大般涅槃經義記 4

English (machine translation) 4

Language: English

4.1

Expounded by the Śramaṇa Shi Huiyuan of Jinying Monastery under the Sui

The above was the first part, teaching and indicating the Three Refuges, which is the beginning of entry; next is the second part, teaching their Middle Way, which is the consummation of entry. Therein, first it teaches by means of a doctrinal exposition; from 'as based on milk' onward, it teaches by means of metaphors. In the doctrinal exposition there are four sections: first, promising to teach the entry; second, from 'if self abides' onward, directly teaching the entry; third, from 'self and selflessness are non-dual in nature' onward, concluding with an encouragement to accept and uphold it; fourth, from 'I previously, in' onward, citing teachings to confirm and establish it. First, 'I now shall further teach you the entry into the tathāgatagarbha' promises to teach the entry; 'further' is said in contrast to what came before; because the further teaching comes afterward, it says 'shall'; detailed exposition is called 'well'; revealing the real to enable realization is called teaching the entry into the garbha.

4.3

In the second teaching, the text is divided into four sections: first, addressing the one-sided views of annihilation and permanence held by ordinary beings, it explains the duality of the characteristics of dharmas; second, from 'ordinary beings have no doubt therein' onward, addressing and dispelling ordinary beings' two views of existence and non-existence, it explains the non-duality of the principle; third, from 'if one speaks of suffering' onward, addressing the one-sided views of the two vehicles, it explains the duality of marks and reality; fourth, from 'if one says ignorance conditions actions' onward, addressing and dispelling the two vehicles' dual views of differentiation, it explains the non-duality of reality. What is the difference between the two 'dualities' in the first and third? The first proclaims the duality of the dharmic characteristics of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa; the third proclaims the duality of the dharmic characteristics of causes and conditions versus their real nature. What is the difference between the two 'non-dualities' in the second and fourth? In the second section, it proclaims that the dharma-nature is non-dual with respect to existence and non-existence; in the fourth section, it clarifies that its real nature is non-dual between earlier and later, just as the bovine flavor in milk, curds, and so forth is non-dual, and simultaneously reveals that the marks and reality of all dharmas are non-dual.

4.4

In the first section, it first clarifies ordinary beings' one-sided views of annihilation and permanence; from 'by this meaning' onward, it refutes their emotional views and clarifies the duality of dharmic characteristics. In clarifying ordinary beings' views, the text has five pairs: the first pair clarifies the faults; the middle three directly distinguish the two characteristics of annihilation and permanence; the last one clarifies the cause from which these views arise.

4.5

In the first pair, 'if self abides' cites their view of permanence: people holding the view of permanence say there is a spiritual self abiding within the five aggregates, which is termed 'self abiding,' and this is an eternal dharma. 'Does not separate from suffering' reveals the fault based upon it: non-Buddhists proclaim that the spiritual self is eternal, so following their intention it is spoken of as an eternal dharma; the five aggregates are suffering, so the self abiding within the aggregates is called not being separated from suffering. 'If there is no self' cites their view of annihilation: people holding the view of annihilation say that there is no conventional self that arises and ceases, and even that there is no true self of nirvāṇa; this is generally called 'no self.' 'Cultivation is of no benefit' reveals the fault based upon it: because there is no self, there is nothing to be nourished and benefited, hence there is no benefit.

4.6

Among the middle three pairs, the first pair distinguishes annihilation and permanence with reference to the views of self and non-self; the second pair does so with reference to the views of permanence and impermanence; the third pair does so with reference to the two views of suffering and pleasure. In the first pair, 'if one says that all dharmas are without self' repeats the preceding non-self: both saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are devoid of self, hence it says 'all are without.' 'This is the view of annihilation' concludes that annihilation differs from permanence. 'If one says that self abides' repeats the preceding view of self; 'this is the view of permanence' concludes that permanence differs from annihilation.

4.7

In the second pair, 'if one says all conditioned phenomena are impermanent' cites the view of impermanence: this says that the dharmas of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are both extinguished and annihilated, hence they are called 'impermanent'—it does not mean the impermanence of changing flux through before and after. 'This is the view of annihilation' concludes that annihilation differs from permanence. 'Conditioned phenomena are permanent' cites their view of permanence, meaning they say that all the conditioned phenomena of the five aggregates are permanent. 'This again is the view of permanence' concludes that permanence differs from annihilation.

4.8

In the third pair, 'if one speaks of suffering' cites their view of suffering: this says that conventional worldly pleasure is completely non-existent, and even the true bliss of nirvāṇa does not exist; this is generally called the view of suffering. 'This is the view of annihilation' concludes that annihilation differs from permanence. 'If one speaks of pleasure' cites their view of pleasure: saying that within saṃsāra there definitely is true bliss is called the view of pleasure. 'This again is the view of permanence' concludes that permanence differs from annihilation.

