大般涅槃經疏 25.11

25.11

「師子吼言我今定知」下，二據世情執有為難。佛答為二：初正破執、次示正義。初文二：初作三番、次更重破。初三番者，初番問取乳不取水，據乳有酪為問。佛答為二：先非問、次並難。初如文。次難中云汝言求酪取乳不取水者，並云如人求面而取於刀。不舉鏡者，欲作橫竪並之。又鏡亦得為刀，仙人孫博屈刀為鏡、伸鏡為刀（云云）。第二番即執刀有面為問。佛答：若定有面，何故顛倒，竪長橫短？若有己面，何故狹長？實不狹長而見狹長。若因己面見他面者，何故不見驢馬面？第三番仍併通。佛並眼光到刀中則見己面像，不見驢馬面像。又眼光到刀中，同刀竪而長、同刀之橫闊，是故見之。佛答為三：一奪破，光實不到；二縱破，假到則多過；三結奪。初奪如文。「光若到」下，縱破，有四過：一若光到火，火應燒眼；眼既不燒，知光不到火。二若光到遠，那忽生疑？三光若到者，不應見水精中物，水精閡眼不見外物；淵中魚石，水應閡眼，眼何得到？四光若不到能見者，何故不見壁外？若見壁外，應見外物。「是故」下，第三結奪。「善男子」下，二重破。上未委悉，故更重破。文亦為三：一縱、二奪、三結訶。初縱為三：一應責酪駒、二應壞子孫、三應含五丈。其既舉世情為執，佛亦用世情破之。若乳有酪，賣乳之人應責酪直。縱若有酪，亦應五味一時。若無醍醐，那獨有酪？賣騲馬者應責駒直。駒復有駒，駒駒無已；如其不然，知馬無駒。世人為子騁妻，妻若有子不得名女。女則無子，有子非女。若女有子，子復有孫，孫孫無窮，一腹所生併是兄弟。世豈然乎？如其不然，知女無子。子中有樹，應具五丈，已是亭亭雲外，交柯接葉布濩八方；如其不然，知子無樹。「乳色味異」下，二是奪破。色異者，乳白、酪黃。味異者，乳甜、酪酢。果異者，乳治熱、酪治冷。既無此等，云何有酪？「譬如服酥」下，第三結訶，明當服酥，今已患臭。亦當明當醪渜，今已飽飫得酪食用。何有是事？「譬如有人」下，第二示正義，文為四：一舉譬示正義、二引偈證、三下約眾生、四高推佛境。初舉三譬，又二：先譬、次合。初譬中示於無性，假緣而有，譬如文。「一切諸法」下合譬。「以是義故」下，第二引偈證成。但取初二句證無性足。若定有性，不應本無而今有，亦不應本有而今無。本有應常有、本無應常無，既其不定，云何而言乳有酪性？下二句相仍而來。此偈是第四出，以證今義。「若諸眾生」下，第三約眾生身空以示正義，自有法、譬、合。重譬如文。「眾生佛性諸佛境界」下，第四高推在佛，如文。觀上經文，縱奪破竟，明佛性即空。次舉三譬，明佛性是假。次引偈證，佛性即空即假。次明眾生身空，譬於佛性遍一切處。引諸佛境界，明佛性即中。觀文甚會。亦與上文佛性名為第一義空，空名智慧等，義甚相應。私謂：章安依經具知佛性遍一切處，而未肯彰言，以為時人尚未信有，安示其遍？佛性既具空等三義即三諦，是則一切諸法無非三諦、無非佛性。若不爾者，如何得云眾生身中有於虛空？眾生既有，餘處豈無？餘處若無，不名虛空。思之思之。

