大般涅槃經集解 68

English (machine translation) 68

Language: English

68.1

Explaining the sixth: ‘having moved on, dwelling again’, broadly distinguishing the anāgāmin. / Explaining the seventh: ‘reaching the other shore’, broadly distinguishing arhats up to the Buddhas. / Distinguishing two persons who slander the Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha: first, slandering through lack of faith; second, slandering through erroneous understanding. / Explaining seven kinds of fruits, namely the fruit of expedients, the fruit of repaying kindness, and so forth. / Explaining the meaning that the buddhadhātu is not existent like empty space, nor non-existent like a rabbit's horns. / Broadly explaining the meaning that the buddhadhātu is like empty space. / Broadly explaining the meaning that the Buddha does not dispute with the world: what the world says exists, the Buddha also says exists. / Broadly explaining the meaning of the three outflows. / Broadly explaining the twelve links of dependent origination, distinguishing that contact increases and generates three kinds of feeling.

68.2

Chapter on Kāśyapa, Part Six

68.3

[The sūtra says:] ‘Having moved on, dwelling again is likened to the anāgāmin who, having obtained food, dwells […] seventh, entering parinirvāṇa in the formless realm.’

68.4

Sengliang states: Ending the lower three grades of desire-realm fetters is called ‘having moved on, dwelling’; the upper two realms are called ‘dwelling’. Second, those attached to the form and formless realms: not being extinguished in the present life, all are persons traveling upward, generically situated in the stage of dwelling. There should be the term ‘moving on’ here; it is likely an omission in the text. If not so, there would ultimately be no explanation for ‘parinirvāṇa while moving on’ below. Five kinds: practice having slow and rapid, it is divided into five kinds. Seven kinds: dividing five into six, which is insufficient to make eight, because among the seven there are those with identical names. Sengzong states: Having severed the cultivation-defilements of the desire realm completely, one is born in the higher stages, receives superior retribution, and attaches to the taste of dhyāna; therefore one dwells. Regarding the anāgāmin having two kinds: two kinds are preliminarily set up, and the text below explains them in detail. One who attains anāgāmin in the present life, having sharp faculties, advances in practice and immediately attains arhatship; second, having escaped suffering, one attaches to pleasant retribution, dwelling in dhyāna and undergoing rebirth. Regarding the anāgāmin having five kinds: from here below, it broadly explains the anāgāmin. Baoliang states: Expounding the Dharma according with suitability, the portals of teaching differ: either two, five, six, or seven, all corresponding to what is elicited at a given time. Now initially opening two portals: the first is one who enters parinirvāṇa in the present life; the second is from the intermediate existence upward, all generically called ‘upstreamers’; this also subsumes the stages of the anāgāmin completely. The next five portals: from the intermediate existence upward, those who undergo actual birth in the first dhyāna are divided into four persons. After undergoing actual birth in the first dhyāna, they later change retributions and depart. The second dhyāna is also generally addressed as upstreamers; although there are five names, they also subsume completely. The next six portals: five are as above, adding the first person from the previous two portals to make six. The seven portals: also as above, taking those born in the form realm who delight in concentration. Although there are these differences among the four portals, subsuming them under a single portal leaves nothing out.

68.5

[The sūtra says:] ‘Entering parinirvāṇa while moving on also has two kinds […] first, possessing vigor and concentration; second, not possessing them.’

68.6

Sengliang states: If the preceding text were not missing [a word], then this passage would have nothing to explain; the former four are too quick, and the latter two are too slow. From the second to the fourth alone corresponds to the designation 'practice' (abhisaṃskāra), which is just what was formerly called 'one who flows upward'; here, speaking of 'flowing upward' differs only in name. From 'one possesses energetic samādhi' down to 'the second does not possess [it]', it comprehensively explains why the seven persons differ in being slow or swift. Entering and emerging at will is called 'mastery'; those who do not possess it are the former two persons. Baoliang states: Next is the explanation of the four chapter headings above. First, he explains the second kind, the 'upward practitioner', among the initial two gates. If one takes two rebirths, one is a person of sharp faculties; if one takes birth from the second dhyāna up to the fourth dhyāna, one is a person of dull faculties. Furthermore, there are two kinds: first, one who is energetic but lacks samādhi with mastery. This person is not sharp regarding the path of samādhi; although capable of energetic effort, when they re-enter samādhi to attain the outflow-free, they do not obtain it immediately, and therefore lack samādhi with mastery. Second, one who is lax but possesses samādhi with mastery. This person is fluent and sharp regarding the path of samādhi; wishing to enter, they immediately attain it, but they are not energetic. Furthermore, there are two kinds: first, one who possesses both; second, one who does not possess them—this likewise refers to sharp and dull faculties.

68.7

"Good son, sentient beings of the desire and form realms have two kinds of karma [...] Therefore, it is called 'attaining nirvāṇa in the intermediate state' (antarāparinirvāṇa)."

