Pramāṇa · Search · About · API

大般涅槃經疏 28.7

大般涅槃經疏 28.7

Language
Classical Chinese

28.7

「世尊一闡提輩」下,第二斷善之相,文為三:初正明斷善、二明根性不定故斷善、三明說教不定故斷善。初有五番問答。初番,先問;次佛答中以斷善根故所以無善。依數人解,闡提起惡邪無閡斷此善根,如無漏無閡道斷煩惱。若爾,當知畢竟不復生善,云何能得還生善根?是義不然,闡提身中有重惡障,善不並興,名此被障善不得生。後惡稍滅,善復得生,故言還生善根。問:闡提為有善可斷?無善可斷?答:具有兩義。其曾作善,後遇惡友斷滅此善,故言有善可斷。無善可斷者,向時作惡全未有善,而惡業將滅、善業應生,而復起障,善不得起,名無善可斷。文云眾生悉有信等五根闡提永斷者,相承釋云:理內眾生有信等五根,理外顛倒虛妄,故無信等五根。此義不然,只此理外亦有信等。闡提既是理外,起惡斷此五根。但作惡眾生既有佛性,應生五根;而即事未有,義說應有,故云一切眾生悉有。文云殺闡提無罪、殺蚊螘有罪者,闡提有重惡在身,殺之無罪;蚊螘無重惡,故殺之有罪。文云施畜生得百倍報、施一闡提得千倍報者,闡提過去五戒感人,施之福重;畜生先世惡業感此畜身,施之福輕。「世尊一闡提者」下,第二番問答。問中定宗,答可見。「世尊一切眾生」下,第三番問答。問中明闡提不斷未來,云何斷善?佛答斷有二種:一現滅、二障未來。若現起惡,善法不生,故是現滅。既現作惡,復遮未來善不得起,故斷未來。亦具斷三世,過去作惡而復不悔,即無復善;未來復有還生善義,但自微弱不能救之。「世尊一闡提輩」下,第四番問答,明不斷佛性。佛性是善,此善不斷名不斷性。又佛性是常,實不可斷。所言如世間眾生我性佛性者,三解:一云借外道我以之為譬,都無邪我,故三世不攝;真我是常,三世不攝。二云不爾,只是世間眾生我性即是佛性,是佛性故三世不攝。三云即是真我,語勢牽令佛性是常。後文云佛性未來,前云非三世攝,兩語相違,今須會通。前云三世所不攝者,就佛性體;後言未來,約眾生修。一切眾生未來當得清淨之身,故言未來。「迦葉言佛性」下,第五番問答。初問佛性、次問闡提。初問者,佛性既其三世不攝,云何言未來?「如來若言」下,次問闡提。若言闡提全無善法,何以得有憐愛等心?若有此心即是有善。「佛言」下,答。先答初問,又二:先答問、次論義。初答中二:先歎問、次正答。性非三世,約未來得故言未來,故下舉例說因為果、說果為因。佛性亦爾,云未來者,因中說果。言食及觸者,食可見;觸名不同,或以識為觸、或根為觸。今具二義,故論云「觸不定故,故無別法。」若意識在緣名觸,此觸在識。若言眼識眼觸,此觸在想。今言見色名觸,此謂識心以之為觸。色是前塵能生識觸,故謂色為觸,亦因中說果。