4.9

Below, it clarifies the origin from which the two views arise: from permanence arises annihilation, and from annihilation arises permanence. Therein, first is the doctrine, next the metaphor, and last the application. In the doctrine, 'cultivating permanence falls into the view of annihilation' means that seeking permanence and failing to obtain it, one gives rise to the view of annihilation; 'cultivating all annihilation' means that the former holder of the view of permanence seeks annihilation and fails to obtain it, and therefore gives rise to the view of permanence. In the metaphor, 'moving the rear foot based on the front' means that the two views of annihilation and permanence alternate as prior and posterior. The application text can be understood.

4.10

The above constitutes the first part, clarifying the one-sided views of ordinary beings. Next is the second part, refuting the one-sided views and clarifying the duality of the characteristics of dharmas, first distinguishing and then concluding. In distinguishing, there are three pairs: first, suffering and bliss are contrasted to distinguish the two dharmas; second, the pair of self and non-self; third, the pair of permanence and impermanence. Therein, impermanence, suffering, and non-self are dharmas of saṃsāra; permanence, bliss, and self are dharmas of nirvāṇa. Among the dharmas of saṃsāra, 'suffering is named unwholesome' is the cause of saṃsāra; 'the defilements of non-self' are the conditions of saṃsāra; 'the impermanent wealth and goods' are the fruits of saṃsāra; in principle they actually apply equally to all, but are spoken of in terms of what is concealed and what is revealed. Among the dharmas of nirvāṇa, 'bliss is named wholesome' is the noble path; 'self is named the secret treasury' is nirvāṇa; 'permanence is named the correct liberation of the Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha' is bodhi; in principle they also apply equally, merely spoken of in terms of what is concealed and what is revealed.

4.11

In the first pair, 'by this meaning' means that because the one-sided graspings of ordinary beings are all matters of annihilation and permanence, according to the principle one must study both together. 'Cultivating other dharmas as suffering is all named unwholesome; cultivating other dharmas as bliss is named wholesome': learning and contemplating is called 'cultivating'; suffering is saṃsāra and bliss is nirvāṇa; contrasting them to distinguish their difference is why it says 'other.' Unwholesome is the cause of suffering, and the cause is named after the fruit, hence it is called suffering; alternatively, the fruit of suffering is designated from the cause and spoken of as unwholesome. Wholesome is the cause of bliss, and the cause is named after the fruit, spoken of as bliss; alternatively, the fruit of bliss is named from the cause and therefore spoken of as wholesome.

4.12

In the second pair, 'cultivating dharmas as non-self' is the dharma of saṃsāra: saṃsāra is unreal and also not autonomous, hence it is called non-self. 'Defilement' is the condition of saṃsāra; because there are defilements, what is experienced is unreal and lacks autonomy; establishing the designation from the fruit, it is therefore called non-self; alternatively, non-self is named from its root and spoken of as defilement. Furthermore, the nature of these defilements is unreal and non-autonomous dharma, hence they are called non-self; therefore non-self is precisely defilement. 'Cultivating the other as permanent' is the dharma of nirvāṇa; this is precisely the self, and it is revealed by mentioning permanence. Truly, because speaking of the self tends to be assimilated to emotional attachment, the dharma is distinguished by permanence and named the 'secret treasury,' which is precisely nirvāṇa; the true self of nirvāṇa is subtle and hidden, hence called 'secret,' and replete with virtues, hence called 'treasury.' 'The so-called nirvāṇa' points out its substance and characteristic; wonderfully transcending all states of existence, it is called 'having no cave or dwelling.' 'Cultivating the other as impermanent' is the dharma of saṃsāra; 'namely wealth and goods' means that the karmic retribution of saṃsāra is named wealth and goods. 'Cultivating the other as permanent' is the dharma of nirvāṇa; 'meaning the Buddha, Dharma,' and so forth points out its substance and characteristic; this Buddha and Dharma are simply bodhi.

4.13

Next is the concluding summary: "You should know that such a Middle Way of the Buddha-Dharma..." formally concludes in accordance with the characteristics, leaving behind both [extremes] to explain the true [reality] and reveal the meaning of the middle. Because it departs from the two extremes of annihilationism and eternalism held by ordinary persons mentioned earlier, it is called the "Middle Way"; it does not mean there is no middle free from duality. From here on, the second section dispels ordinary persons' dual views of existence and non-existence, clarifying that the principle is non-dual. In this there are two parts: first, clarifying that the two views of ordinary persons contravene the middle; second, from "Just as the four great elements..." onwards, the Buddha's teaching of non-duality. In the former part there are two lines. First, the statement "ordinary persons have no doubt regarding it" shows that those ordinary persons do not recognize the Middle Way; ordinary persons have no mental intention to direct their attention toward that non-dual Middle Way, and therefore no doubt arises; if they do not even generate doubt, how could they know and recognize it? Second, from "emaciated and ill" onwards, it shows that those ordinary persons construct the two marks. First, a simile is established: "a sick person" is a simile for the ordinary person; inferior understanding is called "emaciated"; dark delusion afflicting the mind is called "ill"; receiving and consuming false teachings is called "having taken ghee"; grasping at existence and clinging to non-existence is called "his physical strength becomes light and compliant"; the nature of ghee is soft and weak, so when a sick person takes it his body lacks firmness and strength, leaning and relying according to external things, which is called physical strength being light and compliant. False teachings are just like this: ordinary persons listen to and receive them, grasping at existence and clinging to non-existence, unable to remain properly steady, just like strength being light and compliant. "Existence and non-existence being indeterminate" matches [the simile] to reveal the Dharma.