68.8

Sengliang states: 'Karma of taking birth' refers to the activity of afflictions. 'Creating karma' refers to the combined actions of body and speech that generate the karma of taking birth. Down through 'four kinds of mind', it is therefore called 'intermediate'; this is 'intermediate' in terms of one's own mind. 'Trainee (śaikṣa) and non-trainee (aśaikṣa)' refers to the outflow-free mind. 'Neither trainee nor non-trainee' refers to the mundane wholesome and indeterminate [mind] when relinquishing one's lifespan; it does not employ the outflow-free [mind]. Sengzong states: Speaking of 'receiving a body' means aspiring to take birth in a body. As this anāgāmin has sharp faculties, they have long grown weary of birth in the desire realm. When relinquishing the intermediate state of the desire-realm body, they then extinguish right here and do not wish to take birth in the form ground. 'Creating karma' refers to cultivating the four immeasurables and various wholesome merits. Regarding 'four kinds of mind', it means that when the intermediate-state anāgāmin person attains nirvāṇa, among these four, two are the mind of nirvāṇa. The 'neither trainee nor non-trainee' [mind] is the mind of non-arising when fulfilling the fruit. Since this mind of non-arising is no longer that of an anāgāmin, yet it is said that an anāgāmin in the intermediate state possesses this mind, it still retains the name of an anāgāmin. When first entering the intermediate state, they are an anāgāmin, and by the time they are about to enter nirvāṇa, they have already attained arhatship; this mind of non-arising is not the two knowledges of extinction and non-arising, and therefore cannot be called 'non-trainee'. Second, the 'trainee mind' refers to when arhatship is not yet attained, and because of advancing and seeking, it is the trainee mind. Third, the 'non-trainee mind' refers to the arhat's two knowledges of extinction and non-arising, which is called the non-trainee mind. Fourth, the 'neither trainee nor non-trainee mind' refers to the indeterminate mind resulting from the fruition of an arhat. They take the two kinds of 'neither trainee nor non-trainee' to enter nirvāṇa; the two intermediate minds are not used. The former 'neither trainee nor non-trainee' is this mind contemplating emptiness; not for severing fetters to realize the fruit, it merely wanders and contemplates emptiness in order to wish to enter nirvāṇa. Regarding adopting the latter 'neither trainee nor non-trainee', if explained according to the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, the arhat enters nirvāṇa spontaneously; therefore, when entering in the intermediate state, they only employ two minds, and do not employ the two intermediate minds. Baoliang states: Next, he explains the first person among the five gates. First, 'creating karma' is the karma of primary retribution in the form realm. Second, 'karma of taking birth' is the karma that moistens birth into the form realm; in the form realm, one merely receives the retribution of the intermediate state and attains nirvāṇa. Relinquishing the desire-realm body without yet reaching the form realm is spoken with respect to the person, as if proceeding from the four practices without yet arriving. However, examining the principle, it is not so; neither can one measure how long the intermediate state of the first dhyāna lasts. If one takes the analogy of twenty-one days among humans, a person of sharp faculties who attains the path immediately upon taking birth in the intermediate state is like having just left the desire realm. If an extremely dull-facultied person attains it only after exhausting the full twenty-one days, it is like relinquishing desire and reaching the border of the form realm. First, 'neither trainee nor non-trainee' is the conventional wholesome mind. Second, 'trainee' is the mind of correct contemplation and true understanding. Third, 'non-trainee' is also correct contemplation, but is not the mind that eliminates fetters. Fourth, 'neither trainee nor non-trainee' is the indeterminate mind. Now, by employing the conventional wholesome mind and the indeterminate mind, they can enter nirvāṇa; in the remaining two minds, death and extinction cannot occur.

68.9

"Attaining nirvāṇa upon receiving a body (upapadyaparinirvāṇa) also has two kinds [...] Therefore, it is called 'attaining nirvāṇa upon receiving a body'."

68.10

Sengliang states: The meaning of 'receiving a body' lies in initial birth; it is identical to what was formerly called 'attaining nirvāṇa upon birth' (upapadya-parinirvāṇa). Here, saying 'exhausting the lifespan' and 'birth' have different meanings; after this person receives a body, they then sever [fetters], which distinguishes them from [attaining] nirvāṇa in the intermediate state. Sengzong states: 'Two kinds' means that receiving a body is endowed with two kinds of karma. Zhixiu states: Because the words 'exhausting the lifespan' are ambiguous, the question is raised. Baoliang states: 'Attaining nirvāṇa upon receiving a body' explains the second person next. This person receives primary birth in the first dhyāna, severs all fetters of the three realms, and immediately becomes an arhat; hence it is called 'attaining nirvāṇa upon receiving a body'.

68.11

"Good son! One who attains nirvāṇa with effort (sābhisaṃskāraparinirvāṇa) constantly cultivates the path [...] This is called 'attaining nirvāṇa without effort' (anabhisaṃskāraparinirvāṇa)."

68.12

Sengliang states: 'With effort' and 'without effort' are distinctions of sharp and dull faculties within receiving a body. Baoliang states: 'One who attains nirvāṇa with effort' explains the third person next. Among those who merely receive primary birth in the first dhyāna, their faculties have the threefold distinction of sharp and dull; this person is the dullest, cultivating the path through their entire lifespan and only then attaining the fruit; hence it is called 'attaining nirvāṇa with effort'. The Notes of Daohui say: 'Or through two further bodies' additionally presents different persons within the third [category of] attaining nirvāṇa through practice. As the treatise masters merely say there are three persons in the first dhyāna, saying here 'perhaps two bodies or four bodies' and 'not flowing upward' means that it is not only in the first dhyāna.