From “Siṃhanāda said: ‘I now definitely know…’” onwards is the second [part], raising objections based on worldly sentiments that cling to existence. The Buddha’s reply has two parts: first, directly refuting the attachment; second, showing the correct principle. The first text has two parts: first, making three rounds; second, refuting it once more. Regarding the first three rounds: the first round asks about taking milk and not taking water, raising the question based on milk possessing curd. The Buddha’s reply has two parts: first, negating the question; second, presenting a counter-objection. The first is as in the text. In the second, the counter-objection, it says: regarding your statement that one who seeks curd takes milk and does not take water, by comparison, it is like a person seeking a face taking a sword. Not adducing a mirror is done in order to make horizontal and vertical comparisons. Furthermore, a mirror can also serve as a sword, as the immortal Sun Bo bent a sword to make a mirror and straightened a mirror to make a sword (and so forth). The second round takes up the attachment that the sword contains a face to make an objection. The Buddha replies: if it definitely contained a face, why is it inverted, being vertically long and horizontally short? If it has one’s own face, why is it narrow and long? It is truly not narrow and long, yet one sees it as narrow and long. If by relying on one’s own face one sees another face, why does one not see the face of a donkey or a horse? The third round continues with a counter-explanation: when the eye’s rays reach the sword, one sees the image of one’s own face, not the image of a donkey or horse’s face. Furthermore, when the eye’s rays reach the sword, they conform to the sword's vertical length and horizontal breadth, which is why one sees it. The Buddha’s reply has three parts: 1. refutation by deprivation: the rays truly do not reach it; 2. refutation by concession: if they hypothetically reached it, there would be many faults; 3. concluding deprivation. The first deprivation is as in the text. From “If the rays reach…” onwards is the refutation by concession, which has four faults: first, if the rays reach fire, the fire should burn the eyes; since the eyes are not burned, we know the rays do not reach fire. Second, if the rays reach what is far, why should doubt suddenly arise? Third, if the rays reached it, one should not see objects inside crystal, for crystal obstructs the eye from seeing external objects; regarding fish and stones in an abyss, the water should obstruct the eye, so how could the eye reach them? Fourth, if the rays could see without reaching, why do they not see outside a wall? If they saw outside a wall, they should see external objects. From “Therefore…” onwards is the third, the concluding deprivation. From “Good son…” onwards is the second, refuting once more. Because the above was not yet detailed, he refutes it once more. This text also has three parts: 1. concession; 2. deprivation; 3. concluding rebuke. The first, concession, has three points: 1. one should demand curd and a foal; 2. one should disrupt children and grandchildren; 3. it should contain fifty feet. Since he adduced worldly sentiments as his attachment, the Buddha also uses worldly sentiments to refute it. If milk contained curd, the seller of milk should demand the price of curd. Even conceding that it contains curd, the five flavors should also exist at the same time. If there is no sarpirmaṇḍa, why is there curd alone? A seller of a mare should demand the price of a foal. The foal would again contain a foal, foal after foal without end; if that is not the case, we know the horse has no foal. Worldly people take a wife for their son; if the wife had a child, she could not be called a maiden. A maiden has no child, and one who has a child is not a maiden. If a maiden had a child, the child would again have a grandchild, grandchildren without end, and all born of the same womb would simultaneously be brothers. Could the world possibly be like this? If that is not the case, we know the maiden has no child. If a seed contained a tree, it should fully possess fifty feet, already towering beyond the clouds, with entwined boughs and connecting foliage spread out in the eight directions; if that is not the case, we know the seed has no tree. From “The color and taste of milk are different…” onwards is the second, refutation by deprivation. The difference in color: milk is white, curd is yellow. The difference in taste: milk is sweet, curd is sour. The difference in effect: milk remedies heat, curd remedies cold. Since these [qualities of curd] do not exist [in milk], how could there be curd? From “Just like ingesting ghee…” onwards is the third, concluding rebuke, explaining that when one should ingest ghee in the future, one already suffers from its foul odor now; it also explains that when one should have dregs and warm [liquor] in the future, one is already sated and obtains curd to eat now. How could there be such a thing? From “Just as there is a person…” onwards is the second, showing the correct principle. The text has four parts: 1. adducing similes to show the correct principle; 2. citing verses as proof; 3. applying it to sentient beings below; 4. exalting it to the realm of the Buddhas. First, adducing three similes has two parts: first, the similes; next, the application. In the first simile, showing absence of inherent nature and that things exist through provisional conditions, the simile is as in the text. From “All phenomena…” onwards is the application of the simile. From “For this reason…” onwards is the second, citing verses to establish proof. Taking merely the first two lines suffices to prove the absence of inherent nature. If an inherent nature definitely existed, what originally did not exist should not now exist, nor should what originally existed now not exist. What originally existed should eternally exist; what originally did not exist should eternally not exist. Since it is indefinite, why say that milk has the nature of curd? The latter two lines follow upon this. This verse appears for the fourth time to substantiate the present meaning. From “If all sentient beings…” onwards is the third, applying the emptiness of the body of sentient beings to show the correct principle, naturally having the teaching, simile, and application. The reiterated simile is as in the text. From “The buddhadhātu of sentient beings is the realm of all Buddhas…” onwards is the fourth, exalting it to the Buddha, as in the text. Observing the sūtra text above, having finished the refutations through concession and deprivation, it clarifies that the buddhadhātu is identical to emptiness. Next, adducing three similes, it clarifies that the buddhadhātu is provisional. Next, citing verses as proof, [it shows that] the buddhadhātu is both empty and provisional. Next, clarifying that the body of sentient beings is empty, it compares it to the buddhadhātu pervading all places. Citing the realm of all Buddhas, it clarifies that the buddhadhātu is the middle. Examining the text, it is completely fitting. It also closely corresponds with the earlier text's statement that the buddhadhātu is called paramārtha-śūnyatā, and emptiness is called wisdom, etc. In my personal opinion: Zhāng'ān, relying on the sūtra, fully knew that the buddhadhātu pervades all places, but was not yet willing to state it openly, considering that people of the time did not yet believe in its existence, so how could he show its omnipresence? Since the buddhadhātu fully possesses the three meanings of emptiness and so forth, which are the three truths, then none of all phenomena are other than the three truths and none are other than the buddhadhātu. Were it not so, how could it be said that empty space exists within the bodies of sentient beings? Since sentient beings have it, how could other places lack it? If other places lacked it, it could not be called empty space. Contemplate this, contemplate this!