大般涅槃經疏 25.12

25.12

「師子吼」下，第三據緣能發。因中之果若都無者，何用緣耶？又有五番問答。初番問意：若乳無酪性，何用緣因？虛空無性，不俟二因。答如文。第二番，轉緣因作了因名。問中有三譬，次引乳譬合，如文。佛答為四：一明性即是了因、二明了應自了、三應能兩了、四舉正因為決。初言性即是了者，了本了其令出，若己有性，性自是了，何須他了？乳已有酪性，性自是了，何須酵渜而了出之？次「若是了因」下，正言酵渜為了，應能自了；若不自了，何能為乳而作了因？初若自了者，應能自了而出於酪，不須了乳令乳出酪。「若言了因有二」下，第三應能兩了。只酵渜自能了出於酪，復能了乳出酪。「若有二者」下，第四舉正為決。欲明酵渜能兩了者，乳亦應能作於兩正，自作酪正、復為酵渜作正。第三番問意：前雖四難，正執第三自了了他故。言我共八人者，如數他為七，己足為八，此是自數他數。他亦如是，自了了他。佛答為二：先破執、二示正義。初破又二：初破若爾，則非了因。次「何以故」下釋。夫智能自數己色復數他色，色不能自數數他。了因如色，何能自了復能了他？別有一法自了了他，故言了因即非了因。「一切眾生」下，第二示正義，欲明非本定有，藉緣能有。第四番，更復轉難。還引佛言，明有乳有酪故知是有。佛答為二：先汎舉三答：轉答，即隨問答；默答，即置答；疑答，即不定答。後正用轉答，如文。「師子吼」下，第五番，不許當有之說，故設此難。問為二：先仰非；次正問，為三：法、譬、合。佛答為二：先譬、次合。譬為四：一明過去有、二明未來有、三重明過去有、四重明未來有。未來有即是當有，答問即足。而復更明過去者，當由異部不同、眾計非一。薩婆多計三世皆有，曾有、當有、正有。曇無德計過去未來是無，唯現在為有。已上破有竟。今若用之，但是假名隨俗之用。且法王所為，豈可以人情測？前云種橘芽甜熟酢，後之酢味本在前甜，證過去有。今時此橘初酢後甜者，或是國土物異，或是取爛熟時為後，此時味酢。「眾生佛性」下合譬，正明當有即眾生當得。

From "Siṃhanāda said" onward is third, relying on auxiliary conditions' ability to bring [the fruit] forth. If the fruit within the cause were completely non-existent, what use would auxiliary conditions be? Here there are again five exchanges of question and answer. The intent of the first question: if milk lacks the nature of curds, what use are conditioning causes? Empty space has no nature, and does not await the two causes. The answer is as in the text. In the second exchange, the conditioning cause (pratyaya-hetu) is shifted to the name of a revealing cause (vyañjaka-hetu). In the question there are three similes, followed by citing the simile of milk to correspond, as in the text. The Buddha's answer has four parts: first, explaining that the nature itself is the revealing cause; second, explaining that the revealer should reveal itself; third, that it should be able to reveal both; fourth, citing the primary cause as the resolution. First, saying that the nature itself is the revealer: the revealer fundamentally reveals something to make it emerge; if it already possesses the nature, the nature itself is the revealer, so why would it need another revealer? If milk already has the nature of curds, the nature itself is the revealer, so why need yeast and warmth to reveal and bring it forth? Next, from "If it is a revealing cause" onward, directly says that if yeast and warmth are the revealer, they should be able to reveal themselves; if they cannot reveal themselves, how can they act as a revealing cause for the milk? Initially, if they revealed themselves, they should be able to reveal themselves and produce curds, without needing to reveal milk to make milk produce curds. Next, from "If it is said that the revealing cause has two" onward, is third: it should be able to reveal both. Yeast and warmth would themselves be able to reveal and produce curds, and furthermore be able to reveal milk to produce curds. Next, from "If there are two" onward, is fourth: citing the primary [cause] as the resolution. If one wishes to explain that yeast and warmth can reveal both, milk should also be able to act as both primary [causes]: acting as the primary [cause] of curds for itself, and furthermore acting as the primary [cause] for yeast and warmth. The intent of the third question: although there were four objections previously, it directly clings to the third, revealing oneself and revealing another; hence it says "I together with eight people," just as counting others as seven, with oneself completing eight—this is counting oneself and counting others. The other is also like this, revealing itself and revealing another. The Buddha's answer has two parts: first, refuting the attachment; second, showing the correct doctrine. The first refutation also has two parts: first, refuting that if it were so, it would not be a revealing cause; next, from "Why is this?" onward, explaining it. Indeed, wisdom can count one's own form and furthermore count others' forms; form cannot count itself and count others. The revealing cause is like form: how could it reveal itself and furthermore reveal others? There is a separate factor that reveals itself and reveals others, so it is said that the revealing cause is not a revealing cause. Next, from "All sentient beings" onward, is second: showing the correct doctrine, intending to explain that it is not fundamentally definitively existent, but comes to exist by relying on conditions. In the fourth exchange, he further shifts the objection, citing back the Buddha's words, explaining that because there is milk and there are curds, one knows it exists. The Buddha's answer has two parts: first, generally citing three types of answers—a shifting answer, which answers according to the question; a silent answer, which sets the question aside; and a doubtful answer, which is an indeterminate answer. Later, he directly uses the shifting answer, as in the text. From "Siṃhanāda" onward is the fifth exchange: not accepting the teaching of future existence, he therefore poses this objection. The question has two parts: first, deferentially raising an objection; next, the direct question, which has three parts: doctrine, simile, and correspondence. The Buddha's answer has two parts: first, the simile; next, the correspondence. The simile has four parts: first, explaining past existence; second, explaining future existence; third, re-explaining past existence; fourth, re-explaining future existence. Future existence is simply "to-be existence," which would suffice to answer the question; that he furthermore explains the past must be because the different Buddhist schools vary and the multiple views are not one. The Sarvāstivādins assert that all three time periods exist: having existed, will exist, and currently existing. The Dharmaguptakas assert that the past and future are non-existent, and only the present exists. The refutation of existence above is concluded. If we use them now, they are only conventional designations used in accord with worldly convention. Furthermore, how could the actions of the Dharma King be fathomed by human sentiment? Previously it was said that when planting a mandarin orange, the shoot is sweet and when ripe it is sour; the later sour taste is fundamentally based in the former sweetness, proving past existence. Nowadays, that this orange is sour at first and sweet later is either because products differ according to the land, or because taking the time of over-ripeness as "later," at this time the taste is sour. From "Sentient beings' buddhadhātu" onward corresponds to the simile, directly explaining that future existence means that sentient beings will attain it.