大般涅槃經疏 23.7

23.7

次就答中，次第答三雙六問。初答前舉三病二問，次答舉初功德兩問，後答此中兩問。但答前兩問不次第答，直解三種病人竟即是答第一兩問了。依理只應解於初後二種病人，而今復解中間者，不用此為答，只為中間舉來。今還次第為釋，彼不舉來，今亦不解。「一闡名信」下，二、答第三難。前言若不斷佛性亦應不斷善根，只善根即是佛性、佛性即是善根。今答佛性中道，不同善根。何者？一闡名信、提名不具，佛性非信亦復非具，云何可斷？佛性非善非惡，闡提但能斷善，云何斷性？其中諸句例爾。古來云：闡提具含眾惡。不知的翻。唯河西翻為極欲，言極惡欲之邊。此乃於總惡之內取一事為翻。例如涅槃名含眾德，亦無的翻，而翻為滅度者，亦是總中取此一事為翻。又善法者，名生已得。依數人義，善有二種：一生得善、二方便善。世間慈孝名生得善，闡提亦無，故言已斷。「如汝所言」下，答第四難，前難云何不遮墮？今牒問作答，明闡提佛性非有非無，即事求而頗得故非有，而有是理故非無。又善巧方便則非無，無巧方便則非有。故舉箜篌，喻此有無，先譬、次合。初譬中所言王者譬眾生，箜篌譬眾生身，音聲譬佛性，大臣譬佛菩薩能善說之，斷絃譬就此身盡命終，皮木坼裂譬五根四大求之頗得，即無方便故非有也。合譬者，佛性無有住處即非有，以善方便故可得見即是非無。「如汝所說若乳無酪」下，第三、答第五第六兩難，明應有定性。答意非定有性，因緣故有。若乳定有酪，即應自生，不假頗求樹汁；既其假緣，當知因中無果。然前作六難，今但舉一訶者，何也？答：與奪適時，皆為利益。正言此難是計性義，與外道同，寄正訶邪，云是癡人，實不訶德王。此答即兼答第五，歎善自足何須說十二部經。今明既無定性，因緣而有，是故須說十二為緣。次以懺悔明直心者，若有失不悔則非直心，犯愆發露乃名直心。文為三：初「設有過」下，正懺悔；次「於師同學」下，即是發露；三「慚愧自責」下，即斷相續心。結，如文。

Next, with regard to the reply, he answers the three pairs of six questions in succession. First he answers the previous two questions concerning the three types of patients; next he answers the two questions concerning the initial virtue; and finally he answers the two questions raised here. However, in answering the first two questions he does not answer them in sequence; he directly finishes explaining the three types of patients, which completes the answer to the first two questions. According to reason, he should only have explained the first and last of the three types of patients, but now he also explains the middle one; this is not used as the answer, but only brought up because it was raised in the middle. Now he returns to explain them in succession; had the other party not brought it up, he would not now explain it. From "Icchā means faith" onwards, secondly, he answers the third difficulty. Previously it was said that if the buddhadhātu is not severed, the roots of goodness should also not be severed, because the roots of goodness are just the buddhadhātu and the buddhadhātu is just the roots of goodness. Now he answers that the buddhadhātu is the middle way and is not the same as the roots of goodness. Why? "Icchā" means faith, and "tika" means incomplete; the buddhadhātu is neither faith nor completeness, so how could it be severed? The buddhadhātu is neither good nor evil; the icchantika can only sever the good, so how could he sever the nature? The various phrases therein are all analogous to this. From antiquity it has been said: the icchantika completely possesses all evils. Its exact translation is unknown. Only Héxī translated it as "extreme desire," meaning the extremity of evil desire. This is to take one matter from within total evil as the translation. For example, the name nirvāṇa contains all virtues, and also has no exact translation, yet translating it as "extinction and deliverance" is likewise taking this one matter from within the whole as a translation. Furthermore, good dharmas are called "attained upon birth." According to the Abhidharma masters' meaning, there are two kinds of good: first, innate good; second, skillful good. Worldly kindness and filial piety are called innate good; the icchantika lacks even these, hence it is said they are already severed. From "As you have said" onwards, he answers the fourth difficulty. The previous difficulty asked why [the Buddha] did not prevent him from falling. Now he cites the question to formulate an answer, clarifying that the buddhadhātu of an icchantika is neither existent nor non-existent: if sought in concrete phenomena it is completely unattainable, hence it is non-existent; yet because this principle exists, it is not non-existent. Furthermore, with skillful means it is not non-existent, while without skillful means it is non-existent. Therefore he adduces the harp to illustrate this existence and non-existence, first with a simile and next with the application. What is called the king in the initial simile illustrates sentient beings; the harp illustrates the body of sentient beings; the sound illustrates the buddhadhātu; the great minister illustrates the buddhas and bodhisattvas who are able to explain it skillfully; severing the strings illustrates reaching the end of life with respect to this body; splitting the skin and wood illustrates searching for it with the five sense faculties and four great elements and finding it completely unattainable, which means that without skillful means it is non-existent. Applying the simile: the buddhadhātu has no abiding place, which is "non-existent"; because it can be seen through skillful means, this is "not non-existent." From "As you have said, if milk lacks curd" onwards, thirdly, he answers the fifth and sixth difficulties, clarifying that there should be a determinate nature. The intent of the answer is that the nature is not determinately existent, but exists due to causes and conditions. If milk determinately had curd, it should arise on its own without relying on the juice of the *phala* tree; since it relies on conditions, one should know that there is no effect in the cause. However, previously six difficulties were raised, so why does he now only cite one to scold? Answer: granting and taking away at the appropriate time are both for benefit. Precisely because this difficulty posits an inherent nature, which is the same as the non-Buddhists, he relies on the correct to scold the heterodox, calling him a foolish man; he does not actually scold the King of Virtuous Power. This answer also concurrently answers the fifth difficulty: praising goodness as self-sufficient, why need the twelvefold scriptures be preached? Now he clarifies that since there is no determinate nature, but it exists through causes and conditions, it is necessary to preach the twelve divisions as conditions. Next, clarifying the straightforward mind through repentance: if one has faults and does not repent, it is not a straightforward mind; revealing one's transgressions is called a straightforward mind. The text has three parts: first, from "Supposing there is a fault" onwards, the actual repentance; next, from "Before the teacher and fellow students" onwards, the disclosure; third, from "ashamed and blaming oneself" onwards, severing the continuous mind. The conclusion is as in the text.