大般涅槃經集解 68.56

68.56

Sengliang notes: Space has four meanings by which it can illustrate the nature: first, having no three periods of time; second, not being a material thing; third, having no internal or external; fourth, having no obstruction. Sengzong says: The Buddha's intent is that because it is not these three dharmas, it is spoken of as existent. Defilement contrasts with nirvāṇa, the icchantika contrasts with the Tathāgata, and the insentient contrasts with the buddhadhātu; because of these three contrasts, it is existent. Empty space has no contrast, so how could it be existent? Baoliang says: Now within this exposition there are four rounds of clarifying the meaning. First, distinguishing that the permanence of the Buddha-fruit's essence differs from the permanence of empty space; although the two permanences are alike, their purports are very different. Second, beings raise a doubt in return: if both permanences are alike in not being subsumed under the three periods of time, why are they not both called existent, instead of one being existent and one non-existent? The Buddha explains: their permanence is indeed alike, but one must have an antidote to be called existent; whereas empty space is simply the absence of things, having no antidote, so it is non-existent. Third, dispelling the heterodox misconception that empty space is an existent entity. Fourth, citing proof to clarify that the wise of the three periods of time all speak in this way. Now in the first section he briefly sets forth several matters to clarify their divergent characteristics. However, in the text, the Buddha states its purport, and the principle naturally reveals itself.