4.14

Below, it clarifies that the Tathāgata refutes and dispels dualistic sentiments and teaches non-duality. In this there are four parts: 1. with respect to the sickness of existence and non-existence in the later passage, promising to teach their removal; 2. from "reveal and explain" onwards, with respect to the earlier passage's lack of doubt regarding it, promising to teach entry into it; 3. from "If one says that it exists, the wise should not..." onwards, with respect to the earlier first part, directly teaching removal; 4. from "If one says that it exists, one should not remain silent..." onwards, with respect to the earlier second part, directly teaching how to give rise to entry.

4.15

In the first part, there is first the simile and then the application. In the simile, "the natures of the four great elements are not the same, being contrary to one another" is a simile for the mutual opposition of the earlier two views of existence and non-existence. "A skilled physician understands well, regulating and adjusting them in accordance with their unbalanced arising" is a simile clarifying that the Tathāgata knows when an error is predominantly strong and eliminates it. In the application, the first line regarding the differences among the four great elements is abbreviated and not applied, but only the latter line regarding the skilled physician regulating and adjusting is applied. "The Tathāgata is also like this; toward sentient beings he is like a physician" matches the skilled physician above; "knowing the differences in the essential marks of all afflictions" matches knowing well above; "and eliminates them" matches regulating and adjusting them in their unbalanced arising above. The characteristics of elimination are as explained in the subsequent text.

4.16

In the second part, revealing the secret store: "The pure buddha-nature is eternal and unchanging," in response to ordinary persons' having no doubt regarding it mentioned earlier, promises to reveal it so as to cause them to enter it. The characteristics of this revelation are as follows below.

4.17

From here on, the third part directly reveals the characteristics of the aforementioned elimination. "If one says that it exists, the wise should not be tainted" teaches the cutting off of the view of existence: if one hears that dharmas exist, a person of wisdom should not be tainted and attached, grasping it as definitively existing. "If one says that it does not exist, that is false speech" teaches the abandonment of the view of non-existence: if one says that all buddhas are completely non-existent, this contravenes the principle of dharmas and is therefore false speech.

4.18

From here on, the fourth part directly reveals the meaning of the aforementioned revelation of the secret store of buddha-nature, clarifying that its buddha-nature is neither existent nor non-existent. "If one says that it exists, one should not remain silent" clarifies that the nature is not non-existent; because it is not non-existent, one should speak to others of the real existence of the nature and should not remain silent. How does it exist? Distinguishing it, there are two aspects: 1. the Dharma buddha-nature has from the very beginning possessed all buddha-dharmas exceeding the sands of the Ganges, like gold in ore; 2. the retribution buddha-nature has from the very beginning possessed within the mind the potential to produce all virtuous qualities, like gold in ore having the potential to be fashioned into adornments. "Nor should one engage in frivolous discourse and disputation" shows that the nature is not existent. How is it not existent? Distinguishing it, there are also two aspects: 1. the Dharma buddha-nature is free from all marks and free from all intrinsic natures, and is therefore called non-existent. How is it free from marks? Like pure clarified butter, although its substance is existent, it lacks marks such as blue, yellow, red, or white; it is also like the mental consciousness of all sentient beings: although its substance is existent, it lacks marks such as large, small, long, or short. Buddha-nature is like this: although its substance is truly existent, it is without a single mark. How is it free from intrinsic nature? In the tathāgatagarbha all buddha-dharmas exceeding the sands of the Ganges are fully present, neither separated, nor detached, nor different; these various buddha-dharmas are of one identical substance and nature, mutually completing each other, with not a single dharma individually maintaining its own separate nature; hence it is said to be free from intrinsic nature. 2. The retribution buddha-nature originally has only the potential to be produced and does not yet have a substance, just as there is no substance of a tree within a tree seed. Since the nature is like this, to grasp definitively within it cannot fail to contravene the principle; therefore, one is exhorted to abandon it.

4.19

In the text, the opening phrase, "Nor should one engage in frivolous discourse and disputation," directly exhorts the abandonment of existence. Abandoning existence is the same as the previous [abandonment], and hence it says "nor." Previously one was exhorted to abandon non-existence, and now one is further exhorted to abandon existence, which is why it says "again." If one grasps at definitive existence, one's words do not accord with the Dharma, which is termed frivolous discourse. Grasping at existence contravenes emptiness; therefore one is exhorted to abandon it. Because of this fault, one is exhorted that one "should not." "Only seeking understanding, etc." teaches the adoption of the correct meaning; abandoning sentiments to focus on principle is called "only seeking"; what is sought according with principle is precisely discussing the true nature of all dharmas. From "ordinary persons" onwards, it adduces the fault to exhort abandonment; saying that "in frivolous discourse and disputation they do not understand" shows that they are incapable of understanding.

