大般涅槃經疏 28.12

28.12

「善男子如汝所言」下，第二答第二執爭之問。又二：先略答、次廣答。初略中言第五解力，亦云欲力，是知眾生欲解之法。文又云是二力者，由第四力名根力、第五名解力，以成二力。「善男子若言如來」下，第二廣答中明佛赴緣異說，眾生不解致成爭論。凡二十一條。一是涅槃不涅槃，須解異部。菩薩婆多據事明畢竟涅槃，曇無德及僧祇據理云不畢竟涅槃。古來評云：婆多非而短，無德是而長，皆失佛意。文云「若言如來畢竟涅槃不畢竟涅槃，同是爭論，不得我意。」云何評之妄判長短？河西云：畢竟是斷，不畢竟是常。言斷常者，豈是斷常？乃是非斷非常、能斷能常。言斷不違常，言常不違斷，斷常不相異，斷常俱圓滿。觀師云：佛赴機說，何得是非，則失佛意。如醫治病授藥不同，弟子不解妄執失旨。此初爭論，又二：初章門、次解釋。釋中又二：初釋執定涅槃、次釋執不定涅槃。前文又二：先釋、次結。初文者，佛為五事說涅槃：一為諸仙、二為力士、三為純陀、四為須跋、五為世王。先為諸仙者，然仙生香山而言展轉者，從於諸天轉至山上仙人住處，皆得羅漢，有權有實，破其保常故說無常。「拘尸那」下，第二為力士。「有一工巧」下，第三為純陀。「王舍城」下，第四為須跋。「羅閱祇」下，第五為世王。失通墮而不死者，以餘勢故。頻婆娑羅王，亦云瓶沙，國曰摩伽陀，亦云摩竭提。羅閱祇，此翻王舍城。後總結，可解。「菩薩二種」下，第二釋執定不涅槃，又二：先釋、次結。初文者，為假名菩薩言不涅槃；真實菩薩即不言涅槃及非涅槃，此菩薩能知如來非常非無常，豈偏作常無常解。「善男子有諸眾生」下，第二爭論明有我無我者，須善異部意。數人宗薩婆，多純明無我，破諸外道謂之邪我。無假名我，一向明無。雖明無我，終了無我無常而得入道，不同外道。論人同曇無德，明有假我，破諸外道即陰離陰，有相續假我、因成假我；復言實法念念遷滅，無復假名相續假我、因成假我。復言實法念念滅故無我，假名相續不斷故有我。又云真諦無我，世諦有我。此即一向明有我義。而此二家不得佛意，故成爭論。招提解云：此之二文明我無我者，以破兩病；言有我者，破邪見無我不言假我，言無我者破即離我。常見之人直說無我，亦不言假。真諦難云：若我無我破我無我者，有此理不？理中若不得有我無我者，亦應不得用我無我破病。更並生死之中既用我無我破病，涅槃中亦應用常無常破病。若涅槃唯有常不得有無常者，生死中唯得是無我，不得有我。若《中論》云「諸佛或說我，或說於無我。諸法實相中，無我無非我。」應將此意例諸爭論。就文為二：先明有我、次明無我。初又二：前明相續假我以破邪見無我。次「又我一時」下，明因成我，又二：初正明因成、次明因成所成。初文者，文云我者即性。舊有二解：一云是佛性之性，引前文云「二十五有有我不耶」（云云）；二還以假名性為我性。性即是體，體即因成，三假之中唯因成是體、續待是用，內謂四陰、外謂四大。十二緣者色心之總名，眾生者假名性也，此等成身，即因成假。若為其作佛性義者，眾生具為五陰所成，佛性正約眾生身內五陰實法性也。心界者，五陰中心王也。「功德業行」下，次明因成所成。業行即因，自在天即果，修因得果。言自在者，不止但標欲自在天，總語諸天升舉自在。世者，餘四趣也。「復於異時」下，第二明無我，又二：先佛說、後起執。初為三：一假問、二假答、三觀無我得益。問為三：一問名云何名我、二問體誰是我、三問何緣故我。「我時即為」下，二假答。答為三：初總大意答、次別答、三結無益。大意為二：先舉章門、次釋出。「如汝所問」下，二別答三問。大意已足，何須別答？然總論無我，次答別假名、假體、假因緣。初答假名中而言期者，河西云：如人期契，應期而來即是合義，不應期者是不合義。五陰和合即成假名，故是期義。次舉業以答體問。次舉愛以答緣問。業正能成果，故是體義。愛是煩惱潤生，於業復是緣義。「譬如二手」下，三結無，又四：一明假名故有即先譬，次合二手能出聲，其聲譬體，相拍譬愛。「比丘一切」下，第二明即離皆無。「諸外道」下，第三簡也。文云終不離陰者，外道起於即離之計；此中云離陰無是處者，云何解此？為兩：一云元本皆計即陰是我，無計離陰於草木計我；佛破即陰無我，即更計離陰有我。今此中存破，故云若離陰有我無有是處。二云佛法小乘亦有計即陰我義，所以破之，亦不得計離陰有我。「一切眾生」下，第四結無我。「爾時多有」下，第三觀無我得益。當時說此，會機得益，後執成爭（云云）。

From “Good son, as you have said” below, secondly, answers the second question concerning clingings and disputes. This also has two parts: first, a brief reply; next, an extensive reply. First, in the brief reply, mentioning the fifth power of comprehension, also called the power of aspiration, means knowing the dharmas that sentient beings desire and understand. When the text also says “these two powers,” it is because the fourth power is called the power of faculties and the fifth is called the power of comprehension, thereby making two powers. From “Good son, if one says that the Tathāgata…” below, secondly, in the extensive reply, it explains that the Buddha tailored his teachings differently to meet various conditions, and sentient beings failed to understand, leading to disputes. There are twenty-one topics in all. The first concerns nirvāṇa or non-nirvāṇa; one must understand the different schools. The Sarvāstivādins, relying on phenomenal facts, explained ultimate nirvāṇa, whereas the Dharmaguptakas and Mahāsāṃghikas, relying on the principle, said it is not ultimate nirvāṇa. Ancients evaluated this by saying: “The Sarvāstivādins are wrong and deficient; the Dharmaguptakas are right and superior.” Both missed the Buddha's meaning. The text states: “If one says that the Tathāgata enters ultimate nirvāṇa or does not enter ultimate nirvāṇa, both are disputes and do not attain my meaning.” Why evaluate them by recklessly judging superiority and deficiency? Héxī said: “Ultimate implies annihilation; not ultimate implies permanence. As for speaking of annihilation and permanence, how could it be annihilation and permanence? It is precisely non-annihilation and non-permanence, able to be annihilation and able to be permanence. Speaking of annihilation does not contradict permanence; speaking of permanence does not contradict annihilation. Annihilation and permanence are not different from each other; annihilation and permanence are both consummate.” Master Guān said: “The Buddha taught in accordance with the capacities [of beings]; how could one judge right or wrong? To do so loses the Buddha’s meaning. Like a physician treating an illness who dispenses different medicines, if the disciples do not understand and cling delusionally, they miss the aim.” This first dispute also has two parts: first, the outline of headings; next, the explanation. Within the explanation there are also two parts: first, explaining the clinging to definite nirvāṇa; next, explaining the clinging to non-definite nirvāṇa. The former text also has two parts: first, the explanation; next, the conclusion. In the first text, the Buddha spoke of nirvāṇa on account of five matters: first, for the ṛṣis; second, for the Mallas; third, for Cunda; fourth, for Subhadra; fifth, for King Ajātaśatru. First, regarding