 'In sequence, he further contemplates the twelve links of dependent origination': entering the Hīnayāna path through the four truths represents the branching of the three vehicles. Entering into these marks and further contemplating the twelve links of dependent origination is simply another method for entering the path according to conditions.

67.81

Bodhisattva Kāśyapa said to the Buddha: "World-Honoured One! […] why do you say that the dharma of heat arises due to good spiritual friends?"

67.82

Sengliang states: Clarifying that the dharma of heat is solely wisdom (prajñā) and not the five aggregates, he resolves this through form. Sengzong states: How could Kāśyapa not understand the name 'heat'? It is merely for the sake of other beings.

67.83

The Buddha said: "Good son! It is just as you have asked […] all sentient beings would possess the dharma of heat."

67.84

Sengliang states: Heat like this is possessed by all. What is spoken of now is not like this.

67.85

"Good son! Such a dharma of heat is a dharma of the form realm […] not all sentient beings necessarily have it."

67.86

Sengliang states: Heat extends through the three realms and comprises seventy-three kinds of persons. Mentioning only the form realm clarifies that it is not possessed by all. The six aspects are impermanence, suffering, cause, origination, arising, and condition. Sengzong states: It is not that the desire realm categorically cannot attain the contemplation of heat; rather, because they are few, it says 'not'. This reply is made to refute his challenge that all possess it. Baoliang states: One must attain the concentration of higher realms before one can cultivate the dharma of heat. Why so? Because the stage of concentration is in the higher realms; it is not that the desire realm is incapable while the form realm alone is capable. Below, the seventy-three persons are set forth, who across the three realms are all capable of cultivating the contemplation of heat. Another explanation: linking the cause by means of the fruit, the desire realm directly cultivates and restrains body and speech, attaining the pleasant fruit of humans and gods, which is called the retribution of bodily action. In the form realm the mind is tranquil, not dispersing into external conditions, which is called the retribution of mental action. Hence we know it is a dharma of higher fruits. Saying that there is concentration in the desire realm refers to the upāya of the fundamental dhyāna concentration. Only sharp-rooted people are capable of taking this to enter the undefiled. Although the form realm has dhyāna concentration that can produce the dharma of heat, they must be internal disciples and not externalists. If one completes the sixteen aspects, only then is the dharma of heat perfected; externalists can only cultivate two of the sixteen aspects and the four under the initial gate of suffering—how could they perfect the contemplation of the dharma of heat?

67.87

Bodhisattva Kāśyapa said to the Buddha: "World-Honoured One! […] is it hot by its own nature, or is it hot because of something else?"

67.88

Sengliang states: The nature of wisdom is self-illuminating; it is not illuminated by another. Baoliang states: He poses two more questions to fix its position. The first question asks why it receives the name 'heat'. The second question asks whether it is hot by its own nature or hot because of something else. The Buddha now first answers the latter question, clarifying that it is hot by its own nature.

67.89

Bodhisattva Kāśyapa said: "World-Honoured One! The Tathāgata previously stated […] consists of sixteen aspects, and these aspects are none other than wisdom."

67.90

Sengliang states: 'Caused by the faculty of faith' means that faith is the cause of heat, making clear that there is no cause without fruit. 'None other than wisdom' means that destroying self-view must depend on wisdom, not on faith and the like. Regarding the sixteen aspects: dharmas do not go beyond the conditioned and the unconditioned; the conditioned has four aspects, and the unconditioned has four aspects. Existence and non-existence must have causes: the cause of the conditioned and defiled is origination (samudaya); the cause of the conditioned and undefiled is the path (mārga). These two each have four aspects, making sixteen. Baoliang states: Kāśyapa raises the example of Assaji and Punabbhasu lacking the faculty of faith, arguing that one should know faith is the dharma of heat. The Buddha states that it is merely the cause of heat, not heat itself.

67.91

"Good son! As to your question of by what cause and condition […] smoke is none other than severing the fetters on the path of cultivation."

