大般涅槃經疏 12.9

12.9

From "Kāśyapa said to the Buddha" below is the second, clarifying the two practices of non-self and self in terms of nirvāṇa: having no sorrow or grief is having self, and having sorrow and grief is non-self. The text has two parts: first the question, and later the answer. The question has two parts: the direct question, and the concluding question. At first glance, one might consider this a baseless question. However, the Buddha taught that nirvāṇa also has impermanence; impermanence is the conditioned, and the conditioned is sorrow and grief. Now, asking about sorrow and grief is asking whether or not nirvāṇa has impermanence. The Buddha's answer has four parts: first, resolving the question; second, praising the principle; third, resolving the question again; fourth, praising the principle again. The first text has two parts: first the simile, and later its application. Within the simile there are three parts: first, directly creating a simile; next, creating a further simile for the simile; third, applying the simile back to the simile. First, speaking of the Heaven of Non-conception is the simile. Next, further bringing forward the tree spirit as a simile to clarify the non-conception simile is creating a simile for the simile. From "The Buddha-Dharma is also like this" below is applying the simile to the simile. Second, from "Furthermore, good son, the Heaven of Non-conception" below, praises the profound principle, first with a simile and next with its application. The Tathāgata truly has no sorrow or grief, but merely speaks of existence within non-existence. Sentient beings have suffering and have not yet escaped distress; they see the Buddha as having suffering, and since he has suffering he has sorrow and grief. The Buddha has severed the causes of suffering and experiences supreme bliss, having furthermore no sorrow or grief: having sorrow is non-self, and having no sorrow is having self. If in response to beings one says the Tathāgata has sorrow, in actual principle he has none. Now, since the question shows he has compassion, he should also have suffering. In the Tathāgata's mind-ground, he does not harbor thoughts of sentient beings, so he should be free of suffering. If one asks: "The Tathāgata truly has neither sorrow nor joy; why do you say that the Tathāgata truly has joy?" now one may also ask in return: "The Buddha has neither sorrow nor joy; why do you determinately say the Tathāgata has no sorrow?" I say that the Tathāgata truly has neither joy nor sorrow, but in terms of meaning one speaks of sorrow and grief; these are indeterminate words. Third, from "Just as in the sky" below, re-explains the question through two similes: first bringing forward the simile of dwelling in a house, and next bringing forward the simile of the illusionist; both first present the simile and next its application. In the first simile there are two parts: previously, creating a simile for the Dharma. From "The mind is also like this" below is creating a simile for the simile. Later, it further brings forward the lifespan in the Heaven of Non-conception, which is also creating a simile for the simile. From "The Tathāgata's sorrow and grief" below is directly applying the simile. From "Like an illusionist" below is the next simile, applying the two similes. From "The Tathāgata has sorrow as well as no sorrow" below re-praises the principle, again having four parts: first, Dharma; second, simile; third, application; fourth, conclusion. This is the exposition in terms of Dharma. From "Just as an inferior person" below is the second, exposition through simile. If one relies on the Abhidharma, there are three kinds of measuring: first, measuring by persons; second, measuring by faculties; third, measuring by bhūmi (stages). An inferior fruition not knowing a superior fruition, while a superior fruition can know an inferior one, is measuring by persons. Dull faculties not knowing intermediate or sharp, while intermediate and sharp can know dull, is measuring by faculties. The first dhyāna not knowing higher dhyānas, while higher dhyānas can know lower dhyānas, is measuring by stages. The *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra* is not like this; it holds that there is mutual knowing, explaining that even a monkey can see the Buddha's mind, so how could dull faculties be incapable of knowing sharp ones? Here too, because there is partial knowing, one may also say they know; because they cannot know fully, one also says they do not know. The third, application of the simile, and the fourth, the conclusion, can be explored.