大般涅槃經義記 9.43

9.43

In the third section, there are seven further arguments. First, with respect to the meaning of reaching or not reaching, it challenges wisdom's capacity to destroy. It first sets up two alternatives: if wisdom can destroy, does it reach or not reach? Below, challenges are presented, which fall into three distinct types: First, it specifically challenges that it can destroy without reaching. "If it destroys without reaching, ordinary beings should also destroy [them]": if noble wisdom does not reach afflictions yet can destroy afflictions, ordinary beings also do not reach [them], so why do they not destroy [them]? Second, from "If it reaches..." downward, it specifically challenges destruction upon reaching. "If it destroys upon reaching, the initial thought-moment should destroy [them]": this interrogates whether the initial [moment] alone destroys, without depending on subsequent wisdom. What does this mean? The wisdom of the initial thought-moment arises in opposition to delusion; this should be able to destroy [it]. Subsequent thought-moments do not reach [it] and should not destroy [it]; if subsequent ones do not destroy [it], what use is subsequent wisdom? "If the initial one does not destroy, subsequent ones also do not destroy": this refutes the opponent's counter-defense, challenging that subsequent ones destroy together. The other person defends, saying: the initial one does not destroy alone, hence subsequent thought-moments are required to destroy together with the former. Therefore, it now challenges them: if the initial thought-moment, having reached delusion, still cannot destroy [it], how could subsequent thought-moments that do not reach [it] be able to destroy [it]? "If the initial one destroys upon reaching, then [the subsequent] does not reach": this refutes the opponent's counter-defense, challenging destruction upon subsequent reaching. The other person defends, saying: the initial thought-moment reaches delusion, and subsequent thought-moments also reach [it], and therefore they destroy together. Therefore, it now challenges them: if the initial one reaches and destroys, that which destroys afterward simply does not reach, because it is separated by the initial thought-moment. Since the subsequent does not reach, how can one say that it destroys precisely because it reaches? "Why say that wisdom can destroy?": this concludes with a general reprimand. Third, from "If it can destroy whether reaching or not reaching..." downward, it challenges both horns together. Due to the previous challenge, the other person defends, saying: the initial thought-moment reaches and destroys, and subsequent thought-moments also can destroy without reaching. Therefore, it now cites this to reject it as incorrect. The manner in which it is incorrect is fully as challenged above: if one says it destroys upon reaching, it is like the latter challenge above; if one says it destroys without reaching, it is like the first challenge above. This is the first further argument. Second, with respect to companionship or solitariness, it challenges wisdom's capacity to destroy. "If vipaśyanā can destroy afflictions, is it solitary or accompanied?": it establishes two alternatives, forward and backward. Below, challenges are presented. "If it can destroy alone, why do bodhisattvas cultivate the eightfold noble path?": this challenges its destruction alone. From "If accompanied..." downward, it challenges its destruction when accompanied. "If it destroys because it is accompanied, then alone it does not destroy": using accompaniment to refute solitariness. "If alone it does not destroy, accompanied it also does not destroy": using solitariness to refute accompaniment. First the doctrine, next the simile, and then the application may be understood.