大般涅槃經疏 24.9

24.9

From "At that time Siṃhanāda..." below is the second [section], discussing the doctrine. This doctrine arises from the concluding remark above that sentient beings' karmic actions are extremely profound: if sentient beings and the Buddha are equal and non-dual, what use is there in cultivating the Path? At first it seems to be one question, but because the Buddha gives two answers, it forms two questions. In the Buddha's answers below, first he answers that the Buddha and the buddhadhātu are equal, and second he answers concerning the cultivation of the Path; hence we know there are two questions. The Dilun masters say: "Sentient beings are the Buddha; being fully endowed within delusion, they then have no need to cultivate the Path." This directly meets that objection. If, as the Chengshi masters say, the fruit of buddhahood lies in the future, then it does not meet this objection. Yet one cannot say that they are immediately the Buddha; here one should answer in terms of non-differentiation and differentiation. Because there is non-differentiation, they are immediately the Buddha; because there is differentiation, they are not yet fully endowed. Just as when a father begets a son, their surname has no difference, but because his functional capacities are not yet fully endowed, he requires adornment; having been adorned, he is later fully endowed. However, if one only clarifies the buddhadhātu, what does it have to do with being fully endowed or not fully endowed? Since being fully endowed relies on conditions to become complete, the buddhadhātu must also rely on conditions to become complete. If one says that the buddhadhātu lies in the future, this is based on the fruit-nature and fruit-of-fruit nature. If one says that the buddhadhātu lies in the present, this takes the cause-nature and cause-of-cause nature. If one says that the buddhadhātu is neither future nor present, this takes the direct-cause nature. If each considers itself correct, it is like blind men touching an elephant. If one perceives this meaning, there will be no dispute over future versus present. The Buddha's answer has three parts: first, refuting the question; second, the direct answer; third, citing proof. Refuting the question is as in the text. The direct answer has two parts: first, answering that there is non-differentiation and also differentiation; second, answering what use there is in cultivating the Path. The first answer has three parts: first, the direct answer; second, quoting the verse; third, citing milk and curds as an analogy. The meaning here is that based on the essence there is no difference, but according to conditions differentiation is established. The first passage has the statement of doctrine and the analogy. In the doctrinal statement, what is meant by "not yet fully endowed" is that it merely possesses the principle, while phenomenal functions are not yet complete; thus it says "not fully endowed," not that total absence is called not fully endowed. From "For example..." below is the second, the analogy, which has two parts: first the analogy, then the application. The first analogy also has two parts: first citing the bad analogy, next citing good and evil as parallel cases. The first passage means that one will certainly fall [into hell]. Just as one who kills his mother feels remorse: though his body has not yet fallen, he will certainly go without doubt. Sentient beings are also like this: they possess the principle of the buddhadhātu and will certainly attain it in the future. Next, the Buddha further cites that one who practices the ten good deeds is said to see gods and humans, and one who practices the ten evil deeds is said to see hell; this is also a future retribution. From "All sentient beings..." below is the second, applying the analogy. All sentient beings do not yet have the major and minor marks, but [are said to have them] because they will attain them in the future. One explanation says: they will attain the fruit of the major and minor marks in the future. Another explanation says: they will attain the fruit-buddhadhātu in the future. How can the buddhadhātu be future? If it is future, it is subsumed under the three times and is therefore impermanent, so one should not speak of a future-fruit buddhadhātu. As for the second part, answering by quoting the verse: a brief explanation of the verse's meaning has already been given in the preceding text. This verse appears four times: first, answering permanence and impermanence; second, answering attainment and non-attainment. Below, in twenty-six, it answers to refute fixed natures; here it answers that existence and non-existence are unfixed in order to clarify the middle way. If one only explains existence and non-existence separately, neither will accord with the verse's purport; permanence and impermanence and so forth should also be like this. Here, in accordance with the sūtra, one should explain in terms of difference, non-difference, both difference and non-difference, neither difference nor non-difference, non-oneness and non-difference, and the inconceivable, and only then will it accord with the purport of the verse. The remaining cases of permanence, impermanence, and so forth are also like this. Now, the prose explains "originally existent" as meaning that the three times are all originally existent, as in the text. Based on this, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa should each be originally existent and each be non-existent at present. If saṃsāra is originally existent, it is fully endowed with immeasurable afflictions; if saṃsāra is originally non-existent, there is originally no nirvāṇa. If nirvāṇa is originally existent, nirvāṇa's original existence did not just occur now; if nirvāṇa is originally non-existent, one has long since attained buddhahood and is free of all afflictions. Although saṃsāra is both originally existent and now non-existent, and originally non-existent and now existent, they are all bundled together as existent, because looking from nirvāṇa toward saṃsāra, saṃsāra has something attained. Although nirvāṇa is both originally existent and now non-existent, and originally non-existent and now existent, they are all bundled together as non-existent, because looking from saṃsāra toward nirvāṇa, nothing is attained. Moreover, the very "originally existent" is "now non-existent," not discussing non-existence apart from existence; the very "originally non-existent" is "now existent," not discussing existence apart from non-existence. These first three propositions are differentiation and are subsumed within the three times. The existence of "originally existent" is non-existence; the non-existence of "now non-existent" is not non-existent. Being neither existent nor non-existent, an existent phenomenon of the three times has no such basis. This single proposition is non-differentiation and is not subsumed within the three times. Further, re-clarifying the four propositions in terms of root and branch, there are naturally two roots and two branches; one root and one branch; branch and not root, root and not branch; and neither root nor branch. The text above states that a son born to a lodger is driven out by the master of the house. The master of the house is the object; how could saṃsāra not be the root? The one son is correct contemplation; how could nirvāṇa not be the branch? The text states that the great parinirvāṇa is originally present of itself. Furthermore, the tathāgatagarbha supports and establishes [all things]; how could nirvāṇa not be the root? Being deluded about the principle gives rise to afflictions; how could saṃsāra not be the branch? If each has its root, then each has its branch; for this meaning there are two roots and two branches. Furthermore, saṃsāra has no end, taking the beginning of nirvāṇa as the end of saṃsāra; nirvāṇa has no beginning, taking the end of saṃsāra as the beginning of nirvāṇa. Looking toward each other like two rivers, they mutually serve as end and beginning; this is one root and one branch. Furthermore, saṃsāra, whether root or branch, is bundled together under the name of branch because it is false and lacks a foundation; hence it is branch and not root. Nirvāṇa, whether root or branch, is entirely named root because it is real and devoid of falsity; hence it is root and not branch. Branch-root is not root; root-branch is not branch; neither root nor branch, not subsumed under the three times. Once the four propositions distinguishing root and branch are established, by analogy, being endowed and unendowed, attainment and non-attainment, permanence and impermanence, are all unfixed, and the inconceivable is also like this. That the four propositions are unfixed and inconceivable is precisely the three truths neither combined nor separate, as explained before. From "For example, a person..." below is the third, citing the analogy of milk and curds to prove future existence. This means discussing the existence of buddhadhātu with respect to the existence of mind; it does not take mind itself to be buddhadhātu. How is this different from sentient beings possessing the principle of buddhadhātu, so that when they later attain buddhahood, one does not take the sentient being to be the Buddha's mind? The Buddha's mind is also like this: it only says that having a mind constitutes [possessing] buddhadhātu; the mind is not itself the buddhadhātu.