68.13

"Regarding one who attains nirvāṇa by flowing upward (ūrdhvasrotaḥ-parinirvāṇa), if there is a person who attains [...] up to the fourth dhyāna, it is likewise so."

68.14

Sengliang states: Subduing fetters and taking birth in the fourth dhyāna, because one recedes through the flow of afflictions, but advances when the path flows through, revolving up and down is called 'flowing upward', which differs from the standard explanation. Sengzong states: It says that after attaining the fourth dhyāna, an attachment to the first dhyāna arises at a later time, and one regresses to be born in the first dhyāna. If based on the Abhidharma treatises, there is no regression in rebirth. It can also be said that while this body is only in the first dhyāna, one remotely attains the mind of the fourth dhyāna, and later the attachment to the first dhyāna arises again, and is therefore called regression; in truth, it is not regression in rebirth. Flowing along this path, one then severs fetters again and reaches the fourth dhyāna. Baoliang states: Explaining the fifth person. From understanding primary birth in the first dhyāna, receiving the retribution of the second dhyāna and above are all comprehensively called 'persons who flow upward'. If there is a person who, having attained the fourth dhyāna, regresses to be born in the first dhyāna—yet these words are not correct: an anāgāmin has already severed all delusions in the lower three dhyānas, so how could they regress in rebirth? This is a person of the flow of afflictions, in the rank of an ordinary person. Since he is explaining an anāgāmin, why bring this up? It is precisely to dispel people's doubts. If one goes from below upward, it is also called 'flowing upward'. Flowing from above down, however, is natural in this matter. What is it like by analogy? It is like wind coming from the east being called 'east wind', and water coming from the west being called 'flowing eastward'. Thus, speaking with respect to wind, it takes its name from where it comes; speaking with respect to water, it is discussed in terms of where it is headed. The matter of these two persons is also like this; fearing that investigators might go astray, he brought in an ordinary person to clarify what is correct. One who flows according to the path is called an anāgāmin; one who flows according to afflictions is not taken to be a person who flows upward.

68.15

"Within these four dhyānas there are further two kinds [...] those who delight in debate abide in the five pure abodes (śuddhāvāsa)."

68.16

Sengliang states: 'One who enters the formless realm' is precisely a division of flowing upward; because of entering the formless realm, it is a distinction within the flow. 'Second, those who delight in wisdom' explains why the four dhyānas are divided into equal samādhi and prajñā. The formless realm has much samādhi and little prajñā; cultivating equality, they delight in wisdom and do not delight in samādhi. 'First, internal; second, external': internal is one's own body; external is others' bodies. Although samādhi and prajñā in the intermediate state are weak, their path is vigorous; afflictions are coarse and their faults easily seen, so they attain nirvāṇa alone. Baoliang states: Next, he explains the seventh person in the fourth gate; however, from the first person who attains extinction in the present among the initial two gates, he does not explain the sixth person in the subsequent six gates, nor does he comment on them. Why so? Because this person's spiritual faculties are the sharpest, able to instantly resolve the four fruits within a single lifetime. Its principle has no complexities, and its meaning is easy and needs no presentation. Were it not so, one could not fathom its reason either. Sentient beings' inclinations differ: if they delight in debate, they are born in the five pure abodes; if they delight in quietude, they are bound to be born in the formless realm.

68.17

"There are further two kinds: first, one who cultivates fumigating dhyāna [...] then they are able to reprimand the samādhi of the formless realm."

68.18

Sengliang states: As for these two persons, one cultivates fumigating dhyāna; the second does not cultivate it. Those who cultivate it redirect the karma of the four dhyānas to take birth in a distinctly different place. The second, who do not cultivate it, lack this karma. As the masters of the Abhidharma treatises formulate the method of fumigating dhyāna: emerging from the outflow-free mind, one fumigates mundane wholesome [states] so as to make the principle clear. If it were like this, then holy ones would produce further karma. The sūtra says: 'Why call them holy ones? They exhaust the old and do not create new.' One should know that what is discussed now originally belongs to the former karma of the four dhyānas; it is merely that the holy one exercises the power of the outflow-free, being able with mastery to transform that original karma. If born in a different place, there is no other distinct cause. Question: Why is it so? In the four dhyānas, ordinary beings and holy ones share the same place; there is often much noise and confusion, so deep wisdom cannot be generated. For this reason, they redirect this karma to be born in another place. If born there, they are separated from the retribution of ordinary beings, so quiet contemplation abides in the mind, and wisdom becomes brighter day by day. Hence the sūtra declares that those who delight in debate are born in the five pure abodes. Having finished explaining the six persons, people turned around and generated two doubts regarding the aforementioned explanation of nirvāṇa in the intermediate state.

68.19

Bodhisattva Kāśyapa said to the Buddha: "World-Honoured One! [...] the desire realm has intermediate nirvāṇa, while the form realm does not."

68.20

Baoliang states: Kāśyapa raises questions. The first question asks: Regarding intermediate nirvāṇa, if their spiritual faculties are sharp, why do they not enter nirvāṇa in the present life? The second question says: For what reason does the desire realm have intermediate nirvāṇa, while the form realm alone does not?

68.21

The Buddha said: "Good son! In the present, this person [...] Therefore, they cannot attain nirvāṇa in the present."

68.22

Baoliang states: The Buddha does not answer in sequence, but first answers the initial question, saying: Although this person's spiritual faculties are sharp, because conditions for entering the path in the present are incomplete, they must do so in the intermediate state and cannot attain extinction in the present.

