大般涅槃經義記 9

English (machine translation) 9

Language: English

9.1

Composed by Śramaṇa Shi Huiyuan of Jinying Monastery under the Sui

Next is to extensively elaborate on the inconceivability of the Buddha's realm above. 'Realm' refers to nirvāṇa: manifesting extinction in accord with transformation, its real virtues eternally abide; although its real virtues eternally abide, it is wondrously quiescent and free of marks, and hence is called inconceivable. These virtues are difficult to display; now, by resorting to entering through transformed extinction, they are revealed, desiring to cause sentient beings to emulate the Buddha in relinquishing marks and entering into it. In this there are four [parts]: first, relying on the place of extinction to reveal true nirvāṇa; second, relying on the time of extinction to reveal true nirvāṇa; third, relying on the adorned forest to reveal true nirvāṇa; fourth, relying on the extinct body to reveal the realization and entry.

9.3

Within the place, there are two: first, relying on the place of the city to confront and refute non-Buddhists, clarifying that Great Nirvāṇa is permanent, joyful, self, and pure; second, relying on the place of the forest, clarifying that Great Nirvāṇa is permanent, joyful, self, and pure. Regarding the place of the city, Siṃhanāda first asks; the intent of his questioning has three [aspects]: first, he asks why [the Buddha] abandoned the six great cities and came here; second, he asks why he enters nirvāṇa here; third, he asks why the Tathāgata enters nirvāṇa in such an inferior and evil place as Kuśi[nagara]. Below, the Buddha answers individually, first responding, and then questioning. "You should not say it is inferior, evil, narrow, and small" briefly overturns his words; "you should say it is wondrous" instructs him by means of principle. From "Why?" downward, he explains. "The place traversed by the buddhas and bodhisattvas" briefly explains in terms of the dharma; from "Like a lowly person" downward, three metaphors illustrate it; next is the application, and below is the conclusion. From "I recall in the past" downward answers the second question, with three iterations: first, in the past he once heard the Buddha's name and practiced the ten wholesome deeds in this place, and to repay the kindness of the land he came here; second, he once cultivated the four immeasurables in this place; third, he once saw a buddha and generated the mind [for awakening] in this place, and therefore came here. From "When I first went forth" downward, in response to his first question, he clarifies that it was to pursue the various non-Buddhists that he abandoned the six [cities] and came here. First he clarifies abandoning the six, and afterward arriving at Kuśinagara to refute the heterodox and reveal the orthodox, first individually, and then concluding. Within the individual treatment there are three: first, clarifying that the six masters went to Kuśinagara beforehand and increased sentient beings' wrong views; second, from "I saw this" downward, the Tathāgata arrived afterward to overturn the heterodox and reveal the orthodox; third, from "At that time the six masters made this statement" downward, clarifying that the various non-Buddhists clung to the heterodox and disordered the orthodox, and the Tathāgata confronted and refuted them. The first section can be understood.

9.4

In the second section, it first clarifies that the Tathāgata, pitying these sentient beings deluded by heterodox teachers, extensively invited the bodhisattvas to roar the great lion's roar. From "Although in emptiness" downward, it clarifies the reason for gathering the bodhisattvas to roar. From "The lion's roar speaks of all" downward, it sets forth that which they roared: "speaking of impermanence and non-bliss" delineates the phenomena of saṃsāra; "speaking of the Buddha as permanent, etc." reveals the dharmas of nirvāṇa.

9.5

In the third section, it first clarifies the Tathāgata refuting the heterodox and revealing the orthodox. From "The various non-Buddhists said: 'If one says that the Tathāgata is permanent, joyful, and self'" downward, it clarifies the various non-Buddhists abandoning the heterodox and taking refuge in the orthodox. In the former part there are two: first, refuting the non-Buddhists' positing a self identical with dharmas; second, from "The six masters said: 'Form is not the self'" downward, refuting those non-Buddhists' positing a self distinct from dharmas. In the former, he first refutes the self in reference to the six sense faculties; "If the six masters say form is external to my self" refutes the self in reference to the five aggregates. Regarding refutation in reference to the faculties, he first refutes heterodox attachments; from "What the buddhas and bodhisattvas see as the true" downward, he displays the orthodox meaning. In the former part refuting the heterodox, the text specifically has two parts: first, the non-Buddhists establish a self, and the Tathāgata confronts and refutes them; second, the non-Buddhists question the Buddha, and the Tathāgata explains for them. In the former, first the non-Buddhists establish a self: "Gautama has a self, and I also have a self," speaking heterodoxy to disorder the orthodox. Below, he delineates the marks of the self, speaking provisionally of the eye among the six faculties. "The seer is named the self" is established in terms of the dharma, followed by a metaphor, and then the application. Below, the Buddha confronts and refutes it: "That the seer is named the self, this meaning is not so," citing it to negate it generally. From "Why?" downward, he explains with three iterations: First, faculties and functions are not simultaneous, refuting a definitely existing self. "When a person faces one direction, the six faculties all function simultaneously" delineates the details of the metaphor. From "If there definitely is" downward, he questions whether the dharma matches the metaphor. From "If within one faculty one cannot" downward, he examines the metaphor by means of the dharma, refuting a definitely existing self. Second, faculties and functions are not constant, refuting a definitely existing self. "Although the metaphor you cited spans a hundred years, seeing through it is not different" delineates the details of the metaphor. From "If the eye faculty" downward, he questions whether the dharma matches the metaphor, clearly showing there is no self. Third, the faculties and functions face only one direction, refuting a definitely existing self. "Because the person's orientation differs, he sees within and sees without" delineates the details of the metaphor. From "If the eye faculty" downward, he questions whether the dharma matches the metaphor. From "If it does not see" downward, he clarifies that the dharma contradicts the metaphor, refuting a definitely existing self.

