大般涅槃經疏 25.10

25.10

「師子吼言」下，第二廣破邊執，文為二：先破因中有果執成上非內、次破因中無果執成上非外。此執若除，不失不壞佛性中道悉皆可解。就破因中有果，更為四：一據佛教、二據世情、三據緣因、四據正因。初據教者，近據前文，故名一切眾生悉有佛性；遠據前品，貧女寶藏、力士額珠。此皆內有，寧言非內？世情者，世人求酪取乳、求油取麻，若無油酪，人何故取？舉緣因者，內若無正，何須外緣？如穀無芽，不須水土。舉正因者，由外有緣，使正得生。此皆據於因中有果，顯眾生中悉有佛性，性應在內。就初，據教有六番問答。初引品初及〈如來性品〉為問。佛答明乳即是空，故不定說有；但言酪從乳生，乳即是假，故從因緣有，如文。第二番問答，問一切法各有時節，乳中有酪待時而生，如穀有芽春來方出。佛答為三：初作即空奪破，故言乳時無酪。二作縱答，如其有者，何故不得二種名字？如文。三從「因有二種」下，更示乳即是假，是故言有。第三番問答，若乳無酪，何不從角而生？此舉非因作難。佛一往縱答，角亦生酪。第四番問答，即取此為難。求酪之人何不取角？佛答乳是正因：是故取之；角是緣因，是故不取。第五番舉非果為難。佛先縱答，乳亦生樹，如文。次則奪答，若一因生者，可得如難；須兩因乃生，乳非樹之正因，因緣各異，何得生樹？尋文可見。第六番問答，直問眾生佛性復有幾因。佛答亦具二因：正謂眾生，緣謂六度。莊嚴家據此文，明假名是正因佛性。觀師不用，云緣因不但唯有六度，復有境界及道品等，皆是緣因。正因何得但是假名？亦有五陰及心神等。今明莊嚴覽陰成眾生，此據外；觀師取五陰，此即據內。豈可然耶？上文云佛性非內非外、不失不壞，今謂眾生是正因時，眾生假名，為定在內、為定在外？內外求不可得，還是非內非外，雖非內外而有六度。生其陰軀則不失不壞，一切眾生悉有於陰，還是向義，不應餘解。雖作此消文，可更思之。

From “Siṃhanāda said” onwards is the second [section], which extensively refutes extreme attachments. The text has two parts: first, refuting the attachment that the effect exists within the cause, thereby establishing the previous “neither internal”; second, refuting the attachment that the effect does not exist within the cause, thereby establishing the previous “nor external.” If these attachments are eliminated, the middle way of the buddhadhātu being neither lost nor destroyed can all be understood. Concerning the refutation of the existence of the effect within the cause, there are further four points: 1. relying on Buddhist teachings; 2. relying on worldly sentiments; 3. relying on contributory causes; 4. relying on direct causes. First, regarding reliance on the teachings: proximately relying on the preceding text, thus it is said that all sentient beings possess the buddhadhātu; distantly relying on the preceding chapters, [such as] the poor woman’s treasure and the wrestler’s forehead jewel. These are all internal possessions—how could one say it is not internal? Regarding worldly sentiments: worldly people seeking curd take milk, and seeking oil take sesame; if there were no oil or curd, why would people take them? Adducing contributory causes: if there were no direct [cause] internally, why would external conditions be needed? Just as grain without a sprout requires no water or soil. Adducing direct causes: it is due to having external conditions that the direct [cause] is enabled to arise. These all rely on [the premise that] the effect exists within the cause, showing that sentient beings all possess the buddhadhātu and that its nature should be internal. Regarding the first, reliance on the teachings, there are six rounds of questions and answers. The first round cites the beginning of the chapter and the “Chapter on the Tathāgata Nature” as the question. The Buddha replies by explaining that milk is identical to emptiness, and therefore its existence is not definitively asserted; he merely says curd is produced from milk, and milk is identical to the provisional, so it exists through causes and conditions, as in the text. The second round of questions and answers asks that all phenomena have their respective seasons: curd exists within milk and awaits the right time to be produced, just as grain has a sprout that only emerges when spring arrives. The Buddha's reply has three parts: first, making a direct negation of emptiness by deprivation, thus stating that at the time of milk there is no curd; second, making a concession in reply: if it existed, why would it not obtain two names? As in the text; third, from “causes are of two kinds” onwards, further showing that milk is identical to the provisional, and therefore it is said to exist. The third round of questions and answers [asks]: if milk has no curd, why is it not produced from horns? This adduces a non-cause to raise an objection. The Buddha temporarily concedes in reply that horns also produce curd. The fourth round of questions and answers takes this up as an objection: why does a person seeking curd not take horns? The Buddha replies that milk is the direct cause, which is why they take it; horns are a contributory cause, which is why they do not take them. The fifth round adduces a non-effect to raise an objection. The Buddha first concedes in reply that milk also produces trees, as in the text. Next, he deprives in reply: if it were produced by a single cause, it might be as objected; but it requires two causes to be produced—milk is not the direct cause of a tree, and causes and conditions are each distinct, so how could it produce a tree? This can be seen by examining the text. The sixth round of questions and answers directly asks how many causes the buddhadhātu of sentient beings has. The Buddha replies that it also possesses two causes: the direct [cause] refers to sentient beings, and the contributory [causes] refer to the six pāramitās. The Zhuangyan school relies on this passage to explain that the provisional designation is the direct cause of the buddhadhātu. Master Guan does not accept this, saying that contributory causes are not only the six pāramitās, but also include objects of cognition and the factors of awakening, which are all contributory causes. How could the direct cause be merely a provisional designation? It also includes the five aggregates and the conscious spirit, etc. I now explain: Zhuangyan regards assembling the aggregates into a sentient being, which relies on the external; Master Guan takes the five aggregates, which relies on the internal. How could either be correct? The earlier text says that the buddhadhātu is neither internal nor external, neither lost nor destroyed. Now, when considering sentient beings as the direct cause, is the provisional designation of sentient beings definitively internal or definitively external? Seeking it internally or externally, it cannot be found; it remains neither internal nor external. Though neither internal nor external, there are the six pāramitās. When the physical body of their aggregates is generated, it is neither lost nor destroyed; all sentient beings possess the aggregates—this returns to the earlier meaning and should not be explained otherwise. Although I have analyzed the text in this way, one may reflect further on it.