大般涅槃經疏 23.5

23.5

From "What is faith?" onwards is the second [part], the explanation, which forms five chapters. The first, on faith, also has three: first, presenting the essence of faith; next, explaining the virtues of faith; third, concluding. As for the initial essence of faith, in what dharmas does one have faith? In total, five kinds are adduced: first, faith in the Three Jewels; second, faith in cause and effect; third, faith in the two truths; fourth, faith in the one vehicle; fifth, faith in the three truths. One master says: Faith in the paramārthasatya is faith in the ultimate; faith in wholesome expedients is faith in the conventional. Another master says: The two truths have already been discussed earlier; how could they be repeated? Relying on the Avataṃsaka Sūtra, it says, "When praising a bodhisattva, they are called the two wisdoms; when praising a Buddha, they are called the two bodies; they are merely one essence whose latency and manifestation differ." Some say: Paramārthasatya and wholesome expedients are simply the two bodies and also the two wisdoms. We now clarify that this text itself refers to paramārthasatya; how could one change 'truth' to 'wisdom' and again change it to 'body'? We now treat them as the three truths, which naturally differ from the two truths, not constituting a repetition. Furthermore, the text relies on the one vehicle to reveal the meaning of its faith: for the sake of sentient beings, three are distinguished and taught, but knowing there is no other destination, therefore one is taught. Following this single case, it applies by analogy to all four dharmas. The Three Jewels are also like this: for the sake of sentient beings, two essences are distinguished, but knowing that they return to the ultimate, therefore one essence is taught. Cause and effect are also like this: for the sake of sentient beings, causes leading to effects are taught, but upon reaching the other shore, there is neither giving nor receiving. The two truths and three truths are also like this. Next, from "Such faith" onwards explains the virtues of faith. The explanation contains four meanings that follow sequentially. This faith is solid and unbreakable by anyone; why is it unbreakable? It takes attaining the noble nature as its foundation, which is faith born of seeing the nature, deeply rooted and difficult to uproot. Because its roots are deep, it can grow, approaching the great nirvāṇa and accomplishing the precepts and so forth. Initially, all dharmas derive from the noble nature; approaching the great nirvāṇa is vertical height, while precepts, hearing, wisdom, and so forth are horizontal breadth. Although there are differences of horizontal and vertical, depth and breadth, one also does not perceive the characteristics of horizontal and vertical; the more prominent they are, the more they vanish. Faith being explained like this, how could one call it shallow? The third, the conclusion, is as in the text. What is an upright mind? Explaining the second matter also has three: statement, explanation, conclusion. The initial statement is as in the text. In the following explanation, the text has two: first, taking freedom from flattery as uprightness; later, taking repentance as uprightness. In first clarifying freedom from flattery, there are two: first, the explanation; next, discussing the doctrine. In the first there are two: first, the direct explanation; next, dispelling doubts. As for the first text, because of understanding causes and conditions, one is free from flattery. Next, from "Although seeing evil" onwards dispels doubts, explaining it from both sides: first, seeing evil and not speaking of it; later, seeing good and praising it. The doubter says: Seeing evil, one ought to speak of it, yet not speaking of it is not being upright; how can this be called an upright mind? It is then explained: fearing that it would generate afflictions. Then they doubt again: since seeing evil one does not speak of it, seeing good one ought also not to speak of it, and only then would it be an upright mind. Next it clarifies that this is not so, explaining: because praising the buddhadhātu enables them to attain bodhi. Next, in discussing the doctrine there are questions and answers. Initially there are six questions, forming three pairs: the first two arise from the current illness, where three and five kinds of sick persons were explained; the next two arise from the first virtue; the last two arise from this text. Within the first two, the first one also has three: first, rejecting the Buddha's purport; next, recollecting what was taught at the initial opening of the sūtra; from "If one says whether encountering or not encountering" onwards, thirdly, directly raising the objection: since one can spontaneously generate the mind of bodhi, why is it necessary to praise the buddhadhātu to enable them to attain bodhi? This takes the third sick person to raise the objection. In the first [pair], the second also has two: first, recollecting the purport and reverently questioning it; next, directly raising the objection, clarifying that an icchantika should also generate the mind. Why is that? Since they possess the nature, they should spontaneously generate the mind; why wait for praise? This takes the second sick person to raise the objection. From "As the Buddha has taught" onwards are the second two objections, arising from the first virtue. In the twentieth fascicle, five objections were explained: the first two objections were based on the four kinds of sinful persons, the middle two objections were based on the icchantika, and the latter one was based on the indeterminate. In the Buddha's reply, it was explained that the buddhadhātu is neither internal nor external, neither permanent nor impermanent, which is why it is not severed. Now, another question arises from this: first, recollecting the purport and reverently questioning it; next, directly raising the objection. If you directly state that the buddhadhātu is not severed, why do you say that roots of goodness are severed? This very buddhadhātu is precisely the roots of goodness; since good is severed, the buddhadhātu is severed. Why do you also say that the buddhadhātu is neither internal nor external? From "As the Buddha in the past" onwards is the later objection: If the buddhadhātu is not severed, why did it not prevent one from falling into hell? Since the buddhadhātu is not severed and only roots of goodness are severed, by virtue of having the buddhadhātu it should be able to prevent evil. Because the answer was not exhaustive, the doctrine is discussed further. From "If because of the buddhadhātu" onwards is the third [pair], having two further objections: closely arising from this, if praising the buddhadhātu causes one to generate the mind, why is it necessary to preach the twelve divisions of scriptures further? Simply praising the buddhadhātu would naturally be sufficient in meaning. There is the doctrine, and there is the simile and its application. From "The Buddhas, Tathāgatas" onwards is the later objection. Arising from the eighth virtue, the Buddha replied that the lustful mind is neither existent nor non-existent, neither cause nor fruit, or that the fruit is present within the cause, or that the fruit is absent within the cause. Now this is again taken up to raise an objection: If so, milk should lack curds, and a seed should lack a tree of fifty feet. If milk has curds and a seed has a tree of fifty feet, one should know that the fruit is present within the cause, and one cannot vaguely state that it may be absent.