9.6

From here, the non-Buddhists turn back to question the Tathāgata: "If there is no self, who is able to see?" Below, the Buddha explains for them, first clarifying that the coming together of four things is called seeing, next clarifying that there is no self, and below clarifying that sentient beings mistakenly see a self through inversion. What was discussed above in refuting the heterodox and revealing the orthodox can be understood.

9.7

Below, in reference to the five aggregates, he refutes a definitely existing self. The text specifically has four parts: first, refuting their heterodoxy; second, revealing the orthodox; third, again refuting the heterodoxy; fourth, again revealing the orthodox. In the first part, he first refutes it in reference to the aggregate of form, and analogizes the remaining four. Within the aggregate of form, he first refutes the self, and afterward refutes permanence, etc. Within the refutation of the self, "If form is the self, this is also not so" cites it to negate it generally. From "Why?" downward, he extensively reveals its error, refuting it with five clauses: "If form is the self, it should not be ugly" is the first refutation; "Why are there furthermore the distinctions of the four castes?" is the second refutation; "Why does it belong to another?" is the third refutation; "having deficient and impaired sense faculties" is the fourth refutation; "Why does it not become a deva, rather than experiencing the hells, etc.?" is the fifth refutation. From "If it cannot" downward, he concludes the refutation generally. Below, refuting permanence, etc., and analogizing the remaining aggregates can all be understood from the text. The above refuted the heterodox; from "The Tathāgata eternally" downward displays the orthodox meaning; from "Furthermore, form" downward refutes the heterodox again; from "The Tathāgata's body" downward displays the sovereign meaning again.

9.8

Next is the refutation of positing a self distinct from the aggregates. Again, it first refutes the heterodox and afterward displays the orthodox meaning. Within refuting the heterodox, the text has four pairs: First, because of being refuted previously, the non-Buddhists establish a self distinct from the aggregates, saying: "From form to consciousness, none is the self; the self pervades everything, just like empty space." Below, the Buddha confronts and refutes them with three iterations. First, he challenges and refutes them in reference to seeing: "If it exists pervasively, one should not say: 'I did not see the object,'" questioning them based on the fundamental nature [of pervasiveness]. If the self is all-pervading, it has fundamentally always been pervading, and should constantly and fully see forms in all places; one should not say, "I did not see it at first." If one does not see it at first and only sees it later, then the seeing was fundamentally non-existent and is impermanent; how could it be said to be all-pervading? Second, he challenges them in reference to the destinies: "If the self is all-pervading, it should completely have bodies within the five destinies," questioning them to force the consequence of simultaneous existence. Fearing they might establish simultaneous existence, he further challenges and refutes them below: "If it completely possessed them, it should individually receive retribution within the five destinies; how can you say that one transitions away from the three wretched realms and receives a human or heavenly body?" Third, he challenges and refutes them in reference to oneness and difference. He first posits a dilemma: "Is it one, or is it many?" "If it is one, there would be no father and son," etc., objects to and refutes a single all-pervading [self]. From "If the self is many" downward, he objects to and refutes many all-pervading [selves]. If they are many and all-pervading, then this person's self would pervade that person's body, and that person's self would pervade this person's body; the five faculties, karma, and wisdom of all sentient beings should all be identical and equal, and there should be no distinction. Fearing they might assert equality, he further objects and refutes below: If they were indeed identical and equal, "How could one speak of faculties being complete or incomplete?" objects to and refutes the equality of faculties; "wholesome karma and unwholesome karma" objects to and refutes the equality of karma; "the distinction between the foolish and the wise" objects to and refutes the equality of wisdom.

9.9

In the second, the non-Buddhist takes advantage of [the Buddha's] words to rescue his position: "The self is boundless, but dharma (merit) and adharma (demerit) have distinct demarcations." Because they are distinct, "one who cultivates wholesome dharmas obtains a fine body, and one who practices unwholesome dharmas obtains an evil body"; thus there is difference. Below, the Buddha refutes this in response. "If that were so, the self would not be all-pervading": this interrogates [the notion of] all-pervading by means of [the presence of] differences. "If the self were all-pervading..." below interrogates [the notion of] difference by means of [the claim to be] all-pervading. If it were all-pervading, then this self would reach into that person's body, and that self would also reach into this person's body; therefore, "a good person should also possess evil, and an evil person should also possess good karma." Since good and evil would be shared throughout, how could the bodily retributions differ? From "If that is not so..." onward, he concludes by refuting its all-pervading nature.

