大般涅槃經集解 68.68

68.68

Sengliang comments: The bird moving and the tree remaining still are called different. 'Two rams butting each other' means both move together, which is called joint. 'Two pairs of fingers joined in one place' means the fingers previously had space, and space previously had fingers; there are two spaces and two existences joined in one place. If there were an activity of space joining with an object, space would be impermanent; an object abides in space and moves, and moving, it is impermanent. 'The object is then not pervasive' means that because the object is not pervasive it moves, and because it is not pervasive it is impermanent; below, the fault of space being non-pervasive is explained. 'If space were permanent, objects should also be permanent' means that if the object moves and lacks space, space is not pervasive. If it were non-pervasive yet permanent, objects should also be permanent. 'If space were the same as objects, being both permanent and impermanent, there is no such case' means that if space is said to be permanent, an object exists first and conjoins later. Existing first is pervasive; conjoining later is non-pervasive. That the pervasive is permanent while the non-pervasive is impermanent—there is no such case. From 'previously having no conjunction' down to 'is an impermanent phenomenon'—if what has already conjoined conjoins together, then conjunction has a before and an after. The later conjunction was originally nonexistent, and the earlier conjunction is likewise; all are impermanent. From 'when there was previously no vessel' down to 'how can it be said to be pervasive?'—the vessel originally did not exist and now exists; before the vessel existed, there should have been an abiding place; if the place is different, space is different, and it should not be called permanent or pervasive. Sengzong says: 'If space were to abide apart from space and existence'—the preceding countered its conjunction, and this now counters its separation. If space conjoins with existence, then space is identical to existence, and it abides apart from space. 'Existing things should also abide apart from space' is a parallel objection, meaning that if an existing thing conjoins, it should depart from existence and be only space. Baoliang says: It is also said that space is in things like fruit in a vessel; both are incorrect. Therefore, he first hypothetically sets up three phenomena to refute the attachment to conjunction, and below separately refutes the reckoning that space is in a vessel. If it conjoins with existence, there are three kinds of conjunction: First, conjunction of different activities, like a flying bird alighting on a tree; the tree originally does not move, and [the bird] comes toward the tree; hence it is called different activities. Second, joint conjunction of activities, like two rams butting each other; both objects move, hence it is called two activities. Third, joint conjunction of what has already conjoined, like two pairs of fingers brought together into one place; originally they were two conjuncts, and now they come together again in joint conjunction, hence it is called joint conjunction of what has already conjoined. Having first formulated these three propositions, he then refutes them in turn. If it is said to be joint conjunction of different activities, difference involves two things: one that moves, the bird; and one that does not move, the tree. If so, the myriad existences are originally motionless like the tree, and your space moves like a bird to conjoin with objects, which is impermanent. If it is said that the object conjoins with space, the object is further not pervasive; if it is not pervasive, it is a phenomenon of parts and divisions.