4.20

Question: What is the difference between speaking here of neither existence nor non-existence and the refutation of existence and non-existence in the third section above, such that it is repeated again? Explanation: The former was to refute emotional views, whereas what is discussed here is to clarify the principle. Furthermore, the former refuted definitive existence and non-existence with regard to the dharmas of causes and conditions in conventional truth, whereas this [section] directly reveals the meaning that the nature of the tathāgatagarbha is neither existent nor non-existent; being different from the former, it is therefore analyzed again.

4.21

From here on, the third part addresses the errors of the two vehicles' biased views, clarifying the three aspects of mark and reality. Truly, because the two vehicles grasp at marks and are confused about reality, the Buddha teaches them by discerning reality with regard to marks. The text has five distinct sections: the first three reveal reality with regard to defiled marks; the latter two reveal reality with regard to pure marks. Among these five turns, by standard there should be three elements: 1. citing the Buddha's past teaching; 2. clarifying that foolish persons grasp at marks and are confused about reality; 3. clarifying that wise persons understand marks and know reality. However, in the present text the phrasing is sometimes implicit and sometimes explicit, or sometimes complete and sometimes incomplete. In the first turn, there are only two lines, omitting the third. "If one speaks of suffering" is the first line, citing the Buddha's past words: in the past, within the Hīnayāna Dharma, the Buddha taught that the body is entirely suffering. "Foolish persons then say that the body is impermanent, entirely suffering, etc." is the second line: here the śrāvakas are named foolish persons, or called ordinary persons; because they do not know reality, they are called foolish persons; because their minds do not accord with correctness, they are not called noble ones, but are described as ordinary persons. Saying the body is impermanent is the reason for suffering; hence they say it is entirely suffering. Directly grasping it as suffering clarifies their grasping at marks. "Furthermore, they are unable to know that the body has the nature of bliss" shows their confusion about reality. One should adduce the wise person, but since this can be understood by reversing the previous, it is omitted and not adduced.

4.22

In the second turn, all three lines are present. "If one speaks of impermanence" is the first line, citing the Buddha's past words. "Ordinary persons calculate impermanence, like an unbaked clay vessel" is the second line. Here the śrāvakas are called ordinary persons; following the words and grasping at marks, they calculate that everything is impermanent, as illustrated by the simile of the unbaked vessel. This text is slightly abbreviated; according to the previous, it should say: "Furthermore, they are unable to know that the body has the nature of permanence"; not knowing the nature of permanence is precisely confusion about reality. From "A person of wisdom" onwards is the third line. "Should distinguish" generally exhorts distinguishing; from "should not" onwards specifically teaches distinguishing. "Should not say that everything is entirely impermanent" exhorts abandoning grasping at marks; from "Why is this?" onwards teaches causing them to know reality. Saying "Why is this?" questions the preceding to introduce the following: why should one not say that everything is impermanent? In my "body there is the seed of buddha-nature" directly teaches them with reality.

4.23

In the third turn, "If one speaks of non-self" is the first line, citing the Buddha's past words. "Ordinary persons will say that everything is non-self" is the second line, showing that the two vehicles grasp at marks and are confused about reality. However, this text only clarifies grasping at marks, omitting confusion about reality. From "The wise" onwards is the third line, clarifying that the wise understand marks and know reality. "Should distinguish that non-self is a provisional designation" exhorts them to know marks, exhorting them to know that non-self is restricted to unreal dharmas of provisional designation. "Having known this, one should not generate doubt" exhorts them to know reality: having known that non-self is restricted to unreal dharmas of provisional designation, one should not doubt regarding the real Dharma, supposing it to be non-self.

4.24

In the fourth turn, "If one says that the Tathāgata's secret store is empty and tranquil" is the first line, citing the Buddha's past words; here nirvāṇa is spoken of as the secret store. In the past, within the Hīnayāna Dharma, the Tathāgata preached that nirvāṇa is exclusively cessation and non-existence, hence he said "empty and tranquil." Moreover, in the past, within the teachings that refute marks, the Buddha taught that the dharma of nirvāṇa is exclusively empty and non-existent, which is also called "empty and tranquil." "Ordinary persons hearing this give rise to the view of annihilation" is the second line, showing that the two vehicles grasp at marks and are confused about reality, supposing that after the Buddha Tathāgata enters parinirvāṇa he is exclusively annihilated; this clarifies grasping at marks, omitting confusion about reality. From "A person of wisdom" onwards is the third line, clarifying that the wise understand marks and know reality: they should distinguish that the Tathāgata is eternal and without change. This exhorts them to know reality, omitting the knowledge of marks. If complete, it should say: "They should distinguish that the Tathāgata's manifest cessation is truly eternally abiding and without change."