9.10

In the third, the non-Buddhist establishes a simile to rescue his position: "Just as when a single room is lit with hundreds of thousands of lamps," the lamps are distinct while the light is shared throughout; "the self is also like this," like the light pervading throughout; "cultivating good and practicing evil" are distinct and do not intermingle, like the lamps. Below, the Buddha refutes this in response. "To say that the self is like a lamp—this meaning is incorrect": he cites this to reject it generally. From "Why is that?" onward, he demonstrates its incorrectness in detail. The points are distinct in three ways: First, "Light arises from conditions and increases along with the lamp; the self is not like this"—so it cannot serve as a simile. Second, "Light emerges from the lamp and abides in a different place; the self is not like this"—so it cannot serve as a simile. Third, "Light coexists with darkness; the self is not like this"—it does not abide in the same place as non-self; for this reason it cannot serve as a simile. In the text, he first says "Light coexists with darkness" to briefly state the thesis. From "Why?" onward, he explains it. "Just as when a single lamp is lit, the illumination is unclear" properly discusses the lamp's light coexisting with darkness; "only with many lamps is it clear" raises the many to show [the insufficiency of] the few. "If the first lamp dispelled [it], there would be no need for a later lamp": this questions the later [lamp] with respect to the first; "if a later lamp is needed, know that the first coexisted [with darkness]": this adduces the later to prove the former.

9.11

In the fourth, the non-Buddhist interrogates the Tathāgata in return: "If there is no self, who performs good and evil?" Below, the Buddha first refutes him distinctly by four points. "If the self is the agent, how can it be called permanent? If it were permanent, how could it sometimes perform good and sometimes perform evil?" This is the first refutation. "If it acts at certain times, how can one still say that the self is boundless?" This is the second refutation. "If the self is the agent, why would it practice evil?" This is the third refutation. "If the self is the knower, why would it give rise to doubts about the non-self of sentient beings?" This is the fourth refutation. From "For this reason..." onward, he concludes the refutation generally.

9.12

The preceding refutes heterodoxy; below reveals the correct doctrine, explaining the Buddha's permanence, bliss, self, purity, and emptiness, as is clearly evident in the text.

9.13

The above is the first part, refuting heterodoxy and revealing the correct. From "If one says that the Tathāgata is permanent, blissful, self, and pure..." onward, it explains the non-Buddhists abandoning heterodoxy and taking refuge in the correct.

9.14

The above has explained in detail that the Buddha came to Kuśīnagara to refute heterodoxy and reveal the correct. From "For this reason, I in..." onward, it concludes this generally.

9.15

Next, [the text] reveals nirvāṇa in terms of the grove; first [treating it] specifically, and then concluding. Within the specific treatment, there are four points: first, using the eight trees to symbolize the eight cultivations; second, taking the occasion of sentient beings protecting the sāla grove to cause the disciples to learn from them and protect the Dharma; third, taking the occasion of the four heavenly kings protecting the sāla grove to immediately cause them to protect the Dharma; fourth, using the grove's flowers and fruits being ever flourishing and able to benefit sentient beings to symbolize that he himself is able to benefit the multitude of śrāvakas. From "For this..." onward, it concludes.

9.16

Next, it relies on the time of extinction to reveal nirvāṇa. Therein, it first relies on the second month to reveal it. Siṃhanāda asks first, and below the Buddha answers him; first specifically, and then concluding. Within the specific treatment, there are four points: First, it explains that in the second month people mostly give rise to the four inverted views of permanence, bliss, self, and purity; the Buddha, in order to refute these, reveals the Tathāgata's permanence, bliss, self, and purity, first refuting the inverted view of permanence, and next those of bliss, self, and purity. Second, it symbolizes the Tathāgata's two kinds of dharmakāya, namely the true and the responsive. Third, not entering nirvāṇa in winter reveals that the wise do not delight in the Tathāgata's impermanence and extinction; entering nirvāṇa in the second month reveals that the wise love and delight in the Tathāgata's permanence, bliss, self, and purity. Fourth, it uses events such as planting in the second month to symbolize the disciples cultivating various wholesome dharmas. Therein are four: (1) using planting to symbolize sentient beings hearing the Dharma, generating the mind, and planting wholesome roots; (2) the rivers filling to capacity, symbolizing the cloud-like gathering of bodhisattvas from the ten directions; (3) the hundred beasts nursing their young, symbolizing the disciples planting wholesome roots; (4) the blossoming and flourishing of flowers and fruits, symbolizing the disciples cultivating the flowers of the seven factors of awakening and attaining the fruits of the four paths.

9.17

Next, it symbolizes nirvāṇa in terms of the time of the fifteenth day. Siṃhanāda asks first: "The four times, such as birth, all occurred on the eighth day; why is nirvāṇa alone on the fifteenth day?" Below, the Buddha first praises [the question] and then explains it. Within the explanation, there are three points: First, "at the time of the fifteenth day, the moon has neither waning nor waxing," symbolizing that the Buddha's nirvāṇa has neither waning nor waxing. Second, "at the time of the fifteenth day, the moon is fully rounded for eleven matters," revealing that the Buddha's virtues are complete, benefiting sentient beings through eleven matters. Third, from "I truly do not enter..." onward, it explains in connection with the first section that the Buddha is not extinguished, though foolish people think he is extinguished; first [explaining] the doctrine, and then the simile.