the ṛṣis: these ṛṣis were born on Gandhamādana, and the expression “passing successively” means that from the devas they moved successively to the dwelling place of the ṛṣis on the mountain, and all attained arhatship; there are the provisional and the real; to break their clinging to permanence, he therefore spoke of impermanence. From “Kuśinagara” below, secondly, it is for the Mallas. From “There was a craftsman” below, thirdly, it is for Cunda. From “Rājagṛha” below, fourthly, it is for Subhadra. From “Luóyuèqí” below, fifthly, it is for King Ajātaśatru. Losing his supernormal powers and falling without dying was due to the remaining momentum. King Bimbisāra is also called Píngshā; his country is called Magadha, also called Mojieti. Luóyuèqí translates here as Rājagṛha. The concluding summary afterwards can be understood. From “There are two kinds of bodhisattvas” below, secondly, it explains the clinging to a definitive non-nirvāṇa, which also has two parts: first, the explanation; next, the conclusion. In the first text: for nominal bodhisattvas, he spoke of non-nirvāṇa; real bodhisattvas do not speak of nirvāṇa nor non-nirvāṇa. These bodhisattvas can know that the Tathāgata is neither permanent nor impermanent; how could they one-sidedly construct an understanding of permanence or impermanence? From “Good son, there are sentient beings…” below, the second dispute clarifies self and non-self; one must be skilled in the intentions of the different schools. The abhidharmikas honor the Sarvāstivāda, purely clarifying non-self and refuting the non-Buddhists who speak of a false self. There is no nominal self; they purely clarify non-existence. Although they clarify non-self, in the end through non-self and impermanence they enter the path, which is not the same as non-Buddhists. The treatise masters agree with the Dharmaguptakas in clarifying that there is a provisional self, refuting the non-Buddhists' view of a self identical to the skandhas or separate from the skandhas; there is a continuum-provisional self and a causation-constituted provisional self. They further say that real dharmas perish moment by moment, so there is no longer a nominal continuum-provisional self or causation-constituted provisional self. They also say that because real dharmas perish moment by moment, there is no self, yet because nominal designations continue unbroken, there is a self. They also say that in ultimate truth there is no self, while in conventional truth there is a self. This purely clarifies the meaning of having a self. Yet these two traditions did not attain the Buddha's meaning, and therefore disputes arose. Zhāotí explained: “These two passages clarify self and non-self in order to refute two sicknesses; speaking of having a self refutes the wrong view of non-self without speaking of a provisional self, while speaking of non-self refutes the self identical to or separate [from the skandhas]. Those who hold eternalist views are simply taught non-self, without mentioning 'provisional' either.” Paramārtha challenged this, saying: “If self and non-self are used to refute self and non-self, does this principle hold or not? If in principle one cannot hold self or non-self, one should likewise not be able to use self and non-self to cure sickness. Furthermore, since within saṃsāra self and non-self are used to cure sickness, in nirvāṇa permanence and impermanence should also be used to cure sickness. If in nirvāṇa there is only permanence and there cannot be impermanence, then in saṃsāra there can only be non-self and there cannot be self. As the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā says: 'The Buddhas have spoken of a self, and have also taught non-self; within the dharmatā of all dharmas, there is neither self nor non-self.' One should apply this principle to all disputes by analogy.” As for the text, it has two parts: first, clarifying the self; next, clarifying non-self. The first also has two parts: first, clarifying the continuum-provisional self to refute the wrong view of non-self. Next, from “Furthermore, at one time I…” below, clarifying the causation-constituted self, which also has two parts: first, directly clarifying causation-constitution; next, clarifying what is constituted by causation. In the first text, the text says that the self is nature. Traditionally there are two interpretations: one says it is the nature of the buddhadhātu, citing the earlier text: “Is there a self in the twenty-five realms of existence or not?” (and so forth); the second takes the nature of nominal designation as the self-nature. Nature is