68.23

"Good son! As you have asked: 'For what cause and condition [...] stinginess, greed, and anger; therefore it is called abiding.'"

68.24

Sengliang states: Next, he answers the latter question. It means taking birth in the desire realm is a realm of suffering, still requiring external reliance to support and sustain the retribution body. However, precisely by using this as a condition of pressing affliction, coming here and contemplating the desire realm serves as the cause of awakening; therefore, the desire realm has an intermediate state. The higher realm is a realm of dhyāna; it does not depend on external support, nor does it have great suffering, so it does not have intermediate nirvāṇa.

68.25

"Good son! One who reaches the other shore is an analogy for the arhat [...] Therefore, it is illustrated by traveling on both water and land."

68.26

Baoliang states: Explaining the seventh person. From the arhat on up to the Buddhas, they are comprehensively designated as one person; hence the metaphor is borrowed from the divine turtle that can travel on both water and land. However, the two matters of water and land correspond to what is in the text. Although there are seven kinds of distinctions in the worldly river, none of them departs from the water. In nirvāṇa it is likewise: though there are the differences of the seven persons, none of them departs from the water of buddhadhātu. Yet the meaning of buddhadhātu is subsumed according to circumstances, whether as conditioning cause or as cognitive object; such numerous factors, whether causes or fruits, are all buddhadhātu.

68.27

"Good son! Just as with the seven kinds of sentient beings in the Ganges River [...] this is called the Tathāgata speaking at will."

68.28

Sengliang states: It explains that all of these are the Buddha's upāya.

68.29

Bodhisattva Kāśyapa said: "World-Honoured One! If there is a cause […] what is a śramaṇa and what is the fruit of a śramaṇa?"

68.30

Sengliang notes: This clarifies that the fruit is permanent, establishing the meaning of the other shore. Sengzong says: He questions further that since the essence of nirvāṇa has no cause, it ought not to be a fruit. Baoliang says: He raises two further questions. First, if nirvāṇa has no cause, how can it be called a fruit? Second, nirvāṇa is also called a śramaṇa; what is a śramaṇa, and why is it called the fruit of a śramaṇa?

68.31

"Good son! In the entire world there are seven kinds of fruits […] which are the wholesome dharmas cultivated throughout immeasurable lifetimes."

68.32

Sengliang notes: In bringing up these seven kinds, the intention is to take up the last one, the fruit of detachment.

68.33

"Good son! Just as worldly dharmas may be spoken of as having a productive cause […] it has only an illuminating cause and has no productive cause."

68.34

Sengliang notes: For saṃskṛta dharmas, productive causes are of two kinds: first, generation by karma is called a productive cause; second, proximity is called a productive cause. Illuminating causes are also of two kinds: first, non-production of the fruit is called illuminating; second, remoteness is called illuminating. When saṃskṛta dharmas arise, a cause produces something, which is called a productive cause. And productive causes have the proximate and the remote; the remote is called illuminating. That it is also like this for the supramundane means: the supramundane is asaṃskṛta; asaṃskṛta has no arising cause and produces nothing, so it is called an illuminating cause. It has proximate and remote; the proximate is called a productive cause. The productive cause means that when defilements do not arise, that is nirvāṇa. When body, speech, and mind are pure, they all cut off defilements; the three liberations are proximate, so they are called productive causes. As for also serving as an illuminating cause for nirvāṇa: the thirty-seven factors also have proximate and remote; the remote is called an illuminating cause, clearly seeing nirvāṇa. Stating that there is no productive cause answers the question above. Seeing that nirvāṇa is a fruit, because it lacks a productive cause, it can be called permanent. Baoliang says: This clarifies that nirvāṇa is the fruit of an illuminating cause, not produced by a productive cause. Because the three gates of liberation and the like are predominant in bringing about the non-arising of defilements, even if production is posited, production is not a cause [of nirvāṇa].

68.35

"Good son! As for what you asked: 'What is a śramaṇa […]' this is called a śramaṇa and the fruit of a śramaṇa."

68.36

Sengliang notes: He first explains the essence of the path and the fruit, and below he personally explains the meaning of the name. Intending to answer the second question, he says that śramaṇa refers to the eightfold noble path.

68.37

Bodhisattva Kāśyapa said: "World-Honoured One! For what cause and condition […] therefore it is called a śramaṇa?"

68.38

Sengliang notes: The saṃskṛta is frail and deficient, hence called 'destitute'; the distinctions among the six destinies are called 'paths'. The eightfold path gets its name from what it cuts off. Baoliang says: What is here called the destitute path refers solely to saṃsāra. The destitute path is unable to bring to rest all defilements and retributions. Endowed with the eight noble paths, one's virtuous practice is full and karmic encumbrances are exhausted; this is called the fruit of a śramaṇa.

68.39

"Good son! An arhat who cultivates this path […] is called an arhat who has reached the other shore."

68.40

Sengliang notes: This explains the dharma of the other shore. The five aggregates above were general; this elaborates the meaning of the body of liberation knowledge and vision crossing over to the other shore. Baoliang says: He brings up the four knowledges to conclude. This clarifies that fulfilling these four virtues completely is called reaching the other shore.