9.18

Below, third, it reveals nirvāṇa by relying on the adornment of the grove. Siṃhanāda asks first, and below the Buddha explains it for him. The place revealed by virtuous persons is therefore called "adornment." It properly aims to explain the Buddha's discussion of his disciples: the disciples are immeasurable, but six persons are briefly cited, making seven including the Buddha. For each person, the Buddha first explains, and then Siṃhanāda expresses his understanding of the person. In explaining Śāri[putra], he first praises his wisdom; from "Toward enemies and relatives..." onward, he praises his mental conduct. Within the wisdom, there are ten phrases: "great wisdom" is the general, while "sharp" and the others are the specific. Swiftly penetrating principle is called "sharp wisdom"; swiftly understanding events is called "rapid wisdom"; sovereignty in severing obstacles is called "liberation wisdom"; exhaustively illuminating principle is called "profound wisdom"; broadly comprehending conventional meanings is called "extensive wisdom"; exhaustively fathoming the ocean of the Buddha's teachings is called "insurpassable wisdom." Therefore the sūtra says: "Excepting only the Buddha, the World-Honoured One, if all classes of sentient beings wished to match Śāriputra's wisdom and extensive learning, they could not equal one sixteenth part." Because no one surpasses him, it is called "insurpassable"; what he knows is free of error, hence it is called "real wisdom." "Equipped with the faculty of wisdom" concludes this generally.

9.19

Below, fourth, it reveals the meaning of having already realized and entered the great nirvāṇa by relying on the extinction of the body. Because internal realization is difficult to display, it is displayed by relying on the extinction of the body as an entry. Therein are four parts: first, Siṃhanāda requests him to remain; second, the Tathāgata does not grant it; third, Siṃhanāda asks about the intention of the Buddha's extinction; fourth, the Tathāgata explains it for him. In the first, Siṃhanāda builds upon the preceding to request him to remain: "Only the Tathāgata can adorn the grove; without him it is not magnificent. We pray that in your great compassion, you will remain constantly to adorn it."

9.20

Below, the Buddha answers him; first explaining non-abiding, and then displaying his desire to depart. In explaining non-abiding, there are twenty-seven repetitions in all; the text broadly reveals non-abiding, which in essence can be subsumed under four: First, one repetition uses principle to rebuke him in return: "All dharmas are without abiding; how can you ask me to abide?" Second, from "Whenever one speaks of abiding..." onward, there are six repetitions, broadly explaining that the Tathāgata's faults of abiding are forever exhausted, so one should not request him to abide. Third, from "Now, the one who does not abide is called the Boundless Body..." onward, there are twelve repetitions, broadly explaining that the Tathāgata is fully endowed with the virtue of non-abiding, so one should not request him to abide. Fourth, from "If anyone says that evil deeds of body, speech, and mind yield good fruits..." onward, there are eight repetitions, broadly citing all things that are ultimately non-existent to reveal the Buddha's non-abiding; first broadly citing them, and then comparing them to the Buddha.

9.21

The preceding explained non-abiding; below explains the desire to depart. The Tathāgata here enters the cave of the great samādhi and profound meditative absorption; because the multitude does not see him, this is called entering nirvāṇa. This relies on the person to manifest and display true realization, causing people to learn it. Question: Previously it was said that the Tathāgata is ultimately always in the world and does not enter nirvāṇa; why is it now said that he does not abide and definitely enters nirvāṇa? Explanation: The Buddha's virtues have four gates: First, the gate of sharing the world, constantly being in the world without ever ceasing for a moment. Second, the gate of abiding in quiescence, never emerging for a moment. Third, the gate of turning from quiescence to generate functioning, manifesting transformations in accord with beings. Fourth, the gate of ceasing functioning to return to quiescence, relinquishing transformations to return to the real. The former was based on the first gate, manifesting that his presence in the world is ultimately unextinguished; now, relying on the fourth, he speaks of non-abiding and entering nirvāṇa.

9.22

From "Siṃhanāda..." onward, he again asks about the intention of the Buddha's extinction: "Why does the Tathāgata enter the cave of meditative absorption?" Below, the Buddha broadly uses fourteen repetitions to explain the purpose of entering. Although there are many gates, the essential intent is to cause people to emulate the Buddha in progressing toward entry. From "For this..." onward, it concludes.

9.23

From "neither internal nor external" up to this point is the third major section, broadly revealing the realized Dharma. Below, the fourth section encourages cultivation to progress toward entry, broadly revealing realized practice. How does this differ from the realized practice in the preceding second section, such that it needs to be discussed again? In the former second section, it taught seeing the Tathāgata in order to progress toward true realization; now, in this text, it teaches seeing nirvāṇa: this is the first difference. Furthermore, the former text directly explained upholding the precepts and seeing the nature as the practice for progressing toward realization, without differentiating among persons; here it displays the gradations of practice according to persons: this is the second difference.

9.24

Within this text, there are four gradations: First, it teaches cultivating the three, which is the practice of entering realization upon the first ground. Next, it teaches cultivating the ten, which is the practice of progressing toward realization from the lineage stage up to understanding and practice. From "As the Buddha formerly told Cunda..." onward, it teaches cultivating the four kinds of virtues of transforming karma, which is the practice of progressing toward realization within wholesome destinies. From "Siṃhanāda said: 'All sentient beings have buddha-nature and should cultivate...'" onward, it encourages persons who are constantly sunken to cultivate the noble path as the practice of progressing toward realization.