4.25

In the fifth turn, "If one speaks of liberation as being like an illusion or transformation" is the first line, citing the Buddha's past words; here bodhi is spoken of as liberation. In the past, within the teachings that refute marks, the Tathāgata taught that the Buddha's liberation is an illusion, a transformation, and unreal; thus the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā states: "If there were any dharma surpassing nirvāṇa, I would also speak of it as like an illusion and like a transformation, how much more so nirvāṇa." Therefore it is now cited. From "Ordinary persons will..." onwards is the second line, showing that those foolish persons grasp at marks and are confused about reality, supposing that the real liberation attained by the Buddha is like an illusion and a transformation, ultimately returning to extinction; this clarifies grasping at marks, omitting confusion about reality. From "A person of wisdom" onwards is the third line, showing that the wise understand marks and know reality. "Should distinguish that although the lion among men has coming and going" clarifies their knowledge of marks: the Buddha is called the lion among men; manifest birth is called "coming," and responsive cessation is called "going." "Eternally abiding and unchanging" clarifies their knowledge of reality.

4.26

From here on, the fourth part dispels the two vehicles' dual views of differentiation, clarifying that reality is non-dual. Truly, because the two vehicles have not yet realized the reality of dharmas, seeing dharmas shifting and changing they immediately suppose they are definitively distinct; therefore it must be refuted and dispelled in order to clarify non-duality. It also dispels the two vehicles' dual views of marks and reality in order to clarify non-duality, because when people of the two vehicles heard earlier that within impermanence, suffering, and non-self there are natures such as permanence, they immediately supposed that those natures and the marks of suffering, non-self, and so forth are distinct in substance yet gathered together; therefore it must be refuted and dispelled in order to clarify non-duality.

4.27

In the text there are six pairs: the first three pairs refute and dispel the two vehicles' disparate views of before and after to reveal non-duality; the latter three pairs refute and dispel the two vehicles' dual views of characteristic and reality to reveal non-duality. In the first three pairs, how are they non-dual? Just as with the cause and effect of wheat, although before and after are different, the nature of wheat is non-dual; and so on up to all the differences of milk, curd, and so on, the bovine flavor is non-dual. All dharmas are like this: although light, ignorance, and so forth are disparate, their true nature is non-dual, because the essence of the single true mind transforms in accordance with conditions to become all dharmas. Therefore the text below says: "When accompanied by all the fetters, it is called ignorance; when accompanied by wholesome dharmas, it is spoken of as light." In the latter three pairs, how are they non-dual? Just as when a person in the dark of night sees a rope as a snake, they share the same essence while distinguished conceptually, and the nature of their essence is non-dual; and just as when someone is disoriented, taking south for north, this south and north are non-dual in their essential nature. All dharmas are like this: one is deluded about the tathāgatagarbha, taking it to be saṃsāra, yet the essence of saṃsāra is the tathāgatagarbha; therefore it is said to be non-dual.

4.28

Among the first three pairs, the first pair speaks of duality by setting fetter and karma against each other, and in reference to these two it reveals non-duality; the second speaks of duality by setting karma and fruit against each other; the third speaks of duality by setting good and evil against each other. The characteristics of dharmas are immeasurable; we take these three for now, and the rest may be understood by analogy. In the first pair, "If one says that conditioned by ignorance are formations" cites what the Buddha said in the past: ignorance is affliction, and formations are karma. Below "When ordinary persons hear [this]", it clarifies that those foolish people determinately cling to them as two; here again it calls those of the two vehicles ordinary persons, because they have not yet realized and converged with the reality of non-duality. Grasping characteristics with a deluded mind is spoken of as discrimination; claiming that ignorance and formations are determinately distinct is called generating the notion of duality. Light and ignorance are listed as two names; light is still formations, but among formations light is superior, and by contrasting it with ignorance the two characteristics are made apparent, which is why it is singled out. From "The wise" onward, it relies on the wise to reveal that nature is non-dual: the essence of the single true consciousness transforms in accordance with conditions to become light and ignorance, and therefore the nature is non-dual. It is like the nature of water, which according to conditions is clear or turbid, yet the nature of water is non-dual. "Non-duality is reality" takes this up to conclude it. Formations and consciousness being contrasted is clear in the text and can be known.

4.29

In the third pair, "If one says wholesome" and so forth cites what the Buddha said in the past. "Ten wholesome and ten unwholesome [actions]" brings up the essence of karma. "Can be done and cannot be done" distinguishes karma in reference to the person: the ten wholesome actions can be done, and the ten unwholesome actions cannot be done. "Wholesome paths and unwholesome paths" distinguishes karma in relation to its fruit: the ten wholesome actions lead a person to human and heavenly realms, so they are called wholesome paths; the ten unwholesome actions lead a person to the three destinies, so they are called unwholesome paths. "White dharmas and black dharmas" distinguishes karma in accordance with its characteristics: wholesome karma is fresh and pure, so it is called white; unwholesome karma is base and defiled, so it is taken as black. That the ordinary person posits two and the wise person posits one shares the same meaning as the previous explanation.

4.30

From here below, the three pairs proceed in reference to the duality of characteristic and reality in the third section above to reveal non-duality. However, while the text above fully contains five phrases, here we proceed for now in reference to the first three phrases to reveal non-duality; the rest can be known by analogy. "If one says one should cultivate all suffering" cites the first phrase above. "Ordinary persons consider them two": this still calls those of the two vehicles ordinary persons; hearing previously that there is the nature of bliss within suffering, people of the two vehicles claim they are completely distinct entities, and thus it is said that they consider them two. "The wise thoroughly understand that their nature is non-dual" relies on the wise to manifest the principle: the bodhisattva, the wise one, knows that reality gives rise to characteristics, and that characteristics are themselves reality, which is called thoroughly understanding non-duality. "Non-duality is reality" takes this up to conclude it.

