大般涅槃經疏 28.12

28.12

From “Good son, as you have said” below, secondly, answers the second question concerning clingings and disputes. This also has two parts: first, a brief reply; next, an extensive reply. First, in the brief reply, mentioning the fifth power of comprehension, also called the power of aspiration, means knowing the dharmas that sentient beings desire and understand. When the text also says “these two powers,” it is because the fourth power is called the power of faculties and the fifth is called the power of comprehension, thereby making two powers. From “Good son, if one says that the Tathāgata…” below, secondly, in the extensive reply, it explains that the Buddha tailored his teachings differently to meet various conditions, and sentient beings failed to understand, leading to disputes. There are twenty-one topics in all. The first concerns nirvāṇa or non-nirvāṇa; one must understand the different schools. The Sarvāstivādins, relying on phenomenal facts, explained ultimate nirvāṇa, whereas the Dharmaguptakas and Mahāsāṃghikas, relying on the principle, said it is not ultimate nirvāṇa. Ancients evaluated this by saying: “The Sarvāstivādins are wrong and deficient; the Dharmaguptakas are right and superior.” Both missed the Buddha's meaning. The text states: “If one says that the Tathāgata enters ultimate nirvāṇa or does not enter ultimate nirvāṇa, both are disputes and do not attain my meaning.” Why evaluate them by recklessly judging superiority and deficiency? Héxī said: “Ultimate implies annihilation; not ultimate implies permanence. As for speaking of annihilation and permanence, how could it be annihilation and permanence? It is precisely non-annihilation and non-permanence, able to be annihilation and able to be permanence. Speaking of annihilation does not contradict permanence; speaking of permanence does not contradict annihilation. Annihilation and permanence are not different from each other; annihilation and permanence are both consummate.” Master Guān said: “The Buddha taught in accordance with the capacities [of beings]; how could one judge right or wrong? To do so loses the Buddha’s meaning. Like a physician treating an illness who dispenses different medicines, if the disciples do not understand and cling delusionally, they miss the aim.” This first dispute also has two parts: first, the outline of headings; next, the explanation. Within the explanation there are also two parts: first, explaining the clinging to definite nirvāṇa; next, explaining the clinging to non-definite nirvāṇa. The former text also has two parts: first, the explanation; next, the conclusion. In the first text, the Buddha spoke of nirvāṇa on account of five matters: first, for the ṛṣis; second, for the Mallas; third, for Cunda; fourth, for Subhadra; fifth, for King Ajātaśatru. First, regarding the ṛṣis: these ṛṣis were born on Gandhamādana, and the expression “passing successively” means that from the devas they moved successively to the dwelling place of the ṛṣis on the mountain, and all attained arhatship; there are the provisional and the real; to break their clinging to permanence, he therefore spoke of impermanence. From “Kuśinagara” below, secondly, it is for the Mallas. From “There was a craftsman” below, thirdly, it is for Cunda. From “Rājagṛha” below, fourthly, it is for Subhadra. From “Luóyuèqí” below, fifthly, it is for King Ajātaśatru. Losing his supernormal powers and falling without dying was due to the remaining momentum. King Bimbisāra is also called Píngshā; his country is called Magadha, also called Mojieti. Luóyuèqí translates here as Rājagṛha. The concluding summary afterwards can be understood. From “There are two kinds of bodhisattvas” below, secondly, it explains the clinging to a definitive non-nirvāṇa, which also has two parts: first, the explanation; next, the conclusion. In the first text: for nominal bodhisattvas, he spoke of non-nirvāṇa; real bodhisattvas do not speak of nirvāṇa nor non-nirvāṇa. These bodhisattvas can know that the Tathāgata is neither permanent nor impermanent; how could they one-sidedly construct an understanding of permanence or impermanence? From “Good son, there are sentient beings…” below, the second dispute clarifies self and non-self; one must be skilled in the intentions of the different schools. The abhidharmikas honor the Sarvāstivāda, purely clarifying non-self and refuting the non-Buddhists who speak of a false self. There is no nominal self; they purely clarify non-existence. Although they clarify non-self, in the end through non-self and impermanence they enter the path, which is not the same as non-Buddhists. The treatise masters agree with the Dharmaguptakas in clarifying that there is a provisional self, refuting the non-Buddhists' view of a self identical to the skandhas or separate from the skandhas; there is a continuum-provisional self and a causation-constituted provisional self. They further say that real dharmas perish moment by moment, so there is no longer a nominal continuum-provisional self or causation-constituted provisional self. They also say that because real dharmas perish moment by moment, there is no self, yet because nominal designations continue unbroken, there is a self. They also say that in ultimate truth there is no self, while in conventional truth there is a self. This purely clarifies the meaning of having a self. Yet these two traditions did not attain the Buddha's meaning, and therefore disputes arose. Zhāotí explained: “These two passages clarify self and non-self in order to refute two sicknesses; speaking of having a self refutes the wrong view of non-self without speaking of a provisional self, while speaking of non-self refutes the self identical to or separate [from the skandhas]. Those who hold eternalist views are simply taught non-self, without mentioning 'provisional' either.” Paramārtha challenged this, saying: “If self and non-self are used to refute self and non-self, does this principle hold or not? If in principle one cannot hold