大般涅槃經集解 68.60

68.60

Sengliang comments: The world abides in space, and there is no place that is not space to serve as a counter-correlative to space; hence, it has no counter-correlative. When it is said, 'There is nothing that is not the four great elements to counter the four great elements'—the nature of form is not space, yet it abides within space. If there is nothing that is not space to counter space, the mind also arises in reliance upon the great elements, and there is likewise nothing that is not the great elements to counter the great elements; how then could the four great elements be called existent? The Buddha does not reply because it is not a decisive argument, answering by setting the question aside. Why? The bases of the six consciousnesses are each different: the five consciousnesses rely on the great elements, whereas the mental consciousness does not rely on them; the formless does not abide in space, and therefore it is not decisive. From 'Nirvāṇa is existent' down to 'the secure yonder shore'—these are all cases where what was originally not attained is now attained; space has no such meaning. From 'apart from such phenomena' down to 'subsumed under the three times' and so forth—the three phenomena of the Tathāgata, buddhadhātu, and so on are set apart. These three phenomena are saṃskṛta; if space were the same, it would likewise be outside these three phenomena. From 'worldly people say' down to 'must be subsumed under the three times'—the Buddha speaks of the two groups of phenomena, form and formlessness, up to visible and invisible. Form is the four great elements; non-form is mental concomitants. Sengzong says: 'There is nothing that is not the four great elements to counter'—this question is crude, and therefore it is answered by being set aside. When such a person says that space is non-form and is a mental concomitant, what follows below extensively explains wrong understanding, and none can be accepted. Baoliang says: The beginning of the second question directly explains a differing view. It brings up empty space to settle [the status of] nirvāṇa, making both alike existent. The Buddha now replies by stating: Although both are alike permanent, it is essential that the fruit of buddhahood possesses an antidote and is not nonexistent. He clarifies that the three phenomena of the Tathāgata, buddhadhātu, and nirvāṇa all alike have that which they remedy; hence they are existent. Therefore, the two [passages] below explain these three meanings: that which is non-nirvāṇa is the direct antidote to the phenomena of saṃsāra. When the fruit of this deceptive saṃsāra is exhausted, it is named nirvāṇa. That which is non-Tathāgata means that icchantikas and the followers of the two vehicles have a heavy mind of clinging to marks and cannot understand in accordance with the true principle. The Tathāgata is able to sever such discordant understanding and attain harmonious understanding; hence he is named the Tathāgata. That which is non-buddhadhātu means that the reason sentient beings do not see the buddhadhātu is precisely because they have the karmic retribution of afflictions and provisionally rely on fruitions to support their bodies. Once the Buddha has severed all karmic retributions completely, having no further need, he thoroughly discerns the principle of the buddhadhātu and clarifies the meaning of dark obscurations. Overturning and now remedying these karmic retributions until they are exhausted is why it is named the buddhadhātu. 'In all the world there is nothing that is not empty space to counter empty space'—in the world there is not a single thing that is not empty space, nor is it remedied by empty space; how could one object that empty space is existent? Although the understanding of the meaning is such, in the minds of living beings [the doubt] has not yet been dispelled; therefore Kāśyapa further raises a parallel objection based on this. If empty space has nothing to remedy, it cannot be considered existent. Now, when the four great elements arise, they likewise have nothing to remedy; why then are the four great elements alone called existent, while empty space is called nonexistent? Since the settling words are such, the Buddha now, wishing to explain, does not make non-assertion. To claim that empty space is also existent like nirvāṇa—that principle is not so. Why? It is explained that nirvāṇa is existent, visible, and realizable, able to produce various responsive forms, fully possessing the eight aspects of the self and myriad functions, distinctly attainable; it is an existent domain directly seen. Empty space has no such function; how could it be existent? Since it is not like this, he then answers the objection. From 'If, apart from such phenomena, there were further phenomena' onward, it already counters the preceding settlement. If, apart from such phenomena, there were a distinct phenomenon that is existent, it must be subsumed under the three times. If empty space were likewise existent, it should be subsumed under the three times and be an impermanent phenomenon. Once the principle of the answer has been set forth, the Buddha turns back to cite worldly matters to pose an inverted objection to Kāśyapa, saying: As worldly people speak of empty space, they call it formless and without resistance. If empty space is non-form and yet is existent, it should be a mental concomitant phenomenon. If it is a mental concomitant, it cannot fail to be subsumed under the three times, identical to the four aggregates.