4.31

"If one says impermanent" takes up the second [phrase] above. "The Tathāgata's secret treasury is also impermanent": just as in the previous text where ordinary persons reckon that the body is entirely impermanent, hearing impermanence taught in the past teachings, śrāvakas claimed that everything from saṃsāra up to the secret treasury is impermanent; hence it is brought up now. Those people of the two vehicles had not heard of the secret treasury in the past teachings; why then say that they considered the Buddha's secret treasury to also be impermanent? Although they had not heard of it, they said that all things without exception are impermanent. As their statement made no distinction, the secret treasury also fell within the scope of "all things"; therefore one can say they claimed that the Tathāgata's secret treasury is also impermanent. "Ordinary persons consider them two": because those of the two vehicles in the past considered all things to be impermanent, the Buddha earlier taught them to clarify the nature of impermanence; hearing permanency taught, they took it to be entirely distinct in substance from impermanence, which is why it says they consider them two. "The wise understand non-duality" has the same meaning as explained before. "All is non-self" takes up the third [phrase] above. "The Tathāgata's secret treasury is also non-self": just as previously ordinary persons reckoned that all buddha-dharmas are entirely without self, hearing non-self taught in the past teachings, those people of the two vehicles claimed that from saṃsāra up to the buddha-dharmas all are non-self; hence it is brought up now. "Ordinary persons consider them two": because those of the two vehicles in the past considered all things to be non-self, the Buddha taught them above that within the dharma of non-self there is the true self; hearing a self posited, they took it to be vastly different in substance from non-self, which is why it says they consider them two. "The wise understand non-duality" has the same meaning as distinguished above.

4.32

The four sections above together constitute the second part, the direct teaching that leads to entry. From here below is the third part, concluding with an exhortation to accept and uphold [it]. There are four distinct phrases: first, concluding praise of the preceding meaning; second, from "I now in" onward, concluding praise of the preceding teaching; third, from "Self and non-self" onward, exhorting them to uphold the preceding meaning; fourth, from "You also should" onward, exhorting them to uphold the preceding teaching. In the first phrase, "The nature of self and non-self is non-dual" cites the preceding meaning; the preceding meanings were numerous, but it cites it with reference to the last one. "Such is the meaning of the Tathāgata's secret treasury" takes it up to conclude it; from "cannot" onward is praise. In the second phrase, "I now in this sūtra that achieves all merits have explained them all": the principle distinguished above can cause sentient beings to rely on it to accomplish merit, hence it is called the sūtra that achieves all merits; this is an expression of common praise. All the meanings of the words regarding the tathāgatagarbha have already been fully explained in this sūtra. Being called "have all been explained" is a concluding remark. In the third phrase, it exhorts them based on the latter, and therefore specifically says that self and non-self are non-dual and should be upheld. In the fourth phrase, it exhorts them to uphold the teaching, using "also" because it shares the same significance.

4.33

From "As I previously" onward is the fourth major section, citing teachings as corroborating proof; this should cite the teaching of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra to corroborate this meaning. From the explanation above of entering the tathāgatagarbha up to this point is the first part: teaching entry by means of doctrinal exposition.

4.34

From here below is the second part: teaching entry by means of metaphorical exposition. First it raises the metaphorical situation; from "Is such a nature of curd derived from milk" onward, it elaborates the details of the metaphor, revealing the doctrine by reference to it. The text has four distinct divisions: first, refuting determinate existence and non-existence to reveal the second [theme] above, that existence and non-existence are non-dual; second, from "This cow eats water and grass" onward, clarifying that milk, curd, and so on are identical in nature before and after, revealing the fourth [theme] above, that before and after are non-dual; third, from "Kāśyapa addressed the Buddha" onward, expanding on the first [theme] above, that existence and non-existence are non-dual; fourth, from "Conditioned by this cow eating grass" onward, expanding on the second [theme] above, that before and after are non-dual.

4.35

The first division has four parts: first, examining and determining the matter with three propositions regarding milk and curd: originating from milk is the first, originating from itself is the second, and originating from another is the third; second, from "and so on" onward, analogizing the subsequent by the preceding; third, raising objections based on the preceding three propositions to refute the latter two and establish the initial origination from milk; fourth, from "and so on" onward, taking the preceding to analogize the subsequent.

4.36

The first two can be known.