9.25

In the first, there are two parts: first, it re-explains the markless nirvāṇa discussed earlier; second, from "What kind of bhikṣu can sever the ten..." onward, it teaches cultivating entry, whose meaning is similar to the cultivation of the ten in the second [gradation] below. Within the preceding explanation of markless nirvāṇa, Siṃhanāda asks first: "The markless absorption is called the great nirvāṇa; for what reason is it called markless?" Below, the Buddha explains it for him. He first explains that it is called markless because it is far removed from the ten kinds of marks; the initial mention, the subsequent listing, and the final conclusion are clear. From "Now, those attached to marks..." onward, the Buddha encourages cultivation, taking advantage [of the topic] to explain the gains and losses of grasping and relinquishing by the foolish and the wise. He first explains the losses of grasping, in six distinct points; then he displays the gains of relinquishing, also in six points.

9.26

In teaching the cultivation of entry, it is first brief, then detailed, and finally concludes with praise. In the brief part, he first asks: "What kind of bhikṣu can sever the ten marks?" Below, the Buddha explains it for him: "Frequently cultivating the three severs the ten marks" states the thesis generally. Because the times of cultivation are not just one, it says "frequently"; some sūtras also say "cultivating from time to time." Next [it discusses them] specifically, and then concludes.

9.27

In the detailed part, he first asks, "What are called concentration, wisdom, and equanimity?"—asking about the characteristics of their practice. From "Concentration is..." onward, he challenges and refutes the meaning of the practice, first challenging concentration, and then assimilating wisdom and equanimity to it.

9.28

Regarding the objection against concentration, "Concentration is samādhi and is possessed by all; why then do you say one must cultivate and accumulate samādhi?" This clings to the universal to challenge the specific. Among mental factors, there is a specific factor of concentration which all sentient beings possess; clinging to this universally existent [factor], one challenges and refutes the specific cultivation. Below, with "If the mind rests [upon one realm]…", one clings to the specific to challenge the universal. Clinging to the view that abiding in a single phenomenon is samādhi while making all others non-samādhi is called challenging the universal. Dharmas have the universal and the specific: the universal is called the object-support (ālambana), and the specific is called the practice (cāritra/ākāra). Practice and object-support should penetrate each other; to distinguish the universal from the specific, their hidden and manifest names differ. Because universal dharmas can be known by taking their universal characteristics as object-supports, they are called object-supports in terms of the mind that supports them; because specific dharmas are only associated [with the mind] through the investigation of contemplative practice, they are called practices in terms of the practicing mind. Here in this text, one first clings to the specific regarding universal object-supports to challenge the universal. "If the mind [is fixed on] a single realm, it is called samādhi" establishes one's own premise; this is clinging to the specific. "If it is directed to other object-supports, it is not called samādhi" challenges and refutes the other's proposition: if other object-supports are scattered and fluctuating, how can that be called concentration? This challenges the universal. "If it is not concentrated, it is not all-knowledge" challenges knowledge in terms of concentration: that which is supported by a scattered mind is merely conceptual consciousness, so how can it be called knowledge? This is adduced to impute a fault to concentration. "If it is not all-knowledge, how can it be called concentration?" challenges concentration in terms of knowledge: if it cannot produce knowledge, how can it be called concentration? Moreover, if it is not conjoined with all-knowledge, it is easily perturbed, so how can it be called concentration? Below, in terms of specific practices, one clings to the specific to challenge the universal. "If through one single practice one attains samādhi" establishes one's own premise. "The other practices are also not [samādhi]" challenges and refutes the other's proposition. "If it is not samādhi, it is not all-knowledge" challenges knowledge in terms of concentration. "If it is not all-knowledge, how can it be called concentration?" challenges concentration in terms of knowledge. Wisdom and equanimity are likewise: analogizing the previous [argument], one challenges what follows. Although it says "likewise", when investigated minutely within this, there are similarities and differences. How are they similar and different? In terms of ordinary beings and noble ones, clinging to the universal to challenge the specific is the same across all three practices: all sentient beings possess the factor of wisdom and also possess the factor of equanimity; why then do you say one must cultivate and accumulate wisdom and equanimity? In terms of confronting objective spheres, clinging to the specific to challenge the universal differs across the three practices. How do their characteristics differ? Previously, in challenging concentration, the mind abiding in a single realm was called samādhi, while other object-supports were not. In challenging wisdom, knowing all dharmas is called all-knowledge, while knowing one is not. What is the form of the challenge? If knowing all is called all-knowledge, knowing one should not be. If knowing one is not [all-knowledge], the concentration relied upon is not called samādhi. If it is not samādhi, how can it be called knowledge? In challenging equanimity, the challenge regarding the equanimity of abandoning concentration is the same as that for wisdom; the challenge regarding the equanimity of abandoning wisdom is the same as that for concentration.

