大般涅槃經疏 23.7

23.7

Next, with regard to the reply, he answers the three pairs of six questions in succession. First he answers the previous two questions concerning the three types of patients; next he answers the two questions concerning the initial virtue; and finally he answers the two questions raised here. However, in answering the first two questions he does not answer them in sequence; he directly finishes explaining the three types of patients, which completes the answer to the first two questions. According to reason, he should only have explained the first and last of the three types of patients, but now he also explains the middle one; this is not used as the answer, but only brought up because it was raised in the middle. Now he returns to explain them in succession; had the other party not brought it up, he would not now explain it. From "Icchā means faith" onwards, secondly, he answers the third difficulty. Previously it was said that if the buddhadhātu is not severed, the roots of goodness should also not be severed, because the roots of goodness are just the buddhadhātu and the buddhadhātu is just the roots of goodness. Now he answers that the buddhadhātu is the middle way and is not the same as the roots of goodness. Why? "Icchā" means faith, and "tika" means incomplete; the buddhadhātu is neither faith nor completeness, so how could it be severed? The buddhadhātu is neither good nor evil; the icchantika can only sever the good, so how could he sever the nature? The various phrases therein are all analogous to this. From antiquity it has been said: the icchantika completely possesses all evils. Its exact translation is unknown. Only Héxī translated it as "extreme desire," meaning the extremity of evil desire. This is to take one matter from within total evil as the translation. For example, the name nirvāṇa contains all virtues, and also has no exact translation, yet translating it as "extinction and deliverance" is likewise taking this one matter from within the whole as a translation. Furthermore, good dharmas are called "attained upon birth." According to the Abhidharma masters' meaning, there are two kinds of good: first, innate good; second, skillful good. Worldly kindness and filial piety are called innate good; the icchantika lacks even these, hence it is said they are already severed. From "As you have said" onwards, he answers the fourth difficulty. The previous difficulty asked why [the Buddha] did not prevent him from falling. Now he cites the question to formulate an answer, clarifying that the buddhadhātu of an icchantika is neither existent nor non-existent: if sought in concrete phenomena it is completely unattainable, hence it is non-existent; yet because this principle exists, it is not non-existent. Furthermore, with skillful means it is not non-existent, while without skillful means it is non-existent. Therefore he adduces the harp to illustrate this existence and non-existence, first with a simile and next with the application. What is called the king in the initial simile illustrates sentient beings; the harp illustrates the body of sentient beings; the sound illustrates the buddhadhātu; the great minister illustrates the buddhas and bodhisattvas who are able to explain it skillfully; severing the strings illustrates reaching the end of life with respect to this body; splitting the skin and wood illustrates searching for it with the five sense faculties and four great elements and finding it completely unattainable, which means that without skillful means it is non-existent. Applying the simile: the buddhadhātu has no abiding place, which is "non-existent"; because it can be seen through skillful means, this is "not non-existent." From "As you have said, if milk lacks curd" onwards, thirdly, he answers the fifth and sixth difficulties, clarifying that there should be a determinate nature. The intent of the answer is that the nature is not determinately existent, but exists due to causes and conditions. If milk determinately had curd, it should arise on its own without relying on the juice of the *phala* tree; since it relies on conditions, one should know that there is no effect in the cause. However, previously six difficulties were raised, so why does he now only cite one to scold? Answer: granting and taking away at the appropriate time are both for benefit. Precisely because this difficulty posits an inherent nature, which is the same as the non-Buddhists, he relies on the correct to scold the heterodox, calling him a foolish man; he does not actually scold the King of Virtuous Power. This answer also concurrently answers the fifth difficulty: praising goodness as self-sufficient, why need the twelvefold scriptures be preached? Now he clarifies that since there is no determinate nature, but it exists through causes and conditions, it is necessary to preach the twelve divisions as conditions. Next, clarifying the straightforward mind through repentance: if one has faults and does not repent, it is not a straightforward mind; revealing one's transgressions is called a straightforward mind. The text has three parts: first, from "Supposing there is a fault" onwards, the actual repentance; next, from "Before the teacher and fellow students" onwards, the disclosure; third, from "ashamed and blaming oneself" onwards, severing the continuous mind. The conclusion is as in the text.