67.92

Sengliang comments: Regarding the 'fire-signs of the Eightfold Path', the undefiled [wisdom] can burn up the afflictions and is thus called 'fire'. The dharma of heat serves as its cause, and is therefore called its 'sign'. Baoliang comments: In answering the second question, it is explained that because it is a sign of the Eightfold Noble Path, it is called 'heat', just as when drilling for fire, heat appears first.

67.93

Bodhisattva Kāśyapa said again to the Buddha: 'World-Honoured One! [...] how can it serve as a sign of the undefiled path?'

67.94

Sengliang comments: Regarding 'karmically obtaining the five aggregates of the form realm': the previous mention of dharmas of the form realm refers precisely to karmic retribution. Baoliang comments: Since the dharma of heat is conditioned and defiled, and can serve as a cause to karmically obtain the form realm, how can it serve as a sign of the undefiled path?

67.95

The Buddha said: 'Noble son! It is so, it is so! [...] yet it can serve as a sign for that noble path.'

67.96

Sengliang comments: Regarding 'contemplative practice based on revulsion': the sixteen [modes] are the contemplation; but as the contemplation remains obscure, one has not yet escaped craving, and due to craving one undergoes rebirth. Baoliang comments: Regarding 'contemplative practice based on urging onward': this is precisely because these two functions exist within a single mind. One knows that the meaning of wholesome [dharmas] aids in transcendence; but because of grasping signs, rebirth is incurred; otherwise, even a hair's breadth of good would not induce birth and death.

67.97

'There are seventy-three types of persons who attain the dharma of heat [...] committing the five heinous sins, and violating the four major prohibitions.'

67.98

Sengliang comments: Above, the dharma of heat was explained; here, the practitioners are explained. If one has not yet subdued the afflictions of the desire realm, and possesses all the afflictions of the three realms, one is called an 'ordinary person bound by all fetters', which constitutes one type of person. If one has severed one grade, one is called 'not bound by all fetters', up to nine grades making nine types, which together with the preceding makes ten in the desire realm. Above, excluding the seven stages [of the higher realms], each has nine types of persons who can no longer sever the roots of goodness. Sengzong comments: The general meaning is that all these seventy-three persons are capable of practicing the contemplation of heat. There are ten in the desire realm; from the first dhyāna up to the stage of nothingness, there are seven stages in all, seven times nine making sixty-three. Combined with the ten of the desire realm, this makes seventy-three. The fetters of the desire realm have nine grades; if one is an ordinary person bound by all fetters, who is not without coarse subduing, but has not subdued the nine grades in sequence, that is designated as one separate person. According to the exegetes of the Abhidharma scriptures, one must first attain the mind of the first dhyāna before subduing the fetters of the desire realm; one must attain the mind of a higher stage to subdue the fetters of a lower stage. According to the treatise master, this cannot be maintained. If one who attains the dharma of heat attains the mind of the first dhyāna, he subdues the fetters of the desire realm. If he is of sharp faculties, he does not need to rely on the mind of a higher stage; directly employing the mind of his own stage, he proceeds gradually from the four stations of mindfulness into the dharma of heat, enters the path of seeing the truths, and achieves the noble fruit. If he is of dull faculties, he must cultivate the superior, rapid concentration of a higher stage before he can subdue the lower stage. Baoliang comments: When the Buddha first appeared in the world, he had to first deliver all the non-Buddhists. However, the methods used by non-Buddhists to subdue fetters do not recognize the distinction between seeing the truths and cultivation; they only know how to revile what is below and seek what is above, practicing the nine grades of subduing. Why is this? The root of the fetters abandoned by seeing has its source in the view of self and in the views of annihilation and permanence. Since non-Buddhists do not subdue these fetters, yet their afflictions share similarities with those abandoned by cultivation, why would they not subdue them? It is only that their subduing of the fetters of seeing is not accomplished. Therefore, the Buddha now establishes the seventy-three persons solely in terms of subduing the nine grades of cognitive afflictions abandoned by cultivation in the three realms, not in terms of seeing the truths. While initially subduing to achieve concentration follows this pattern, after the contemplation of heat is fulfilled, all is the function of wisdom. As for the ten persons of the desire realm, they are taken from having previously subdued the [afflictions of] cultivation, or divided into nine persons according to the nine grades, while the first person has never subdued any fetters at all. Why is this? Although this person previously did not direct his mind to subdue afflictions, upon encountering a worthy or meeting a noble one, he immediately practiced according to the teachings. Practicing the contemplation of suffering and impermanence, he attained nominal and dharmic emptiness, fulfilling the contemplation of the dharma of heat; hence he constitutes one person. If one had previously directed the mind to use the nine grades to subdue afflictions, upon later entering the path, his method is no different from that of the first person. In this way, from the fruit of desire up to the stage of nothingness, each stage has nine. Adding the one who had never subdued fetters in the desire realm, the seven stages each have nine, which is seven times nine making sixty-three. Adding the ten persons of the desire realm, together they make seventy-three persons. Why are there ten in the desire realm, while the upper realms have only nine? For rebirth into the upper realms, there is no one who can ascend to be reborn without having subdued the afflictions of the lower stages. Since among those reborn in the upper realms there are none who, like in the desire realm, have never subdued afflictions, there are only nine persons. Zhixiu comments: The reason no persons are established in the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception is that according to the Hīnayāna scriptures, ordinary persons have nothing higher to rely upon, and are therefore unable to subdue afflictions there.

