大般涅槃經義記 10.181
大般涅槃經義記 10.181
- Language
- Classical Chinese
10.181
就破遍中有四復次:一定其所立,「汝說是我遍一切處」。二先尼為定,「不但我說,一切智人亦如是說」。如來對破,「若我遍者,應當五道一時受報。若一時受,汝等何緣,不造眾惡為遮地獄、修善求天」。三先尼被徵,建立二我,常身、作身。為作身我,故須離惡以防地獄、修善生天。如來對破。汝常身我遍一切處,若作身有即是無常、若作身無我即不遍。四先尼被徵,重復救義。「我所立我亦在作中亦是常法」法說救義。「如失火」等,喻說救義。「我亦」下合,「是故」下結。文顯可知。下佛破之,先破法說、後破其喻。就破法中,「汝說亦遍亦常,不然」牒以總非。「何以」下釋。於中,初先以理正徵。「遍即有二,常與無常;復有二種,色與無色」。法外是常、在法無常,法外非色、在法是色。「是故若」下,重復結徵。若一切有亦常無常亦色無色,不得偏常、不得偏色。就破喻中,「若舍主出不名無常,是義不然」牒以總非。「何以」下釋。「舍不名主、主不名舍,異燒異出故得如是」簡喻異法。燒舍異人名為異燒,人出異舍稱曰異出。「我即不」下,簡法異喻。「不爾」略簡。「何以」下釋。以我遍故在色中者,「我即是色、色即是我」。在色外者,「無色即我、我即無色」。「云何言」下,結呵其言。
Regarding the refutation of pervasiveness, there are four turns: First, determining what he posits: "You say this self of mine pervades all places." Second, Śreṇika confirms it: "Not only do I say so, but all omniscient persons also speak thus." The Tathāgata refutes it: "If the self pervades, then one should receive retribution simultaneously in all five destinies. If received simultaneously, for what reason do you not commit all evil deeds to ward off the hells, or cultivate good deeds to seek heaven?" Third, Śreṇika, having been pressed, establishes two selves: the permanent body and the active body. For the sake of the active body's self, one must avoid evil to guard against the hells, and cultivate good to be born in heaven. The Tathāgata refutes it: "Your permanent body's self pervades all places; if the active body exists, then it is impermanent; if the active body does not exist, then the self does not pervade." Fourth, Śreṇika, having been pressed, once again defends his doctrine: "The self that I establish is both within the active and is a permanent dharma" is a defense through literal statement. "Just as when a fire breaks out," etc., is a defense through an analogy. From "I also" below is the application, and from "therefore" below is the conclusion. The text is clear and understandable. Below, the Buddha refutes it: first refuting the literal statement, and then refuting his analogy. Regarding the refutation of the literal statement, "You say it is both pervasive and permanent; this is not so" repeats it to generally negate it. From "Why?" below is the explanation. Within it, he first presses him directly with reason: "Pervasive then has two: permanent and impermanent; there are also two kinds: form and formless." Outside of dharmas it is permanent, within dharmas it is impermanent; outside of dharmas it is non-form, within dharmas it is form. From "Therefore, if" below, he repeats the conclusion and presses him: If everything possesses both permanent and impermanent, and both form and formless, it cannot be exclusively permanent, nor exclusively form. Regarding the refutation of the analogy, "If the master of the house going out is not called impermanent, this meaning is not so" repeats it to generally negate it. From "Why?" below is the explanation. "The house is not called the master, and the master is not called the house; because burning is different and going out is different, it can be like this" distinguishes the analogy from the Dharma. The burning of the house being distinct from the person is called 'burning is different'; the person going out being distinct from the house is called 'going out is different'. From "The self is not" below, he distinguishes the Dharma from the analogy. "It is not so" briefly differentiates it. From "Why?" below is the explanation: because the self pervades, for that which is within form, "the self is form and form is the self"; for that which is outside of form, "the formless is the self and the self is the formless." From "How can you say" below, he concludes by rebuking his words.
Translations (1)
- English (machine translation) — English, machine translation