68.41

"Just as an arhat or pratyekabuddha […] because of attaining the fruit, it is called complete."

68.42

Sengliang notes: Only upon attaining the unsurpassed path is one called complete; this belongs solely to the Buddha. The general designation as bodhisattva is because their paths are identical. Compared to the two vehicles, it is also the other shore.

68.43

"Good son! These seven kinds of sentient beings do not cultivate the body […] cross the river of saṃsāra to reach the other shore."

68.44

Sengliang notes: Above he already explained its meaning extensively; here he reveals it more concisely.

68.45

"If anyone should say that an icchantika […] if they say they cannot attain it, this is false."

68.46

Sengliang notes: This refers to attaining or not attaining in the present, or attaining or not attaining in the future; prematurely calculating and conceptualising it is called attachment, and testifying to the nature is false.

68.47

"Good son! Among these seven kinds of persons, one person may possess all seven, or seven persons may each possess one."

68.48

Sengliang notes: 'One person possesses all seven' means one person across the three periods of time. 'Each possesses one' breaks down the present. Baoliang says: Conceptually designated as one person, in the future they will certainly be complete. Sengzong says: Speaking from beginning to end, even the Buddha was once an icchantika, so one person possesses all seven; discussing them in terms of their present stations, each person has one.

68.49

"Good son! If someone has divergent appearances of mind and speech […] you should know that this person slanders the Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha."

68.50

Sengliang notes: Having already spoken of the presence and absence of the marks of the seven natures, to definitely hold divergent views and utter divergent words is to slander the Buddha. 'Divergent appearances' means the mind's view differs from the seven marks, and what the mouth says is also like this, as is personally explained below. From the factors of the eightfold noble path down to what ordinary beings cannot attain: if attained, they are not attained in the present; if not attained in the future, saying they cannot attain it in the future is clearly slander. Sengzong says: If we speak of its essence, at the time of fruit it is naturally fruit, and at the time of unwholesomeness it is naturally unwholesome; this means that cause and effect are not separate. If there is an icchantika who has already attained bodhi, or who cannot attain it at all, all such views are called slandering the Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha. Baoliang says: From here below is the fifth passage under 'the regeneration of the wholesome', which adduces gains and losses to conclude the section. First he extensively clarifies the errors and faults. The last one or two lines jointly clarify that although faults and matters are cited, the principle is obscure. Sifting through this text, one cannot simply apply it literally.

68.51

"If anyone should say that the buddhadhātu of sentient beings […] because he speaks according to intent, he is called a samyaksambuddha."

68.52

Sengliang notes: Space exists with respect to sentient beings, but being permanent, it cannot be seen; buddhadhātu also exists, and is seen by cultivating the path. That it is not non-existent like a rabbit's horns means: a rabbit's horns are presently non-existent and cannot be attained through upāya; buddhadhātu is also non-existent [in the present], but can be attained through upāya. As for 'because space is permanent': being permanent, it cannot be seen. As for 'because a rabbit's horns are non-existent': being non-existent, they cannot be produced. 'Both existent and non-existent': existence refers to what will exist; non-existence refers to present non-existence. 'Because it exists, it refutes the rabbit's horns': what will exist can exist, unlike a rabbit's horns. 'Because it is non-existent, it refutes space': although it is not seen at present, it will ultimately be seen, unlike space.

68.53

Bodhisattva Kāśyapa said to the Buddha: "World-Honoured One! As the Buddha has spoken […] how can it be called like empty space?"

68.54

Sengliang notes: This is the sixth major section, distinguishing the approach of permanence. The reason permanence is distinguished is that being able to discern the buddhadhātu, one regenerates the kuśalamūlas and properly attains the permanent fruit. It clarifies that permanence has only two kinds: first, non-existent permanence, which is empty space; second, existent permanence, which is the buddhadhātu. Non-existent permanence cannot be attained through learning. Existent permanence is seen by cultivating the path. The intent is to cause people to recognise the permanent fruit and cultivate the permanent cause, not regarding Brahmā and the like as permanent. From the beginning of the sūtra onwards, space has been used as a simile for the nature; above it was said that its existence is not like empty space, and now he asks about the intent of using this simile in the past. Sengzong says: The intent of the question is: if the buddhadhātu is not subsumed under the three periods of time yet is called existent, then empty space is also not subsumed under the three periods of time, so it ought also to be existent. This is a parallel question. Baoliang says: Once sentient beings' minds are settled regarding the principle of nature as cause and fruit, they then wish to cultivate the cause; but if they do not recognise the fruit, they have no way to advance. Therefore, because its essence as a whole is not subsumed under the three periods of time, those with consciousness will equally attain it in the future. Although the 'Lion's Roar' chapter above clarified that the essence of the fruit is permanent, it ultimately did not formally address the difference between existence and non-existence in this essence. Now it categorises and distinguishes that although empty space is permanent, its nature is non-existent; nirvāṇa is wondrous existence, and its nature is serene. Thus, while both are alike in not belonging to the three periods of time, they differ in existence and non-existence.

68.55

"Good son! The nature of empty space is not past […] I say that the buddhadhātu is like empty space."