9.29

Below, the Buddha answers it: he first resolves the objections and then answers the initial question. Within resolving the objections, he first explains the later round of clinging to the specific to challenge the universal, and then explains the initial round of clinging to the universal to challenge the specific. In [resolving] the challenge of clinging to the specific, he first explains the initial challenge regarding universal object-supports, first citing and directly negating it, and explaining it below from "Why is that?". "Such other object-supports are also a single realm" means: following their distinctions, each abides in a single realm, so why would it not be concentration? "Practices are also like this" analogously resolves the later challenge regarding specific practices.

9.30

The above explains away the challenge of clinging to the specific to challenge the universal; next, he explains away the challenge of clinging to the universal to challenge the specific. He first explains it in terms of concentration: "To say that sentient beings possess it from the outset—this meaning is not correct" cites and directly negates it. It is explained below from "For what reason?". "What is called samādhi is called wholesome samādhi" eliminates unwholesome and indeterminate [states]; "sentient beings do not yet possess it" eliminates ordinary beings to distinguish noble ones. From "How can you say…" below, he concludes by refuting the words of the challenge. From "Because of abiding before…" below, relying on the previous samādhi, he analogously reveals wisdom and equanimity, distinguishing them from the two factors of wisdom and equanimity possessed by all sentient beings.

9.31

The passage above explains away the subsequent objections; below, he resolves the initial question. Previously it was asked what the characteristics of concentration, wisdom, and equanimity are; the Buddha now distinguishes them. Here, one should first broadly explain the three meanings and only then explain the text; the meanings are as [stated] in a separate chapter. In the text there are eight rounds: first, distinguishing them in terms of objective spheres; second, distinguishing them in terms of persons; third, distinguishing them according to their characteristics, which may also be called distinguishing them in terms of their functions; fourth, analyzing their characteristics through expansion and contraction; fifth, clarifying the purpose of cultivation; sixth, clarifying their mutual support; seventh, distinguishing the three practices in terms of the three samādhi gateways; eighth, distinguishing their differences in terms of the times of cultivation.

9.32

In the first round, the distinct objective spheres are numerous, as explained in a separate chapter; however, for now we discuss them in terms of phenomenal dharmas. Phenomenal dharmas are all-encompassing, but we speak for now in terms of form. Settling the mind on the phenomenal matter of form is called samādhi, like the eight mundane dhyānas. "If one can contemplate form as permanent, impermanent, and so forth, this is called the characteristic of wisdom." Cultivating concentration and wisdom equally and abandoning biased practice is called the "characteristic of equanimity". Within this, first is the doctrine, next is the simile, and last is the application.

9.33

The second, distinguishing in terms of persons, is understandable.

9.34

Within the third, distinguishing according to their characteristics, concentration has five clauses. The first clause can extinguish coarse afflictions, and the second can eliminate coarse unwholesome karma: these two are the beginning of cultivation. The third can pacify subtle karma, and the latter two can remove subtle afflictions: these three are the end of practice. Below "With this…", he concludes. In wisdom, there are six clauses: "called right view" is rightly viewing the ultimate truth; "also called clear view" is clearly viewing conventional truth; "able to see and seeing everywhere" expands the previous right view—being able to see principle, and knowing exhaustively is called "everywhere"; "successive and distinct characteristics" expands the previous clear view—knowing dharmas without confusion is called "successive view", and knowing according to the differences of dharmas is called "distinct-characteristic view"; "these are called…" sums it up. In equanimity, there are four clauses: "called equal" is cultivating concentration and wisdom together; "also called non-contention" is abandoning biased practice: these two discuss equanimity in terms of concentration and wisdom; "moreover called non-contemplation" is not contemplating existence or non-existence; "also called non-action" is not acting upon existence or non-existence: these two distinguish equanimity in terms of conformity with principle; "these are called…" sums it up.

