大般涅槃經疏 23.5

23.5

「云何為信」下，第二解釋，即為五章。初信又三：前出信體、次釋信德、三結。初信體者，信何等法？凡舉五種：一信三寶、二信因果、三信二諦、四信一乘、五信三諦。一師云：信第一義是信真，信善方便是信俗。一師云：前已二諦竟，何容重說？依《華嚴經》云「若歎菩薩作二智名，若歎佛者作二身名，只是一體隱顯為異。」有言：第一義諦善方便者，即是二身，亦是二智。今明此文自稱第一義諦，何容改諦為智，復改為身？今作三諦，自異二諦，不成重說。而文約一乘顯其信意，為眾生故分別說三，知無異趣是故說一。準此一條，例通四法。三寶亦爾，為眾生故分別二體，知歸至極故說一體。因果亦爾，為眾生故說因致果，到於彼岸無施無受。二諦三諦亦復如是。次「如是信者」下，釋信德。釋有四意，相次而來。此信堅固無能壞者，何故不壞？得聖人性以為根本，即是見性之信，深固難拔。以根深故即能增長，近大涅槃成就戒等。初一切諸法從於聖性，近大涅槃即是豎高，戒聞智慧等即是橫廣。雖有橫豎深廣之異，而亦不見橫豎之相，彌著彌亡。如此明信，那忽云淺？三結，如文。云何直心？釋第二事，又三：標、釋、結。初標如文。次釋中，文為兩：初以不諂為直、後以懺悔為直。初明不諂中二：先釋、次論義。初中二：初正釋、次釋疑。初文者，以解因緣故不諂。次「雖見惡」下，釋疑，左右解之，初見惡不說，後見善則歎。疑者云：見惡應說而不說者，乃是不直，何名直心？即釋云：恐生煩惱。即復疑云：既見惡不說，見善亦應不說，乃是直心。次明不爾，即釋云：讚佛性故令得菩提。次論義中有問答。初問有六，而為三雙：初兩從現病生，彼明三種五種病人；次兩從初功德生；後兩從此文生。就初兩中，初一又為三：先非佛旨；次領初開經時說；「若言遇不遇」下，第三正難，既能自發菩提之心，何須歎於佛性令得菩提？是取第三病人為難。初中第二又兩：先領旨仰非；次正難，明闡提人亦應發心。何故爾？其既有性，應自發心，何俟須歎？此是取第二病人為難。「如佛所說」下，是第二兩難，從初功德生。第二十卷中明五難：初兩難據四種罪人、中兩難據闡提、後一難據不定。佛答中，明佛性非內非外、非常非無常，所以不斷。今還因此生問：先領旨仰非、次正難。正言不斷佛性，云何言斷善根？只此佛性即是善根，既其斷善，即斷佛性。云何復言佛性非內非外？「如佛往昔」下，後難。若佛性不斷，何故不遮令不墮地獄？既不斷佛性但斷善根，由有佛性應能遮惡。答未了，故更論義。「若因佛性」下，第三，復有兩難：近從此生，若歎佛性令發心者，何須復說十二部經？直歎佛性其義自足。有法、有譬合。「諸佛如來」下，即是後難。從第八功德，佛答貪心非有非無、非因非果，或即因中有果、或因中無果。今還取此為難。若爾，乳應無酪、樹無五丈。若乳有酪、樹有五丈者，當知因中有果，不得汎言或無。