68.56

Sengliang notes: Space has four meanings by which it can illustrate the nature: first, having no three periods of time; second, not being a material thing; third, having no internal or external; fourth, having no obstruction. Sengzong says: The Buddha's intent is that because it is not these three dharmas, it is spoken of as existent. Defilement contrasts with nirvāṇa, the icchantika contrasts with the Tathāgata, and the insentient contrasts with the buddhadhātu; because of these three contrasts, it is existent. Empty space has no contrast, so how could it be existent? Baoliang says: Now within this exposition there are four rounds of clarifying the meaning. First, distinguishing that the permanence of the Buddha-fruit's essence differs from the permanence of empty space; although the two permanences are alike, their purports are very different. Second, beings raise a doubt in return: if both permanences are alike in not being subsumed under the three periods of time, why are they not both called existent, instead of one being existent and one non-existent? The Buddha explains: their permanence is indeed alike, but one must have an antidote to be called existent; whereas empty space is simply the absence of things, having no antidote, so it is non-existent. Third, dispelling the heterodox misconception that empty space is an existent entity. Fourth, citing proof to clarify that the wise of the three periods of time all speak in this way. Now in the first section he briefly sets forth several matters to clarify their divergent characteristics. However, in the text, the Buddha states its purport, and the principle naturally reveals itself.

68.57

Bodhisattva Kāśyapa addressed the Buddha: "World-Honoured One […] insentient objects are called the buddhadhātu."

68.58

Sengliang notes: Non-Buddhists say that space is an existent dharma, hence it must be clarified. 'Tathāgata' is the general designation for body and mind. 'Nature' is a distinct name for awakening and understanding. 'Nirvāṇa' is the collective name for the cessation of suffering. The three meanings are distinct yet always one. As for distinctively calling what is non-nirvāṇa 'nirvāṇa': existent dharmas of conventional truth are relative in existence, non-existence, right, and wrong. Space is said to be non-existent in conventional truth. 'All defilements and saṃskṛta dharmas': defilement is the cause, saṃskṛta is the fruit; cause and fruit are suffering, whose cessation is bliss. From 'icchantika' up to 'pratyekabuddha': the six perfections are the path of Suchness; coming by riding the path of Suchness, one is called a Tathāgata. These [other beings] do not ride the path of Suchness; bodhisattvas ride it but have not yet arrived, so they are excluded. 'Insentient objects': the insentient lacks the nature of awakening and understanding, so it is not the nature.

68.59

"Good son! In the entire world there is nothing that is not empty space […] apart from the four aggregates, there is no empty space."

68.60

Sengliang comments: The world abides in space, and there is no place that is not space to serve as a counter-correlative to space; hence, it has no counter-correlative. When it is said, 'There is nothing that is not the four great elements to counter the four great elements'—the nature of form is not space, yet it abides within space. If there is nothing that is not space to counter space, the mind also arises in reliance upon the great elements, and there is likewise nothing that is not the great elements to counter the great elements; how then could the four great elements be called existent? The Buddha does not reply because it is not a decisive argument, answering by setting the question aside. Why? The bases of the six consciousnesses are each different: the five consciousnesses rely on the great elements, whereas the mental consciousness does not rely on them; the formless does not abide in space, and therefore it is not decisive. From 'Nirvāṇa is existent' down to 'the secure yonder shore'—these are all cases where what was originally not attained is now attained; space has no such meaning. From 'apart from such phenomena' down to 'subsumed under the three times' and so forth—the three phenomena of the Tathāgata, buddhadhātu, and so on are set apart. These three phenomena are saṃskṛta; if space were the same, it would likewise be outside these three phenomena. From 'worldly people say' down to 'must be subsumed under the three times'—the Buddha speaks of the two groups of phenomena, form and formlessness, up to visible and invisible. Form is the four great elements; non-form is mental concomitants. Sengzong says: 'There is nothing that is not the four great elements to counter'—this question is crude, and therefore it is answered by being set aside. When such a person says that space is non-form and is a mental concomitant, what follows below extensively explains wrong understanding, and none can be accepted. Baoliang says: The beginning of the second question directly explains a differing view. It brings up empty space to settle [the status of] nirvāṇa, making both alike existent. The Buddha now replies by stating: Although both are alike permanent, it is essential that the fruit of buddhahood possesses an antidote and is not nonexistent. He clarifies that the three phenomena of the Tathāgata, buddhadhātu, and nirvāṇa all alike have that which they remedy; hence they are existent. Therefore, the two [passages] below explain these three meanings: that which is non-nirvāṇa is the direct antidote to the phenomena of saṃsāra. When the fruit of this deceptive saṃsāra is exhausted, it is named nirvāṇa. That which is non-Tathāgata means that icchantikas and the followers of the two vehicles have a heavy mind of clinging to marks and cannot understand in accordance with the true principle. The Tathāgata is able to sever such discordant understanding and attain harmonious understanding; hence he is named the Tathāgata. That which is non-buddhadhātu means that the reason sentient beings do not see the buddhadhātu is precisely because they have the karmic retribution of afflictions and provisionally rely on fruitions to support their bodies. Once the Buddha has severed all karmic retributions completely, having no further need, he thoroughly discerns the principle of the buddhadhātu and clarifies the meaning of dark obscurations. Overturning and now remedying these karmic retributions until they are exhausted is why it is named the buddhadhātu. 'In all the world there is nothing that is not empty space to counter empty space'—in the world there is not a single thing that is not empty space, nor is it remedied by empty space; how could one object that empty space is existent? Although the understanding of the meaning is such, in the minds of living beings [the doubt] has not yet been dispelled; therefore Kāśyapa further raises a parallel objection based on this. If empty space has nothing to remedy, it cannot be considered existent. Now, when the four great elements arise, they likewise have nothing to remedy; why then are the four great elements alone called existent, while empty space is called nonexistent? Since the settling words are such, the Buddha now, wishing to explain, does not make non-assertion. To claim that empty space is also existent like nirvāṇa—that principle is not so. Why? It is explained that nirvāṇa is existent, visible, and realizable, able to produce various responsive forms, fully possessing the eight aspects of the self and myriad functions, distinctly attainable; it is an existent domain directly seen. Empty space has no such function; how could it be existent? Since it is not like this, he then answers the objection. From 'If, apart from such phenomena, there were further phenomena' onward, it already counters the preceding settlement. If, apart from such phenomena, there were a distinct phenomenon that is existent, it must be subsumed under the three times. If empty space were likewise existent, it should be subsumed under the three times and be an impermanent phenomenon. Once the principle of the answer has been set forth, the Buddha turns back to cite worldly matters to pose an inverted objection to Kāśyapa, saying: As worldly people speak of empty space, they call it formless and without resistance. If empty space is non-form and yet is existent, it should be a mental concomitant phenomenon. If it is a mental concomitant, it cannot fail to be subsumed under the three times, identical to the four aggregates.