self or non-self, one should likewise not be able to use self and non-self to cure sickness. Furthermore, since within saṃsāra self and non-self are used to cure sickness, in nirvāṇa permanence and impermanence should also be used to cure sickness. If in nirvāṇa there is only permanence and there cannot be impermanence, then in saṃsāra there can only be non-self and there cannot be self. As the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā says: 'The Buddhas have spoken of a self, and have also taught non-self; within the dharmatā of all dharmas, there is neither self nor non-self.' One should apply this principle to all disputes by analogy.” As for the text, it has two parts: first, clarifying the self; next, clarifying non-self. The first also has two parts: first, clarifying the continuum-provisional self to refute the wrong view of non-self. Next, from “Furthermore, at one time I…” below, clarifying the causation-constituted self, which also has two parts: first, directly clarifying causation-constitution; next, clarifying what is constituted by causation. In the first text, the text says that the self is nature. Traditionally there are two interpretations: one says it is the nature of the buddhadhātu, citing the earlier text: “Is there a self in the twenty-five realms of existence or not?” (and so forth); the second takes the nature of nominal designation as the self-nature. Nature is essence; essence is causation-constitution. Among the three provisionalities, only causation-constitution is the essence, while continuity and relationality are functions; internally it refers to the four skandhas, and externally to the four great elements. The twelve links of dependent origination are the collective name for form and mind; sentient beings are nominal natures. These elements constitute the body; this is causation-constituted provisionality. If one takes it as the meaning of buddhadhātu: sentient beings are fully constituted by the five skandhas, and the buddhadhātu refers precisely to the real dharmatā of the five skandhas within the bodies of sentient beings. The realm of mind is the mind-king among the five skandhas. From “Meritorious deeds and karmic actions” below, secondly, it clarifies what is constituted by causation. Karmic actions are the cause, and the Īśvara heaven is the fruit; by cultivating causes one attains fruits. As for “sovereign” (īśvara), it does not merely designate the Īśvara heaven of the desire realm, but refers generally to all devas who ascend freely. The “world” refers to the other four destinies. From “Again at another time” below, secondly, it clarifies non-self, which also has two parts: first, the Buddha's teaching; later, the arising of clinging. The first has three parts: first, hypothetical questions; second, hypothetical answers; third, gaining benefit from contemplating non-self. The questions are threefold: first, asking about the name: “How is it named 'self'?”; second, asking about the essence: “Who is the self?”; third, asking about the conditions: “By what condition is there a self?” From “I then at that time…” below, second, hypothetical answers. The answers have three parts: first, answering with a general overview; next, answering individually; third, concluding with the lack of benefit. The general overview has two parts: first, presenting the outline heading; next, elaborating on it. From “As you have asked” below, second, answering the three questions individually. If the general overview was already sufficient, why answer individually? While it discussed non-self in general, next it answers regarding individual nominal designation, nominal essence, and nominal conditions. First, in answering about the nominal designation, the text says “appointed time” (qí); Héxī said: “Like a person keeping a rendezvous, arriving at the appointed time is the meaning of conjunction; not arriving at the appointed time is the meaning of non-conjunction. The conjunction of the five skandhas constitutes a nominal designation, so this is the meaning of appointed time.” Next, karmic action is raised to answer the question about essence. Next, craving is raised to answer the question about conditions. Karmic action directly produces results, so it is the essence. Craving is the affliction that moistens rebirth, so in relation to karmic action it is a condition. From “Just as when two hands…” below, third, concluding non-existence, which also has four parts: first, clarifying that it exists due to nominal designation, which is first the analogy, and next the application of the analogy: two hands can produce sound, the sound being analogous to the essence, and the clapping being analogous to craving. From “Monks, all…” below, second, clarifying that both identity and separation are non-existent. From “The non-Buddhists…” below, third, distinguishing [views]. The text says “never separate from the skandhas”; non-Buddhists give rise to calculations of identity or separation. Here it says “there is no basis for being separate from the skandhas”; how is this explained? There are two views: one says that originally they all calculated that the skandhas themselves were the self, and did not calculate a self separate from the skandhas in grass and trees; when the Buddha refuted the identity of the skandhas as non-self, they then calculated a self separate from the skandhas. Here, retaining the refutation, it says that if there is a self separate from the skandhas, there is no such basis. The second view says that in the Hīnayāna of the Buddha-Dharma there was also the calculation of a self identical to the skandhas, and therefore he refuted it, so that one also cannot calculate a self separate from the skandhas. From “All sentient beings” below, fourth, concluding non-self. From “At that time, there were many…” below, third, gaining benefit from contemplating non-self. At that time, when this was taught, it met their capacities and they gained benefit; later, clinging arose and turned into disputes (and so forth).