essence; essence is causation-constitution. Among the three provisionalities, only causation-constitution is the essence, while continuity and relationality are functions; internally it refers to the four skandhas, and externally to the four great elements. The twelve links of dependent origination are the collective name for form and mind; sentient beings are nominal natures. These elements constitute the body; this is causation-constituted provisionality. If one takes it as the meaning of buddhadhātu: sentient beings are fully constituted by the five skandhas, and the buddhadhātu refers precisely to the real dharmatā of the five skandhas within the bodies of sentient beings. The realm of mind is the mind-king among the five skandhas. From “Meritorious deeds and karmic actions” below, secondly, it clarifies what is constituted by causation. Karmic actions are the cause, and the Īśvara heaven is the fruit; by cultivating causes one attains fruits. As for “sovereign” (īśvara), it does not merely designate the Īśvara heaven of the desire realm, but refers generally to all devas who ascend freely. The “world” refers to the other four destinies. From “Again at another time” below, secondly, it clarifies non-self, which also has two parts: first, the Buddha's teaching; later, the arising of clinging. The first has three parts: first, hypothetical questions; second, hypothetical answers; third, gaining benefit from contemplating non-self. The questions are threefold: first, asking about the name: “How is it named 'self'?”; second, asking about the essence: “Who is the self?”; third, asking about the conditions: “By what condition is there a self?” From “I then at that time…” below, second, hypothetical answers. The answers have three parts: first, answering with a general overview; next, answering individually; third, concluding with the lack of benefit. The general overview has two parts: first, presenting the outline heading; next, elaborating on it. From “As you have asked” below, second, answering the three questions individually. If the general overview was already sufficient, why answer individually? While it discussed non-self in general, next it answers regarding individual nominal designation, nominal essence, and nominal conditions. First, in answering about the nominal designation, the text says “appointed time” (qí); Héxī said: “Like a person keeping a rendezvous, arriving at the appointed time is the meaning of conjunction; not arriving at the appointed time is the meaning of non-conjunction. The conjunction of the five skandhas constitutes a nominal designation, so this is the meaning of appointed time.” Next, karmic action is raised to answer the question about essence. Next, craving is raised to answer the question about conditions. Karmic action directly produces results, so it is the essence. Craving is the affliction that moistens rebirth, so in relation to karmic action it is a condition. From “Just as when two hands…” below, third, concluding non-existence, which also has four parts: first, clarifying that it exists due to nominal designation, which is first the analogy, and next the application of the analogy: two hands can produce sound, the sound being analogous to the essence, and the clapping being analogous to craving. From “Monks, all…” below, second, clarifying that both identity and separation are non-existent. From “The non-Buddhists…” below, third, distinguishing [views]. The text says “never separate from the skandhas”; non-Buddhists give rise to calculations of identity or separation. Here it says “there is no basis for being separate from the skandhas”; how is this explained? There are two views: one says that originally they all calculated that the skandhas themselves were the self, and did not calculate a self separate from the skandhas in grass and trees; when the Buddha refuted the identity of the skandhas as non-self, they then calculated a self separate from the skandhas. Here, retaining the refutation, it says that if there is a self separate from the skandhas, there is no such basis. The second view says that in the Hīnayāna of the Buddha-Dharma there was also the calculation of a self identical to the skandhas, and therefore he refuted it, so that one also cannot calculate a self separate from the skandhas. From “All sentient beings” below, fourth, concluding non-self. From “At that time, there were many…” below, third, gaining benefit from contemplating non-self. At that time, when this was taught, it met their capacities and they gained benefit; later, clinging arose and turned into disputes (and so forth).