68.61

"Furthermore, good son! The various non-Buddhists say [...] if it is subsumed under the three times, how can it be called permanent?"

68.62

Sengliang comments: Non-Buddhists say that space is form, possesses resistance, and is visible. The Buddha says it is non-form, without resistance, and invisible. Baoliang says: The third passage refutes the attachments of non-Buddhists. The orthodox doctrine clarifies that space is nonexistent, yet non-Buddhists reckon it as existent; therefore it must be refuted. If you say that space is light and further reckon it to be an abode, then it is a phenomenon of form. If it is a phenomenon of form, it has a spatial location, which means it is subsumed under the three times and is an impermanent, abiding phenomenon. 'Space does not depart from the three phenomena'—the Buddha further posits characteristics to refute it. The myriad phenomena, existent or nonexistent, do not depart from these three; in which phenomenon do you reckon space to be? 'Empty' simply refers to a place devoid of things being called empty. 'Solid' refers to phenomena of form such as pillars and timber. 'Empty and solid' is the boundary between existence and nonexistence. If one says that space abides within the empty phenomenon, it must then be impermanent. Why? This space does not pervade the solid place, forming parts and divisions with the empty and solid. If it has parts and divisions, it again does not escape impermanence. The other two phenomena, solid and empty-solid, mutually impinge on each other; the intent of the refutation is as before, sharing the fault of non-pervasiveness.

68.63

"Good son! If it is further said that space [...] if space were thus, it should be impermanent."

68.64

Sengliang comments: Because it does not exist in solid places, it is not pervasive and should be impermanent. 'Nonexistent in two places' means that there is no space in solid places, and no solid in empty places.

68.65

"Good son! People of the world say that among all phenomena [...] space is unobstructed and conjoins with existence."

68.66

Sengliang comments: Each having a location is termed 'all exist.' The locations clung to are two; thus both are impermanent, following objects. Baoliang says: Having completed these three propositions of refutation, he then concludes by stating that empty space is nonexistent. Furthermore, as worldly people say that all places without obstruction are named empty space, the Buddha sets up a further hypothetical objection: If the absence of obstruction is called empty space, is this empty space entirely and completely pervasive in saṃskṛta places, existent places, nonexistent places, or does it exist in parts? If it exists completely, then it is absent elsewhere, and it cannot be pervasive in all places; your empty space is existent, so how could it pervade? If it does not pervade, it is a phenomenon countable as this or that, and is impermanent. Furthermore, if someone says that space is unobstructed and conjoins with existence, there is likewise no such principle.

68.67

"Moreover, it is said that space is within things like fruit in a vessel; therefore you should know there is no space."

