大般涅槃經義記 3.289

3.289

上來一段正明眾生有性不見，自下第二問答重顯，有二問答：第一迦葉執相徵實，難無佛性，如來辯實異相以答；第二迦葉執實徵相，難無殺生，如來辯相異實以答。就初難中有十二句，前二難上一切眾生悉有我性，後十難前從本以來常有之義。就前二中，「迦葉白佛實無有我」反佛前言，「何以」下釋，先自徵責，然後顯無。「生時無知」以相驗實，「若有我」下以實責相，「以是義」下結成無義。第二句中，以有終沒證成無我。後十句中，第一以其差別之義難破性常，「若皆有性是常住者」牒佛前義，「應無壞」者約實徵相。相別名壞，若性是常，常法不異，一切眾生應無種種差別壞相。「若無壞」下難破無壞，成相差別。「今見」已下以相差別難破性常，「業緣不同」明其因別，「諸趣各異」彰其果別。因果既別，何處得常？第二「以有勝負」難破性常。第三「以有殺、盜、婬」等諸不善業難破性常。第四「以其飲酒醉亂」難無性常；第五「以其盲不見色、聾不聞」等難破性常；第六「以避火坑、毒」等難無性常；第七「所更後便忘失」難無性常；第八「以有老少等別」難破性常；第九句中就處以徵；第十句中約殺以責。

The passage above directly explains that sentient beings possess the nature but do not see it; from here below is the second part, questions and answers to clarify it again. There are two exchanges of question and answer: first, Kāśyapa clings to characteristics to investigate the real, challenging that there is no buddha-nature, and the Tathāgata replies by distinguishing the real as different from characteristics; second, Kāśyapa clings to the real to investigate characteristics, challenging that there is no killing of living beings, and the Tathāgata replies by distinguishing characteristics as different from the real. In the first challenge there are twelve clauses: the first two challenge the point above that all sentient beings possess the nature of self, and the latter ten challenge the previous meaning of it existing eternally from the origin. In the first two, “Kāśyapa said to the Buddha: Truly there is no self” contradicts the Buddha's previous words; from “why” onward explains it, first investigating and criticizing on his own, and then demonstrating nonexistence. “Being without knowledge at birth” tests the real by means of characteristics; from “if there is a self” onward criticizes characteristics by means of the real; from “by this meaning” onward concludes the meaning of nonexistence. In the second clause, he uses the fact of death and passing away to substantiate non-self. In the latter ten clauses, the first challenges and refutes the permanence of the nature by means of the meaning of differentiation: “if all possess the nature and it is permanent” repeats the Buddha's previous meaning; “there should be no destruction” investigates characteristics on the basis of the real. Characteristics differing is called destruction; if the nature is permanent, permanent dharmas are not different, so all sentient beings should have no manifold, differentiated, destructible characteristics. From “if there is no destruction” onward challenges and refutes the absence of destruction, establishing the differentiation of characteristics. From “now we see” onward challenges and refutes the permanence of the nature by means of the differentiation of characteristics: “karmic conditions are not the same” explains the difference in their causes; “the various destinies are each distinct” reveals the difference in their effects. Since causes and effects are distinct, where could permanence be found? The second challenges and refutes the permanence of the nature “by there being victory and defeat.” The third challenges and refutes the permanence of the nature “by there being killing, stealing, sexual misconduct,” and other unwholesome karmas. The fourth challenges the permanence of the nature “by drinking alcohol and being intoxicated and confused.” The fifth challenges and refutes the permanence of the nature “by the blind not seeing forms, the deaf not hearing,” and so forth. The sixth challenges the permanence of the nature “by avoiding fire pits, poison,” and so forth. The seventh challenges the permanence of the nature by “forgetting afterward what one has experienced.” The eighth challenges and refutes the permanence of the nature “by there being differences of old and young.” In the ninth clause, he investigates according to location. In the tenth clause, he criticizes with respect to killing.