9.35

Within the fourth, analyzing characteristics through expansion and contraction, concentration and wisdom are discussed in particular. Within concentration, they are distinguished successively in increasing numbers. First, it is divided into two. The two have two approaches: first, dividing by stage—the eight worldly dhyānas are called mundane, while the undefiled are supramundane; second, dividing into two in terms of cultivation, which may also be called dividing into two in terms of persons: first positing, next listing, and below distinguishing in terms of persons. Next, increasing to explain three: the text is clear and understandable. Next, increasing to explain four: lower-grade pure concentration is easily defeated by afflictions of lower planes, so it is called of the division of falling away, though it has not already fallen away; also, being mixed with afflictions of its own plane is also called of the division of falling away. Medium-grade pure concentration firmly guards its own plane and is not defeated by afflictions of lower planes, so it is called of the division of abiding; also, not being encroached upon and mixed with afflictions of its own plane is also called abiding. Upper-grade pure concentration can feel revulsion toward its own plane and joyfully seek higher serenity, so it is called of the division of superior progress. Being able to bring about great benefit is the definitive division: in a defiled mind, learning to contemplate the principle of the truths and proceeding toward the noble path is called the definitive division; being able to produce the noble path is called bringing about great benefit. Next, increasing to explain five: first stating the overarching category—"five knowledges" generally indicates it—and below listing their names. "Without food" is the first dhyāna, because it is separated from morsel food. "Faultless samādhi" is also the first dhyāna, because it is free from desire and evil. "One-pointed samādhi of purity of body and mind" is the second dhyāna: being free from the coarse movement of vitarka and vicāra among the six consciousnesses is called purity of body and mind, and inner purification in one place is called one-pointedness. "Joyful in both cause and fruit" is the third dhyāna. "Constant mindfulness samādhi" is the calming of the fourth dhyāna: having attained it, it is unshakeable, hence called constant mindfulness. Next, increasing to explain six: the first five are still the fivefold contemplation of stopping the mind, contemplating phenomena to rest the mind; but here within those fivefold contemplations of stopping the mind, it omits the fourth, the analysis of realms and sense bases, and divides the fifth, ānāpāna, into two, so there are also five. In terms of counting breaths, it constitutes the fourth; mindful of the faults of vitarka and vicāra, ānāpāna gives rise to a mind of revulsion, which is stated as the fifth, mindfulness of vitarka and vicāra. The last one is the contemplation of principle. Next, increasing to explain seven: the seven have two approaches: the first seven are in terms of practice, where the concentration enlightenment factor is primary and the remaining six are all retinue of concentration, named concentration by association; the latter seven are in terms of persons. Next, increasing to explain eight, which refers to the eight liberations, the meaning of which is as [stated] in a separate chapter; in the eighth gateway, the liberation of cessation, sūtras and treatises are largely the same, but only the Tattvasiddhi explains the cessation of afflictions as the eighth. Next, increasing to explain nine, which refers to the nine successive meditative absorptions; these nine take only the fundamental dhyāna-essence and their gradual transitions, not extending to expedients. Next, increasing to explain ten, which refers to the ten totalities, slightly differing from other texts; having no fire totality and adding the [totality of] nothingness is its difference. Why is it like this? This was in order to refute non-Buddhists who worshipped fire; therefore the fire totality was removed, and to complete the count of ten, nothingness was added. The ten totalities are broadly as [stated] in a separate chapter; here they should be discussed fully.

9.36

Next, discussing them in increasing numbers within wisdom. First, two kinds are explained: prior to the path of seeing is called mundane, and on the stages is supramundane. Next, increasing to explain three: first positing, next listing. Prajñā is called wisdom; vipaśyanā here is called contemplation; jñāna is called knowledge. Below, he distinguishes their characteristics, within which there are two rounds: first, discussing in terms of persons. Saying "prajñā belongs to all sentient beings" refers to ordinary beings, for ordinary sentient beings equally possess the factor of wisdom. "Vipa[śyanā] belongs to noble persons" refers to the two vehicles, for the two vehicles can contemplate the dharmas of the four noble truths, which is called vipaśyanā. "Jñāna" refers to all buddhas and bodhisattvas, for because buddhas and bodhisattvas possess all-knowledge, it is called jñāna. Below, they are distinguished according to objective spheres: "prajñā's distinct characteristics" know the dharmas of conventional truth; "vipa[śyanā]'s universal characteristics" know the ultimate truth; "jñāna's deconstructive characteristics" know the one real truth. Next, increasing to explain four: knowing the four noble truths. Broadly they should be immeasurable; here we merely cite these.

9.37

From here, the fifth clarifies the purpose of cultivation; it discusses concentration and wisdom, but briefly does not clarify equanimity. Cultivating concentration has three [purposes]: first, for non-negligence, suppressing afflictions; second, to adorn great wisdom, giving rise to wisdom based upon it; third, to attain sovereignty, initiating supernormal powers based upon it. Cultivating wisdom has three [purposes]: first, contemplating cyclic existence to know the faults of suffering; second, increasing all wholesome [qualities] to put an end to unwholesome karma; third, to destroy afflictions.

9.38

From here, the sixth clarifies mutual support, and likewise does not discuss equanimity. Siṃha first asks: "As it says in the sūtra, vipaśyanā can destroy afflictions" clings to wisdom alone being capable—this is one question. "Why again cultivate śamatha?" doubts that there is any need for concentration—this is the second question.

9.39

The Buddha's answer has two parts: first, directly addressing the previous questions, clarifying that one-sidedness has faults while cultivating both brings attainment; second, possessing both dharmas, broadly clarifying the double benefit.

9.40

The former has two parts: first, overturning the previous clinging, clarifying that wisdom does not destroy [afflictions]; second, below "If one cultivates concentration…", explaining away the subsequent doubt, revealing the necessity of concentration. Within the former, "Vipa[śyanā] can destroy—this is not so" cites the question and negates it universally. Below "Why is that?" he explains; within the explanation he broadly clarifies that wisdom does not destroy. Why clarify this? If one grasps that wisdom can destroy afflictions, that is a mind that grasps characteristics, which cannot eliminate delusion. Not seeing that wisdom can destroy afflictions, and not seeing afflictions as what is destroyed, is the mind that deconstructs characteristics, which alone can cause delusion never to arise ultimately. Now, here, in order to accomplish supramundane correct antidote, he clarifies non-destruction. This is similar in general meaning to the previous passage where wisdom does not destroy afflictions. In the text there are ten [points], which together form four: the first "furthermore" clarifies that wisdom does not destroy; the next "furthermore" adduces the absence of self and person to establish that wisdom does not destroy; the next seven clarify that wisdom does not destroy; the last "furthermore" again adduces selflessness to establish that wisdom does not destroy.