67.99

'These persons are of two kinds: the first is one who encounters a good friend [...] one who encounters a good friend contemplates all four directions.'

67.100

Sengliang comments: This explains the capability of the dharma of heat. Regarding 'temporarily emerging and sinking back': if one meets a bad friend, one remains an internal ordinary person, sinking in the realms of humans and devas, and does not quickly realize the fruit. Sengzong comments: From this distinction onwards, this refers to the fourth person; the third person will definitely not regress. As for speaking of 'two kinds', this refers to when one has not yet attained heat. While residing in the four stations of mindfulness, if one encounters a good friend, one advances in practice and enters the path; if one meets an evil friend, one does not even attain heat, let alone the noble fruit! Baoliang comments: This is not different from the previous explanation. One who meets a good friend becomes an established person; one who meets an evil friend then sinks back.

67.101

'Contemplating the four directions is the dharma of the summit [...] the four directions are the four noble truths.'

67.102

Sengliang comments: For the fourth person, from the summit onwards, whether abiding or progressing, whether slow or fast, he is not bound by evil friends. From the four stations of mindfulness up to the worldly supreme dharmas, there are five grades of roots of goodness: inferior, middling, superior, superior-middling, and supreme-superior. The four stations of mindfulness are inferior; the dharma of heat is middling; the dharma of the summit is superior; the dharma of acceptance is superior-middling; and the worldly supreme dharma is supreme-superior. The dharmas prior to mindfulness are not fixed and do not enter the five grades; being above the two grades, it is called the 'summit'. The four directions are a metaphor for the four noble truths. The contemplation and practice extends further, hence it is said to be 'all-pervading', which explains the meaning of 'summit'. Regarding 'its nature is the five aggregates': one who possesses bodily view and all such karmas is called an ordinary person; if heavy, he is called an external [ordinary person], and if light, an internal [ordinary person]. The dharma of heat is the beginning of severing the heavy ones; because the mind of wisdom is weak, it cannot yet cause the mental factors of body and speech to entirely turn away from heavy evils. When the mind of the summit has grown strong, it causes the karmas of body and speech not to give rise to heavy evils, and the wholesome karmas of body and speech are all the dharma of the summit; hence it is said that 'its nature is the five aggregates'. Regarding 'also taking the four noble truths as its object': this clarifies that wisdom is the master of practice, and it is explained practice by practice. Next, one attains the dharma of acceptance: as the heavy views are about to end, acceptance is next established; because the mind of wisdom is not yet fully tranquil and expansive, it is called 'acceptance'. Next, one attains the worldly supreme dharma: the sūtra speaks of internal and external ordinary persons; if one has not yet severed the internal, it is called 'worldly'; when both internal and external are completely severed, it is called 'supreme'. These five persons attain worldly non-defilement, being both noble and ordinary. Dharma-acceptance of suffering is supramundane non-defilement. For severing the internal ordinary person, only acceptance and wisdom are spoken of; taking the seeing of cessation as the path of seeing the truths, if one does not see cessation, one does not see suffering and the rest. To say that form and the rest have intrinsic nature implies that intrinsic nature is permanent; what is permanent is blissful; and what is blissful is not suffering. When one sees that form lacks intrinsic nature and is a provisional coming-together of causes and conditions, then arising is merely the arising of suffering, and cessation is merely the cessation of suffering. When one initially sees acceptance of suffering, seeing that suffering is unarisen—this