大般涅槃經義記 8.278

8.278

自下第二師子以其不生異果證性本有，佛破明無。有二問答：初「師子言：若尼拘陀無樹生樹，亦無有油，何不出油」。下佛印取，明亦生油。師子重徵，「何故不名胡麻油也」。下佛為釋，「非胡麻故」當問正解。「如火」下喻，「尼拘」下合。「甘蔗」下喻，文顯可知。上來第一明眾生中即未有果顯前非內，下明有因彰前非外。師子先作無性之難，下佛釋通。難中准答有十二句，文中少一。其十二者，一以業得果難破有性。二「若生有性何緣闡提斷善根」下，舉一闡提斷善墮獄難破有性。三「若菩提心是佛性」下，舉一闡提斷菩提心，難破發心為佛性義。四「若生有性何故名為初發心」下，舉初發心難破有性。五「云何而言毘跋致」下，舉退不退難破有性。六「一心趣」下，執緣為正，難破有性。七「如乳」下，舉有佛性徵破假緣。八「若定有性，行人何故見三惡」下，舉有佛性徵破有退。九「亦不須修六波羅蜜多」下，舉修乃得證無佛性。其第十句舉有佛性責人不見，文中略無。其第十一「僧若常」下，舉僧常住無作佛義難破有性。其第十二「眾生本無菩提心」下，舉菩提心本無今有類性本無。准答定爾，不得增減。

From here below is the second [part], where Siṃhanāda proves that the nature is originally existent on the grounds that it does not produce a different fruit, and the Buddha refutes this by explaining its non-existence. There are two questions and answers: First, "Siṃhanāda said: If the nyagrodha has no tree yet produces a tree, and also has no oil, why does it not produce oil?". Below, the Buddha approves this, clarifying that it also produces oil. Siṃhanāda questions again: "Why is it not called sesame oil?". Below, the Buddha explains for him: "Because it is not sesame": this directly answers the question. From "Like fire..." onward is an analogy; from "The nyagrodha..." onward is the application. From "Sugar cane..." onward is an analogy, the text of which is clear and can be understood. The first [part] above clarified that within sentient beings the fruit does not yet exist, showing that the earlier [thesis of its being internal] is incorrect; below clarifies that the cause exists, showing that the earlier [thesis of its being external] is incorrect. Siṃhanāda first raises an objection regarding the lack of nature, and below the Buddha resolves and explains it. In the objection, based on the answers, there are twelve clauses, but one is missing in the text. As for these twelve: 1. Interrogating and refuting the existent nature on the grounds that the fruit is obtained through karma. 2. From "If sentient beings have a nature, for what reason do icchantikas sever their roots of goodness..." onward, he adduces the icchantika severing goodness and falling into hell to interrogate and refute the existent nature. 3. From "If the bodhicitta is the buddha-nature..." onward, he adduces the icchantika severing the bodhicitta to interrogate and refute the thesis that the aspiration to bodhi is the buddha-nature. 4. From "If sentient beings have a nature, why is it called the first aspiration?" onward, he adduces the first aspiration to interrogate and refute the existent nature. 5. From "Why then say 'avivartika'?" onward, he adduces retrogression and non-retrogression to interrogate and refute the existent nature. 6. From "Single-mindedly heading towards..." onward, he clings to conditions as the primary [cause] to interrogate and refute the existent nature. 7. From "Like milk..." onward, he adduces the existence of the buddha-nature to challenge and refute reliance on conditions. 8. From "If the nature is definitely existent, why do practitioners see the three evil [realms]?" onward, he adduces the existence of the buddha-nature to challenge and refute the presence of retrogression. 9. From "One also would not need to cultivate the six pāramitās" onward, he adduces that attainment requires cultivation to prove the absence of the buddha-nature. The tenth clause adduces the existence of the buddha-nature to censure humans for not seeing it; this is omitted in the text. The eleventh, from "If the Saṅgha is permanent..." onward, adduces that the Saṅgha is permanent and has no sense of becoming a buddha to interrogate and refute the existent nature. The twelfth, from "Sentient beings originally lack the bodhicitta..." onward, adduces that the bodhicitta is originally non-existent and now exists, analogizing that the nature is originally non-existent. Based on the answers, it is definitely so, neither more nor less.