From "What is faith?" onwards is the second [part], the explanation, which forms five chapters. The first, on faith, also has three: first, presenting the essence of faith; next, explaining the virtues of faith; third, concluding. As for the initial essence of faith, in what dharmas does one have faith? In total, five kinds are adduced: first, faith in the Three Jewels; second, faith in cause and effect; third, faith in the two truths; fourth, faith in the one vehicle; fifth, faith in the three truths. One master says: Faith in the paramārthasatya is faith in the ultimate; faith in wholesome expedients is faith in the conventional. Another master says: The two truths have already been discussed earlier; how could they be repeated? Relying on the Avataṃsaka Sūtra, it says, "When praising a bodhisattva, they are called the two wisdoms; when praising a Buddha, they are called the two bodies; they are merely one essence whose latency and manifestation differ." Some say: Paramārthasatya and wholesome expedients are simply the two bodies and also the two wisdoms. We now clarify that this text itself refers to paramārthasatya; how could one change 'truth' to 'wisdom' and again change it to 'body'? We now treat them as the three truths, which naturally differ from the two truths, not constituting a repetition. Furthermore, the text relies on the one vehicle to reveal the meaning of its faith: for the sake of sentient beings, three are distinguished and taught, but knowing there is no other destination, therefore one is taught. Following this single case, it applies by analogy to all four dharmas. The Three Jewels are also like this: for the sake of sentient beings, two essences are distinguished, but knowing that they return to the ultimate, therefore one essence is taught. Cause and effect are also like this: for the sake of sentient beings, causes leading to effects are taught, but upon reaching the other shore, there is neither giving nor receiving. The two truths and three truths are also like this. Next, from "Such faith" onwards explains the virtues of faith. The explanation contains four meanings that follow sequentially. This faith is solid and unbreakable by anyone; why is it unbreakable? It takes attaining the noble nature as its foundation, which is faith born of seeing the nature, deeply rooted and difficult to uproot. Because its roots are deep, it can grow, approaching the great nirvāṇa and accomplishing the precepts and so forth. Initially, all dharmas derive from the noble nature; approaching the great nirvāṇa is vertical height, while precepts, hearing, wisdom, and so forth are horizontal breadth. Although there are differences of horizontal and vertical, depth and breadth, one also does not perceive the characteristics of horizontal and vertical; the more prominent they are, the more they vanish. Faith being explained like this, how could one call it shallow? The third, the conclusion, is as in the text. What is an upright mind? Explaining the second matter also has three: statement, explanation, conclusion. The initial statement is as in the text. In the following explanation, the text has two: first, taking freedom from flattery as uprightness; later, taking repentance as uprightness. In first clarifying freedom from flattery, there are two: first, the explanation; next, discussing the doctrine. In the first there are two: first, the direct explanation; next, dispelling doubts. As for the first text, because of understanding causes and conditions, one is free from flattery. Next, from "Although seeing evil" onwards dispels doubts, explaining it from both sides: first, seeing evil and not speaking of it; later, seeing good and praising it. The doubter says: Seeing evil, one ought to speak of it, yet not speaking of it is not being upright; how can this be called an upright mind? It is then explained: fearing that it would generate afflictions. Then they doubt again: since seeing evil one does not speak of it, seeing good one ought also not to speak of it, and only then would it be an upright mind. Next it clarifies that this is not so, explaining: because praising the buddhadhātu enables them to attain bodhi. Next, in discussing the doctrine there are questions and answers. Initially there are six questions, forming three pairs: the first two arise from the current illness, where three and five kinds of sick persons were explained; the next two arise from the first virtue; the last two arise from this text. Within the first two, the first one also has three: first, rejecting the Buddha's purport; next, recollecting what was taught at the initial opening of the sūtra; from "If one says whether encountering or not encountering" onwards, thirdly, directly raising the objection: since one can spontaneously generate the mind of bodhi, why is it necessary to praise the buddhadhātu to enable them to attain bodhi? This takes the third sick person to raise the objection. In the first [pair], the second also has two: first, recollecting the purport and reverently questioning it; next, directly raising the objection, clarifying that an icchantika should also generate the mind. Why is that? Since they possess the nature, they should spontaneously generate the mind; why wait for praise? This takes the second sick person to raise the objection. From "As the Buddha has taught" onwards are the second two objections, arising from the first virtue. In the twentieth fascicle, five objections were explained: the first two objections were based on the four kinds of sinful persons, the middle two objections were based on the icchantika, and the latter one was based on the indeterminate. In the Buddha's reply, it was explained that the buddhadhātu is neither internal nor external, neither permanent nor impermanent, which is why it is not severed. Now, another question arises from this: first, recollecting the purport and reverently questioning it; next, directly raising the objection. If you directly state that the buddhadhātu is not severed, why do you say that roots of goodness are severed? This very buddhadhātu is precisely the roots of goodness; since good is severed, the buddhadhātu is severed. Why do you also say that the buddhadhātu is neither internal nor external? From "As the Buddha in the past" onwards is the later objection: If the buddhadhātu is not severed, why did it not prevent one from falling into hell? Since the buddhadhātu is not severed and only roots of goodness are severed, by virtue of having the buddhadhātu it should be able to prevent evil. Because the answer was not exhaustive, the doctrine is discussed further. From "If because of the buddhadhātu" onwards is the third [pair], having two further objections: closely arising from this, if praising the buddhadhātu causes one to generate the mind, why is it necessary to preach the twelve divisions of scriptures further? Simply praising the buddhadhātu would naturally be sufficient in meaning. There is the doctrine, and there is the simile and its application. From "The Buddhas, Tathāgatas" onwards is the later objection. Arising from the eighth virtue, the Buddha replied that the lustful mind is neither existent nor non-existent, neither cause nor fruit, or that the fruit is present within the cause, or that the fruit is absent within the cause. Now this is again taken up to raise an objection: If so, milk should lack curds, and a seed should lack a tree of fifty feet. If milk has curds and a seed has a tree of fifty feet, one should know that the fruit is present within the cause, and one cannot vaguely state that it may be absent.