大般涅槃經疏 24.9

24.9

「爾時師子」下，第二論義。此義起上結眾生行業甚深甚深，若眾生與佛平等不二，何用修道？初似是一問，佛為兩答則成二問。下佛答中，一答佛與佛性平等、二答修道，故知兩問。地人云：眾生是佛，具足在妄，便不用修道。正當此難。若成論人云：佛果在當，則不當此難。而不得言即是佛，此應作無差別差別答。無差別故即是佛，差別故未具足。如父生子姓無差別，用未具足故須莊嚴，莊嚴故後則具足。然但明佛性，何關具足不具足？具足既藉緣而具，佛性亦應藉緣而具。若言佛性在當，此據果性果果性。若言佛性在現，此取因性因因性。若言佛性非當非現，此取正因性。若各以為是，如盲觸象。若見此意，無當現之爭。佛答為三：一非問、二正答、三引證。非問，如文。正答為兩：一答無差別亦有差別、二答何用修道。初答為三：一正答、二引偈、三舉乳酪而譬。此意者，據體不殊，約緣成異。初文有法、有譬。法說中云未具足者，但有其理，事用未足，故言不具，非謂悉無名為不具。「譬如」下，二譬，為二：先譬、次合。初譬又二：先舉惡譬、次引善惡例。初文者，必定當墮。如害母者悔，身雖未墮，必去不疑。眾生亦爾，有佛性理，未來必得。次佛復引云行十善者名見天人，行十惡者名見地獄，亦是當報。「一切眾生」下，二合譬。一切眾生未有相好，以當得故。一解云：當得相好之果。一解云：當得果佛性。佛性云何是當？若是當者，為三世攝，即是無常，則不應言當果佛性。二引偈答者，略釋偈意，已如前文。此偈四出：初答常無常、二答得無得。下二十六答破定性，今答有無不定以明中道。若但以有無別解，俱不會偈旨，常無常等亦應如是。此中準經應作差、無差、亦差亦無差、非差非無差，不一不異、不思議釋，乃會偈旨。餘常無常等亦復如是。今長行釋本有云三世皆本有，如文。準此而言，生死與涅槃各應本有、各應今無。若生死本有者，具足無量煩惱；生死本無者，本無涅槃。涅槃本有者，涅槃本有非適今；涅槃本無者，久已成佛無諸煩惱。生死雖復本有今無、本無今有，悉束為有，以涅槃望生死，生死有所得故。涅槃雖復本有今無、本無今有，悉束為無，以生死望涅槃無所得故。又即本有是今無，不離有而論無；即本無是今有，不離無而論有。此前三句，即是差別三世所攝。本有之有非有，今無之無不無，不有不無，三世有法無有是處。此一句是無差別，不為三世所攝。更約本末重明四句，自有兩本兩末；一本一末；末而不本、本而不末；非本非末。上文云寄生一子舍主驅逐。舍主是境，豈非生死為本？一子正觀，豈非涅槃為末？文云大般涅槃本自有之。又如來藏依持建立，豈非涅槃為本？迷理起惑，豈非生死為末？若各有其本則各有其末，為是義故兩本兩末。又生死無終，將涅槃之始為生死之終；涅槃無始，將生死之終為涅槃之始。二河相望互作終始，是為一本一末。又生死若本若末皆束名為末，以其虛妄無根本故，故末而不本。涅槃若本若末皆名為本，以其真實無偽故，本而不末。末本非本、本末非末，非本非末，三世不攝。分別本末四句既成，例具不具、得無得、常無常，皆悉不定，不可思議亦復如是。四句不定不可思議，即是三諦不並不別，如前說。「譬如有人」下，第三舉乳酪譬以證當有。此謂約有心論有佛性，不即心為佛性。何異眾生有佛性之理，後得佛時不取眾生為佛心。佛心亦爾，只云有心為佛性，心不即為佛性。