4.37

In the third section, raising objections to refute self-origination clarifies non-existence; raising objections to refute origination from another establishes the initial origination from milk, revealing non-nonexistence. In refuting origination from another, "If it arises from another" raises the differing theory; this terms water and so forth as "another," and the refutation against it can be known. Next, refuting origination from self: "If it arises from itself" raises another differing theory, which proclaims that there is already the nature of curd in the milk beforehand that generates the subsequent curd, termed self-origination; hence it is cited now. Below, in refuting and dispelling it: "It should not arise in resemblance and continuity": using curd arising from itself, it refutes origination from milk. If curd arises from curd and not from milk, this milk should not generate subsequent curd in resemblance and continuity. Milk resembles curd, hence "resemblance"; curd arising succeeding milk is called "continuity." Speaking of their resemblance clarifies milk as the cause of curd; speaking of continuity clarifies curd as the fruit of milk. "If it arises in continuity, then they are not simultaneous": using origination from milk, it refutes the self-origination of curd. Because it arises as curd in continuity from the preceding milk, one clearly knows that the self-nature of curd did not exist beforehand, arising simultaneously with the milk to produce the subsequent curd. "If they do not arise simultaneously, the five flavors are not at the same time": analogizing the subsequent by the initial, if there is no nature of curd arising simultaneously with the milk to produce the subsequent curd, then there is also no fresh butter up to clarified butter in the milk; therefore the five flavors cannot occur at the same time. Below "Although they are not at the same [time]", it explains and establishes the first proposition, clarifying origination from milk: "although they cannot be at the same time" sets aside the preceding self-origination; "it certainly does not come from elsewhere either" sets aside the preceding origination from another, meaning that it does not come from the other water and grass. "One should know that within milk there are beforehand the marks of curd" directly clarifies origination from milk. Milk possesses the nature of curd, and the nature of curd is a mark belonging to the fruit of curd, just as heat is the mark of fire; it is not that the entity of curd exists [in milk]. "Because sweet flavor is abundant, it cannot transform on its own" clarifies that it arises dependent on conditions; these words serve to ward off an external objection. What is the thrust of the objection? If milk possesses curd, why depend on conditions? Because it arises dependent on conditions, one clearly knows that there is no nature of curd beforehand in milk; since there is no nature of curd, it does not originate from milk. Hence it is explained now: because the sweet flavor in milk is genuinely abundant, it cannot transform on its own, so it relies on the condition of sourness before it can finally be produced.

4.38

The fourth section below analogizes the subsequent by the preceding; the text is clear and can be known. This is the meaning of the first section.

4.39

In the second section, first the metaphor is established, and then the doctrine is revealed in reference to it. In the metaphor, it clarifies that although the producer and the produced are different before and after, their nature is identical and non-dual, by which it analogizes that although ignorance, formations, and so forth are different before and after, their true nature is non-dual. In the text, it first says, "Conditioned by this cow eating water and grass, blood transforms into milk," clarifying the two of before and after. Below, it clarifies that their nature is non-dual in reference to these two: "Eating sweet [grass], the milk is sweet; eating bitter [grass], the milk is bitter; eating rich grass, one obtains pure clarified butter," clarifying that their nature is non-dual; the milk produced from eating grass versus grain differs in color and flavor—when eating grain the milk is good, and when eating grass the milk is poor—clarifying that their nature is non-dual. Below, it reveals the doctrine in reference to this: "Taking light and ignorance to give rise to two characteristics" corresponds to eating water and grass; "blood transforms into milk" clarifies the duality of doctrinal characteristics. "If ignorance transforms, it becomes light" corresponds to eating sweet grass making the milk sweet, and so forth, clarifying that their nature is non-dual. "All dharmas are also like this" analogizes the subsequent by the initial; "having no two characteristics" concludes the meaning of duality and non-duality, as also distinguished above.

4.40

From here below, the third section extensively refutes existence and non-existence, establishing the first [theme] above; first comes the question, followed by the answer. In the preceding question, it first raises an objection against determinate existence, and then raises an objection against determinate non-existence. Because the Buddha just said that milk has the marks of curd, he raises an objection against determinate existence; fearing that upon being challenged the Buddha might turn and posit the meaning of non-existence, he raises an objection against determinate non-existence.

4.41

In the preceding refutation of 'existence', the text cites to question directly: 'Regarding what the Buddha has stated, that there is cheese within milk—what is the meaning of this?' Below, objections are formulated. The objections consist of four clauses. First, refuting existence by means of origination: 'If it is asserted that the characteristic of cheese definitely exists within milk, but is not seen because it is subtle' cites the Buddha's assertion of existence, while from 'why is it said' downward, it refutes it through origination; 'newly originated from milk' shows that it does not inherently pre-exist. Second, from 'if originally non-existent' downward, it establishes reasoning to press the inquiry further: having been originally non-existent and now existing, it can be called origination; if it already pre-existed, how could it be called origination? Third, from 'if it is asserted that definitely within milk' downward, it cites the cause to refute by analogy: grass is the cause of milk; by citing that within that grass there pre-exists the nature of milk, it refutes by analogy that within milk there pre-exists the nature of cheese. 'If it is asserted that within milk there definitely exists the characteristic of cheese' recites the preceding assertion of existence, and 'grass should contain milk' properly refutes it by analogy. Fourth, 'likewise within milk there should also be grass' cites the effect to refute by analogy: fearing that the Buddha, when pressed, might claim that grass contains milk, it now refutes by analogy that milk should contain grass; this is citing the effect to analogously reverse upon its cause.