9.41

Within the first "furthermore", "Where there is wisdom there is no affliction, where there is affliction there is no wisdom; how can you say it destroys?" investigates through doctrinal explanation; "like light…" reveals it through simile.

9.42

In the second section, it explains that there is no self or person: "Who has wisdom and affliction such that one speaks of wisdom destroying [them]?" challenges their [assertion of] destruction; from "If there are no..." downward clarifies that there is no destruction.

9.43

In the third section, there are seven further arguments. First, with respect to the meaning of reaching or not reaching, it challenges wisdom's capacity to destroy. It first sets up two alternatives: if wisdom can destroy, does it reach or not reach? Below, challenges are presented, which fall into three distinct types: First, it specifically challenges that it can destroy without reaching. "If it destroys without reaching, ordinary beings should also destroy [them]": if noble wisdom does not reach afflictions yet can destroy afflictions, ordinary beings also do not reach [them], so why do they not destroy [them]? Second, from "If it reaches..." downward, it specifically challenges destruction upon reaching. "If it destroys upon reaching, the initial thought-moment should destroy [them]": this interrogates whether the initial [moment] alone destroys, without depending on subsequent wisdom. What does this mean? The wisdom of the initial thought-moment arises in opposition to delusion; this should be able to destroy [it]. Subsequent thought-moments do not reach [it] and should not destroy [it]; if subsequent ones do not destroy [it], what use is subsequent wisdom? "If the initial one does not destroy, subsequent ones also do not destroy": this refutes the opponent's counter-defense, challenging that subsequent ones destroy together. The other person defends, saying: the initial one does not destroy alone, hence subsequent thought-moments are required to destroy together with the former. Therefore, it now challenges them: if the initial thought-moment, having reached delusion, still cannot destroy [it], how could subsequent thought-moments that do not reach [it] be able to destroy [it]? "If the initial one destroys upon reaching, then [the subsequent] does not reach": this refutes the opponent's counter-defense, challenging destruction upon subsequent reaching. The other person defends, saying: the initial thought-moment reaches delusion, and subsequent thought-moments also reach [it], and therefore they destroy together. Therefore, it now challenges them: if the initial one reaches and destroys, that which destroys afterward simply does not reach, because it is separated by the initial thought-moment. Since the subsequent does not reach, how can one say that it destroys precisely because it reaches? "Why say that wisdom can destroy?": this concludes with a general reprimand. Third, from "If it can destroy whether reaching or not reaching..." downward, it challenges both horns together. Due to the previous challenge, the other person defends, saying: the initial thought-moment reaches and destroys, and subsequent thought-moments also can destroy without reaching. Therefore, it now cites this to reject it as incorrect. The manner in which it is incorrect is fully as challenged above: if one says it destroys upon reaching, it is like the latter challenge above; if one says it destroys without reaching, it is like the first challenge above. This is the first further argument. Second, with respect to companionship or solitariness, it challenges wisdom's capacity to destroy. "If vipaśyanā can destroy afflictions, is it solitary or accompanied?": it establishes two alternatives, forward and backward. Below, challenges are presented. "If it can destroy alone, why do bodhisattvas cultivate the eightfold noble path?": this challenges its destruction alone. From "If accompanied..." downward, it challenges its destruction when accompanied. "If it destroys because it is accompanied, then alone it does not destroy": using accompaniment to refute solitariness. "If alone it does not destroy, accompanied it also does not destroy": using solitariness to refute accompaniment. First the doctrine, next the simile, and then the application may be understood.

9.44

Third, from "Like the earth..." downward, it clarifies that the nature of delusion is cessation and does not rely on wisdom's destruction. "Like the earth's hardness..." and so forth sets up similes to illustrate the doctrine, clarifying that each of the four great elements has its own nature and is not produced by causes and conditions. From "Like the four great elements..." downward, it applies them to illustrate the doctrine, clarifying that delusion is severed of itself and does not depend on wisdom. From "If this severance..." downward, it interrogates and refutes that it depends on wisdom. From "For this reason..." downward, it concludes that wisdom does not destroy [them].

9.45

Fourth, from "Like salt..." downward, it clarifies that with regard to dharmas that do not cease, wisdom cannot destroy them. First, it directly negates: "Just as salt is salty by nature and causes other things to be salty..." and so forth cites the opponent's established simile. "If the nature of wisdom is cessation and causes dharmas to cease": this cites the opponent's doctrinal statement, and "not so" generally negates it. From "Why..." downward is the explanation. If a dharma does not cease, how could wisdom forcibly cause it to cease?

9.46

Fifth, from "If one says that salt..." downward, it clarifies that the nature of wisdom is itself cessation and cannot cause others to cease. First, it directly negates: "If one says that the saltiness of salt causes other things to be salty": this cites the opponent's established simile. "The cessation of wisdom is also like this": this cites the opponent's doctrinal statement. "Not so" generally negates it. From "Why..." downward is the explanation. The nature of wisdom is itself cessation; how could it cause others to cease? From "Because of this..." downward is the conclusion.

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Linked texts (1)

大般涅槃經義記 — Classical Chinese