From "World-Honoured One, as for icchantikas" onwards is the second [section], the characteristics of severing goodness, which consists of three parts: first, directly explaining the severing of goodness; second, explaining that goodness is severed because the faculties and nature are indeterminate; and third, explaining that goodness is severed because the taught doctrine is indeterminate. The first has five rounds of questions and answers. In the first round, there is first a question; then, in the Buddha's reply, because they sever the roots of goodness, there is therefore no goodness. According to the explanation of the masters of the Abhidharma, an icchantika gives rise to evil and wrong [views] that unimpededly sever these roots of goodness, just as the uncontaminated path of unimpeded progress severs afflictions. If so, one should know that goodness would ultimately never arise again; how then could roots of goodness be restored and reborn? This interpretation is incorrect. Within the body of an icchantika there are grave, evil hindrances, and goodness cannot arise alongside them; this is termed the hindered goodness being unable to arise. Later, as evil gradually fades away, goodness can arise again; hence it is said that the roots of goodness are restored and reborn. Question: Does an icchantika have goodness to sever, or no goodness to sever? Answer: Both meanings are present. If one previously performed goodness and later encountered evil companions and severed and destroyed this goodness, this is termed having goodness to sever. As for having no goodness to sever, when performing evil earlier there was no goodness whatsoever, yet as evil karma was about to be extinguished and good karma should have arisen, an obstruction arose again so that goodness could not arise; this is termed having no goodness to sever. The text states that all sentient beings possess the five faculties of faith and so forth, whereas an icchantika completely severs them; traditional explanations say: sentient beings within the principle possess the five faculties of faith and so forth, whereas those outside the principle are inverted and false, hence lacking the five faculties of faith and so forth. This interpretation is incorrect; even those outside the principle possess faith and so forth. Since an icchantika is outside the principle, by giving rise to evil they sever these five faculties. However, since sentient beings who perform evil possess buddhadhātu, the five faculties ought to arise; yet in actual fact they do not yet exist, and it is said conceptually that they ought to exist; hence it says that all sentient beings possess them. The text states that killing an icchantika is without sin, while killing a mosquito or ant incurs sin; this is because the icchantika has grave evil in their person, so killing them is without sin, whereas mosquitoes and ants lack grave evil, so killing them incurs sin. The text states that giving to an animal brings a hundredfold reward, while giving to an icchantika brings a thousandfold reward; this is because an icchantika's human status was elicited by the five precepts in past lives, so giving to them yields heavy merit, whereas an animal's bodily form was elicited by evil karma in previous lives, so giving to them yields light merit. From "World-Honoured One, an icchantika" onwards is the second round of questions and answers. In the question, the thesis is established; the reply can be understood. From "World-Honoured One, all sentient beings" onwards is the third round of questions and answers. In the question, it is explained that since the icchantika does not sever the future, how can it be said that they sever goodness? The Buddha answers that severing is of two kinds: first, extinction in the present; second, obstruction of the future. If evil arises in the present, good dharmas do not arise, hence it is extinction in the present. Having performed evil in the present, it further prevents future goodness from arising, hence severing the future. It also completely severs all three time periods: performing evil in the past without repenting means there is no more goodness; in the future there is also the sense of goodness being reborn, but being weak of itself, it cannot save them. From "World-Honoured One, as for icchantikas" onwards is the fourth round of questions and answers, explaining that buddhadhātu is not severed. Buddhadhātu is good; that this goodness is not severed is termed not severing the nature. Furthermore, buddhadhātu is eternal and indeed cannot be severed. Regarding what is said of the selfhood and buddhadhātu of worldly sentient beings, there are three explanations: The first says that the self of the non-Buddhists is borrowed as an analogy; there is no false self at all, hence it is not subsumed under the three time periods; the true self is eternal and not subsumed under the three time periods. The second says this is not so: it is simply that the selfhood of worldly sentient beings is itself buddhadhātu, and because it is buddhadhātu it is not subsumed under the three time periods. The third says it is precisely the true self, the momentum of the wording implying that buddhadhātu is eternal. The later text says that buddhadhātu belongs to the future, whereas the earlier text says it is not subsumed under the three time periods; these two statements conflict, and now they must be harmonised. What was earlier stated as not being subsumed under the three time periods refers to the essence of buddhadhātu; what is later stated as belonging to the future is in terms of the cultivation of sentient beings. All sentient beings will in the future attain a pure body; hence it is said to belong to the future. From "Kāśyapa said: Buddhadhātu" onwards is the fifth round of questions and answers. First he asks about buddhadhātu; next he asks about the icchantika. The first question: Since buddhadhātu is not subsumed under the three time periods, why is it said to belong to the future? From "If the Tathāgata says" onwards, he next asks about the icchantika: If one says an icchantika completely lacks good dharmas, why do they have minds of love and pity? If they have such a mind, then they possess goodness. From "The Buddha said" onwards is the reply. First he answers the first question, which again has two parts: first answering the question, and next discussing the meaning. In the first answer there are two parts: first praising the question, and next directly answering. The nature does not belong to the three time periods; it is called future in terms of its future attainment, and therefore below an analogy is raised of speaking of the cause as the fruit, and speaking of the fruit as the cause. Buddhadhātu is also like this: saying it is future speaks of the fruit within the cause. Regarding "food and contact": food can be understood; the designations of contact differ: some take consciousness as contact, and some take the sense faculties as contact. Here both meanings are present; hence the treatise says, "Because contact is not fixed, there is no separate dharma." If the mental consciousness is focused on a condition, it is called contact; this contact lies in consciousness. If one speaks of visual consciousness and visual contact, this contact lies in ideation. Now, saying that seeing visible form is called contact means that the conscious mind takes this as contact. Visible form is an external datum capable of producing conscious contact; hence visible form is called contact, which is also speaking of the fruit within the cause.

English (machine translation) (machine translation)

Translations (1)