68.68

Sengliang comments: The bird moving and the tree remaining still are called different. 'Two rams butting each other' means both move together, which is called joint. 'Two pairs of fingers joined in one place' means the fingers previously had space, and space previously had fingers; there are two spaces and two existences joined in one place. If there were an activity of space joining with an object, space would be impermanent; an object abides in space and moves, and moving, it is impermanent. 'The object is then not pervasive' means that because the object is not pervasive it moves, and because it is not pervasive it is impermanent; below, the fault of space being non-pervasive is explained. 'If space were permanent, objects should also be permanent' means that if the object moves and lacks space, space is not pervasive. If it were non-pervasive yet permanent, objects should also be permanent. 'If space were the same as objects, being both permanent and impermanent, there is no such case' means that if space is said to be permanent, an object exists first and conjoins later. Existing first is pervasive; conjoining later is non-pervasive. That the pervasive is permanent while the non-pervasive is impermanent—there is no such case. From 'previously having no conjunction' down to 'is an impermanent phenomenon'—if what has already conjoined conjoins together, then conjunction has a before and an after. The later conjunction was originally nonexistent, and the earlier conjunction is likewise; all are impermanent. From 'when there was previously no vessel' down to 'how can it be said to be pervasive?'—the vessel originally did not exist and now exists; before the vessel existed, there should have been an abiding place; if the place is different, space is different, and it should not be called permanent or pervasive. Sengzong says: 'If space were to abide apart from space and existence'—the preceding countered its conjunction, and this now counters its separation. If space conjoins with existence, then space is identical to existence, and it abides apart from space. 'Existing things should also abide apart from space' is a parallel objection, meaning that if an existing thing conjoins, it should depart from existence and be only space. Baoliang says: It is also said that space is in things like fruit in a vessel; both are incorrect. Therefore, he first hypothetically sets up three phenomena to refute the attachment to conjunction, and below separately refutes the reckoning that space is in a vessel. If it conjoins with existence, there are three kinds of conjunction: First, conjunction of different activities, like a flying bird alighting on a tree; the tree originally does not move, and [the bird] comes toward the tree; hence it is called different activities. Second, joint conjunction of activities, like two rams butting each other; both objects move, hence it is called two activities. Third, joint conjunction of what has already conjoined, like two pairs of fingers brought together into one place; originally they were two conjuncts, and now they come together again in joint conjunction, hence it is called joint conjunction of what has already conjoined. Having first formulated these three propositions, he then refutes them in turn. If it is said to be joint conjunction of different activities, difference involves two things: one that moves, the bird; and one that does not move, the tree. If so, the myriad existences are originally motionless like the tree, and your space moves like a bird to conjoin with objects, which is impermanent. If it is said that the object conjoins with space, the object is further not pervasive; if it is not pervasive, it is a phenomenon of parts and divisions.

68.69

"Good son! If someone says that the place where fingers abide [...] Because space is nonexistent, it is not subsumed under the three times."

68.70

Sengliang comments: The Buddha says that existence abides in reliance upon space, yet the confused say: there is a phenomenon of space that serves as what existence relies upon, which is abiding through causes and conditions. Cause and effect share the same characteristic; because the cause is impermanent, the effect is also impermanent. Baoliang says: Having completed the refutation of the reckonings of the non-Buddhists, he then concludes by stating that empty space is devoid of things and therefore called permanent, not being an existent phenomenon; the buddhadhātu is permanent and yet existent, and therefore is not subsumed under the three times.

68.71

"Good son! I never dispute with the world [...] What the wise of the world say is nonexistent, I also say is nonexistent."

68.72

Sengliang comments: The seventh is the section analyzing causes. The reason for analyzing causes is that above it was said that only three phenomena are permanent and all the rest are impermanent, which differs from the world, and difference engenders dispute. Now, by analyzing that different causes lead to different effects, speaking of difference according with principle, one speaks in unison with worldly wisdom and does not dispute with the world. Sengzong says: Below this is the fourth section, clarifying the cultivation of the Path. Baoliang says: When the Buddha says that the wise of the world are precisely the bodhisattvas, this begins the seventh text in the major section below, explaining the difference between the two causes. Intending to clarify this principle, he first takes up the preceding thesis to pose an objection: The wise people of the world say that the five aggregates are impermanent, whereas the Buddha alone says that the self is permanent. Since the teachings do not accord, this becomes a dispute with the world. How then can the Buddha say he is far removed from inversions and does not dispute with the world? The Buddha now replies: Ordinary beings take the three outflows as causes and thus incur suffering and impermanence. The Buddha uses true understanding of non-arising as condition, eliminating the cause of outflows so that there is no longer impermanence; thus the essence itself is permanent. Their causes being each different, how could they be identical to the world? Thus, when speaking in accordance with principle, how could conflict and dispute arise? Now, within this text, there are in total three rounds, extensive and brief, explaining that saṃsāra takes the three outflows as causes and is therefore impermanent; the Buddha does not take these as causes, and is therefore permanent. The first directly clarifies that ordinary beings do not recognize the fault of the three outflows; the second analyzes the source from which their outflows arise; the third clarifies that the fruit incurred by the outflows is purely suffering without bliss. Yet in these three rounds, the noble ones recognize the fault, penetrate the source of outflows, and contemplate it to produce understanding; thus they can eliminate the three outflows and accomplish the Eightfold Noble Path.

68.73

Bodhisattva Kāśyapa said: "World-Honoured One! A bodhisattva-mahāsattva [...] like an udumbara flower."

68.74

Sengliang comments: If one does not dispute when speaking from principle, seeing the principle must depend on practice; hence he asks about it. Baoliang says: The Buddha briefly lists ten phenomena.

68.75

Bodhisattva Kāśyapa said to the Buddha: "World-Honoured One! [...] the wise speak of no-self and also speak of nothingness."

68.76

Sengliang comments: He requests [the Buddha] to settle the meaning of existence and non-existence.

68.77

Bodhisattva Kāśyapa said to the Buddha: "World-Honoured One! [...] therefore it is said to be permanent, eternal, and unchanging."

68.78

Sengliang comments: Intending to clarify cause and effect, he grasps at differences to raise an objection. If the phenomenon were the same yet the explanation differed, it would be contaminated. From "having already abandoned the three kinds" onward, if explained according to the principle, then there is no dispute. But if the explanation differs from the perception, how could there not be dispute? From "the form of ordinary persons" onward, this clarifies that the matters of cause and effect are not identical; because the description does not apply to it, there is neither contamination nor dispute.

First 78 of 106 passages. Read on

Linked texts (1)

大般涅槃經集解 — Classical Chinese