大般涅槃經疏 12.9

12.9

「迦葉白佛」下，第二就涅槃以明無我我二行，無憂悲即有我，有憂悲即無我。文為二：先問、後答。問為二：正問、結問。一往謂是無端之問。然佛說涅槃亦有無常，無常是有為，有為即憂悲。今問憂悲，是問涅槃有無常不？佛答，為四：一釋問、二歎理、三重釋問、四重歎理。初文二：先譬、後合。譬中三：先正作譬、次更為譬作譬、三還以譬合譬。初云無想天者是譬。次更舉樹神譬顯無想譬，即是為譬作譬。「佛法亦爾」下，以譬合譬。二「復次善男子無想天」下，歎理甚深，先譬、次合。如來實無憂悲，但於無中說有。眾生有苦未得脫難，見佛有苦，既其有苦即有憂悲。佛斷苦因受第一樂，復無憂悲，有憂即無我，無憂即有我。若應物云如來有憂，實理即無。今問既示有悲，亦應有苦。如來心地不念眾生，應是無苦。問如來實無憂喜，汝何以云如來實喜？今亦反問佛無憂喜，何以定云如來無憂？我說如來實非憂喜，義說憂悲，此是不定之言。三「譬如空中」下，重釋問兩譬，先舉舍住譬、次舉幻師譬，皆先譬次合。初譬中有二：前為法作譬。「心亦如是」下，即為譬作譬。後復舉無想天壽，亦為譬作譬。「如來憂悲」下，正是合譬。「如幻師」下，次譬二譬合。「如來有憂及以無憂」下，重歎理，又四：一法、二譬、三合、四結。此即法說。「譬如下人」下，第二譬說。若依毘曇，有三種度義：一人度、二根度、三地度。下果不知上果，上果能知下，即是人度。鈍根不知中上，中上能知下，即是根度。初禪不知上禪，上禪能知下禪，即地度。成論不爾，互有知義，明獼猴尚見佛心，豈有鈍根不能知利？今亦有少分故知，亦得言知；不能具足知，故亦言不知。三合譬、四結，可尋。

From "Kāśyapa said to the Buddha" below is the second, clarifying the two practices of non-self and self in terms of nirvāṇa: having no sorrow or grief is having self, and having sorrow and grief is non-self. The text has two parts: first the question, and later the answer. The question has two parts: the direct question, and the concluding question. At first glance, one might consider this a baseless question. However, the Buddha taught that nirvāṇa also has impermanence; impermanence is the conditioned, and the conditioned is sorrow and grief. Now, asking about sorrow and grief is asking whether or not nirvāṇa has impermanence. The Buddha's answer has four parts: first, resolving the question; second, praising the principle; third, resolving the question again; fourth, praising the principle again. The first text has two parts: first the simile, and later its application. Within the simile there are three parts: first, directly creating a simile; next, creating a further simile for the simile; third, applying the simile back to the simile. First, speaking of the Heaven of Non-conception is the simile. Next, further bringing forward the tree spirit as a simile to clarify the non-conception simile is creating a simile for the simile. From "The Buddha-Dharma is also like this" below is applying the simile to the simile. Second, from "Furthermore, good son, the Heaven of Non-conception" below, praises the profound principle, first with a simile and next with its application. The Tathāgata truly has no sorrow or grief, but merely speaks of existence within non-existence. Sentient beings have suffering and have not yet escaped distress; they see the Buddha as having suffering, and since he has suffering he has sorrow and grief. The Buddha has severed the causes of suffering and experiences supreme bliss, having furthermore no sorrow or grief: having sorrow is non-self, and having no sorrow is having self. If in response to beings one says the Tathāgata has sorrow, in actual principle he has none. Now, since the question shows he has compassion, he should also have suffering. In the Tathāgata's mind-ground, he does not harbor thoughts of sentient beings, so he should be free of suffering. If one asks: "The Tathāgata truly has neither sorrow nor joy; why do you say that the Tathāgata truly has joy?" now one may also ask in return: "The Buddha has neither sorrow nor joy; why do you determinately say the Tathāgata has no sorrow?" I say that the Tathāgata truly has neither joy nor sorrow, but in terms of meaning one speaks of sorrow and grief; these are indeterminate words. Third, from "Just as in the sky" below, re-explains the question through two similes: first bringing forward the simile of dwelling in a house, and next bringing forward the simile of the illusionist; both first present the simile and next its application. In the first simile there are two parts: previously, creating a simile for the Dharma. From "The mind is also like this" below is creating a simile for the simile. Later, it further brings forward the lifespan in the Heaven of Non-conception, which is also creating a simile for the simile. From "The Tathāgata's sorrow and grief" below is directly applying the simile. From "Like an illusionist" below is the next simile, applying the two similes. From "The Tathāgata has sorrow as well as no sorrow" below re-praises the principle, again having four parts: first, Dharma; second, simile; third, application; fourth, conclusion. This is the exposition in terms of Dharma. From "Just as an inferior person" below is the second, exposition through simile. If one relies on the Abhidharma, there are three kinds of measuring: first, measuring by persons; second, measuring by faculties; third, measuring by bhūmi (stages). An inferior fruition not knowing a superior fruition, while a superior fruition can know an inferior one, is measuring by persons. Dull faculties not knowing intermediate or sharp, while intermediate and sharp can know dull, is measuring by faculties. The first dhyāna not knowing higher dhyānas, while higher dhyānas can know lower dhyānas, is measuring by stages. The *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra* is not like this; it holds that there is mutual knowing, explaining that even a monkey can see the Buddha's mind, so how could dull faculties be incapable of knowing sharp ones? Here too, because there is partial knowing, one may also say they know; because they cannot know fully, one also says they do not know. The third, application of the simile, and the fourth, the conclusion, can be explored.