From "At that time Siṃhanāda..." below is the second [section], discussing the doctrine. This doctrine arises from the concluding remark above that sentient beings' karmic actions are extremely profound: if sentient beings and the Buddha are equal and non-dual, what use is there in cultivating the Path? At first it seems to be one question, but because the Buddha gives two answers, it forms two questions. In the Buddha's answers below, first he answers that the Buddha and the buddhadhātu are equal, and second he answers concerning the cultivation of the Path; hence we know there are two questions. The Dilun masters say: "Sentient beings are the Buddha; being fully endowed within delusion, they then have no need to cultivate the Path." This directly meets that objection. If, as the Chengshi masters say, the fruit of buddhahood lies in the future, then it does not meet this objection. Yet one cannot say that they are immediately the Buddha; here one should answer in terms of non-differentiation and differentiation. Because there is non-differentiation, they are immediately the Buddha; because there is differentiation, they are not yet fully endowed. Just as when a father begets a son, their surname has no difference, but because his functional capacities are not yet fully endowed, he requires adornment; having been adorned, he is later fully endowed. However, if one only clarifies the buddhadhātu, what does it have to do with being fully endowed or not fully endowed? Since being fully endowed relies on conditions to become complete, the buddhadhātu must also rely on conditions to become complete. If one says that the buddhadhātu lies in the future, this is based on the fruit-nature and fruit-of-fruit nature. If one says that the buddhadhātu lies in the present, this takes the cause-nature and cause-of-cause nature. If one says that the buddhadhātu is neither future nor present, this takes the direct-cause nature. If each considers itself correct, it is like blind men touching an elephant. If one perceives this meaning, there will be no dispute over future versus present. The Buddha's answer has three parts: first, refuting the question; second, the direct answer; third, citing proof. Refuting the question is as in the text. The direct answer has two parts: first, answering that there is non-differentiation and also differentiation; second, answering what use there is in cultivating the Path. The first answer has three parts: first, the direct answer; second, quoting the verse; third, citing milk and curds as an analogy. The meaning here is that based on the essence there is no difference, but according to conditions differentiation is established. The first passage has the statement of doctrine and the analogy. In the doctrinal statement, what is meant by "not yet fully endowed" is that it merely possesses the principle, while phenomenal functions are not yet complete; thus it says "not fully endowed," not that total absence is called not fully endowed. From "For example..." below is the second, the analogy, which has two parts: first the analogy, then the application. The first analogy also has two parts: first citing the bad analogy, next citing good and evil as parallel cases. The first passage means that one will certainly fall [into hell]. Just as one who kills his mother feels remorse: though his body has not yet fallen, he will certainly go without doubt. Sentient beings are also like this: they possess the principle of the buddhadhātu and will certainly attain it in the future. Next, the Buddha further cites that one who practices the ten good deeds is said to see gods and humans, and one who practices the ten evil deeds is said to see hell; this is also a future retribution. From "All sentient beings..." below is the second, applying the analogy. All sentient beings do not yet have the major and minor marks, but [are said to have them] because they will attain them in the future. One explanation says: they will attain the fruit of the major and minor marks in the future. Another explanation says: they will attain the fruit-buddhadhātu in the future. How can the buddhadhātu be future? If it is future, it is subsumed under the three times and is therefore impermanent, so one should not speak of a future-fruit buddhadhātu. As for the second part, answering by quoting the verse: a brief explanation of the verse's meaning has already been given in the preceding text. This verse appears four times: first, answering permanence and impermanence; second, answering attainment and non-attainment. Below, in twenty-six, it answers to refute fixed natures; here it answers that existence and non-existence are unfixed in order to clarify the middle way. If one only explains existence and non-existence separately, neither will accord with the verse's purport; permanence and impermanence and so forth should also be like this. Here, in accordance with the sūtra, one should explain in terms of difference, non-difference, both difference and non-difference, neither difference nor non-difference, non-oneness and non-difference, and the inconceivable, and only then will it accord with the purport of the verse. The remaining cases of permanence, impermanence, and so forth are also like this. Now, the prose explains "originally existent" as meaning that the three times are all originally existent, as in the text. Based on this, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa should each be originally existent and each be non-existent at present. If saṃsāra is originally existent, it is fully endowed with immeasurable afflictions; if saṃsāra is originally non-existent, there is originally no nirvāṇa. If nirvāṇa is originally existent, nirvāṇa's original existence did not just occur now; if nirvāṇa is originally non-existent, one has long since attained buddhahood and is free of all afflictions. Although saṃsāra is both originally existent and now non-existent, and originally non-existent and now existent, they are all bundled together as existent, because looking from nirvāṇa toward saṃsāra, saṃsāra has something attained. Although nirvāṇa is both originally existent and now non-existent, and originally non-existent and now existent, they are all bundled together as non-existent, because looking from saṃsāra toward nirvāṇa, nothing is attained. Moreover, the very "originally existent" is "now non-existent," not discussing non-existence apart from existence; the very "originally non-existent" is "now existent," not discussing existence apart from non-existence. These first three propositions are differentiation and are subsumed within the three times. The existence of "originally existent" is non-existence; the non-existence of "now non-existent" is not non-existent. Being neither existent nor non-existent, an existent phenomenon of the three times has no such basis. This single proposition is non-differentiation and is not subsumed within the three times. Further, re-clarifying the four propositions in terms of root and branch, there are naturally two roots and two branches; one root and one branch; branch and not root, root and not branch; and neither root nor branch. The text above states that a son born to a lodger is driven out by the master of the house. The master of the house is the object; how could saṃsāra not be the root? The one son is correct contemplation; how could nirvāṇa not be the branch? The text states that the great parinirvāṇa is originally present of itself. Furthermore, the tathāgatagarbha supports and establishes [all things]; how could nirvāṇa not be the root? Being deluded about the principle gives rise to afflictions; how could saṃsāra not be the branch? If each has its root, then each has its branch; for this meaning there are two roots and two branches. Furthermore, saṃsāra has no end, taking the beginning of nirvāṇa as the end of saṃsāra; nirvāṇa has no beginning, taking the end of saṃsāra as the beginning of nirvāṇa. Looking toward each other like two rivers, they mutually serve as end and beginning; this is one root and one branch. Furthermore, saṃsāra, whether root or branch, is bundled together under the name of branch because it is false and lacks a foundation; hence it is branch and not root. Nirvāṇa, whether root or branch, is entirely named root because it is real and devoid of falsity; hence it is root and not branch. Branch-root is not root; root-branch is not branch; neither root nor branch, not subsumed under the three times. Once the four propositions distinguishing root and branch are established, by analogy, being endowed and unendowed, attainment and non-attainment, permanence and impermanence, are all unfixed, and the inconceivable is also like this. That the four propositions are unfixed and inconceivable is precisely the three truths neither combined nor separate, as explained before. From "For example, a person..." below is the third, citing the analogy of milk and curds to prove future existence. This means discussing the existence of buddhadhātu with respect to the existence of mind; it does not take mind itself to be buddhadhātu. How is this different from sentient beings possessing the principle of buddhadhātu, so that when they later attain buddhahood, one does not take the sentient being to be the Buddha's mind? The Buddha's mind is also like this: it only says that having a mind constitutes [possessing] buddhadhātu; the mind is not itself the buddhadhātu.