4.42

Below, it refutes definite non-existence, comprising three distinct clauses. First, refuting non-existence through origination: the words 'how can cheese be originated because of milk?' refute it through origination; that cheese originates from milk shows that it is not inherently non-existent. Second, from 'if originally non-existent' downward, it refutes the notion that non-existence can bring about origination: it first cites the words that what is originally non-existent brings about origination, and from 'why' downward, it subsequently refutes it. If cheese is originally non-existent yet cheese can be produced, grass was also originally non-existent—why is it not produced? Milk does not produce grass, so grass may indeed be originally non-existent; but cheese is produced in milk, showing that cheese is not non-existent.

4.43

Below, the Buddha answers it, first laying out three approaches to explain that all are inadmissible. That existence and non-existence are not fixed directly answers the previous objections; that it does not originate from another comprehensively guards against divergent doctrines. The phrase 'not fixedly existent' establishes the meaning of not originating from self in the first section; 'not fixedly non-existent' establishes the meaning of originating from milk in the first section; 'not from another' establishes the meaning of not originating from another in the first section.

4.44

Below, it explains this extensively, first refuting definite existence, beginning with citation and then refutation. If milk contained cheese, their substance and taste should be identical; 'why then are their substance and taste distinct?' That milk is cold while cheese is hot is the difference in their substance; that milk is sweet while cheese is sour is the difference in their taste; their colours are also different, but this is omitted and not detailed. That substance and taste are each distinct shows that it is not inherently pre-existent. From 'therefore' downward is the conclusion.

4.45

Next, it refutes definite non-existence, first citing and then refuting. 'Why are rabbit horns not produced in milk?' By the fact that what is non-existent is not produced, it reveals that what is produced is not non-existent. What is the meaning of this? If milk lacked cheese yet cheese could be produced, then since milk lacks rabbit horns, why are they not produced? Since milk lacks rabbit horns, horns cannot be produced; that milk produces cheese shows that cheese is not non-existent. 'If poison is placed in milk, the cheese kills people' verifies the beginning by the end, revealing that it is not inherently non-existent. From 'therefore' downward is the conclusion.

4.46

Next, it refutes origination from another, first citing and then refuting. If it originated from another, water is 'another'—why is cheese not produced in it? That water does not produce cheese shows that it does not originate from another. From 'therefore' downward is the conclusion.

4.47

From here below, the fourth part extensively reveals non-duality, completing the second part above. First it establishes a simile; from 'clarity and ignorance' downward, it applies it to reveal dharmas; from 'due to these conditions' downward, it concludes and correlates with the preceding simile; 'buddha-nature is also like this' cites the dharma to correspond. Within the simile there are four parts: first, based on the cause and effect of milk, it establishes two characteristics, analogising the duality of the dharma-characteristics of clarity and ignorance; second, from 'although this milk emerges from grass and blood' downward, based on the cause and effect of milk, it explains that the nature is non-dual, analogising that the true nature of clarity and ignorance is non-dual; third, from 'when this milk ceases' downward, based on the cause and effect of cheese, it establishes two characteristics, analogising the duality of the dharma-characteristics of volitional formations, consciousness, and so forth; fourth, from 'therefore one cannot definitely say' downward, based on the cause and effect of cheese, it explains that the nature is non-dual, analogising that the true nature of volitional formations, consciousness, and so forth is non-dual.

4.48

In the first part, 'due to the condition of this cow eating grass, blood turns white' describes the effect arising from the cause. The cow analogises sentient beings; the mind receiving conditions of defilement is called 'eating grass'; giving rise to the link of ignorance is analogised to the blood; and ignorance giving rise to volitional formations is called the blood turning white. 'After the grass and blood have ceased, by the power of merit it becomes milk' describes the exhaustion of the cause and the emergence of the effect, which can also be called the power of conditions producing the effect; to illustrate that cause and effect are distinct before and after, it is said that they have ceased. It is by the power of the calf's merit that blood is transformed into milk; hence it says that by the power of sentient beings' merit it becomes milk. What is the meaning of this? The cow analogises sentient beings of ignorance; sentient beings creating karma arise from what precedes them and are spoken of as the calf. By the perfuming of these sentient beings' past karma, the preceding ignorance is transformed and subsequent volitional formations are arisen, just as that calf's power of merit turns [blood] into milk.

4.49

In the second section, 'although this milk emerges from grass and blood, it cannot be called two' properly explains non-duality. That grass and blood produce milk is their difference; to distinguish the difference while including the oneness, it therefore says 'although'. The preceding is transformed into the succeeding, and therefore it cannot be categorically fixed as two. From 'it can only' downward, it explains and completes the non-duality: it is only from the conditions of grass and blood that milk is produced, and not from anywhere else; therefore it cannot be categorically fixed as two. From 'cheese up to' downward, it infers the subsequent by the initial; from 'for this reason' downward, it concludes the non-duality. Because these such as milk are produced subsequent from prior, and their nature is without distinction, they are jointly named bovine flavour; because the bovine flavour is identical, it is called non-dual.

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大般涅槃經義記 — Classical Chinese