大般涅槃經疏 18.8

18.8

「迦葉白」下，第二明無所得知見。又三：一明無所得、二引偈證、三無得而得。初又三：一問、二答、三領解。問又三：初領指前文。前文已遠，故言梵行。次「菩薩知見」下，正難。三「云何如來」下，結難。佛答又二：初歎其問；次正答，又二：先正答、次結正簡邪。初正答中凡十復次。得無得相對，得者非謂得中之得，乃是無得之得。此無非是析滅之無，是體達無。十對者，所謂得無得、倒無倒、智慧無明、涅槃諸有、大乘小乘、方等三藏、真空生死、常無常、真空五見、菩提二乘。「次善男子汝之所問」下，結，如文。《大品》明諸有二者是有所得，諸無二者名無所得（云云）。「迦葉白佛」下，三領解，又二：有領解有得益、次引偈證者。如來上云於此，正在雙樹，云何更指雙樹？解言：直是語法，未必別處指此雙樹。二云：見聞不同，寧有定所？假使異處，指此何妨。此偈是第二出，釋得無得。文為二：一舉偈請問、二釋偈為答。答為三：一別釋、二總釋、三結釋。別又三：一略標、二重問、三正釋。釋中二：先誡許、次正答。答中凡有八番，前六番正釋、後二明不果得。說一一並前釋上半、後釋下半，又須望下總釋之意。舊釋此偈，本有煩惱即是昔本，今無涅槃即是昔今，不得云是今日之今。何者？今有涅槃故。若天魔梵說言如來有煩惱者，無有是處，此乃今日佛果不為三世所攝。如此釋文一往得去，不遣他難。只為昔日有無無常，後乃是常，還是本無今有，焉能遣疑？興皇云：本無今有皆是隨緣。本有煩惱，非有說有；今無涅槃，非無說無。若天魔梵能解此者，說言如來有煩惱者，無有是處。遣難釋文，二塗俱了。今謂乃是總答中意。若別釋文，猶自未去。此之偈意為化眾生，眾生唯作善惡之見，謂昔有惡今則有善，二乘作真俗不一之見，菩薩作三諦各別之見，文殊作三諦相即之解，亦是四門四悉等解。豈可只作如上諸人一種解耶？私謂：如來自作八重解釋，佛意乃將此八為式，當知其義遍一切法。若如諸師各一種見，佛何不唯一種釋耶？欲許諸師一一皆是。若欲非之，假使諸釋寧得佛意？略如章安四悉故悉是、離悉故俱非。故知四出則四是，各計亦四非。四非故一切俱非，四是故八番皆是。故更總釋以總冠別，方稱佛旨。四悉四門，具如前釋。

From "Kāśyapa addressed the Buddha" onwards, it secondly clarifies knowledge and vision of non-attainment. This also has three parts: first, clarifying non-attainment; second, citing a verse as proof; and third, attaining through non-attainment. The first also has three parts: first the question, second the answer, and third the expression of understanding. The question also has three parts: first, referring back to the previous text. The previous text is already distant, and so it speaks of "pure conduct". Next, from "the bodhisattva's knowledge and vision" onwards is the objection proper. Third, from "How does the Tathāgata" onwards is the concluding objection. The Buddha's answer also has two parts: first, praising his question; next, the direct answer, which also has two parts: first the direct answer, and next concluding what is correct while setting aside what is false. In the first direct answer, there are ten instances of "furthermore". Attainment and non-attainment are set against each other: attainment does not mean attainment within attainment, but rather the attainment of non-attainment. This "non-" is not the non-existence of analytical cessation; it is the non-existence of penetrating comprehension. The ten pairs are: attainment and non-attainment, perversion and non-perversion, wisdom and ignorance, nirvāṇa and realms of existence, Great Vehicle and Lesser Vehicle, vaipulya and the three baskets, true emptiness and saṃsāra, permanence and impermanence, true emptiness and the five views, and bodhi and the two vehicles. From "Next, good son, that which you asked" onwards, it concludes, as in the text. The *Pañcaviṃśati* explains that whatever possesses duality is having attainment, while whatever lacks duality is called non-attainment (and so forth). From "Kāśyapa addressed the Buddha" onwards, third is the expression of understanding, which also has two parts: having an expression of understanding and having the attainment of benefit; next is citing a verse as proof. The Tathāgata previously said "here", directly at the Twin Trees; why does he point again to the Twin Trees? The explanation states: it is merely a manner of speaking, not necessarily pointing to these Twin Trees from a different place. The second says: seeing and hearing differ, so how could there be a fixed place? Even if it were a different place, what harm is there in pointing to this? This verse appears for the second time, explaining attainment and non-attainment. The text has two parts: first, raising the verse to ask; second, explaining the verse in reply. The answer has three parts: first, distinct explanations; second, a general explanation; and third, a concluding explanation. The distinct [explanation] also has three: first, a brief indication; second, a repeated question; and third, the explanation proper. In the explanation there are two parts: first, admonishing and granting permission; next, the direct answer. In the answer there are eight rounds: the first six rounds are explanations proper, while the latter two clarify not attaining the fruit. In each explanation, the first half of the verse is explained first, and the second half of the verse is explained later; one must also look ahead to the meaning of the general explanation below. An old explanation of this verse takes "originally having afflictions" as the past origin, and "now lacking nirvāṇa" as the past "now"; one cannot say it is the "now" of today. Why? Because now there is nirvāṇa. If heavenly Māra or Brahmā says that the Tathāgata has afflictions, there is no such possibility—this is today's buddha-fruit not being subsumed by the three times. Explaining the text in this manner works for an initial reading, but it does not dispel other objections. Precisely because previously there was existence and non-existence, impermanence, and later there is permanence, it is still "originally non-existent and now existent"—how could it dispel doubt? [Master] Xīnghuáng said: "Originally non-existent and now existent" are both in accord with conditions. Originally having afflictions is speaking of existence when it is not existence; now lacking nirvāṇa is speaking of non-existence when it is not non-existence. If heavenly Māra or Brahmā can understand this, then to say that the Tathāgata has afflictions is without possibility. Dispelling objections and explaining the text, both paths are completely resolved. We now say that this is the meaning within the general answer. If applied to the distinct explanations of the text, it still does not work. The intent of this verse is to transform sentient beings: sentient beings form only views of good and evil, thinking that formerly there was evil and now there is good; the two vehicles form the view that the real and the conventional are not unified; bodhisattvas form the view that the three truths are distinct; Mañjuśrī forms the understanding that the three truths are mutually identical, which is also the understanding of the four doors and four siddhāntas, and so forth. How could one adopt only one kind of explanation like the masters above? Privately, I consider: The Tathāgata himself gave an eightfold explanation; the Buddha's intent was to take these eight as a model, and one should know that its meaning extends across all phenomena. If it were as the various masters say, each with a single view, why would the Buddha not have given only one kind of explanation? One might wish to grant that each of the various masters is correct. Yet if one wishes to reject them, even if there are various explanations, how could they attain the Buddha's intent? Briefly, as Zhāng'ān held, because of the four siddhāntas they are all correct; apart from the siddhāntas they are all incorrect. Therefore know that when the four are produced, the four are correct; when each is grasped, the four are also incorrect. Because the four are incorrect, all are incorrect; because the four are correct, all eight rounds are correct. Therefore, he further gives a general explanation, crowning the distinct with the general, so that it only then accords with the Buddha's intent. The four siddhāntas and four doors are fully as explained before.