is 'seeing suffering'. It is first termed 'acceptance of suffering' to clarify its seeing of cessation, though only the name of suffering is expressed. The rest can be understood accordingly. Severing fetters is of three kinds: first, proceeding from principle rather than from revulsion—this refers to bodhisattvas. Second, proceeding from revulsion rather than from principle—this refers to non-Buddhists. Third, proceeding from both revulsion and principle—this refers to śrāvakas. For bodhisattvas, proceeding from principle is called the acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas. Śrāvakas ride upon revulsion and universally take suffering as its designation, thus distinguishing the Mahāyāna path from the Hīnayāna. Regarding 'the nature of acceptance is wisdom': taking emptiness as its object is wisdom, while taking existence as its object is ideation. Regarding 'taking one truth as its object, completely severing the afflictions abandoned by seeing': 'one truth' refers to cessation. 'Abandoned by seeing' refers to what is severed by the four truths. A single wisdom severs all four, hence it says 'up to'. As the Śrīmālādevisūtra says: 'Severing the afflictions of the four dwellings by a single wisdom', one also obtains the merit of four severing wisdoms. It also says: 'There is no worldly supreme-superior wisdom', because through the four wisdoms one gradually reaches the supreme-superior wisdom, which is supramundane and undefiled. Sengzong comments: Although the person of the dharma of the summit takes the four truths as object, his mind focused on emptiness is little, and his thoughts perceiving existence are many. 'Aggregates' implies existence and is also called 'accumulation', clarifying that this contemplative mind retains much sentiment of existence, which is why it is said that 'its nature is [the five aggregates]'. Up to the dharma of acceptance, which is slightly superior, its nature is also the five aggregates. The worldly supreme dharma is called 'having the five faculties as its nature' because its attainment of principle has grown deeper, shifting the name from 'aggregates' to 'faculties'. In saying that the supreme dharma's mind can serve as a root for the undefiled, the acceptance of suffering takes one truth as its object. If we discuss the preceding dharma of heat and supreme dharma, at that time they could practice taking one truth as their object, but since the mind of existence was abundant and the mind of non-existence was slight, the name of non-existence was obscured and only the name of existence was given. From the summit upward, severing the afflictions abandoned by seeing up to the fruit of srotāpanna constitutes the fourth person. Baoliang comments: It is precisely because this third established person meets a good friend and establishes the five faculties headed by faith, and relying on this understanding enters the path of seeing the truths, completely severing the afflictions that display characteristics, that he becomes a srotāpanna. Regarding 'taking one truth as object': when the equality of the four truths is attained, correct contemplation appears before oneself, there are no longer four distinctions, and only empty wisdom follows along. While in the five expedient stages, there were still distinctions of ideation, sensation, and the like, taking the four truths as separate objects. Now, because the initial mind of the acceptance of suffering tallies with the signless, it obtains the name of taking the truth of cessation as its object.

67.103

Bodhisattva Kāśyapa said to the Buddha: 'World-Honoured One! [...] the second is seeing causes where there are no causes; the third is the net of doubt.'

67.104

Sengliang comments: Regarding 'one truth', the simultaneous seeing of the truths when severing fetters can serve as evidence. Sengzong comments: He wishes to hear the reconciliation of the two sūtras. There are four questions here, which are answered below in sequence. Baoliang comments: This first question requests a reconciliation of the teachings.

First 104 of 136 passages. Read on

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大般涅槃經集解 — Classical Chinese